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The Chinese construction industry has witnessed many remarkable achievements 
over the past years. Yet it still suffers from many problems, including low product 
quality, low working efficiency, projects finishing over budget, huge construction 
wastes, and others. As very little past studies have shed light on the Chinese 
construction industry in the context of implementing lean or Toyota Way practices, 
this study addresses this research gap with the aim of generating useful insights that 
may better guide large Chinese construction firms in embarking on a lean 
transformation exercise by means of deploying the Toyota Way principles.  
 
The Toyota Way was historically the first domain, where the practices and principles 
of lean production or lean construction were formulated and developed. It can be 
easily seen that lean construction has already borrowed some principles and 
techniques of the lean concept or Toyota Way, and has become an established 
theme in the construction domain. The aim of this study is to establish the 
implementation framework of the Toyota Way model for large construction firms in 
China. It begins with an extensive literature review of the lean concept, the Toyota 
Way, and the relevant frameworks of lean construction. A theoretical framework for 
the Toyota Way model within the construction context has been developed, and is 
accompanied by a list of Toyota Way-styled attributes, which fit into the construction 
context. It is worth highlighting that the focus has been put on the Toyota Way model, 
over other existing frameworks of lean construction, because of the 
comprehensiveness of the Toyota Way model, which contains four layers – the 
philosophy model, the process model, the people and partners model, and the 
problem-solving model. Most importantly, it has addressed the technical and social 
aspects of the lean concept.  
 
In order to assess Toyota Way practices within large Chinese construction firms, a 
mixed research method was adopted at different stages of the study. For a start, a 
structured questionnaire based on the identified Toyota Way-styled attributes was 
developed, and data was collected from building professionals with large construction 
firms in China. The quantitative data outlines the status quo of the Toyota Way-styled 
practices implemented in the Chinese construction industry, as well as the extent to 
which these attributes were perceived. The results showed that all the actionable 
attributes derived from the Toyota Way model were appreciated by the respondents, 
but some attributes fall short of implementation. To further investigate why 
XI 
 
implementation was uneven, and also to understand how these Toyota Way 
practices could be implemented in real-life projects, interviews and case studies were 
carried out as part of the investigation. At this stage, from the interview findings, the 
evaluations of the case study projects, and the comparisons with the theoretical 
model of the Toyota Way, the findings have enhanced the understanding of Toyota 
Way practices in the Chinese construction context. Furthermore, the results 
highlighted that the gap between actual practice and Toyota Way-styled practices is 
enormous, and implementation faces considerable challenges. Based on all the 
findings, this study then employs the SWOT analysis to present a picture that 
addresses the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats to the 
implementation of the Toyota Way in China. It is also confirmed that the Toyota Way 
model presented in this thesis is considered appropriate for use in Chinese 
construction firms, and may additionally be used as a holistic assessment tool for 
measuring the maturity of firms in terms of their Toyota Way implementation. 
Management would then be in a better position to develop plans for Toyota Way 
implementation by focusing on weak areas, and thus increasing the likelihood of 
success in the implementation of the Toyota Way.  
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ACE Architectural, Engineering and Construction 
BIQ Built-in Quality 
BIM Building Information Modeling  
CCA Chinese Construction Association 
CCETB China Construction Engineering Third Bureau 
CCTV Closed-circuit Television 
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PE Project Engineer 
PM Project Manager 
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PPC Percent Plan Complete 
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SME Small and Medium Enterprises 
SOE State-Owned Enterprises 
SOP Standardized Operating Procedure 
SQC Statistical Quality Control 
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
TFV Transformation-Flow-Value  
TPS Toyota Production System 
TQC Total Quality Control 
TQM Total Quality Management 
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LIST OF NON-ENGLISH TERMS USED  
5-S   5-S is the acronym for Sort (Seiri), Simplify (Seiton), Sweep 
(Seiso), Standardize (Seiketsu), and Self-discipline (Shitsuke): a 
visually-oriented system for organizing the workplace to minimize 
the waste of time. 
 
Andon A visual control device to notify management, maintenance staff 




The actual place where the real added-value work is done. 




Relationships among various parties that cooperate and support 
one another.  
 
Hansei  Relentless reflection. 
 
Heijunka Production smoothing or leveling the production schedule. 
 
Hoshin kanri Also called policy deployment. It is a step-by-step planning, 




This is the supervision firm in the Chinese construction industry. 
The jianli’s main role is to ensure that a project is constructed 
safely and to the quality standards as required under the law. 
 
Jidoka Providing machineries and operators with the ability to detect 
when an abnormal condition has occurred and to immediately stop 
work.   
 
Kaizen  Continuous, incremental improvement of an activity to create more 
value with less waste.   
 
Kanban  A signal, often a card attached to suppliers or equipment that 
regulates pull by signaling upstream production or delivery.  
 
Muda Waste or non-value adding activities.  
 
Muri Overburden – when workers or machines are pushed beyond their 
capacity. 
 
Mura Unevenness – when some workers and machines work below 
their capacities for some of the time, while others may 
overproduce. 
 
Nemawashi A commonly-used Japanese consensus building technique 
 
Poka-yoke Mistake-proofing by employing visual signals that prevent 
mistakes or defects. 
Takt time A German word for cycle time which is calculated as the available 





The construction industry in China is in a period of rapid expansion, witnessing a 
steady growth rate of 10% in recent years. The latest statistics released by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2011) indicate that the construction 
sector contributes 6.7% to the Chinese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (RMB 40.12 
billion) at the end of 2010, and will continue to play a significant role in expanding the 
Chinese economy. However, within China, the construction industry is still perceived 
as one of the less developed sectors, and has a public image of producing low-
quality products (Chen, 1998; Lam and Cheng, 2004; China Daily, 2010a) with low 
productivity (Xue et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2005), low profit margins (China Daily, 2010a; 
Cheah et al., 2007), and poor on-site working conditions (Lu and Fox, 2001). Hence, 
there is a great need to help the industry improve its competitiveness, change its 
image, and contribute to the national economy. 
 
Taiichi Ohno, a Toyota Motor Corporation engineer, revolutionized the thinking on 
process inefficiency or “waste” in the early 1950s, leading to the creation of the 
Toyota Production System (hereinafter referred to as TPS). This system helped 
propel Toyota Motor Corporation from a small truck-maker in the early 1950s to the 
world’s largest auto-maker by 2007. Over the years, Toyota has been able to sustain 
a strategic competitive advantage by applying TPS as a process of innovation, as 
measured by quality, reliability, productivity, cost reduction, sales and market share 
growth, and market capitalization. The principles underlying the TPS are embodied in 
Liker’s (2004) book, The Toyota Way, where he outlined the strategic organization-
level principles that guide behaviour in Toyota. More recently, many organizations 
have tried to replicate Toyota’s success by adopting TPS or derivative philosophies, 
such as lean production and lean thinking principles, into their respective business 
environments. Its implementation beyond manufacturing firms has also been 
reported in the literature, such as in the health care sector (Collins and Muthusamy, 
2007) and the construction industry (Koskela, 1992; Ballard, 2000).  
 
The Toyota Way philosophy thus has the potential to help solve the problems that 
plague the Chinese construction industry with a view to changing its poor image for 
the better. This study examined how the Toyota Way principles can be used as 
guidelines for the large Chinese construction firms (LCCFs) to improve their 
performance and enhance competitiveness.   
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1.2 Problem statement 
China’s construction industry, as one of the pillars of China’s economy, has been 
developing very rapidly in recent years (Han and Ofori, 2001; Low and Jiang, 2003). 
Membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, as well as the 
successful hosting of the Olympic Games in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 
2010 helped to draw much attention to the industry. While many of the remarkably 
successful construction projects were highly appreciated by their western 
counterparts, China’s construction industry nonetheless still suffers from many 
problems: poor product quality (Chen, 1998; Lam and Cheng, 2004); low work 
efficiency (Xu et al., 2005; Li and Jia, 2009); over budget (Cheah et al., 2007; China 
Daily, 2010a; Liao, 2004); high frequency of accidents at construction sites (Fang et 
al., 2008); and huge construction waste (China Daily, 2010b). Although these 
problems have been highlighted repeatedly by the government, hardly any progress 
has been seen. Moreover, the Ministry of Housing Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD, 2008) has begun to recognize the gaps between China’s construction 
firms and their counterparts in the developed nations in terms of management 
capabilities. MOHURD (2008) has outlined a government agenda for improving the 
management level of firms, and has highlighted that the business and project 
management of Chinese construction firms need to adapt to standardization, 
normalization, and fine-tuning at all stages of management processes, in order to 
develop a unique management method for them. The highlighting of these problems 
within China’s construction industry has encouraged people to think about how 
construction project methods can be changed. This is especially the case with 
China’s becoming a WTO member and with the world’s economy being in a 
recession; the competition faced by the construction industry is no longer regional, 
but is global, and therefore, there is an urgent need for new management ideas and 
methods to improve the industry’s performance.  
 
Inspired by the manufacturing sector, a significant number of studies have been 
undertaken in construction aimed at reaping similar benefits (e.g. Egan, 1998). In line 
with these, it is important to acknowledge the lessons learnt in the manufacturing 
industry, where lean implementation took off. For example, many applications of lean 
practices and principles have focused more narrowly on the technical or physical 
aspect of the lean system (see Liker, 2004; Paez et al., 2004), while ignoring the 
implications for human resource management (Green, 2002). This study therefore 
builds upon Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model, which is well considered with the 
social and technical aspects of the lean system.   
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Moreover, the challenge of dealing with the issue of poor quality and high cost of 
construction, while speeding up the value-delivery process of construction projects 
has therefore led to the need to explore production management systems (such as 
TPS or lean philosophy) which optimize value delivery to customers while minimizing 
waste. If the application of Toyota Way principles to the Chinese construction 
industry is feasible, it seems that this new production management philosophy would 
allow the industry to have the opportunity to improve its performance. Although the 
authors of the book The Machine that Changed the World claimed that these lean 
techniques could apply universally in all sectors (Womack et al., 1990), it is 
necessary for the Chinese construction industry to develop its own implementation 
framework based on lean principles if it is to solve the above problems.  
 
1.3 Research aim, objectives and hypotheses  
1.3.1 Aim and objectives 
Based on the above discussion, this study aims to establish the implementation 
framework of the Toyota Way model that can guide and enable large Chinese 
construction firms to embark on lean implementation in the future. To achieve this, 
the research pursues the following key objectives: 
Objective 1: Break the Toyota Way principles down into measurable or quantifiable 
parameters that are appropriate to the construction context. 
To establish understanding of the subject matter, literature with relevance to Toyota 
Way principles is reviewed in the areas of lean production, TPS, and lean 
construction. The sub-objectives are: 
(1) To review the state of art in lean approaches and the Toyota Way.  
(2) To identify the actionable attributes of Toyota Way-styled practices in the 
construction context. 
(3) To develop a conceptual framework incorporating lean, Toyota Way, as well as 
relevant theories from the domain of production and management 
 
Objective 2: Investigate the status quo of Toyota Way principles that have been 
implemented by LCCFs. 
This investigates the current practices of LCCFs and specific problem areas. An 
industry-wide questionnaire survey is conducted to identify 
(1) The extent to which the attributes derived from Toyota Way principles have been 
implemented by LCCFs, 
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(2) The extent to which the attributes derived from Toyota Way principles are 
perceived as important factors in managing the projects, and 
(3) The relationship between the implementation level of Toyota Way practices and 
project performance. 
Objective 3: Understand how these Toyota Way-styled practices can be better 
implemented within LCCFs.  
This focuses on understanding the gaps that exist between the current practices of 
LCCFs and the Toyota Way standards. Constraints that would hinder the 
implementation of the Toyota Way principles – specially of those rated poorly in the 
questionnaire survey – are reviewed and investigated in real-life projects, to achieve 
the following:  
(1) Understanding the current practices of LCCFs in relation to the Toyota Way-
styled practices.  
(2) Investigate the constraints in real-life projects that hinder the successful 
implementation of Toyota Way principles.  
 
Objective 4: Establish the Toyota Way implementation guidelines for LCCFs. 
This focuses on establishing the Toyota Way guidelines as a holistic approach for 
LCCFs. The sub-objectives are: 
(1) To use SWOT analysis to summarize the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, 
and threats from the collective findings on the basis of all the fieldwork carried out.   
(2) To propose strategies to mitigate the threats and minimize the weaknesses of 
LCCFs in terms of Toyota Way implementation.  
(3) To refine some of the Toyota Way implementation guidelines to better suit the 
Chinese context.  
 
In fulfilling the first objective of the study, a detailed review of the fourteen Toyota 
Way principles is required. Efforts are also needed to operationalize the underlying 
principles and behaviours of the Toyota Way into measurable parameters. Moreover, 
comparing the status quo in LCCFs with each Toyota Way principle would outline the 
gaps and challenges that might hinder the process of implementation of the Toyota 
Way model within China’s construction industry. Eventually, based on Liker’s (2004) 
4P model, as well as findings arising from the fieldwork, a set of implementation 
guidelines are proposed for LCCFs to commence their implementation with 
philosophy, process, people, and problem solving, all of which are intertwined in 




1.3.2 Research hypotheses 
Based on the research objectives stated above, this study sets out to test a number 
of hypotheses: first, that large Chinese construction firms have implemented Toyota 
Way principles (H1); and second, that Toyota Way principles and attributes are 
perceived as important factors in firm performance by Chinese building professionals 
(H2). The first two hypothesis are derived from the first objective of this study, which 
is related to the approach of large Chinese construction firms in conducting business, 
i.e. in the area of philosophy, site operations (process), people management, and 
problem-solving practices. The third hypothesis is formulated to test the differences 
between the extent to which Chinese building professionals perceived Toyota Way 
attributes to be important and the extent to which they have implemented Toyota 
Way attributes (H3). Moreover, in examining the extent to which potential hindrances 
may affect the implementation of Toyota Way principles in China’s construction 
industry, two further hypotheses are developed:  
(1) There are hindrances when Chinese construction firms implement Toyota Way 
principles (H4.1). 
(2) There are no significant differences in the perceptions of the barriers to Toyota 
Way implementation between premier and first-grade Chinese construction firms 
(H4.2). 
 
The final hypothesis tests the relationship between Toyota Way implementation level 
and the performance measurements. It states that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of Toyota Way implementation and performance measurements 
(H5). A correlation analysis was performed to test this hypothesis.  
 
1.4 Research scope 
This research is driven by the rising recognition of the constant quality problems and 
other issues reported in the Chinese construction industry. The study focuses on 
examining the operations of LCCFs to establish how Toyota Way principles can be 
incorporated in their business operations. It is necessary to define several specific 
boundaries, including: 
 
1.4.1 Research focus 
The Toyota Way is the real-life model from which all understanding of lean 
production originates. Since the 1990s, there are certain terms, such as lean 
construction and lean thinking principles, that have been applied in the construction 
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industry; these all refer to the same model inspired and derived from the Toyota 
Production System (Koskela, 2004). In contrast to the various models or frameworks 
of the lean approach or lean construction that narrowly focus on the technical 
aspects of lean, this study will be expanded to give a more holistic approach to lean 
construction. In the context of this research view, lean in construction is based on the 
Toyota Way model (Liker, 2004) in order to explain its adoption across four key areas:  
(1) The Toyota Way Philosophy model: the cornerstone of the Toyota Way, which 
encourages managers to base their decisions on a well-articulated long-term 
vision.  
(2) The Toyota Way Process model: this contains the “tactical” or “operational” 
aspects of the Toyota Way.  
(3) The Toyota Way People and Partners model: this concerns how Toyota’s 
strategy relates to its people and partners.  
(4) The Toyota Way Problem-solving model: this has been seen to be critical in 
solving problems and sustaining improvements in performance 
 
The four models contain 14 principles in total, and are explained in details in Chapter 
4, which also explains why the Toyota Way model was chosen from among the 
various models of lean production and lean construction.  
 
1.4.2 Measurable factors  
The Toyota Way model was formulated by Liker (2004). The Toyota Way principles 
are explained using cases that show how these are implemented in the development 
of the Lexus and Prius. It is necessary to operationalize the 14 management 
principles into quantifiable attributes, in order to fit into the construction environment. 
This is because the construction processes and their peculiarities are the two main 
reasons that prevent the industry from adopting lean principles (Koskela, 1992). Thus, 
some Toyota Way principles may need modification in order to test their applicability 
in the Chinese construction industry.  
 
1.4.3 The targeted firms  
Construction firms in China are divided into four categories in terms of ownership: 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective owned enterprises (COEs), enterprises 
with shares, and private enterprises (Wang et al., 2006). More recently, a group of 
leading Chinese construction firms has emerged with large-scale operations, solid 
construction capabilities, and strong initiative in China’s construction industry. This 
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study aims to shed light on how the Toyota Way principles can be implemented in the 
Chinese construction industry, by focusing on leading construction firms whose 
qualification fall into the “premier” and “first” categories. There are several reasons 
for choosing large Chinese construction firms (LCCFs) for this study: 
(1) These firms are relatively large in terms of size, and who employ a large 
number of managers (such as project managers, project directors, and quality 
managers). This factor can assist in securing the cooperation of a relatively 
large number of managers to participate in this research study.  
(2) It is generally accepted that they represent a typical business model in terms of 
management style, site management practice, and human resource 
management in China.   
(3) It is more likely that LCCFs will be able to absorb the management philosophy 
than SMEs. Efforts have been made by many scholars in exploring the 
opportunities of implementing information management (Love and Irani, 2004), 
knowledge management (Hari, et al., 2005), innovation (Barrett and Sexton, 
2006), and other approaches in SMEs in the construction industry. All these 
studies have indicated that SMEs tend to focus more on securing the next 
project, rather than on implementing contemporary management approaches, 
due to their limited resources. Similarly, implementing the Toyota Way - an 
approach that originated outside of construction - would inevitably initiate 
changes and would require commitment and resources. Given the constraints 
faced by SMEs, it appears to be more challenging for them to adopt the Toyota 
Way in the first instance.   
 
Moreover, Following Long’s (2006) work on differentiating units of analysis and units 
of observation, this research has taken LCCFs as the unit of analysis. For example, 
the survey data were aggregated at the firm level by computing the mean scores on 
various Toyota Way style attributes measuring the implementation level of the Toyota 
Way. On the other hand, the units of observation in this study are the building 
professionals working for the LCCFs, as these are the individuals who participated in 
this study. 
 
1.5 Research methodology  
To achieve the aim and objectives, this research involves the following key phases: 
(1) Literature review: The available literature on lean production in general, lean 
construction, and the Toyota Way were reviewed. Possible theories from the 
domains of management and production were also reviewed and linked to the 
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Toyota Way model. One of the outcomes of the literature review is to identify a 
basket of actionable attributes underpinning the Toyota Way principles.  
(2) Two-phased research: The mixed methods research is adopted. Data were 
collected from Chinese building professionals working at LCCFs using a 
questionnaire survey and interviews, in order to investigate both quantitative and 
qualitative elements of the research objectives. Additionally, case studies of three 
ongoing construction projects in China enhanced understanding of the application 
of Toyota Way principles in real-life projects.  
(3) Validation: The findings arising from the fieldwork, as well as strategies proposed 
to better implement the Toyota Way within LCCFs, were further validated by six 
Chinese building professionals who are currently working in Singapore (see 
Chapter 11).   
 
1.6 Significance of this research 
This study makes the following contributions to knowledge and practice, particularly 
to the improved understanding of lean management and Toyota Way-styled practices 
in construction. Further details can be found in the final chapter of this study. With 
respect to its practical significance, the contribution includes the following results: (1) 
the research has produced a checklist of Toyota Way-styled attributes that can be 
used easily to evaluate gaps (if any) in the implementation of such management 
philosophy, and practices for firms intending to embark on lean transformation or 
Toyota Way implementation; (2) a report on the status quo of lean or Toyota Way 
principles in China’s construction context, where the relevant literature is found 
lacking; and (3) a series of implementation guidelines for Toyota Way model, with the 
necessary modifications to facilitate better implementation in the Chinese 
construction industry. The theoretical contributions consist of: (1) the proposition of 
an alternative model to the Toyota Way for the lean construction community, 
possessing better conceptual underpinnings from theories of management and 
production; (2) addressing human resource issues in the context of lean construction 
while also acknowledging the importance of the technical aspects of lean system; 
and (3) integrating the current two major schools of thoughts of lean construction into 






1.7 Organization of chapters 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study by outlining the background and the research 
problem. Chapter 1 also sets out the research aim and objectives of this study.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the production management related literature as the Toyota 
Production System falls within this domain. In this chapter, Koskela’s (2000) 
Transformation-Flow-Value (TFV) model of production is introduced to complement 
the need to further enhance the theory of production. Chapter 2 also presents a brief 
history of management thoughts for each management school to find its practice in 
the relevant production template.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a summary of the literature in the body of knowledge relating to 
production paradigms. In this chapter, three production templates will be reviewed. 
These production paradigms include the craft-production paradigm, the mass-
production paradigm, and the lean-production paradigm. Chapter 3 also provides a 
detailed explanation of the lean construction philosophy. It presents various issues of 
lean production and analyses the origins of and advances in lean production. In 
addition, Chapter 3 reviews the current frameworks of lean construction and their 
application in various countries.  
 
Chapter 4 presents a review of the 14 management principles of the Toyota Way and 
clarifies why the Toyota Way model is chosen as the basis for this study. Each 
principle, grouped into the four categories of the Toyota Way model, is reviewed. The 
advantages and disadvantages of the Toyota Way model are also discussed, as are 
the barriers to the effective implementation of the Toyota Way. Chapter 4 also 
presents a review of how Toyota Way principles can be implemented in construction. 
 
Chapter 5 develops a conceptual framework based on the findings of the literature 
review. It ties the various theories together for coherence, which then forms the basis 
for developing the survey questionnaire.  
 
Chapter 6 argues for the need to introduce the Toyota Way model as a framework to 
the large Chinese contractors, and reviews the status quo of the Chinese 
construction industry in the areas of quality, productivity, profitability, and others, 




Chapter 7 presents the research methods adopted in this research. The discussion 
therein answers three questions: firstly, why the two-phased methods are used in this 
research; secondly, how data is to be collected; and thirdly, what operationalized 
measurements will be used in this research.  
 
Chapter 8 presents the first part of the empirical results. This chapter deals with 
descriptive statistics and statistical data analysis. It presents statistical data on the 
current state of Toyota Way-styled practices with LCCFs, as well as the perceived 
importance of the Toyota Way attributes. It highlights the implementation and 
importance gap, The relationships between levels of implementation with project 
performance are also investigated. The results provides an insightful overview of 
what the strengths and weaknesses are in terms of the implementation capacities of 
the Toyota Way.   
 
Chapter 9 presents the interview results, which focuses on understanding the gaps 
that exist between the current practices of LCCFs and the Toyota Way standard. 
Moreover, constraints that hinder the implementation of the Toyota Way principles 
are also discussed during the interviews, and presented in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 10 presents the three case studies conducted. The case studies further test 
the proposed model of the Toyota Way in the Chinese construction context.  
 
 
Chapter 11 employs the SWOT analysis to summarize the results. The implications 
of this analysis are discussed. The chapter concludes with a set of strategies 
proposed to better implement Toyota Way-styled practices in the Chinese 
construction industry.  
 
Chapter 12 concludes the thesis. In this chapter, the theoretical and practical 
contributions of the research for academics, practitioners and policy makers are 
discussed. Finally, the chapter highlights the limitations of the research, and 





2 PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
Production and operations management (POM) is the management of the production 
process by which goods and services are made. Research on production 
management can be found in a large and growing volume of literatures. However, in 
most POM textbooks (see Gaither and Frazier, 1999), it appears to have been 
repeated on a few topics, the application of methods and frameworks. In recent years, 
POM research embraces a number of concepts derived from Japanese automobile 
industry. According to Filippini (1997), Just in time (JIT) and Quality Control (QC) – 
two building blocks of the Toyota Production System (Ohno, 1988) – are becoming 
two key areas of production and operations management discipline. Moreover, some 
non-manufacturing industries such as construction are encouraged to emulate the 
managerial practices proved in manufacturing with the hope of gaining similar 
benefits (Egan, 1998). In this respect, it must further be understood the 
manufacturing industry and its production management. In this chapter, the first part 
of the literature review is presented with an effort to cover a number of things. Firstly, 
this chapter starts with reviewing production management from a systematic 
perspective, mainly regarding its definition and elements. Secondly, this chapter 
adopts two approaches to study theoretical aspect of production. One is to search a 
“theory” of production through economics lens (e.g. Coombs, et al., 1987; Perloff, 
2001), the other way is to review production in production management discipline, in 
which this study largely draws on Koskela’s (1992, 2000) study. Lastly, as Chase and 
Aquilano (1992) emphasized the need to put management back into production 
management, it infers that reviewing production management cannot be isolated with 
its managerial aspect. Moreover, Toyota Way is a management philosophy used by 
Toyota (Liker, 2004). Hence the most important schools of thought within managerial 
theory in general are reviewed.  
 
2.2 Overview of production management  
POM emerged from World War II and entered the 1950s as a manufacturing oriented 
subject, which had its basis on concepts and techniques from the scientific 
management era (Andrew and Johnson, 1982). The management of manufacturing 
of products is referred to as production management (Chase and Aquilano, 1992; 
Gaither and Frazier, 1999). While, the functions dealing with the operation of services 
as well as manufacturing and organizations are covered under operations 
management (Hopp and Spearman, 2000), which is broader than the scope of this 
12 
 
study that only concerns management of production. Production management deals 
with the direct production resources of the firms. These resources may be thought of 
as an amalgam of five aspects of work including People, Plants, Product, Process, 
and Planning and control (Lockyer, 1984; Chase and Aquilano, 1992). The people 
are the direct and indirect work force; the plants include the factories where 
production is conducted; the processes include the equipment and the steps by 
which production is accomplished; planning and control are the procedures and 
information used by management to operate the system.  
 
Furthermore, production management, as defined by most scholars (e.g. Abramowitz, 
1967, p.8; Neely, 1991; Ogawa, 1984), consists of two main functions. First, there is 
production, which is the act of manufacturing goods for which a consumer is willing to 
pay. The underlying principles of production are outlined by O’Connor (1994, p.136) 
as given below:  
(1) The first principle of production is to convert designs into products, at the lowest 
cost. A production system takes inputs – raw materials, capital, machinery, labour, 
information, time and other resources – and transforms them into outputs in the 
form of products and services of higher value than the inputs. It may also be 
reviewed as a value adding process. 
(2) The second principle of production is that all processes are operated or 
influenced by people, even though the automation has been increasingly adopted 
to replace human efforts. 
(3) The third principle of production is that, as far as practicable, nothing should be 
made that cannot be billed immediately as it leaves the factory. 
 
Second, there are production managers (also called managers), managing the 
production system. Management was the process of planning, scheduling, 
commanding, coordinating, and controlling business activities (Wren and Bedeian, 
2009; Ogawa, 1984), and their primary concern is with the activities of the conversion 
process or production (Gaither and Frazier, 1999). Drucker (1986) pointed out that 
production is not the application of tools to materials; it is the application of logic to 
work. Management needs to understand the logic behind each system of production, 
and applies these principles consistently and thoroughly (Drucker, 1986).  
 
Ogawa (1984) pointed out that production management, originally focusing on 
managing the production line, has evolved into a means that is directly related to 
corporate strategy such as to cope with systematization, computerization, automation, 
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respect for human, ecological control, safety and welfare. This change is likely to be 
related to the birth of industrial giants having complex production systems, such as 
the Toyota Production System (Ogawa, 1984). In other word, production 
management should encompass not only quality, time and cost as three traditional 
goals (Hopp and Spearman, 1996), but also flexibility, corporate strategy, and the 
changing business environment (Ogawa, 1984).  
 
2.3 Theory of production: search in economics 
Economists describe a production process either (1) as an arrangement of productive 
operations (or tasks) or (2) as a mapping of input quantities into output quantities 
(Scazzieri, 1993). The former approach was favoured by a number of classical 
economists (Smith and Marx in particular). The latter approach is common to 
“neoclassical” theory of production, which occupies a rather central place in 
economics (Coombs et al., 1987). The neoclassical theory of production concerns 
the first aspect of production management, which focuses on the relationships 
between quantities of input (factors of production) and outputs in the productive unit. 
The function that describes the amount of output obtained for specified amounts of 
the inputs is called the production function, and mathematically it takes the form: 
Q = q(X1, X2, X3, X4, …, Xn) or Q = f(K, L) 
 
Where Q denotes the quantity of output and Xi is the ith input. The inputs encompass 
all things required for production, including raw material, machines, employees, 
managers, utilities and so on. However, most of these inputs can be grouped into 
three broad categories namely capital (K), labor (L) and material (M) (Coombs et al., 
1987; Perloff, 2001). Under the neoclassical theory of production, the firm is built 
upon several important assumptions (Perloff, 2001). One of the most important is the 
presumption that firms maximize profits and reduce cost (Coombs, et al., 1987; 
Perloff, 2001). This implies that the firm will attempt to exploit all opportunities to 
make more money and avoid any project that is not expected to make the firm richer 
(McCormick, 1993). Because at any time there is a given level of technology which 
determines the techniques available for production, therefore among the available 
techniques the firm will choose the one which, given existing levels of production 
factors, minimizes total production costs (Coombs et al., 1987). In Toyota, or any 
other manufacturing firms, profit can be obtained only by reducing costs. According 
to Ohno (1988), Toyota Production System was born at the age of slow economic 
growth worldwide with a focus to develop human ability to their fullest capacity, to 
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utilize facilities and machines well, and to eliminate all waste to achieve the cost 
minimization goal of the company.  
 
2.4 New production philosophy: an integrated view 
2.4.1 Overview 
The economic explanation of production only captures one aspect of production 
theory, which focused on the relationship between input and output. There is a 
general agreement of the formulation Q = f (K, L) by which the production function 
involves the transformation (conversion) of inputs into useful products and services. 
In Koskela’s (1992, 2000) view, this conventional view of production was in line with 
Walrasian production model, which depicts the transformation process of production 
factors into finished product. Shingo (1988) however highlighted that this 
conventional model of production confuses the difference between “operation” and 
“process”, by which they all refer to a worker works on different products. Shingo 
(1988, p.5) added that there is distinction between process and operation: 
(1) Process: it refers to the flow of products from one worker to another, that is, the 
stages through which raw materials gradually move to become finished products.  
(2) Operation: it refers to the discrete stages at which a worker may work on different 
products and spatial flow that consistently centres around the worker.  
 
In the meantime, the Japanese owe their leadership in manufacturing quality as a 
result from the guidance of quality gurus such as W. Edwards Deming and Joseph 
Juran in the 1950s and 1960s (Drucker, 1990). The quality concepts such as 
Statistical Quality Control (SQC) were developed from statistical theory in 1930s. 
With SQC’s rigorous methodology, Japanese assembly line could deliver built-in 
process control. Greatly influenced by Shingo’s (1988) work which focused on the 
flow of material as well as quality control concept of production, the term “new 
production philosophy” has been coined by Koskela (1992). Furthermore, Koskela 
(1992) outlined that the genesis of new production philosophy was in the Japanese 
Just in time (JIT) and Total quality control (TQC) efforts in automobile manufacturing 
and the most prominent application was the Toyota Production System. Additionally, 
Shingo (1988) outlined that the Toyota Production System represents a pioneering 
attempt at a new production philosophy over the conventional preoccupation with 
operations. After that, attempts have been made by Koskela (2000) to develop a 
model of production that synthesizes all important features of production, especially 




different views on the production process namely the transformation concept, the 
flow concept and the value generation concept and termed it as a new production 
model (Koskela, 2000).  
 
2.4.2 Production as a Transformation activity 
The transformation concept has deep roots in the present Western thinkings about 
production (Ogawa, 1984; Frisch, 1965) and it has been commonly conceptualized in 
POM textbook as: “A production system receives inputs in the form of material, 
personnel, capital, utilities, and information. These inputs are changed in a 
conversion subsystem into the desired products and services, which are called 
outputs” (Gither and Frazier, 1999, p.154).  
 
According to Koskela (2000), there are three principles in the transformation model: 
(1) Production can be divided into smaller and more manageable sub-processes, 
finally into tasks, in which all inputs are available and assign these tasks to 
operatives or workstations (see Figure 2.1).  
(2) Cost can be minimized by reducing the cost of each sub-process.  
(3) The output value of a process is associated with the costs (or value) of its input. 
In practice, the value of the output can be raised by utilizing better materials and 










Figure 2.1 A transformation process of a production process  
(Source: Koskela, 2000) 
 
The transformation concept not only appears in the production management domain, 
but also can be found in the microeconomics theory of production which employs 
production function to discuss the relationship between input and output. Koskela 
(1992, 2000) outlined, this transformation concept is predominantly applied in 
construction industry, where management efforts are centered on task management. 
Production process 






This brings to a high chance of causing extra variability that if task management is 
poorly implemented (Koskela and Vrijhoef, 2001).  
 
2.4.3 Production as a Flow activity 
According to Koskela (2000), the transformation model of production had not been 
challenged until the 1980s when Shingo’s (1988) invention on the theoretical 
rationale of the JIT movement, that highlighted two core points; one is the 
introduction of time as an input in production, and the second is in the observation 
that time is consumed by two types of activities: transformation activities and non-
transformation activities. The flow view of production was further developed in Japan, 
especially in the automobile manufacturing at Toyota (Koskela et al., 2002), which 
was later embodied in “Lean production”, a term to characterize the Toyota 
Production System (Womack et al., 1990). Koskela (2000) explained that the basic 
thrust of the flow concept of production is to eliminate waste from the flow processes, 
along with its three types of principles: 
(1) Reducing the share of non-value-adding activities (waste) is the first principle that 
also serves part of the theoretical and conceptual foundation. 
(2) There are principles of “reduce the lead time” and “reduce variability” derived 
from the flow model. 
(3) A set of core heuristic principles includes “simplicity”, “increase flexibility” and 
“increase transparency” are derived based on their usefulness in practice but less 
direct connections with theory.  
 
Reduce the share of non-value-adding activities (waste) 
Koskela (2000) outlined that the three root causes of non-value-adding activities: (1) 
the structure of the production system, (2) the way production is controlled, and (3) 
the inherent nature of production attributed the non-value-adding activities in the 
different time frame of the process (i.e. design, control and improvement of 
production). With respect to all these root causes, Koskela (2000) proposed the 
following principles to reduce waste.  
 
Reduce the Lead time 
Lead time refers to the time required for a particular piece of material to traverse the 




Lead time = queue time before processing+ processing time + waiting time + moving 
time  
Table 2.1 identified a set of strategies to compress the lead time by elimination of 
queuing, processing, waiting and moving.  
 
Table 2.1 Strategies to compress the lead time  
 Explanation Strategies to gain reduction 
Lead time 
 Time required making products. 
Simply speaking, it is a sum of 
the following items 
 Reducing the time required for the 




 The time prior to the 
commencement of operations 
 Establishing one-piece flow 
through set-up reduction along 
with the pull method to reduce the 
lot delay. 
 Standardizing the work in order to 
reduce the process delay 
Processing 
time 
 Process time comprises setup 
time and run time  
 Small sized lot production 
 Using conveyor system 
Waiting time 
 Waiting time after process is the 
time that inventory must wait 
before being conveyed to the 
next process 
 Small sized lot production 
Moving time 
 The duration required to move 
between employee/machines 
operations 
 A process-based layout so that 
transport distances are eliminated 
Source: Koskela (2000) and Monden (1998) 
 
Reduce variability 
The principle of reducing variability is to deal with two types of variability, namely 
process-time variability and flow variability (Hopp and Spearman, 1996). Process-
time variability refers to the time required to process a task at one workstation, which 
consists of natural variability such as setups, operator availability and rework. The 




According to Koskela (2000), simplification is the result of the reduction of the 
number of components or steps that link in a material/information flow. Practical 
approaches can include shortening the flows by consolidating activities, 
standardizing parts, and minimizing the amount of control information needed. 
Moreover, organizational changes can also bring about simplification, such as multi-





The thrust of JIT production was based on mix flexibility (numbers of different 
products produced). The practical means to increase flexibility comprise: (1) minimize 
lots sizes to closely match demand, (2) reduce the difficulty of setups and 
changeovers, (3) training a multi-skilled workforce, and (4) training the workforce in 
operational flexibility and so on. 
 
Increase transparency 
Transparency can be used as an instrument to increase the motivation of workers for 
improvement, reduce the propensity of errors and increase the visibility of errors 
(Koskela, 2000). Koskela (2000) further listed a number of practical approaches for 
increasing the level of transparency that can include the adoption of 5-S, 
standardization, using visual controls to enable anyone to capture the difference 
between the standards and deviation, reduce the interdependence of production 
units and so on. 
 
2.4.4 Production as a Value generation activity 
Value creation is the major concern in many modern theories of production 
management. In the same timeline when the critique originating from the flow 
concept moved against the transformation concept, the value generation concept 
was also employed as another approach to evaluate the foundation of production 
(Koskela, 2000). This is a contrast to the transformation concept, which focuses on 
internal production matters rather than the customers’ needs. The value of a product 
emphasizes more on the customer side, and the goal of production is to satisfy 
customers’ needs. The quality-based movement and marketing-oriented value-based 
method are two diffusion and practice means of value generation concept (Koskela, 
2000). The quality movement originated and disseminated in Japan, under the 
guidance of Deming, Juran and other quality management techniques (i.e., Quality 
Control, Total Quality Control, etc.). The value-based approach was fulfilled when a 
growing number of companies adopted various value generation models including 
value-based management, customer-driven company, customer orientation, and 
mass customization (Koskela, 2000). Overall, the value generation concept of 
production can be structured into the following five principles according to Koskela 
(2000, p.79-81): 




(2) Ensure that relevant customer requirements are available in all phases of 
production, and that these are not lost when progressively transformed into 
design solutions, production plans and products. 
(3) Ensure that customer requirements have a bearing on all deliverables for all roles 
of the customer. 
(4) Ensure the capability of the production system to produce products as required. 
(5) Ensure by measurements that value is generated for the customer. 
 
2.4.5 TFV model of production 
Koskela (2000, p.88) highlighted that each concept of production focuses on certain 
aspects of the production phenomenon and has its own methods and practices, but 
they are complementary. For integration purpose, Koskela (2000) proposed the 
“Transformation-flow-value generation” or TFV model of production by 
conceptualizing the above three complementary ways as shown in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 Integrated TFV view on production 





As a transformation 
of inputs into outputs 
As a flow of material, 
composed of 
transformation, inspect, 
moving and waiting 
As a process where 
value for the 
customer is created 
through fulfilment of 
his requirements 
Main principles 
To make production 
efficiently 
Elimination of waste 
(non-value-adding 
activities) 
Elimination of value 
loss (achieve value in 



















Ensure what has to 
be done 
Ensure what is 
unnecessary is done 
as little as possible 
Ensure customer 
requirements are met 




application of the 
view 
Task management Flow management Value management 
Source: Koskela (2000) 
 
A closer examination of TFV model of production revealed that each of the three 
production concepts is closely related to one of the traditional objectives 
manufacturing firms that strive for, namely cost, time, and quality.  
(1) Cost: cost reduction can be achieved by minimizing the cost of sub-process 
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which transformation concept supports. 
(2) Time: time can be pressed through eliminating the non-value-adding activities in 
the flow concept. 
(3) Quality: the value generation view was started by and later on refined in the total 
quality movement framework. Ensuring customers’ requirement are met in good 
manner enables the quality of product should be further underscored. 
 
Koskela’s (2000) TFV production model however has received criticisms. For 
example, Winch (2006) highlighted the following conceptual weakness that all three 
conceptual pillars share: 
(1) Focus on the production as material process. Winch (2006) argued that it ignored 
the factors that some phases in the production process involve non-
transformation activities, for example, supplier service to client in the context of 
construction.  
(2) Absence of a concept of organization in the analysis. 
(3) Lack of any analysis of the implications of risk and uncertainty. 
(4) The unitary concept of value derived from quality management is inadequate for 
the value generation concept applied through the construction process. 
 
Nevertheless, the development of TFV production model heavily draws on production 
management literature (Valence, 2005) and has addressed how the three aspects of 
production namely tasks, flow and value (quality) can be managed. This is important 
to an understanding of production management.  
 
2.5 Historical milestones of management thoughts: search in 
production management 
In today’s competitive world, it is necessary to understand how production systems 
should be designed and put into operation in order to support competitive industrial 
production. Santos et al. (2002) pointed out that production has been one of the 
critical laboratories for developing management theories throughout history. The 
evolution of management thoughts had direct influence on the way how production 
system was designed and management which reflect its connection with the second 
aspect of production management. Santos et al. (2002a) revisited the recent history 





Figure 2.2 Key contribution of production to the evolution of management  
(Source: Santos et al., 2002a) 
 
Similar efforts have been made by Mullins (2006), who suggested four main 
approaches with different focus could identify main trends in the development of 
organizational behavior and management theory; the earliest emphasizing production 
efficiency (classical approach), the second emphasizing human behavior, the third 
emphasizing organizations as systems and the fourth emphasizing a range of 
situational variables that determine the success of the organization (see Figure 2.3). 
It reflects that the management not only concerns the production process, plants, 
programmes, but also deal with the people, organization, and others. Following 
Figure 2.3, the next section reviews these mainstream management thoughts in the 











Figure 2.3 Main approaches to organization, structure and management  
(Source: Mullins, 2006) 
 
2.5.1 The “classical” approach: Scientific management  
The field of production management is generally considered to be an outgrowth of 
the scientific management movement fostered by Frederick W. Taylor. Notable co-
workers of Taylor were Frank Gilbreth (motion study) and Henry Gantt (Scheduling, 
Gantt chart). Each of these individuals offered great contribution to the scientific 
management movement and pioneered the evolving methods (Abramowitz, 1967). 
The ideas of scientific management developed by them have had a huge influence 
































as a system  
Emphasizing a 




The Taylor system of scientific management 
According to the theory of scientific management, each supervisor and manager is 
expected to have a total view of the process, define its objectives and steer daily 
work so that the targets are met. Taylor summarized his method in four principles 
(Taylor, 1934): 
(1) The proper design of the work tasks such that the absolute maximum amount of 
work can be extracted from a given labour (using time and motion studies). 
(2)  Scientific selection of the proper workers (finding workers who are highly 
motivated and controllable). 
(3) Cooperate with the workers so as to ensure that all of the work is being done in 
accordance with the principles of the science which has been developed. 
(4) An almost equal division of the work and the responsibility between the 
management and the workers. 
 
Time study, used by Taylor to discover “what was possible” in improving job 
performance, became the foundation of Taylor’s work. With a stopwatch, weight 
scale, and tape, Taylor literally measured the distances that workers and materials 
covered. As Wren and Bedeian (2009) outlined, Taylor’s time study had two phases: 
analysis and synthesis. In the analysis phase, each job was broken into its 
elementary movements. Non-essential movements were discarded and the 
remainder carefully examined to determine the quickest and least wasteful means of 
performing a job. In the synthesis stage, the elementary movements were combined 
in the correct sequence to determine the time and the exact method for performing a 
job. This phase also led to improvements in tools, machines, materials, methods, and 
the ultimate standardization of all elements surrounding and accompanying a job.  
 
The contributions of Frank Gilbreth 
Another important pioneer of the scientific management movement was Frank 
Bunker Gilbreth. His concept of scientific management can best be described as the 
search for the one best way to do work (Abramowitz, 1967). His early work focused 
on motion study, which aimed to eliminate those variables that affect motion, develop, 
standardize and determine the best practice. In doing so, they paved the way for 
modern work simplification by cataloguing 17 different hand motions, such as “grasp” 
and “hold” (Kreitner, 2007). Rather than Taylor’s endeavors on the quality of the 
operative, Gilbreth offered the view that each worker can be trained in the correct 
way to sustain those best practices. He sought to improve operator’s performance 
through reducing unnecessary motions (e.g. unnecessary motions can be eliminated 
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through better design of the workplace) and limiting fatigue by placing far greater 
emphasis on the total working environment (Shelderake, 1996). The motion study 
had generated a great influence on the later concepts such as waste elimination 
(Ohno, 1988), which became the cornerstone of the Toyota Production System.  
 
The contributions of Gantt  
Gantt is perhaps best known for his development of the graphic methods of 
describing plans and making possible better managerial control. He emphasized the 
importance of time, as well as cost, in planning and controlling work. This led 
eventually to the famous Gantt chart which is still in wide use today. Due to its 
simplicity, ease of preparation and graphical format, the Gantt chart is widely used as 
a construction-scheduling tool (Shelderake, 1996). 
 
Lessons from the “classic” approach 
Taylor’s “one best way” method became the standard for managerial work, and has 
been both celebrated and criticized over the years. Kreitner (2007, p.40) comments: 
“within the context of haphazard, turn-of-the-twentieth-century industrial practices, 
scientific management was indeed revolutionary with its emphasis on promoting 
production efficiency and waste elimination.” Nevertheless, much of the criticisms 
being directed towards scientific management was concerned that this management 
approach and techniques have dehumanized people by making them act like 
machines (Kreitner, 2007). In the 1920’s, these aspects were given more attention, 
which eventually led to the Human Relations movement. 
 
2.5.2 Human relations approach 
In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s, observers of business management began to 
develop the human relations school of managerial thought. During that time, workers 
gradually realized the weaknesses in the scientific management system and started 
to exploit them. The dehumanization of work on the shop floor, where the imperatives 
of working with machines had tended to dominate the work of people, had become 
more evident as mechanization and automation proceeded, threatening jobs which 
depended on continually expanding markets (Pearson, 2009). The human relations 
school exclusively focused on management’s relationship with people at work. Mayo 
and his colleagues’ observations at Western Electric’s Hawthorne Works were the 
first thorough experimental social science study of industrial work, and commonly 
viewed as having generated great influence on this school. Pearson (2009, p.138) 
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noted that “Understanding in the field of human relations…is of first importance to the 
executive; for human relations are the essence of managerial, employee, public and 
political relations.”  
 
Hawthorne studies 
A series of studies, now known as the Hawthorne studies, was conducted from 1924 
to 1932 at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company, as an attempt to 
investigate how characteristics of the work setting (specifically the level of lighting or 
illumination) affected worker fatigue and performance. During the experiment, it was 
found that production output increased when lighting was improved. When lighting 
was subsequently decreased, however, production again increased. The result 
suggested that people were strongly affected not only by physical conditions, but also 
by mental factors. The so called “Hawthorne effect” seemed to suggest that workers’ 
attitudes toward their managers affect the level of workers’ performance (Wren and 
Bedeian, 2009). This experiment also emphasized the importance of social and 
psychological factors in the work environment and the recognition of informal 
organization structures at work, in contrast to the assumptions of scientific 
management that motivation was simply a matter of payment by results. 
 
The influence of psychology: neo-human relations 
According to Mullins (2006), the Hawthorne studies did not address the link between 
“satisfaction” and work productivity. This is because the link between the two was not 
always correlated clearly and positively. A group of notable writers such as Abraham 
Maslow (1954), Frederick Herzberg (1959), and McGregor (1960) made their 
attempts to understand the forces which motivated people at work and the way in 
which individual adjustment, group relations and leadership styles impacted on 
worker motivation (Mullins, 2006).  
 
Lessons from the human behaviour approach 
The human behaviour approach strove for a better understanding of people’s 
psychological and social needs at work as well as improving the process of 
management (Mullins, 2006). According to Kreitner (2007), the human behaviour 
approach makes it clear to present and future managers that people are the key to 
productivity and technology, and that work rules, and standards do not necessarily 
guarantee good job performance. In contrast, success depends on motivated and 
skilled individuals who are committed to organizational objectives.  
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2.5.3 System approach  
Whereas classical approaches focused the technical requirements of the 
organization without the people, and the human relations approaches emphasized 
the psychological and social aspects of work, excluding the organization, the system 
approach attempts to reconcile these two earlier approaches by addressing the 
interrelationships of structure and behaviour, and the range of variables within the 
organization (Mullins, 2006). Lugwig Von Bertalanffy (1973) was the first to use the 
term “system theory”, and who was often cited as the founder of this school. From his 
perspective as a biologist, an organization is seen as a combination of 
interdependent parts or subsystems which collectively make up the whole (Mullins, 
2006). The value of system theory to the study of organizations is its ability to simplify 
complex situations by considering its subcomponents (subsystems) as well as with 
the relationship and interdependencies between these subsystems (Mullins, 2006). In 
the system theory the socio-technical system will be discussed as it pertains to 
production management. 
 
The socio-technical system 
The concept of the organization as a “socio-technical” system is concerned with the 
interactions between the psychological and social factors and the needs and 
demands of the human part of the organization, and its structural and technological 
requirements (Mullins, 2006). Broadly speaking, the social system is viewed as 
anything having to do with the selection, development, and characteristics of an 
organization’s people and the culture that emerges through the interaction of those 
people. The technical system includes not only machines but also the policies and 
standard operating procedures of an organization. Recognition of the socio-technical 
approach is of particular important today because people must be considered as at 
least an equal priority along with investments in technology (Mullins, 2006). Morgan 
and Liker (2005) employed this model to describe Toyota’s product development 
system with three primary subsystems: (1) process, (2) people, and (3) tool and 
technology. These three sub-systems are interrelated and interdependent and affect 
an organization’s ability to achieve its external purpose.  
 
2.5.4 Contingency approach  
The contingency approach can be seen as an extension of the system approach that 
highlights possible means of differentiating among alternative forms of organization 
structures and systems of management (Mullins, 2006). According to Kreitner (2007), 
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the contingency approach is an effort to determine which managerial practices and 
techniques are appropriate in specific situations. This approach to management also 
acknowledges that there is no one single best way to manage people or work in 
every situation (Dubrin, 2008). It is true that in real-life management, the success of 
any given technique is dictated by the situation. Given the nature of this management 
approach, caution should therefore be exercised in this current research study that 
the so-called best practice of lean or Toyota Way is contingent upon the 
circumstances and projected outcomes of each unique organization. Simply because 
it has generally worked well in Japanese manufacturing plants, or because it has now 
become internationally accepted, does not necessarily mean that such management 
practices would work as well in the Chinese construction industry. It is more 
important to select and/or tweak the principles or combinations of principles to 
achieve the targeted performance, or to adjust where necessary to better suit the 
Chinese context. 
 
2.5.5 Discussion  
The above literature review has clearly shown that the evolution of management 
theory from different schools of management thoughts mirrored the changes in the 
surrounding economic and social environment in the production management 
discipline. It confirms production as one of the critical laboratories for developing 
management theories. Moreover, the evolution of the management thoughts had a 
direct influence on the way how the production system was designed. For example, 
time and motion study inspired Toyota to eliminate wastes in seven different forms. In 
addition, the human relations approach laid significant emphasis on people and 
acknowledged that people are the key to productivity and technology success, while 
the system approach equally treats the technical aspects and human resource 
aspects of the organization. The Toyota Way was also developed on the socio-
technical system thinking in that the Toyota Way model is incorporated with the 
people and process parts. 
 
2.6 Summary 
Figure 2.4 outlines contemporary developments in the production management 
domain with two different emphases, namely on production and management. It 
parallels Adam’s (1983) production management typology that contains two 
dimensions: the technical transformation axis included the design and operations 
activities for products and services. The managerial axis separated the classical, 
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behavioural, system, and contingency approaches often used when responding to 













Figure 2.4 Conceptualization of production management 
 
In the course of reviewing production, a brief economic explanation of production has 
been presented. The development of the neo-classical theory of production was 
reviewed in particular, which was based on a cost minimizing, profit maximizing firm, 
with a given level of technology. The economic explanation of production 
acknowledges all conceivable transformations that can be achieved with given inputs. 
In order to widen this unitary perspective of production, Koskela (1992, 2000) 
collectively reviewed three different views of production and integrated them into a 
new production model, which also laid the foundation for the development of lean 
construction (see Section 3.4). Furthermore, following a chronological order of theory 
development, this chapter reviewed the evolution of management thoughts from the 
classical approach to the human relations approach to the system and contingency 
approaches. Changes in the economy and society worldwide have resulted in a 
workforce that no longer accept it as being treated like another piece of machinery. In 
the human relations school, management theorists placed emphasis on motivation, 
leadership, etc. In the system approach to management, people are treated as equal 
to technology. The review of conceptualizations of production as well as the various 
approaches to management theories provides this research with a general theoretical 
background to review the Toyota Way model, which not only focuses on the 
manufacturing process, but is also a management philosophy per se.  
  
Production management 
(Abramowitz, 1967:8;  
Neely, 1991; Ogawa, 1984) 
Production  
 An economic explanation 
of production 
 An integrated review of 




 Classical approach (e.g. 
Scientific management) 
 Human relations 
approach 
 System approach (e.g. 
Socio-technical system) 
 Contingency approach 
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3 From Lean Production To Lean Construction 
3.1 Overview 
The last few decades have witnessed three major phases or paradigm shifts of 
industrial production in the modern world (Womack et al., 1990; Smith, 1992). These 
phases are generally concluded as craft production, mass production and lean 
production. Shook (1998) highlighted that the concepts such as mass production and 
lean production reflect ways of thinking about production within particular cultures 
and eras rather than simply focus on production systems. Moreover, these 
production paradigms can be related easily to the automobile manufacturing factories, 
where they are created, exercised and eventually evaluated to the next phase. The 
first part of this chapter provides a history of evolution of production practices and 
philosophies through the automobile manufacturing industry from the craft production 
era to current lean production. The differences in production philosophies, their limits, 
and their impacts in the construction industry are also reviewed. The second part of 
this chapter attempts to answer the following question: Can the success of lean 
principles be replicated in the construction industry? A number of scholars hold 
positive attitudes towards this proposition (including Koskela 1992, 2000; Ballard, 
2000). To address this issue, it starts with brief discussion of the peculiarities of 
construction that differentiate that industry from manufacturing industry. The following 
discussion covers the terminology of lean construction, along with its principles, tools, 
and implementation frameworks, as well as criticisms of it. It also sheds light on 
governments’ roles in promoting lean construction in Western countries and outlines 
a few cases of lean practices that have emerged in developing countries.  
 
3.2 From craft production to mass production 
Craft production employs skilled workers to make non-standard products. Womack et 
al. (1990) summarized the following characteristics of the age of craft production: 
(1) A highly skilled work force who transformed the inputs with their own hands, 
using tools to facilitate their work on a job-by-job basis.  
(2) Organizations were decentralized, although concentrated within small geographic 
locations.  
(3) Only producing a very low production volume of unique products.  
 
Hormozi (2001) recognized the benefits that craft production can bring about that 
revolutionized the creative workers from the burdens of difficult manual labour and 
allowed them the time to utilize their creativity to increase their income and their 
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standard of living. Many other benefits were reported by Nesan and Holt (1999) 
within the craft-based approach in the context of construction that include first, the 
integration of design and construction eliminated buildability problems; second, work 
processes were decentralized which led craftsmen to fully enjoy authority and control 
over the construction process. But craft production could not compete with the next 
phase in manufacturing, namely mass production in terms of its low work efficiency 
and costly but yet high quality final products. 
 
Mass production was developed to increase production capacity and to reduce unit 
cost. Henry Ford revolutionized the automobile manufacturing process through the 
use of scientific management methods, when developing his assembly line for 
producing the famous Model T, in 1913. The interchangeability of parts and the 
simplicity of assembly were the manufacturing innovations that made the assembly 
line possible (Womack et al., 1990). The advantage of the mass production paradigm 
is that it brings about economies of scale as demonstrated in the moderate quality 
but low cost products as production volume increase. This gave Ford a substantial 
advantage over his craft-based competition. Moreover, mass production had a big 
impact on the organization of work. This was because Taylor’s job specialization 
concept nicely fit with the concept of mass production which employed relatively 
unskilled labour. However, the disadvantage of mass production is that the job 
satisfaction is generally low and the cost of switching the models to vary the 
production is high (Womack et al., 1990). Furthermore, Henry Ford failed to 
appreciate the potential for producing a variety of end products from a common set of 
standardized parts, which led to Ford’s declining market share. These problems 
forced American companies to look at lean production techniques as an alternative to 
mass production.  
 
3.3 The development of lean production 
The term “lean production” was first brought to attention through the book – The 
Machine that Changed the World (Womack et al., 1990), in which the authors 
critically contrasted the differences between Toyota plants and three U.S. Motor 
giants. The authors claimed that the production philosophy and system of Toyota 
were superior to all the others, because it used less human effort, less manufacturing 
space, less investment in tools, less time spent on new product development but 
generated high quality, less inventory, and a greater variety of products  (Womack et 
al., 1990). Since then, a large volume of publications on lean production emerged, 
which usually considered the Toyota Production System (TPS), or JIT production, or 
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lean production as synonymous and equal (see Shah and Ward, 2007; Womack et 
al., 1990). In order to understand lean production more precisely, it requires first of all 
an understanding of its historical evolution which was discussed in the previous 
sections as well as its mother platform – the TPS. 
 
3.3.1 Toyota production system (TPS) 
Toyota first drew the world’s attention back in the 1980s, when it became clear that 
there was something special in terms of Japanese quality and efficiency (Liker, 2004). 
It began with Eiji Toyoda’s determination to implement American manufacturing 
methods (mass production techniques) when he studied in the U.S. in the 1950s. It 
then took considerable time for Toyota to find ways to maintain economies of scale in 
manufacturing and procurement with small-lot production. One principle that was 
considered as worthwhile to adapt from Ford’s production system was the continuous 
flow. On the basis of continuous flow, Toyota created a one-piece flow with a unique 
flexibility to satisfy the customers’ demands. Toyota learnt from the essence of, but 
did not follow the mass production approach blindly (Ohno, 1988). Under the 
leadership of Eiji Toyoda and Taiichi Ohno, Toyota led the way in developing what is 
now called the TPS. Ohno (1988) in his book – Toyota Production System – credited 
Ford’s mass production and the American supermarket was behind his JIT thinking. 
Moreover, Toyota adapted quality thinking from the American pioneers within quality 
engineering, including Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran. Deming encouraged the 
Japanese to adopt a more systematic approach towards problem solving. Later this 
approach became known as the Deming-cycle or the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle 
(PDCA) which is a pillar for continuous improvement (Kaizen) (Imai, 1986). These 
techniques evolved into what is now described as lean production. 
 
TPS’s goal is to reduce cost without increasing production volume. The basis to 
achieve is the elimination of waste and this idea marked the start of the present 
Toyota Production System (Ohno, 1988). It has been widely acknowledged that the 
two pillars of the Toyota Production System are Just-in-Time and Jidoka (Ohno, 1988; 






















Figure 3.1 The Toyota Production System  
(Source: Liker, 2004) 
 
Just in Time 
Just-in-time manufacturing prescribes the required units needed to produce the 
required quantities at the required time, wasting neither raw material nor time. A 
manufacturing company establishing this flow throughout can ideally approach zero 
inventories. Just in time is hardly an easy task, as it requires the coordination of 
potentially thousands of components/parts arriving where and when needed in just 
the right quantities, with all parts meeting the quality parameters. Ohno (1988) 
commented that JIT operates from a different paradigm than mass production and 
requires a different managerial and leadership mindset than mass production. Trying 
to achieve the JIT system led Ohno (1988) and others within Toyota to develop TPS 
tools such as continuous flow, pull system, quick changeover and integrated logistics 
(see Figure 3.1 – the TPS house). 
 
Autonomation 
It is often known as its Japanese abbreviation jidoka, meaning “never let a defect 
pass into the next station and freeing people from machines” (Liker, 2004). In all 
Toyota manufacturing plants, most machines, whatever old or new, are equipped 
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with such devices as well as various safety devices to prevent defective products. 
The idea is to build quality in the process by distinguishing between normal and 
abnormal conditions, stopping production line once there is a problem being detected. 
It calls attention to the abnormal to ensure that its root cause is found and eliminated. 
In addition, Toyota also uses tools such as andon, error proofing, and visual 
management to build quality into its processes. 
 
In the TPS house, Liker (2004) places “people and teamwork” in the center of the 
system because only through continuous improvements can the operation ever attain 
the needed stability. People must be trained to identify waste and solve problems at 
the root causes. Finally, there are various foundational elements, which include the 
need for standardized, stable, and levelled processes. All of these are elaborated in 
the succeeding chapter.  
 
3.3.2 Lean production and lean principles 
At the beginning, industry practitioners observed Toyota facilities and saw many tools 
and methods that were very different from what they practised. Believing this was the 
source of Toyota’s competitive edge, many companies set out to emulate them. 
According to Koskela (1992), eleven important principles are essential to the lean 
philosophy, including:  
(1) Reduce the share of non-value adding activities (also called waste) 
(2) Increase output value through systematic consideration of customer 
requirements 
(3) Reduce variability 
(4) Reduce cycle time 
(5) Simplify by minimizing the number of steps, parts and linkages 
(6) Increase output flexibility 
(7) Increase process transparency 
(8) Focus control on the complete process 
(9) Building continuous improvement into the process 
(10) Balance flow improvement with conversion improvement 
(11) Benchmark 
These principles of lean production as reflected in the early days, suggested that 
lean principles were process focused. Of the principles identified by Koskela (1992), 
none was relevant to human resource or social aspect of lean. Implementing a few 
lean tools could result in some improvements, but it would never come close to the 
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benefits that were possible from implementing the whole system (Liker, 2004). Shah 
and Ward (2007, p.791) conceptualized lean production as: “an integrated socio-
technical system, whose main objective is to eliminate waste by concurrently 
reducing or minimizing supplier, customer, and internal variability”. This is echoed by 
Paez et al. (2004) that a lean enterprise should be viewed as a socio-technical 
system that looks to maximizing production performance with minimal resources.  
 
Waste elimination 
Identifying and eliminating waste is fundamental to a lean organization such as 
Toyota. Liker (2004) highlighted that the heart of the Toyota Production System is 
eliminating waste. Waste is anything that absorbs resources but creates no value 
(Womack and Jones, 1996). Ohno (1988) identified the following seven wastes or 
“muda”, namely (1) overproduction, (2) waiting, (3) transportation, (4) over 
processing, (5) inventory, (6) movement and (7) defect products, and highlighted that 
the preliminary step towards application of the Toyota Production System is to 
identify wastes completely. Liker (2004) added one more waste: (8) waste of unused 
employee creativity, which resulted in losing time, ideas, skills, improvements, and 
learning opportunities by not engaging or listening to employees. This is applicable to 
employees in any industries. For example, construction companies were used to 
employ their employees for manual work, but have appeared to forget that their 
employees are able to think (Druker et al., 1996). The fact is that by capitalizing on 
employees' creativity, companies can eliminate the other seven wastes to 
continuously improve their performance. The first five “muda”, namely overproduction, 
waiting, transportation, over processing, and inventory refer to the flow of materials. 
The last two “muda”, namely movement and defective products, together with the 
waste of unused employee creativity are related to work of labour. Womack and 
Jones (1996) highlighted that lean is a powerful antidote to muda (waste). Likewise, 
Koskela (1992, 2000) proposed that eliminating non-value adding activities from 
production is the fundamental principle based on the flow concept of production. 
 
Customer value  
Hine et al. (2004) argued that a misunderstanding of lean leads to value creation 
being viewed as equal to cost reduction. In the shop floor, all unnecessary production 
has been categorized as waste or non-value adding activities, while what is 
necessary for creating a “perfect” product is called value adding activities (Koskela, 
1992, 2000). By eliminating all the non-value adding activities, cost can be reduced, 
which ultimately helps in creating value. Since value was defined as the first principle 
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of lean thinking (Womack and Jones, 1996), Hine et al. (2004) outlined that lean had 
moved away from a merely “shop-floor-focus” on waste and cost reduction, to an 
approach that contingently sought to enhance value (or perceived value) to 
customers by adding product or service features and/or removing waste. According 
to Hine et al. (2004), this shift from a mere waste reduction focus to a customer value 
focus essentially provides an alternative perspective on value creation: 
(1) Value is created if internal waste is reduced, as the wasteful activities and the 
associated costs are reduced, increasing the overall value proposition for the 
customer. 
(2) Value is also increased, if additional features or services are offered, which are 
valued by the customer. This could entail a shorter delivery cycle or smaller 
delivery batches, which might not add additional cost, yet enhance customer 
value. 
 
In the context of lean construction, Jørgensen and Emmitt (2008) highlighted that 
value is either unaddressed, or it is largely discussed in the construction process, not 
the resultant building (the product). A number of challenges were identified by 
Jørgensen and Emmitt (2008) when the concept of customer value is applied to 
construction:  
(1) Construction is a long-term investment and is designed to function for one 
hundred year or more. 
(2) A number of different owners and users, who may have different interests in 
projects or have different perceptions on value. Winch (2011) highlighted that 
even within the client organization, there exists different interest groups, who may 
have different functional requirements. In this case, project definition is likely to 
become a compromise, which may unravel as more information becomes 
available to those groups throughout the project life cycle relating to what the 
facility will be like (Winch, 2011). 
(3) The level of complexity increases when the concept of value is discussed in the 
field of architectural design, in which more micro level issues should be taken into 
account. 
 
Lean thinking  
Lean thinking was elaborated in Womack and Jones’s (1996) book – Lean Thinking – 
as additional theoretical framework and principles associated with lean production. 
The five main guiding principles of lean thinking are summarized by Womack and 
Jones (1996) as: 
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(1) Value: value can only be defined by the ultimate customer (Womack and Jones, 
1996), where the customer can be considered as all downstream operations. It 
can be applied in the construction context in which end customers are multiple 
and the construction client can rarely be considered as the single ultimate 
customer (Jørgensen and Emmitt, 2008). 
(2) Value stream: value stream analyzes three types of actions along with the value 
stream: first, activity creating value; second, activity creating no value but is 
unavoidable with current technologies and production assets; third, activities 
creating no value and are determined to be avoidable. 
(3) Flow: once a company has reduced or eliminated waste and variation from a 
single process and streamlined the value stream, the next step is to make the 
remaining process steps flow. It is the opposite of batch and queue. The goal of 
this principle is to have a product move from concept to customer without 
interruption or delay. 
(4) Pull: this principle is closely related to the “pull” system which the TPS firstly 
created. The end users pull the production such that it is only produced to suit 
their requirements. 
(5) Pursue perfection: this principle indicates “the complete elimination of muda so 
that all activities along a value-stream create value” (Womack and Jones, 1996, 
p.350). The lean concept associated with perfection is kaizen, a Japanese word 
which is interpreted as continuous improvement in the West. By applying the 
previous four principles each time, the organization gains more and finds more 
hidden wastes that can be eliminated. 
 
These principles have been successfully implemented in the manufacturing industry 
as well as in construction. In the context of construction, the Egan’s (1998) report 
adopted the essence of lean thinking and recommended that the industry should 
work toward the following aims: 
(1) Elimination of non-value activities which can represent up to 95% of time and 
effort. 
(2) Removal of waste from all activities involved in delivering the end product. 
(3) Establishment of relationships with all members of the supply chain. 
(4) Removal of delays in the design and production process using just-in-time 
management. 
 
However, the principles of lean thinking were challenged by Koskela (2000) that 
these failed to provide a proper theory of lean production due to the discussion of 
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lean thinking being practically confined to the flow conceptualization of production 
without incorporating the transformation and value generation concepts. It lacks an 
adequate conceptualization of production, which has led to imprecise concepts, such 
as the term “value” (Koskela, 2004). 
 
In summary, lean production exists at both strategic and operational levels (Hines et 
al., 2004): at the strategic level, the concept helps one to understand customer value 
and identify the value stream; while at the operational level, it is a bundle of practices 
and tools that lead to the elimination of waste and encourage continuous 
improvement. In a similar vein, according to Shah and Ward (2007), lean production 
is generally viewed either philosophically or practically. The first point of view is 
related to guiding principles and overarching goals (see Womack and Jones, 1996 
and Spear and Bowen, 1999); the second point of view relates a set of management 
practices, tools, or techniques that can be observed directly.  
 
3.3.3 Implementation frameworks of lean  
Empirically, based on the description of Womack et al. (1990) for lean production, 
Karlsson and Åhlström (1996) developed an implementation model based on 
conceptualizing lean production as consisting of a number of principles 
characterizing different functional areas and the overall strategy of the lean company. 
These functional areas consist of lean development, lean procurement, lean 
manufacturing and lean distribution as well as the factors are given below: 
(1) Lean development: supplier involvement, cross-functional teams, simultaneous 
engineering, integration instead of coordination, strategic management, and 
black-box engineering.  
(2) Lean procurement: supplier hierarchies and larger subsystems from fewer 
suppliers. 
(3) Lean manufacturing: elimination of waste, continuous improvement, 
multifunctional teams, vertical information systems, decentralized responsibilities, 
and pull system. 
(4) Lean distribution: lean buffers, customer involvement, and aggressive marketing. 
 
This indicates that the utilization of lean production can affect the whole enterprise. 
Furthermore, Karlsson and Åhlström (1996) enumerated the following fundamental 
principles of lean production: elimination of waste, continuous improvement, zero 
defects/JIT, pull instead of push, and multifunctional teams. By taking the next step, 
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Karlsson and Åhlström (1996) identified a number of measurable determinants within 
each principle, which are able to reflect changes in an effort to become lean. 
Karlsson and Åhlström’s (1996) study is significant to this research because based 
on this, it offers management an opportunity to follow a checklist for what to aim at 
when trying to implement lean production. Following the work of Karlsson and 
Åhlström (1996), Sanchez and Perez (2001) introduced a check-list model with 36 
indicators and tested the sample empirically in their study. The importance of various 
indicators can be analyzed to develop manufacturing strategies for the manufacturing 
companies. Moreover, it offers a practical framework for its introduction in 
manufacturing companies and provides a good reference for lean implementation in 
the construction firms. In a similar vein, Paez et al. (2006) presented an integrated 
framework of lean enterprise based on the combination of human and technological 
subsystems. The framework contains four steps of guidelines: 
(1) It starts from the management commits to lean underpinned by three goals: 
waste elimination, flow, and pull. 
(2) The scope of activities is identified to conform the value stream, namely design, 
supply, and manufacturing.  
(3) This step aims to develop the workforce capabilities: problem-solving focus, 
teamwork, and creative thinking. 
(4) The final step is the implementation of lean techniques. It comprises of kanban 
system, production smoothing and autonomation. Additionally, it welcomes 
unique or individual elements that fit a specific company. 
 
Shah and Ward (2007) proposed ten factors which constituted the operational 
complements from the contents and objectives of the historical roots in the TPS to 
the philosophy of lean production. This includes supplier feedback, JIT delivery, 
developing suppliers, involved customer, flow, pull, low set up, involved employees, 
productive maintenance, and controlled processes. Of these ten factors, three factors 
measured supplier involvement issues, one factor measured customer involvement, 
and the remaining six factors addressed issues that are internal to the firm. 
 
One missing link in the implementation framework of lean production is that, as 
Olivella et al. (2008) argued, the abovementioned frameworks of lean have barely 
dealt with work organizations. Olivella et al. (2008) pointed out that there are indeed 
work organization practices characteristic of lean production and summarized their 
central concepts as given below: (1) standardization, discipline and control: that aim 
to obtain uniformity of the work, (2) continuing training and learning, (3) team-based 
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organization: i.e., an organization where work is assigned to and done by teams, (4) 
participation and empowerment: the fact that the functions assumed by direct 
workers are more extended, (5) multi-skilling and adaptability, (6) common values, 
and (7) compensation and rewards to support lean production. 
 
Forze (1996) highlighted that there is a priority order between the various work 
organization practices: some are indispensable for a lean system, while others adapt 
well to it but require more time and can be introduced later, for example, aspects of 
work organization which involve hierarchy: supervisors favour workers to act as a 
team, and decentralization of authority was found less of a differentiating factor in a 
lean plant. 
 
3.4 Lean construction  
3.4.1 What is lean construction? 
The success of lean principles in manufacturing and the benefits arising from its use, 
is one of the main motivations for adopting lean principles in construction (Egan, 
1998). Lean first emerged in the construction industry a few years after it had gained 
full acceptance in Western manufacturing industries. Several authors have attempted 
to provide an account of the lean construction perspectives. These include Koskela’s 
(1992) early discussion on the potential of what he termed “the new production 
philosophy” in the construction industry in his seminal Stanford report. Koskela (2000) 
later synthesized three different perspectives on the construction process (discussed 
earlier in Chapter 2), which formed the foundation for what has now become known 
as lean construction. A simple definition of lean construction was given by Koskela et 
al. (2002, p.211):  
 
“lean construction is a way to design production systems to minimize waste of 
materials, time, and effort in order to generate the maximum possible amount of 
value.”  
 
The Lean Construction Institute (LCI) defines lean construction as a management-
based production approach to project delivery that is particularly useful on complex, 
uncertain, and quick projects (see www.leanconstruction.org). The definition of lean 
construction due to Koskela et al. (2002) indicates that lean construction strives for 
the same goals as lean production, namely to eliminate waste and to maximize value. 
LCI’s definition, on the other hand, implies that industrial approaches in 
manufacturing are directly applicable to construction. Apart from Koskela’s (1992, 
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2000) work, an alternative interpretation of the concepts of lean construction is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2 (Koskela et al., 2002; Winch, 2006). This school of thought 
discusses the application of lean production methods to construction. The best 
known of these is the Last Planner approach to the planning and management of the 
construction process (Ballard and Howell, 1998a; Ballard, 2000). Its goal is to create 
a reliable workflow by having the project team, including all affected firms, 
collaboratively create a phase plan for a segment of the work (such as the 
foundations). This is a social process involving discussion with site staff and planning 










Figure 3.2 Two core interpretations of lean construction 
 
The coexistence of different interpretations of lean construction has also been 
observed by Green and May (2005, p.503), who have pointed out that “lean 
construction can be interpreted as a set of techniques, a discourse, a ‘socio-technical 
paradigm’ or even a cultural commodity”. The Egan report (Egan, 1998) has been 
responsible for popularizing the “lean” label amongst construction professionals in 
the UK (Green and May, 2005), who see lean thinking (Value, Value stream, Flow, 
Pull, and Perfection) primarily as a set of techniques that can be directly applied to 
construction. As interest in lean construction has steadily grown, the research has 
covered almost all construction stages employing lean concepts. As Emmitt (2007, 
p.135) noted: “the term lean construction tends to be interpreted quite widely, ranging 
from a term to include design and construction activities to very narrow 
interpretations related to specific production functions and/or application of tools by 
contractors.”  
 
In addition, the term covers a range of project types, such as industrialized housing 
(Höök and Stehn, 2008; Dentz et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2009), high-rise buildings 
(Sacks and Goldin, 2007), prefabrication projects (Low and Chan, 1997), 
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refurbishment project (Bryde and Schulmeister, 2012), and others. It has also 
extended to project areas such as project definition, the design process (Ballard and 
Zabelle, 2000), supply-chain mapping and simulation (Tommelein, 1998), and 
construction site practices (Picchi and Granja, 2004; Salem et al., 2006). It has been 
reported that lean construction can bring about benefits to the construction sector 
(see section 3.4.5). Although its achievements in construction so far have not been 
as extraordinary as in the case of Toyota, the outcome is indeed encouraging.  
 
3.4.2 Peculiarities of the construction industry 
The construction industry differs in many ways from the manufacturing industry. Thus, 
this study cannot suggest simply applying the Toyota Way model to the construction 
industry without modification. Previous studies have listed a large number of factors 
differentiate the construction industry from other industries, and from manufacturing 
in particular (Ball, 1988). These are what Koskela (1992) called the inherent 
peculiarities of construction; they are summarized in Table 3.1. The unique and 
complex environment of the construction industry represents a challenge for 
production management. As Riley and Clare-Brown (2001) have argued, it would not 
be possible to transfer management practices from manufacturing to construction 
unless necessary effort had been taken to modify the management tools or the 
culture in the construction industry. The critical question in assessing the potential for 
the application of the lean approach to construction is the extent to which the one-off 
nature of the construction process can be changed (Winch, 2010). This suggests that 
the appropriate model of manufacturing for the construction industry depends on the 
analysis of the construction subsector, which can generally be grouped into four 
broad categories (Winch, 2010), namely (1) large infrastructure works, typically civil 
engineering, (2) prestige building projects, (3) “routine” building projects that provide 
the bulk of new buildings, including schools, offices, and so on, and (4) housing. The 
first three categories are on-site, project-oriented construction projects (the majority 
of the work is site-based), so that production in volume can hardly be achieved. 
Construction projects will remain a one-off production process where design and 





Table 3.1 Differences between manufacturing and construction industry  
Aspects Construction industry Manufacturing industry 
Duration (life cycle) Short  Long 
Nature  One-of-a-kind nature Repetitive 
Work Station Transient  Stable 
Material components  Non-standardized Standardized 
Material supply Schedule-driven Order-driven  
Safety provision Less enforced Highly enforced 
Labour force Seasonal, low job security 
Not seasonal, higher 
employment security 
Wages 
Vary depending on skill, 
experience, and employers 
More stable wage policies 
Environment  
Productivity influenced by the 
change in environment  
Productivity less influenced by 
the change in environment 
Assembly and 
production 
final production is assembled in 
situ 
Within the factory 
Technology 
Low level of automation, prefer 
not to use  
Better and advanced 
Quality 
Related to product conformance; 
Rework is common 
More closely to process control; 
Rework is generally avoided 
Owner involvement  Highly involved Less involved 
Culture 
Ill-defined, site personnel know 
nothing of company’s 
management philosophy 
Clearly defined so that staff are 
conscious of it 
Regulatory 
intervention  
Design solution and many work 
phases in a construction project 
are subject to checks and 
approvals by regulatory 
authorities 
Less subject to checks and 
approvals 
Source: Ball (1988); Koskela (1992); Low and Chan (1997); Oglesby, et al. (1989); 
Salem et al. (2006); Riley and Clare-Brown (2001); Winch (2003)  
 
Furthermore, according to Winch (2003), the last category – housing production – is 
the most similar to lean production in terms of its underlying business process, where 
high-volume production allows the approach to be economically viable. The housing 
production company embraces the whole construction process, from design to the 
factory production of a complete house. This was often viewed as indistinguishable 
from conventional site-built housing. This does not imply that lean construction 
principles can only be implemented in the housing sector. Winch (2010) has outlined 
that lean-inspired improvement activities such as TQM and JIT have their place in 
effectively managing construction projects, because they provide a valuable tool set 
for improving process capability. In addition, some structural modifications of the 
manufacturing management concepts (e.g. the concept of JIT) are indispensable for 
the concept to be applied in the construction industry (Low and Chan, 1997). 
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3.4.3 Criticisms of lean construction 
It has been argued that the lean construction community has been slow in 
surmounting the critical debate over what lean is and is not (Green, 1999). Limited 
efforts have been made by researchers to enhance the credibility of lean construction 
by addressing or challenging its shortcomings (Jorgensen and Emmitt, 2008). Green 
(1999, 2002) is one of the few academics to claim that researchers have ignored a 
crucial argument concerning lean construction. Basically, most of Green’s (1999, 
2002) concerns are related to the potential effects on the quality of working life that 
the lean method could bring about. This warning has been expressed in the literature 
on lean production. However, the lean construction literature has repeatedly failed to 
recognize or has appeared to ignore the consideration of the human resource 
management (HRM) implications of lean construction. Green (1999, 2002) 
highlighted a number of issues that the lean construction literature has so far failed to 
address: 
(1) The institutional requirements for lean production. This requires an overall 
understanding of Japanese industrial structure as the business practice where 
lean production evolved. 
(2) The human cost of lean production, such as long working hours, loss of individual 
freedom, karoshi (sudden deaths), and severe stress. 
(3) Criticisms are not limited to production plants in Japan but also extend to 
Japanese overseas plants. Criticisms arising from overseas plants included 
increased management control instead of empowerment, intensification of work, 
etc. 
(4) The association of lean methods with totalitarian management regimes in the 
global context. 
 
Moreover, Green (2002) warned that if the construction industry overwhelmingly 
focused on waste elimination and improving efficiency – without however explicitly 
considering the HRM implications – construction companies and professional firms 
would find it increasingly difficult to attract intelligent, creative young professionals to 
join the industry. Green’s (2002) criticism has had meaningful impact on the lean 
construction community. A number of lean construction frameworks will be discussed 
later, all of which underscore the importance of HRM. Furthermore, this study uses 
Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model, which is a direct adaptation of Toyota’s philosophy, 
to provide an alternative framework. The Toyota Way model concerns people 
management in lean organizations. More importantly, the discussion in Chapter 4 
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revealed that “people-related” principles were positioned higher than the “process” 
management aspects that could be described as the amalgamation of TQM with the 
JIT concept.  
 
3.4.4 Lean construction: tools, techniques, and implementation frameworks 
3.4.4.1 Tools and techniques 
Lean construction does not simply adapt techniques from manufacturing into 
construction. Instead, as Paez et al. (2005) explain, lean construction tools were 
developed in three forms. 
(1) On the first level: lean construction adapted techniques from manufacturing for 
construction. Kanban cards are an example of this. This first level implies that 
lean construction has succeeded in overcoming the contextual difference and 
implemented the principles. 
(2) On the second level: lean construction has expanded the scope of lean 
manufacturing techniques. For example, lean construction has extended the 
scope of visual inspection (andon) of defective parts to the visualization of 
material and workflow. 
(3) On the third level: lean construction has introduced new techniques for its unique 
context. For example, the Last Planner System can be viewed as a combination 
of production smoothing and the kanban system. In manufacturing, production 
smoothening prepares the product sequence that is driven by kanban cards. 
Similarly, in the construction industry, the Last Planner System prepares a 
reverse-phase schedule that pulls assignments. 
 
Salem et al. (2006) discussed the transferability of lean manufacturing techniques to 
construction despite the differences in their working environment and process. An 
assessment tool was subsequently developed to evaluate the impact of the lean 
construction tools on the performance of the construction project. These lean 
construction tools include the Last Planner System, increased visualization, huddle 
meetings, first-run studies, 5-S, and fail safe for quality. Moreover, Picchi and Granja 
(2004) also considered that lean implementation is viable for the construction sector, 
and summarized a few examples of lean tools used on job sites by employing lean-
thinking principles. Unlike Salem et al. (2006) and Paez et al. (2005), who only 
focused on discussing the feasibility of lean production tools in the construction 
industry, Picchi and Granja (2004) instead studied the extent of construction firms 
44 
 
dealing with lean tools, and identified three common lean implementation scenarios 
as follows: 
(1) Scenario 1: This shows the most frequent application pattern to be adopted by 
construction firms so far. In most cases, the building professionals only took up 
one lean construction tool, and failed to connect it with other tools or other lean 
principles (Picchi and Granja, 2004).  
(2) Scenario 2: This concerns situations in which there is systematic interpretation of 
the lean-thinking principles and the integrated application of lean tools on the job 
site.  
(3) Scenario 3: This represents a larger application of the lean approach to the job 
site and as company-wide transformation. Picchi and Granja (2004) noted that 
Scenario 3 cannot be achieved without involving several aspects of the company, 
such as product development, suppliers and customer relationships. It also 
indicates that lean implementation would be most effective when considering a 
construction firm as a whole, and should be considered as a long-term goal. This 
is in line with Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model, which promoted the application of 
the fourteen principles as a whole and on a long-term basis. 
 
3.4.4.2 Implementation frameworks 
Although lean construction is still in its infancy, there is already a set of practices that 
have been proposed, tested, and implemented (Paez et al., 2005). The following 
section discusses the various frameworks of lean construction that have been 
adopted. These include lean construction as a socio-technical system (Paez et al., 
2005) which equally concerns the human and technical aspects; lean initiatives in 
eight areas of the construction business (Johansen and Walter, 2007); the lean 
construction wheel (Diekmann et al., 2004), and the three dominant models of lean 
construction as summarized by Green and May (2005) from the perspective of policy-
makers in the industry. 
 
Socio-technical system of lean construction  
Socio-technical design is defined as the combination of a technical and human 
subsystem into the same work design. Lean construction and lean manufacturing are 
part of the same socio-technological design with the same goals, activities, and 
workforce capabilities but with different technical systems (Paez et al., 2005). Based 
on this, Paez et al. (2005) introduced a higher view of lean construction and lean 
manufacturing as a socio-technical system in Table 3.2. This model implies that the 
operational improvement will always rely on the joint effort of the technical and 
45 
 
human elements that characterize the lean enterprise (Paez et al., 2005). It also 
concluded that the tools presented in the context of the lean manufacturing scenario 
can fit the construction industry to support the same principles (e.g. JIT, production 
smoothening and autonomation). 
 
Table 3.2 Lean construction as socio-technological design 
Scope: Design, supply and production   





Team    




























Source: Paez et al. (2005) 
 
Lean construction in eight areas 
Given that an understanding of the complexity of the construction industry, as well as 
of the human aspects of lean construction has improved, Johansen and Walter (2007) 
proposed a conceptual model of lean construction, which can be employed to assess 
the level of awareness of lean construction. They conducted a questionnaire to study 
eight areas in an organization, namely design, procurement, planning/control, supply, 
installation, collaboration, behaviour, and management. The chosen areas were 
highlighted by Johansen and Walter (2007) as being fundamental in developing a 
lean culture. Later, the German construction industry was chosen as a pilot study, in 
which the results showed that a holistic understanding of construction activities has 
not been developed yet, because the majority employed only a few management 
concepts from the framework (Johansen and Walter, 2007). 
 
Lean construction wheel 
In a similar vein, efforts have been made by Diekmann et al. (2004), a team of 
researchers from the Construction Industry Institute (CII) in the US, to help 
construction companies self-assess the extent to which they conform to lean 
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behaviors. This framework looks similar to that of Tapping et al. (2002) in terms of 
structure, and contains five key principles. The five principles are as follows: 
(1) Customer focus 
(2) Culture/people 
(3) Workplace standardization 
(4) Waste elimination 
(5) Continuous improvement/built-in quality 
Yet there are many differences in terms of the sub-principles listed. This is because 
each sub-principle was evaluated for its applicability to the construction industry.  
 
Lean construction models from the perspective of policy makers 
Green and May (2005) discussed three dominant models represent the practical 
adoption of lean in construction. The finding was derived from an investigation of the 
perception on lean amongst the industry’s policy makers. First of all, Green and May 
(2005) outlined that Model 1 is limited to the hardware of lean production and places 
little focus on human resource practices. It aims to sort the inefficiency within the 
industry by changing the term from “waste elimination” to “cut out unnecessary cost” 
(Green and May, 2005). Secondly, Model 2 advocates “project partnering” and 
“strategic partnering” but is nevertheless concerned that the partnership would be 
become one sided. Moreover, it does not advocate the need for supporting human 
resource practices. Thirdly, Model 3 combines elements from the previous two 
models and is regarded as more sophisticated than the previous two (Green and May, 
2005). It has much stronger emphasis on the institutional context within which 
projects are delivered. Moreover, Model 3 places far greater emphasis on social and 
technological aspects such as technology and training at all levels than the two 
previous models.  
 
In summary, this section discusses various models of the implementation of lean 
construction. The first model focuses on the human and technological aspects of lean 
construction, and asserts that tools from the manufacturing scenario can work in the 
construction industry to realize the same goals. The second model examines 
opportunities for exercising the lean approach in various functions that a normal 
construction firm would deal with. This begins with the procurement strategy, 
extending from site planning and control to the supply chain, and also including 
organizational considerations. The third framework focuses on five key principles of 
lean construction, and uses these principles as guidelines to assess the extent to 
which a company conforms to lean practice. The fourth framework summarizes the 
47 
 
current practices within the industry from the perspective of policy-makers, and 
highlights how waste elimination is the first step towards true lean transformation. 
The above-mentioned frameworks offer good practical references, which can be 
used to assess the awareness of construction practitioners, the level of leanness of a 
company, and also to give a holistic picture of lean implementation.  
 
3.4.5 Lean construction and enhanced performance 
Many management initiatives do not go well at the early stage, due to the fact that 
the people involved fail to see the benefits associated with the changes (Song and 
Liang, 2011). In the lean construction context, an increase has been seen in the 
number of empirical studies, originating from many countries, which have argued that 
the successful application of lean principles in construction can improve cost 
structure (Salem et al., 2006), productivity (Agbulos et al., 2006; Alex et al., 2008; Al-
Sudairi, 2007), delivery times (Diekmann et al., 2004), plan reliability (Ballard, 2000; 
Cho and Ballard, 2011; Liu et al., 2011), quality (Leonard, 2006), relationship 
between working partners (Miller et al., 2002; Salem et al., 2006; Turner Construction 
Company, 2012), and job satisfaction (Nahmens et al., 2012). These are good 
reasons for implementing lean construction. To be more specific, the evidence 
includes: studies using lean for managing drainage operations (Agbulos et al., 2006) 
and sewer installation (Alex et al., 2008) in the construction sector achieved 
respectively 4% and 35% improvement in productivity in Canada. In a similar vein, 
Song and Liang (2011) reported potential productivity improvement for formwork 
installation using simulation techniques. Al-Sudairi (2007) reported 21% and 50% 
increase in process efficiency for block-laying and plastering from 13 cases of low-
rise residential buildings in Saudi Arabia. This suggests that lean principles are 
effective not only in complicated processes, but also in simple processes (Al-Sudairi, 
2007). In the UK, Balfour Beatty (2011), a leading British contractor, reported its 
experience with sports stadium construction (the Emirates Stadium): it applied JIT 
delivery of the pipe reinforcement cages and saw a 20% improvement in productivity. 
As for plan reliability, the application of the Last Planner System of production control 
to projects has been demonstrated to increase plan reliability (Ballard, 2000). 
Following Ballard’s (2000) work, Cho and Ballard (2011) surveyed a list of 
participants with experience of the project production system and found that there is 
a significant correlation between the implementation of the Last Planner System and 
project performance, as measured by cost and schedule reduction. In addition, 
research using 134 weeks of production data in the 10 working areas of a pipe 
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installation project conducted by Liu et al. (2011) revealed that work-flow reliability 
and labour productivity are significantly correlated, and that the Last Planner System 
can reduce work flow variation, which can help improve labour productivity.  
 
Yu et al. (2011) reported a case study of a US modular building producer, which had 
been implementing lean for only 6 months, but which witnessed an improvement of 
50% in production throughout and of 10% in labour efficiency, as well as 18% 
decrease in labour costs without laying off a single worker. Leonard (2006) 
conducted research of kaizen activities for a homer builder in the US, and found that 
inspection time and cost were reduced by 50% after kaizen improvement efforts were 
made. Also in the US, Salem et al. (2006) noted that the benefits of lean construction 
implementation were tangible: a car park project in Ohio implemented lean 
construction techniques and was completed under budget and three weeks ahead of 
schedule. The subcontractors were also more satisfied with their relationships with 
the general contractor. This is consistent with the finding of Song and Liang’s (2011) 
study that time saving was among the greatest benefits of using lean construction 
concepts, because these helped to generate teamwork among the subcontractors. 
Maturana et al. (2007) also investigated whether the benefits of lean construction can 
be extended to subcontractors. Maturana et al. (2007) developed an on-site 
subcontractor evaluation methods based on lean principles and partnering practices. 
This tool allows main contractors in Chile to help subcontractors improve their 
performance by providing them with periodic feedback on such tools. Furthermore, a 
case study conducted by Nahmens et al. (2012) in the US industrialized 
homebuilding sector revealed an increase of 11% in job satisfaction after lean 
implementation.   
 
3.4.6 Lean construction in developing countries 
In developing countries, research is concerned with three major issues in the area of 
lean construction: 
(1) Feasibility studies and investigation into awareness of lean construction. 
(2) Exploring the barriers to the implementation of lean construction (Forbes et al., 
2002; Alinaitwe, 2009). 
(3) Implementing lean starts with identifying the waste in construction, which 





Feasibility study and awareness of lean 
Lean construction can be viewed as a strategic option when its implementation is 
placed in a new setting (Senaratne and Wijesiri, 2008). Senaratne and Wijesiri (2008) 
used suitability and acceptability tests to conclude that lean construction is suitable 
and acceptable in the Sri Lankan context. They revealed that: 
(1) A number of controlled waste flows and their root causes were identified. This 
waste hindered the performance of the Sri Lankan construction industry. Lean 
construction is suitable in the Sri Lankan context as a strategic approach, 
because it can be used to eliminate this major waste.  
(2) The construction workforce in Sri Lanka accepts the core principles of lean 
construction and has a continuous improvement or kaizen mentality. 
 
Moreover, Abduh and Roza (2006) revealed that the large Indonesian contractors 
have already implemented “macro” lean construction principles (such as the policy of 
continuous improvement and promoting transparency). Yet when it comes to the 
“micro” principles of lean construction (such as the reduction of cycle time and 
variability), the large Indonesian contractors still lack awareness and the ability to 
implement principles and techniques, due to their inadequate capability to plan 
workflow well. 
 
Barriers for implementation of lean 
Forbes et al. (2002) conceded that the main obstacle to the implementation of lean in 
developing nations is that construction firms do not emphasize productivity and 
quality initiatives. Alinaitwe (2009) identified many barriers to lean production under 
different management concepts, including JIT, TQM, concurrent engineering, etc. in 
Uganda’s construction industry. Alinaitwe (2009) detailed the barriers by grouping 
these into (1) barriers that strongly influence workers’ productivity, and (2) barriers 
that are easier to overcome. Olatunji (2008) interviewed a total of 10 clients made up 
of five private and five public construction firms in Nigeria. In Olatunji’s (2008) work, 
the barriers to implementation of lean were categorized under seven groups, namely: 
(1) skills and knowledge related, (2) management related, (3) government related, (4) 
attitude related, (5) resource related, (6) logistics related, and (7) others. Low and 
Gao (2011) discussed the potential impediments to implementing the concept of JIT 
in the Chinese construction industry from a project life-cycle perspective. The 
impediments identified fall into the areas of design, procurement, construction, and 




Elimination of waste 
Ramaswamy and Kalidindi (2009) quantified different categories of waste in terms of 
cost in the Indian construction industry. They found that waste due to non-value-
adding activities carried out by labour or due to equipment were much higher 
compared to material wastes generated in the site. Polat and Ballard (2004) identified 
the material and time wastes in areas of design, procurement, material handling, 
operations, residual, and others, which were classified by Bossink and Brouwers 
(1996) as the main causes of waste in construction. Polat and Ballard (2004) 
highlighted that the material and time wastes are major problems in the Turkish 
construction industry and that the construction practitioners have failed to appreciate 
the adaptation of lean construction techniques. Contractors were therefore advised to 
do their part and to employ lean construction techniques through adopting the lean 
philosophy. It was further suggested to concentrate on eliminating the causes of 
waste, rather than only reacting to these problems. 
 
The literature on the application of lean construction has received considerable 
attention in the developed countries, such as in the UK, US, Singapore, Nordic 
countries, etc. One of the remarkable facilitators in promoting the lean concept is the 
government in these developed countries. In the developing countries, the 
implementation of lean construction is still in the very early stage. It began with 
investigation into the awareness of lean concepts among construction practitioners, 
and with waste elimination in the construction processes. It turned out that the 
awareness level of lean in the construction industry was low. For example, some 
contractors were already practicing either one or more lean concepts every day, but 
they were not consciously aware that this was in conformance with lean construction 
until the lean frameworks were introduced to them. Moreover, it is beneficial for the 
developing countries to explore the barriers that can hamper the adoption of lean in 
construction. This indicates that support from the government in the developing 
countries needs to be enhanced. Without clear objectives set by the government, the 
awareness of lean will be adversely affected. Given that China is still a developing 
country and the Chinese construction industry is operating in a very similar manner 
(i.e. traditional procurement, labour intensive, etc.) compared to other developing 
countries, the literature relating to such a similar context would bear implications for 




3.5 Knowledge gap analysis  
A number of scholars have suggested that the concept of lean should be built on the 
socio-technical system with a balanced view of process-related (hard) and people-
related (soft) elements (Emiliani, 2006; Liker, 2004; Paez et al., 2005; Shah and 
Ward, 2007; Low and Gao, 2011). Toyota Way is a good example which has to two 
main pillars namely “continuous improvement” and “respect for people” (Liker, 2004). 
However, the principle of “respect for people” is sometimes give less attention than it 
should. Commonly, when we think of lean, we typically first consider process flow, 
pull kanban system, standardization, visual control tools, and opportunities for 
significant financial improvement. All of these fall under the “hard” part of lean, which 
greatly limits the amount of improvement that can be achieved (Bhasin and Burcher, 
2006; Emiliani et al., 2003). Seeing this, Emiliani (2006) wrote that “the people-
related principle has long been unrecognized, ignored, or misunderstood by most 
senior managers outside Toyota and its affiliated suppliers” (p.4).   
 
Similarly, in the domain of lean construction, the ignorance of the human-resource 
management aspect of lean was constantly criticized. Examination of a number of 
lean construction frameworks supports this assertion, as made by Green (1999; 
2002). As shown in Chapter 3, a majority of the above-mentioned frameworks 
provide answers to questions such as “what constitutes lean construction” (Diekmann 
et al., 2004, Salem et al., 2006). Some offer good practical references, which can be 
used to assess the awareness of lean construction among the construction 
practitioners (Santos, 1999, Johansen and Walter, 2007), or the status quo of their 
lean construction implementation (Diekmann et al., 2004, Salem et al., 2006). 
However, the examination also highlights the fact that the development of lean 
construction is uneven, because it is evident that “process-focus” thinking is still the 
dominant theme among all the lean construction framework examined. This is 
because with the shop floor-focused mind-set, implementing lean tools can result in 
immediate improvements, but it would never come close to the benefits arising from 
implementation of the whole system (Liker, 2004). In addition, only three of the 
frameworks selected (Diekmann et al., 2004, Paez et al., 2004, Green and May, 
2005) consider the soft side of the lean approach, while the remaining do not 
consider HRM implications at all. The knowledge gap could be fulfilled if the lean 
construction paradigm were to move forward to shift its present focus onto the issues 





This chapter reviewed three major paradigms of industrial production over the last 
100 years and argued that lean production, as a dominant paradigm in recent years, 
combines the advantages of both craft production and mass production in concert 
with the principles of JIT and elimination of waste in order to minimize the total cost 
of producing a product (Crowly, 1998; Womack et al., 1990). Lean production is an 
innovative way of manufacturing distilled from the two former paradigms. In order to 
evaluate the evolution of the lean production model, it is best to start by considering 
the evolution of leading firms such as Toyota, whose experience was the basis for 
the model itself. In addition, this chapter discussed the concept, elements and its 
theoretical support – five principles of lean thinking – contributed by Womack and 
Jones (1996) as well as various implementation frameworks of lean production. It can 
be argued that most implementation frameworks of lean production (e.g. Karlsson 
and Åhlström, 1996; Koskela, 1992; Ohno, 1988; Shah and Ward, 2007; Womack 
and Jones, 1996) were process focused. Implementing a few lean tools that focused 
on the shop floor could result in some improvements, but it would never come close 
to the benefits that were possible from implementing the whole system (Liker, 2004). 
Moreover, this chapter also discussed various issues in lean construction. It started 
with an overview of what lean construction is, followed by an outline of the 
differences between the construction and the manufacturing industry, and addressing 
the difficulties of transferring the lean principles to the construction industry. This 
chapter also reviewed the various implementation frameworks for lean construction, 
and summarized how developing countries have adopted the lean principles. In 









4 THE TOYOTA WAY 
4.1 Why Toyota Way model 
4.1.1 Why Toyota and its production system 
Toyota is worthy of in-depth study because the company is good at manufacturing 
(Liker, 2004; Sobek and Smalley, 2008). Every automotive insider and many 
consumers are aware of and familiar with Toyota’s stunning success in terms of its 
reliable products, high productivity and increasing profitability every year (Liker, 
2004). Toyota became the world’s leading auto manufacturer with approximately 15 
percent of the global market share in 2005. Toyota’s market value (US$177billion in 
2005) exceeds the combined value of General Motors (GM), Chrysler, and Ford 
(Morgan and Liker, 2006). One reason for this success is the quality of Toyota 
products. According to the recent U.S. Vehicle Dependability Study published by J.D. 
Powers & Associates (2013)1, Toyota motor models earn seven segment awards for 
higher quality and less problems experienced by car owners. Moreover, Toyota is the 
most productive company, according to the Oliver Wyman’s (2008) Harbour report on 
the North American automobile industry. Toyota and Chrysler led the six largest 
multi-plant auto-makers in total manufacturing productivity, averaging 30.37 labour 
hours per vehicle (GM averages 32.29 hours per vehicle, while Ford averages 33.88 
hours per vehicle). It is worth noting that Toyota fabricates and assembles a greater 
percentage of its vehicle parts with its own employees, while the big Three (GM, Ford 
and Chrysler) purchase many modules and subassemblies from suppliers, thus 
saving labour. Although productivity gains are essential to a company's success, it is 
profitability that keeps the business growing. According to Oliver Wyman (2008), 
Toyota earned US$922 pre-tax profits per vehichle produced in North America in 
2007. In contrast, Ford, GM and Chrysler lost US$1467, US$729 and US$412 
respectively.  
 
Toyota’s success has made the TPS the new paradigm in the manufacturing industry. 
The advantages of the TPS have been demonstrated tangibly enough in practice and 
widely cited in the literature. That is the fundamental reason why Toyota attracted so 
many audiences. Ideally, it seems logical to adopt the TPS as a model in a study 
dealing with improving operations in organizations, even when the firms are 
considered to be operating in a very different environment and have distinguished 
themselves differently from the manufacturing industry.  
                                                     
1
 J.D. Powers and Associates is a global marketing information services firm, which is best 
known for its customer satisfaction research on new-car quality and long-term dependability. 
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4.1.2 Why the Lean paradigm is not enough 
For the production system that most firms have currently adopted, Liker (2004) 
advocated the use of the Toyota Way management principles as a whole system 
because: (1) the Toyota Production System is historically accepted as the mother 
platform where lean concepts originated; and (2) a very normal phenomenon was 
recognized by Liker (2004) that most U.S. companies have been learning the TPS 
and lean practices for decades without understanding what made them work together 
in a system. These organizations claimed to be advanced practitioners of lean 
methods, but when compared with Toyota actually showed otherwise. Although the 
lean programmes are effective in cutting down costs and have helped these 
companies enjoyed cost saving, Liker (2004) however highlighted that the problem 
persists because these companies have mistaken a particular set of lean tools for 
deep “lean thinking”. This has been pointed out in Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model, 
where most companies are still stagnant at the “process” level. Although obvious 
progress have already been made and such companies have performed better than 
their non-lean counterparts, without adopting the other practices and philosophies, 
they will do little more than dabble in the same place, and their performance will 
continue to lag behind those companies that adopt a true culture of continuous 
improvement (Liker, 2004). Therefore, it is very critical to introduce the Toyota Way 
principles as a whole. This has become another reason for studying the Toyota Way 
model. 
 
4.1.3 Disadvantage of TPS 
Recently, the limits of the lean model have been examined, both in Japan, the 
original context of the model, and in other industrial and cultural contexts (Cusumano, 
1994). Cusumano (1994) pointed out Toyota’s practice of having suppliers make or 
deliver components just in time to assembly lines, requires suppliers to diligently 
increase the delivery frequency each day. This can result in traffic problems 
especially in congested urban areas as well environment problems (Katayama and 
Bennett, 1996), wasting time when people are stranded in the traffic. Apart from the 
disadvantages of the process part of lean principles, the human resource aspects 
have also revealed side-effects resulting from lean production practices (see Conti et 
al., 2006; Williams et al., 1992). The JIT philosophy involves the workers working 
much harder at continuous tasks, and Toyota have more recently been accused of 
making front-line workers work in conditions that could cause repetitive strain injuries 
(Crowther and Green, 2004). In a similar vein, Williams et al. (1992) suggested that 
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lean production is de-humanizing and exploitative. However, Conti et al. (2006) 
indicated that lean production is not inherently stressful and it depends heavily on 
management choices in designing and operating lean system. Hine et al. (2004) 
noted that the key criticisms of the main critics of lean thinking are the lack of 
contingency and ability to cope with variability, the lack of consideration of human 
aspects, and the narrow operational focus on the shop floor. Additionally, Hine et al. 
(2004) argued that the emerging shortcoming of lean was the outcome of 
organizations who have progressed on their learning curves, as well as the extension 
of lean thinking into new sectors with different settings and constraints.  
 
4.2 From TPS to the Toyota Way model 
Gaining a true understanding of Toyota’s philosophy perhaps requires going beyond 
TPS and lean to understand the Toyota Way (Liker, 2004). In describing the Toyota 
Way, the Toyota Motor Corporation’s (2003) internal training document with the same 
title (see Figure 4.1) is examined, which sums up five key principles of the Toyota 
employee conduct guidelines based on the dual pillars of “Continuous Improvement” 














Figure 4.1 The Toyota Way 2001  
(Source: Toyota Motor Corporation, 2003) 
 
Liker (2004) incorporated and correlated these high-level guiding principles from 
Toyota’s internal document with his Toyota Way model (see Figure 4.2). He used a 
pyramidal model, which comprises a synopsis of the fourteen principles to outline the 




We improve our business operations 
continuously, always driving for 
innovation and evolution. 
Genchi Genbutsu 
We go to the source to find the facts to 
make correct decisions, build 
consensus, and achieve our goals. 
Respect 
We respect others, make every effort 
to understand each other, take 
responsibility, and do our best to build 
mutual trust. 
Team work 
We stimulate personal and 
professional growth, share the 
opportunities of development, and 
maximize individual and team 
experience. 
Challenge 
We form a long-term vision, meeting 
challenges with courage and creativity 
to realize our dreams. 




success. According to Gary Convis2, who was cited in Liker (2004, p.xi), “the Toyota 
Way, along with the Toyota Production System, make up Toyota’s DNA.” The 
principles are grouped in four broad categories and each category contains relevant 
sub-principles:  
(1) Long term Philosophy (Philosophy). 
(2) The right Process will produce the right results (Process). 
(3) Add value to the organization by developing your People and Partners 
(People/Partners). 
(4) Continuously solving root Problems drives organizational learning (Problem 
Solving) 
The foundation of the pyramid is the management philosophy which bases its 
decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the expense of short-term financial 
targets. The next level in the pyramid deals with the right processes such that 
production flow is levelled, pulled, standardized and visualized for everyone to 
identify problems. The next layer places respect on people and partners, while 
challenging and growing them. The last step of the pyramid in the Toyota Way model 
is the problem solving philosophy by using various improvement tools such as kaizen 
















Figure 4.2 4P model of the Toyota Way  
(Source: Liker, 2004) 
 
                                                     
2
 Gary Convis is a managing officer of Toyota and President, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, 
Kentucky. 
Process  
P2: One-piece flow (waste elimination) 
P3: Use pull systems to avoid overproduction  
P4: Heijunka – levelled workload 
P5: Jidoka – built-in quality 
P6: Standardized work 
P7: Visual management  
P8: Use reliable and proven technology 
Problem Solving  
P12: Genchi genbutsu – go see for yourself 
P13: Decisions by slow consensus; implement quickly 
P14: Kaizen, become a learning organization 
 
People and Partners  
P9: Grow leaders who understand the work and live the 
philosophy 
P10: Develop exceptional people and teams 
P11: Respect extended network of partners and suppliers  
Philosophy 
P1: Management decisions based on a long-
term philosophy, even at the expense of short-
term financial loss 
Philosophy 
Process 





The Toyota Way actually supersedes the TPS and is, in fact, quite different in its 
emphasis (Liker and Hoseus, 2008). In the TPS (see Figure 3.1), the core pillars are 
just-in-time and jidoka (autonomation) – both technical concepts. People are at the 
center of the TPS house but most lean applications implemented outside of Toyota 
focused specifically on the tools used to take waste out of the process. In contrast, 
the Toyota Way model focused on people and their way of solving problems, their 
continuous improvement and respect for others. Liker (2004) put the “process” part 
containing the principles of JIT and other lean tools in the middle of the pyramidal 
Toyota Way model, one layer down as sub-methodologies supporting “people” in 
creating more value to the final products in Toyota. 
 
The 4P model of the Toyota Way provides a picture of the values that constitute the 
foundation of the Toyota Production System and how these principles are applied in 
practice. The principles together create a totality which has made Toyota an 
enormously successful and profitable company. These broad four categories of 
philosophy, process, people/partners, and problem solving can be used to construct 
any organization. Therefore in the following sections, each of the fourteen principles 
will be detailed and discussed at two levels: principles and tool/practice if any. It can 
be noticed that in Liker’s (2004) book – The Toyota Way – the fourteen principles 
were reviewed with stories of the challenges Toyota overcame to develop the Lexus 
and the Prius. Therefore, efforts should be made to distil the key principles and tools 
from these stories. 
 
4.3 Toyota Way Philosophy model  
4.3.1 Principle 1: Long-term philosophy 
“Based your management decision on the long-term philosophy, even at the expense 
of short-term financial goals” has been outlined as the first principle of the Toyota 
Way (Liker, 2004, p.37). The first principle is the most philosophical foundation since 
it does not define hard action items but focuses a number of guiding principles of the 
company that Toyota firmly believed and stuck to it. It includes four sub-principles 
that have a very strong influence on the overall philosophy of the organization which 
permeate down to influence other principles and tools in other layers of the Toyota 
Way model. Each sub-principle is described and analyzed below, namely: (1) sense 





Sense of purpose 
One major characteristic of corporate purpose is that it embodies the ultimate priority 
(objective) of the organization (Basu, 1999). It is the case that Toyota as a company, 
wants and needs to make a profit, but that is not the driving purpose of the company. 
Liker (2004, p.72) revealed that “the Toyota people have a sense of purpose greater 
than earning a paycheck”. Toyota’s purpose is to be a contributing member of society 
by taking care of its employees and local communities (Basu, 2000; Liker, 2004) and 
achieving long term prosperity for all employees and partners (Liker and Hoseus, 
2008). There are changes in Toyota’s purpose as revealed by Basu (2000), who 
reviewed the evolution in the guiding principles of Toyota over the past decades and 
noted that what changed with time is the geographic scope of purpose, which from 
the earlier days focused only on the Japanese employees and the Japanese society 
to the global employees and the global society in more recent years. Liker (2004, 
p.72) summarized the first principle of the Toyota Way, by stating that: “Toyota’s 
strong sense of mission and commitment to its customers, employees, and society is 
the foundation for all the other principles.” Moreover, to develop the “constancy of 
purpose” is one of the strategies that Toyota had adopted and operated for a long 
term purpose, which explained why Toyota enjoys a steady growth trend in the sales 
and profits for every year except during the economic recession caused by the Wall 
Street meltdown in 2008-2009. 
 
Long-term perspective 
The Toyota people commonly agreed that they are very cost-conscious (Liker, 2004). 
However, cost deduction is not the overriding principle that drives Toyota. Most 
people would agree that focusing on short-term financial results at the expense of the 
long-term health of the organization is not the best approach. However, taking a long-
term view is not easy in the presence of pressure to perform in the short-term. In 
addition, the company, according to Liker (2004), is like an organism nurturing itself, 
constantly protecting and growing its offsprings (this will be discussed in Principles 9 
and 10) on a long-term basis, so that it can continue to grow and stay strong. A 
company that focuses as much as Toyota does on eliminating waste in 
manufacturing might find it pragmatic to lay off employees during the slow period. 
Toyota would not dismiss its employees because of a temporary downturn. Moreover, 
sustaining a long-term relationship with the suppliers is also essential to the Toyota 




Be self-reliance and responsible  
Liker (2004, p.78) outlined that self-reliance and “let’s do it ourselves” is a unique 
spirit of Toyota which was implemented at a corporate institutional level. The concept 
of self-reliance plays an important role in developing Toyota’s core competitiveness 
because although Toyota outsourced 70% of the vehicles to suppliers, it never 
transferred all the core knowledge and responsibility in any key area to the suppliers 
(Liker, 2004). Toyota distinguishes itself by endeavouring to be an expert and the 
best in the world at mastering certain core technologies. Moreover, at Toyota, the 
champion to self-reliance is responsibility for its own successes and failures. The 
Toyota Way 2001 document, cited in Liker (2004, p.80), states that: “We strive to 
decide our own fate. We act with self-reliance, trusting in our own abilities. We accept 
responsibility for our conduct and for maintaining and improving the skills that enable 
us to produce added value.”  
 
Customer focus 
The Toyota Way is about adding value to customers, employees, and society. 
According to Basu (2000), another purpose of Toyota is to enhance customer 
satisfaction. Understanding what the customer wants and needs is the first step for 
an organization to have a customer focus. Profits are generated by satisfying 
customer needs by providing valuable products and/or services. That is why the TPS 
starts with the customer, asking “what value are we adding from the customer’s 
perspective” (Liker, 2004, p.9). Moreover, to ensure that the organization always 
does the right thing for the customer, it is critical for Toyota to develop a culture that 
puts customer’s interests above all. Convis (2001) outlined that the “customer-first” 
philosophy is one of the fundamental elements of the TPS that management must be 
fully committed to. In contrast with other organizations’ envision of customers in 
terms of that person who purchases the final product, the TPS views each 
succeeding process, workstation or department as the customer (Convis, 2001). 
Convis (2001) revealed that in a Toyota plant, the management endeavours to 
ensure that all team members and departments realize their dual roles, namely that 
they are not only the customers of the previous operation but also the suppliers to the 




4.3.2 Summary of Principle 1 
Table 4.1 summarizes the operationalized measureables from the Toyota Way 
Philosophy model.  
 
Table 4.1 Operationalized measureables from the Toyota Way Philosophy model 
The Toyota Way 
Philosophy model 
Operationalized measurables 
Sense of purpose 
A high purpose to generate value towards customers, 
employees and society  
Sustain a constant purpose 
Long-term perspective 
Long term philosophy supersede short-term financial loss 






Understand what customer wants 
Customer first spirit 
Extend customer focus internally (e.g. employees, suppliers) 
 
4.4 Toyota Way Process model  
Performing processes is what allows people to transform the organization’s inputs 
into outcomes which customers are willing to pay for. Every activity performed that is 
able to directly or indirectly support this transformation can be seen as a process. 
Achieving an effective and efficient process is the most fundamental determinant of 
how successful the company is in satisfying the customer’s needs today. Principles 2 
to 8 of the Toyota Way are part of the second broad category of Process (refers to 
Figure 4.2), which involve a number of TPS tools for improving the manufacturing 
process as well as to achieve a stable production flow (Liker, 2004; Moore, 2007). 
These tools and processes are important and powerful but they are only the “tactical” 
or “operations” aspects of the Toyota Way. They can be far more effective when they 
are supported by a company-wide, long-term management philosophy (Principle 1) 
(Liker, 2008). As Liker (2004, p.87) outlined that: “Toyota leaders truly believe that if 
they create the right process the results will follow.” So what is the right process? 
What does a right process looks like? To answer these questions, the rest of this 
section focuses on defining how to achieve this right process with detailed 
examination of each principle along with the relevant tools.  
 
4.4.1 Principle 2: One piece flow 
One-piece flow is also called “continuous flow”. It means products that move 
continuously through the processing steps with minimal waiting time in between them, 
and the shortest distance travelled, will be produced with the highest efficiency (Liker 
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and Meier, 2006). Although the JIT concept has not been explicitly mentioned in 
principle 2, achieving the one-piece flow is widely accepted as one of the goals of JIT. 
Aggarwal (1985) viewed JIT as an approach for providing smoother production flows 
and making continual improvements in processes and products. Liker (2004) noted 
that the ideal JIT aims to eliminate the physical buffers (materials or time) between 
production processes. To achieve that, cutting out wasted effort and time that is not 
adding value (waste) is required. Therefore, experts (e.g. Liker, 2004; Liker and 
Meier, 2006) suggested that companies should begin their lean journey with waste 
reduction, discussed seven major types of non-value adding activities in the 
manufacturing process. 
  
Toyota leaders believe that if they create the right process, the results will follow. 
This principle focuses on optimizing a flow process to identify the rooted problems. 
When operations are linked together, there is more teamwork, rapid feedback on 
earlier quality problems, control over the process, and direct pressure for workers to 
solve the problems and think and grow. Ohno (1988) discovered that if he reduced 
the inventory, the problems surfaced, and people were forced to solve them or the 
system was forced to stop producing. In essence, the creation of flow forces the 
correction of problems, resulting in reduced waste.  
 
Elements of one-piece flow 
To accomplish a one-piece flow as a distinct production system, Miltenburg (2001) 
called for the following five unique elements to be present: (1) Takt time, (2) Flow 
manufacturing on U-shaped production lines, (3) Pull production control, (4) Jidoka, 
and (5) Standardized work. Each of these five elements is examined in details as 
follows: 
 
(1) Takt time 
Takt is a German word for rhythm or meter, which is defined as the rate of customer 
demand for the group of product produced by one process (Liker, 2004). Takt time is 
calculated by dividing the effective operating time of a process by the quantity of 
items customers require from the process in a certain time period. It does not 
automatically mean that every item should be produced at a rate of every takt time. 
Usually, there are two scenarios: if the production flow does not follow the takt time, 
when the production line is either going faster or slower. If they are going faster, they 
will overproduce; if they are going slower, they will create bottlenecks. Takt can be 
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used to set the pace of production and advise the workers whenever they are getting 
ahead or are behind schedule.  
 
(2) U-shaped production lines 
In a U-shaped production line, machines are arranged around the edge of a U-shape, 
allowing workers to walk the shortest distance from process to process, loading and 
unloading parts, and performing other manual operations (see Figure 4.3). The 
advantages of the U-shape over a linear flow line are: firstly, it assists communication, 
since workers on a particular line are physically closer to each other; and secondly, 
the layout allows the workers access to a number of machines and to be able to 
operate several machines. It can be seen from the U-shape flow line example that a 
flexible multi-skilled workforce is required for efficient operation of the flow line.  
Figure 4.3 U-shaped one-piece flow cell  
(Source: Liker, 2004) 
 
(3) Pull production control, (4) Jidoka, and (5) Standard work 
These three principles are discussed individually as Principles 3, 5 and 6 of the 
Toyota Way. This infers that in order to achieve a flow manufacturing process, it 
requires an integration of all these principles working together. 
 
4.4.2 Principle 3: Pull kanban system 
There are two primary ways of regulating work flow in production systems: pull and 
push. Hopp and Spearman (2000) distinguished push from pull by the different 
mechanisms that trigger the movement of work in the system: a push system 
releases a job (e.g. materials or information) into a production process (e.g. factory, 
line, or workstation) precisely based on pre-assigned due dates. In contrast, a pull 
system release a job into a system based on the state of the system (e.g. the amount 
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of work in process and the quality of available) in addition to due dates. This avoids 
excess inventory resulting from bad guesswork. Liker (2004) highlighted that in the 
Toyota Way, the pull system means the ideal state of just-in-time manufacturing: 
giving the customer what he or she wants, when he or she wants it, and in the 
amount he or she wants. In construction, pull is ultimately driven by target completion 




According to Liker (2004), in the mode of mass production or push system, each 
department will decide for all the largest volume items to follow their independent 
schedule in advance, without any coordination between the departments, before it 
changes over. That is the strategy which most mass production companies will take 
to minimize the equipment changeovers that are necessary for making different types 
of products with the same equipment. The disadvantage is well recognized by Ohno 
(1988) as such production systems will lead to overproduction and create large 
banks of inventory. Hence, Ohno (1988) decided to create small “store” of parts 
between operations to control the inventory. When the customer takes away specific 
items, they are replenished. If a customer does not use an item, it sits in the store but 
it is not replenished. This prevents overproduction and there are at least some direct 
connections between what customers want and what the company produces.  
 
Use visual control – kanban 
Kanban is a tool to achieve JIT production (Monden, 1998, p.16). Ohno (1988) 
invented simple signals – cards, empty bins, carts, called kanban, as a vehicle for 
signalling the assembly line to produce the specific number of parts. Kanban 
identifies the part number, container capacity, and certain other information. Because 
there are rich instructions listed in kanban, kanban is regarded as an effective and 
advanced visual control system focusing primarily on eliminating overproduction, 
increasing flexibility to respond to customer demand, and reducing costs by 
eliminating waste. Monden (1998, p.16) outlined that the TPS employs two kinds of 
kanban: one kanban, the production-ordering kanban, specifies the kind and quantity 
of product which the preceding process must produce; the other, called withdrawal 
kanban, specifies the kind and quantity of product which the subsequent process 
should withdraw from the preceding process.  A kanban system therefore consists of 
a set of cards that travel between preceding and subsequent processes, 
communicating what parts are needed in the subsequent processes. In the 
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processes controlled by kanbans, the operators produce products based on actual 
usage rather than forecasted usage. Therefore, the production process it controls 
must: 
(1) Only produce products to replace the products consumed by its customer(s). 
(2) Only produce products based on the signals sent by its customer(s). 
 
The implementation of the pull system have resulted in striking improvements 
(Sepheri, 1986), and has been identified as one of the characteristic elements of the 
just-in-time philosophy (Monden, 1983; Low and Chan, 1997). Following the 
discussion above, one of the first priorities of the pull production system is to achieve 
reliability of processes and smooth and synchronized flows involving a stable product 
mix (Monden, 1983). Monden (1983) also listed the necessary conditions for kanban 
to work well: (1) Set-up time will need to be shortened in order to allow rapid 
response since there will be small or no butter stocks; (2) Proper machine layout can 
facilitate the flow; (3) Standardization of jobs; (4) Improvement activities; and (5) 
Autonomation (autonomous defects control). 
 
4.4.3 Principle 4: Level out the workload (heijunka) 
Principle 4: Level out the workload (heijunka) can help to achieve the benefits of 
continuous flow. It focuses on strategies by levelling product volume, mixing and, 
most importantly, levelling out the demand on people, equipment, and suppliers.  
 
The principle of heijunka and its benefits 
Heijunka is a Japanese term used to describe a mixed production system, where 
various and changeable sequences of mixed models are produced in the same 
production line (Coleman and Vaghefi, 1994; Liker, 2004). It also referred to as 
production smoothing or levelling the production schedule. Heijunka does not build 
products according to the actual flow of customer orders, but takes the total volume 
of orders in a period and levels them out so that the same amount and mix are being 
made each day. In contrast to mass production, which would be to dedicate the line 
first to one model, then to another, the Toyota Way-styled heijunka allows various 
models can be produced in the same line on the same day, with quick changeovers 
(Hampson, 1999). It reflects the Toyota’s philosophy against speculative production 
and the idea that customers do not order in a stable and predictable way which 
therefore creates inventories (Coleman and Vaghefi, 1994). According to Shingo 
(1989) and Coleman and Vaghefi (1994), the concept of heijunka incorporates the 
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concepts of levelling and line balancing. Levelling is the term describing the effort to 
balance the work load to be performed to the capacity or capability of the process 
(machine and operators) to complete that work (Shingo, 1989). The principle of line 
balancing attempts to equate workloads (production rate) at each process to each 
other (Shingo, 1988). In summary, heijunka is a production planning method with two 
objectives (Coleman and Vaghefi, 1994): 
(1) To reduce the inventories by setting up mixed-model production lines to produce 
small batches.  
(2) To equate workloads in each production process to each other and to capacity. 
 
Liker (2004, pp.118-119) and Coleman and Vaghefi (1994) revealed the four benefits 
of levelling the schedule as follows: 
(1) Flexibility to make what the customer wants when they want it. This reduces the 
plant’s inventory and its associated problems. 
(2) Reduced risk of unsold goods. If the plant makes only what the customer orders, 
it reduces the costs arising from owning and storing inventory. 
(3) Balanced use of labour and machines. The plant can create standardized work 
and level out production by taking into account that different machines have 
different level of manufacturing capabilities. 
(4) Smoothed demand on upstream processes and the plant’s suppliers. If the plant 
uses a JIT system for upstream process and the suppliers deliver goods multiple 
times in a day, the suppliers will get a stable and level set of orders. This will 
allow them to reduce inventory. 
 
In addition, Coleman and Vaghefi (1994) summarized four requisites for heijunka 
implementation: 
(1) Quick setups, the small-lot production sequences. 
(2) Cross-trained and flexible employees, with flexible machinery and equipment. 
(3) Effective quality assurance system. 
(4) Components/parts must also be supplied to the assembly process in very small 
lots, without delays. It necessitates the use of kanban, to attain the smooth shop-
floor characteristic of JIT system. 
 
Elimination of Muda, Muri, and Mura 
According to Liker (2004), many companies failed to stabilize the manufacturing 
system and create evenness. Achieving heijunka is a key to TPS (Coleman and 
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Vaghefi, 1994) and fundamental to eliminating mura, which is fundamental to 
eliminating muri and muda. 
(1) Muda (non-value added): It includes the seven types of waste mentioned earlier. 
These are wasteful activities that lengthen lead time, cause extra movement, and 
create unnecessary inventories and so on. 
(2) Muri (overburdening people or equipment): Muri translates as “overburden – 
when workers or machines are pushed beyond their capacity” (Oliver and 
Wilkinson, 1992). This may reduce the production life of both human beings and 
machines (Hampson, 1999). “Overburdened jobs” resulted in extreme worker 
stress, repetitive strain injuries, and potential quality problems. Overburdening 
equipment causes breakdowns and defects. 
(3) Mura (unevenness): Unevenness results from an irregular production schedule or 
fluctuating production volumes due to internal problems, like downtime or missing 
parts or defects. Muda will automatically result in some varieties of mura 
(Hampson, 1999; Liker, 2004). This is because some workers and machines will 
be working below capacity for some of the time, while others may overproduce.  
 
Eliminating muda is just one-third of the equation of making lean successful (Liker, 
2004), while eliminating overburden to people and equipment (Muri) and eliminating 
unevenness in the production schedule are equally important, yet not fully 
appreciated in companies attempting to implementing lean practices. Furthermore, 
Principle 4 allows a pre-determined level of finished goods inventory. It seems 
wasteful and contradicts lean Principle 2 in creating a continuous one-piece flow. A 
small inventory of finished goods is however often necessary to protect a supplier’s 
level of production schedule from being jerked by sudden spikes in demand (Liker, 
2004).  
 
4.4.4 Principle 5: Built-in quality (jidoka) 
Quality is built into the product, according to Principle 5 of the Toyota Way model, by 
stopping the process when defects are encountered. This is done to prevent defects 
from being made and used by downstream operations. The Japanese term Jidoka is 
in agreement with Principle 5 – stopping the process to build in quality. The term 
jidoka, translated as “autonomation” in English, is the second pillar of the TPS (Ohno, 
1988; Liker, 2004). The origins of jidoka can be traced back to Sakichi Toyoda, 
founder of Toyota, whose approach was to achieve efficiency gains in the use of 
Toyota automatic looms. This brilliant method of enabling automatic looms would 
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stop them when a thread broke (Liker, 2004, p.129). Like many elements of the TPS, 
the concept of jidoka places further emphasis on control with the people actually 
doing the work allowing them to halt production to fix a problem as it arises. It is 
predominately a technique for detecting and correcting production defects and 
always incorporates the following devices: a mechanism to detect abnormalities or 
defects (Monden, 1983). Monden (1998) highlighted that jidoka also has other 
equally important components and effects including cost reduction, adaptable 
production, and increased respect for humanity: 
(1) Cost reduction through decrease in the workforce: Autonomation utilizes 
worker’s ability to handle more than one machine at a time because as 
equipment is designed to stop automatically when a defect occurs, there is no 
need for the employee to oversee machine operations.  
(2) Adaptable production: Since all machines halt automatically when they have 
produced the required number of parts and produce only good parts, 
autonomation eliminates excess inventory and thus makes possible JIT 
production and ready adaptability to changes in demand. 
(3) Increase respect for humanity: Autonomation calls immediate attention to defects 
or problems in the production process. It promotes improvement activities and 
thus increases respect for humanity. 
 
The andon system 
The human aspect of jidoka, the decision to stop producing based on “things that 
cannot be express exactly”, is collectively known as andon – literally translated from 
the Japanese means “traditional rice paper lantern” (Everett and Sohal, 1991). In 
Toyota’s shop floor, andon usually works with the rope call switch. When any team 
member judges an abnormal situation, whoever can take the rope call switch will light 
the andon to indicate the location of the problems. But the line will continue moving. 
The team leader proceeds immediately to the site to investigate the situation, and 
provides assistance. If the problem has been fixed, the team leader pulls the rope 
again to switch off the andon informing all the production workers that the line has 
returned to normal. If the abnormality cannot be corrected within the prescribed 
section of the line, it will automatically stop and, the andon light further changes to 
red. In this way, the colour of the andon light informs all the workers of the condition 
of the problem in the production line with a glance. Under this principle, quality is 
guaranteed as it will be very uncommon for defects to move into the next station 
because the operatives are highly responsible for every product moving into their 
station, and they are empowered to examine the quality issue. 
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Built-in quality tools 
Liker and Meier (2006) depicted the Toyota Way of stopping the line to fix problems 
by beginning with a focus on waste elimination. The core of this principle is to 
develop a system that emphasizes getting the quality right the first time. Toyota has 
developed an extensive support system to provide people with the tools and 
resources to identify problems and solve them. Monden (1998) detailed two 
approaches that can be used in general to stop and fix production when 
abnormalities occur: by relying on human judgment and by means of automatic 
devices. 
(1) By human judgment: All workers are empowered and given the responsibility to 
stop the line if all operations are not or cannot be performed in accordance with 
the standard operations routine. With line stoppage due to the above-mentioned 
two causes, the supervisor’s responsibility is two-fold: First, he should teach the 
workers to stop the line whenever the defects occur. Second, he must discover 
and correct the cause of the defects that have stopped the line at source. To 
reiterate, the key to preventing defects via human judgment is that each 
employee has the power to stop the line (Monden, 1998). 
(2) By means of automatic devices:    
 Visual controls: implementing autonomation, various visual controls monitor 
the state of the line and the flow of production. For example, andon is one of 
the widely used visual controls in Toyota.  
 Foolproof systems: foolproof systems are used to eliminate defects that may 
occur due to an oversight on the worker’s part, not due to a lack of time in the 
cycle or unwillingness to stop the line. While these detecting instruments 
sense abnormalities or deviations in the work-piece or the process, the 
restricting tool stops the line and the signalling device will sound a buzzer or 
lights a lamp to notify the workers. 
 
Although it is impossible to reach zero defects in reality, this can be approached 
through the use of above-mentioned methods and tools. At Toyota they keep things 
simple and use very few statistical tools. Their quality specialists and team members 
have just four key tools (Liker, 2004): (1) Go and see, (2) Analyze the situation, (3) 
Use one-piece flow and andon to surface problem, and (4) “5 Whys” techniques 
 
Autonomation and people 
In mass production, the traditional attitude of management towards the operator is to 
tell him/her what to do instead of involving the operatives in decision-making. 
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However, andon, or autonomation, when applied, changes the order of control in the 
workplace, as it is the operative who eventually controls the quality via the system, 
albeit through the demand for quality (Everett and Sohal, 1991). In the construction 
industry, the likelihood that things go wrong and result in a defect are great. Hence it 
is necessary to have as many people as possible involved in detecting, analyzing, 
and eliminating sources of defects. Workers on site, foremen, and project managers 
must all be part of this effort. Everett and Sohal (1991) summarized a number of key 
steps for the successful implementation of the andon system that are related to the 
people aspects. 
(1) Senior management are committed to the whole project is utterly vital from the 
outset. The ramifications must be clear and the organization should be in a stable 
mode of growth or a strong position to withstand the shock of possible product 
loss to the market during the early phase. 
(2) Trade union officials must be fully briefed, their co-operation gained and their 
concerns for their members addressed long before start-up. 
(3) Shop floor supervisors and operatives must be well briefed on their roles. 
(4) Quality standards must be clearly agreed upon by all parties and displayed in the 
production line. All existing known quality problems should be solved prior to 
start-up. 
(5) All equipment in the area must be in, or brought up to, a satisfactory condition. 
 
4.4.5 Principle 6: Standardized tasks  
Gibb and Isack (2001) identified standardization as the extensive use of processes or 
procedures, products or components, in which there is regularity, repetition and a 
record of successful practice. It involves the development of pre-set procedures and 
reference materials for performing a particular process or operation. Companies have 
methods they call “standards”, but it is not what Toyota means by using the term 
“standardized work” to define the method used to perform work. In Toyota or lean 
terminology, standardized work is to reduce costs relating to production. According to 
Monden (1998), standard operations in Toyota have three main goals, namely (1) to 
achieve high productivity through efficient work; (2) to achieve line balancing among 
all processes in terms of production timing; and (3) to limit the work-in-process to a 
minimum amount, helping to eliminate excessive in-process inventories. Figure 4.4 















Figure 4.4 Elements of standard operations  
(Source: Monden, 1998) 
 
(1) Cycle time: the cycle time or takt time represents the time span in which one unit 
of a product must be produced. It is deduced from the monthly market demand 
forecast and thus follows a push system. In this context, the cycle time is 
determined by the daily quantities of outputs required and the effective daily 
operating time (Monden, 1998; Ohno, 1988). Based on this information, 
management derives the minimum staffing level needed.  
(2) Standard operations routine: This can be defined as the order of actions that 
each worker must perform within a given cycle time (Monden, 1998). According 
to Monden (1998), the setting of this routine serves two purposes. First, it 
provides the worker with the order or routine to pick up work tasks according to a 
routine sequence. Second, it is to give the sequence of operations that the multi-
functioned worker must perform at various machines within a cycle time. 
(3) Standardized work-in-process: According to Monden (1998), the standard 
quantity of work-in-process consists of the work laid out and held between 
machines.  
 
The traditional manufacturing model has an initial focus on achieving the lowest 
possible unit cost by utilizing time and motion studies to determine the most efficient 
work procedure, and a standard time is therefore allotted for the designated task 
(Liker and Meier, 2006). The Toyota Way seeks the same objective as the traditional 
manufacturing model in terms of low cost but the primary focus is on reducing the 
waste within the system. In most organizations, there is substantial amount of waste 
that is caused by random activities and inconsistent methods. To eliminate waste, 
reduction or elimination of variation within processes is needed. The isolation of 
variation is a key to the establishment of standardized work methods and procedures 
(Liker and Meier, 2006). By definition, variation implies the inability to standardize. 









one should develop new standards. If variability occurs even when people have 
adopted standards, it will be necessary to determine the causes and either 
revise/upgrade the existing standards, or verify that the existing standards are clear 
to the workforce. Standardized work has four main advantages according to Hall 
(1995):  
(1) It prevents overproduction. 
(2) It is an aid in achieving higher quality. 
(3) It lowers cost. 
(4) It provides a basis to judge the normal from the abnormal. 
 
Once standard operations are set, it is the task of the supervisors and workers to 
continuously improve these standards. Liker (2004) explained that standardization is 
the basis for continuous improvement, because as Imai (1986) pointed out, it is 
impossible to improve any process until it is standardized. This means the standards 
do not remain the same forever, but future results are expected to improve from the 
standard (Liker and Meier, 2006).  
 
Organization structure supports standardization 
Standardization is primarily associated with Taylor’s scientific management 
philosophy. In mass production, productivity gains can be achieved using Taylor’s 
scientific management principles (e.g. time and motion studies). It however created 
very rigid bureaucracies in which workers were to blindly and simply follow the 
standardized procedure; whist managers play the role of doing the thinking. This 
results in a number of disadvantages such as red tape, hierarchical organizational 
structures, top-down control, resistance to change, poor communication, slow and 
cumbersome implementation and application, static and inefficient rules and 
procedures, and piles of written rules and procedures (Liker, 2004). New United 
Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI), Toyota’s first joint venture in North America, has 
all the characteristics of bureaucracy and is a very “mechanistic” organization (Alder, 
1999; Liker, 2004). Liker (2004) adopted Alder’s (1999) study on Toyota’s 
organizational practice and compared the coercive bureaucracy uses standards to 









Table 4.2 Coercive versus enabling design of systems and standards 
Coercive bureaucracies system Enabling bureaucracies system 
Top down control Empowered employees 
Minimum written rules and procedures Rules and procedures as enabling tools 
Hierarchy controls Hierarchy supports organizational learning 
Source: Liker (2004) and Alder (1999) 
 
Based on the above observation, Liker (2004, p.145) noted that the key difference 
between Taylorism and the Toyota Way is that the Toyota Way preaches that the 
worker is the most valuable resource – not just a pair of hands taking orders, but an 
analyst and problem solver. The Toyota Way also shows that, to maintain long term 
competitiveness, a company must have viable and enabling standards so that it can 
continually improve upon repeatable processes (Liker, 2004). 
 
Empowered employees  
The critical task when implementing standardization is to explore the balance 
between providing employees with rigid procedures to follow and providing the 
freedom to innovate and be creative to meet challenging targets consistently for cost, 
quality and delivery. Liker (2004) offered the key to the balance, which lies in the 
following considerations: 
(1) The standards have to be specific enough to be useful guides, yet general 
enough to allow for some flexibility. 
(2) The people doing the work have to improve the standards. For a production 
person to be able to write a standard work sheet that other workers can 
understand, he or she must be convinced of its importance (Ohno, 1988) and 
empowered to make his or her contribution to their own improvement. 
 
Principle 6 can be summarized as: 
(1) Standardized work consists of three elements namely takt time, standard 
operations routine and standard quantity of work-in-process. 
(2) Rules and procedures are used as enabling tools – performance standards are 
used in parallel with information on best practices for achieving them. 




4.4.6 Principle 7: Visual management  
Principle 7 of the Toyota Way is to use visual control to improve flow. This principle 
can be shortened to “make it visual”. The goal of visual management is to make 
waste, problems, and abnormal conditions readily apparent to employees and 
managers so that problems can be fixed. The principle behind visual management is 
based on the assumption that people are usually attracted what they see (Ho, 1999). 
Liker (2004) outlined that the visual aspect means being able to examine the process, 
a piece of equipment, inventory, information or a worker performing a job and 
immediately seeing the standard being used to perform the task and if there is a 
deviation from the standard. It has gone beyond capturing deviations from a target or 
goal on charts and graphs and posting them publicly. The control aspect means an 
immediate approach will be adopted to fix any examined deviation to smooth the 
process. It is opposed to the old mindset of hiding problems to make things look good. 
Caravaggio (cited in Levinson and Rerick, 2002, pp.134-135) summarized that a 
visual control system has five aspects: 
(1) Communication: written communications are easily accessible. 
(2) Visibility: communication with pictures and signs. 
(3) Consistency: each activity adopts the same conventions. 
(4) Detection: alarms and warnings will work when abnormalities occur. 
(5) Fail-safing: these activities prevent abnormalities and mistake. 
To sum up, visual control tools play an important part of the communication process 
can tell us in a very straightforward way how work should be done and whether it is 
deviating from the standard just through a glance (Liker, 2004). 
 
The practice of 5-S 
 “5-S” programme was developed by the Japanese that comprises a series of 
activities or guidelines regarding how to effectively organize a workplace or 
production process. According to Hirano (1995), the 5-S approach is a simple but 
powerful method for workplace improvement that yields impressive results. It has 
become so familiar in Japan that it is hard to find a factory or office that has not 
borrowed at least some of its ideas (Hirano, 1995). Hirano (1995) summarized the 
five stages of a 5-S programme consists (see Figure 4.5): 
(1) Seiri (sort): during the seiri process, all materials and tools are sorted, and only 
the needed to be kept for continued use. Everything else unneeded should be 
stored or discarded. This process leads to fewer hazards and less clutter that 
might interfere with productive work.  
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(2) Seiton (set in order): seiton refers to organizing the way needed for things to be 
kept so that anyone can find and use them easily. 
(3) Seiso (clean): Seiso stands for sweeping and cleanliness. It means to sweeping 
floors and keeping things in order. The key point is that maintaining cleanliness 
should be part of daily work – not an occasional activity that is initiated only 
when things get too messy (Haghirian, 2010)  
(4) Seiketsu (standardize): Seiketsu translates as “standards”. It means making all 
the cleanliness, orderliness, and improvement processes a regular activity in the 
workplace. 
(5) Shitsuke (sustain): Shitsuke means “sustaining discipline”. It also means always 
following specified (and standardized) procedures to support long-term kaizen 
goals. The first four S’s can be implemented smoothly if the employees are 
committed to maintain discipline. 
 
Figure 4.5 The 5-S  
(Source: Liker, 2004) 
 
In practice, 5-S in manufacturing ensures that all raw materials, work in progress, 
and finished products are located neatly on the well-labelled racks or spaces. Liker 
(2004) highlighted that the integration of the 5-S can create a continuous process for 
improving the work environment. 
 
Relationship with other Toyota Way principles 
Monden (1998) noted that the visual control system monitors the status of the line 
and the flow of production along with the implementation of autonomation. Toyota 
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used an integrated set of visual controls or a visual control system to create a 
transparent and waste-free environment. In the discussion of the earlier Toyota Way 
principles, different forms of visual controls have been highlighted that played 
different roles with the same aim of ruling out the waste in the process. For example, 
the practice of andon was discussed in Principle 5. The andon cord, when pulled by 
an operator, lights up a display and shows a signal unique to the station. This 
communicates that a problem exists and indicates its location in the line so that it can 
be solved before it becomes necessary to stop production. Kanban, discussed in 
Principle 3, is another visual control tool which indicates to the downstream 
operatives to manufacture the exact number of products to rule out overproduction. 
In addition, the standard operations sheet as highlighted as a tool in Principle 6 is 
another visual control tool in practice. The use of visual control is regarded as the 
most important step in the process of developing standardization (Liker and Meier, 
2006).  
 
Principle 7 can be summarized as: 
(1) Clean it up, Make it visual – use simple visual control systems (e.g. 5-S). 
(2) Integrate the visual control systems with other principles to the value-added work 
– use visual control to improve flow. 
 
4.4.7 Principle 8: Use of only reliable, thoroughly tested technology  
Toyota has rigorous requirements on acquiring technology because it is not an easy 
task to search and choose appropriate tools and technology in the “techno-jungle”. In 
Toyota, new technology cannot be introduced until it is proven through direct 
experiment along with the involvement of experts from cross-section departments 
(Liker, 2004). This means that the technology would have been tested and evaluated 
to ensure it can add value to support people and the manufacturing process. Simply 
put, technology in Toyota is pulled by process, not pushed by process. Moreover, the 
technology is also designed to complement rather than substitute for production 
workers. For example, according to Pil and Fujimoto (2007), Toyota abandoned full 
automation efforts in the assembly line but focused instead on “in-line mechanical” 
automation, which consists of equipment and component jig-pallets synchronized 
with the auto bodies moving on the conventional continuous conveyers. This allows 
automation zones and manual assembly zones to coexist in the same assembly line. 
Morgan and Liker (2006) highlighted how Toyota implements five highly effective 
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sub-principles as guidelines derived from Principle 8 for its production development 
system: 
(1) Technologies must be seamlessly integrated. 
(2) Technologies should support the process, not drive it: from Toyota’s perspective, 
changing the process to conform to technology leads to instability, drives massive 
process variation, confuses people, and creates waste. What Toyota adopted is 
the opposite approach, not to acquire the next technological fad in a rush, but to 
focus on its potential that can enhance the process. 
(3) Technologies should enhance people, not replace them: since Toyota values 
their employees as the most value assets, it is best for Toyota to choose tools 
and technology that make the best use of engineering time and talents. It is the 
impact of principle 8 on people. 
(4) Specific solution oriented, not a silver bullet: Toyota people believe that 
technology is never a substitute for the head work, the potential of a required 
technology only lies in supporting and accelerating that hard work once a lean 
process is in place and highly skilled people are appropriately trained and 
organized. 
(5) Right size: it is a misconception to procure the biggest, fastest, and newest tools 
in the market. Toyota engineers still employ used notebooks for their engineering 
checklists, while their competitors developed an impressive online and fully 
integrated database. But the data was vacuous and rarely used. The point is that 
Toyota only uses simple tools that can greatly facilitate their employees’ work and 
ensure that things are being done properly. 
 
Toyota’s attitude towards new technology is to adapt it appropriately. It is critical to 
Toyota, but Toyota looks at technology as a tool that, like any other tool, exists to 
support the people and the process. Some departments in Toyota still employ, and 
will continue to use, old in-house developed software under simpler circumstances. 
Because it has continuously evolved over the years and does exactly what is needed, 
there is no need to upgrade the system because according to the principle explained 
earlier, it will not add extra improvement to the process. 
 
4.4.8 Summary of Principles 2 to 8 
As the “process” title indicates, all the seven sub-principles along with their related 
tools aim to eliminate the waste and improve the flow. Liker (2004) highlighted the 
pitfall found in some firms even though the tools have been implemented; they have 
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missed out the focus on flow, thus are still performing mass production with a couple 
of lean tools. Another observation is that each principle can be viewed as part of an 
integrated system to add value to the production flow. This part originates and 
evolves from the shop floor, and become the core of the Toyota Production System. 
Table 4.3 summarizes a number of operationalized measurables that are identified in 
this layer of the Toyota Way model. 
 
Table 4.3 Operationalized measurable from the Toyota Way Process model 
Toyota Way Process 
model and its sub-
principles 
Operationalized measurables 
P2. One-piece flow to 
bring problems to the 
surface 
 Waste elimination 
 Takt time 
 Use flow oriented layout (U shape) 
 Synchronize production activities so that one does not 
start until the previous activity has finished (pull) 
 Standardized work to stabilized flow 
P3. Use pull system to 
avoid overproduction 
 Pull from customer end – including both internal and 
external customers 
 Use visual control – kanban system 
P4. Level out the workload 
(Heijunka) 
 Eliminate overburden to people and equipment (muri) 
 Eliminate unevenness in the production schedule (mura) 
 Level out the workload of all manufacturing and service 
process 
P5. Build a culture of 
stopping to fix problems 
 Deliver perfect first time quality 
 Reveal and solve problems at the source as they occur 
 Keep quality control simple 
 Create culture – involve and empower employees to 
continuously improve 
P6. Standardized tasks 




 Standardized operating procedure (SOP) 
 Continuously improve the standardization 
 Empowered employees to participate in the writing of 
standard procures 
P7. Use visual control so 
no problems are hidden 
 Practice of 5-S 
 Integrate the visual control systems to the value-added 
work 
P8. Use only reliable 
technology that serves 
people and process 
 Thoroughly test new technology 
 Technology must support people 
 Technology must improve flow 




4.5 Toyota Way People and Partners model  
The Toyota Way 2001 document indicates that “respect for people” and “continuous 
improvement” should go hand in hand. The basic tenet of the TPS is that people are 
the most important asset in Toyota (Convis, 2001; Liker, 2004); very few companies 
actually behave in a way that supports this basic tenet. If Liker’s (2004) 4P model is 
examined carefully on the People and Partner layers, three key words, namely 
“Respect”, “Challenge”, and “Grow them” are highlighted (see Figure 4.2). These are 
the core principles from the Toyota Way 2001. Here people can be extended to 
broadly mean leaders, teams, and the network of partners and suppliers. The 
following three principles reveal how Toyota selects, develops, and motivates people 
to become committed to the goal of building high quality products in Toyota. 
 
4.5.1 Principle 9: Leaders and leadership  
Throughout Toyota’s history, key leaders have been found within the company, at the 
right time, to shape the next step in Toyota’s development. Toyota does not go 
shopping for “successful” CEOs and presidents because their leaders must 
understand the Toyota culture and philosophy well. These include the former 
president Fujio Cho, who grew up in Toyota and was a student of Taiichi Ohno, 
where he and Ohno created the theoretical basis for the Toyota Production System, 
to the current president Akio Toyoda, who has also worked for Toyota for 
approximately four decades. These leaders lived and thoroughly understood the 
Toyota culture day by day (Liker, 2004). For this reason, Toyota cannot readily recruit 
leaders; they must take people who have some natural leadership abilities and 
develop them to think and act in the Toyota Way every day – a process which easily 
can take decades or more to home (Liker and Hoseus, 2008). 
 
Thoughtful leaders and servant leadership 
Toyota’s internal document, the Toyota Way 2001 cited in Liker and Hoseus (2008, 
p.319), defined thoughtful leaders as: “having the ability to energize and invigorate 
others, willingly giving realistic challenges and development opportunities and 
fostering a sense of accomplishment in subordinates. Thoughtful leaders monitor 
individual and team performance, holding people accountable for their actions and 
taking responsibility for their activities.” Unlike the traditional manager’s image as a 
monitor and controller under a command structure, Toyota leaders focus on 
confirming that all the works are followed by a set of defined rules of takt time, 
operations-standard work, 5-S, etc rather than catching people make mistakes and 
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blame them. Management should have a shop-floor focus because they are taught 
that all value-added activities start on the shop floor and their job is to support the 
team members (Convis, 2001). Moreover, thoughtful leaders do not assume that the 
right rewards and punishments will produce impact on the behaviors of their 
employees. Rather, thoughtful leaders develop a culture in which they can effectively 
delegate to and trust their team members to produce excellent results (Liker and 
Hoseus, 2008). Servant leadership is the concept formalized by Mikio Kitano, 
TMMK 3 ’s second president (Liker and Hoseus, 2008), who prioritized the team 
members at the top and put himself (and other leaders) at the bottom in an upside 















Figure 4.6 Servant leadership in Toyota plants   
(Source: Liker and Hoseus, 2008) 
 
In this model, the group leader is the first level of “management”, who leads a small 
group of approximately five to seven people. Both team leader and group leader has 
three basic responsibilities: (1) support the operations, (2) promotion of the system, 
and (3) leading change (Liker and Meier, 2006). The key concept of servant 
leadership recognizes that the value-adding work is the process of building cars 
where team members can directly add value. Leaders only add value by supporting 
those who are most actively adding value to the process, and therefore, leaders are 
posted to the bottom of the pyramid. This is unlike in a traditional top-down 
organization, where the capacity and imagination is limited to a few leaders at the top. 
 
                                                     
3
 TMMK refers to Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky in the United States of America. 
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Toyota leadership model  
Table 4.4 summarizes some of the key differences of the Toyota Way leadership 
which is contrary to the practices of western managers. It reveals the distinctive 
leadership in Toyota from other companies. The Toyota leaders must have a 
combination of in-depth understanding of the work and the ability to develop, mentor 
and lead people. The expectation of leadership in Toyota is to effectively develop 
people so that performance is constantly improved. This is accomplished by instilling 
the Toyota culture in all employees, by continuously developing and growing capable 
people, and by focusing the efforts on strengthening the Toyota Production System 
(Liker and Meier, 2006). 
 
Table 4.4 Traditional Western leadership compared to Toyota leadership 
Traditional Western leadership Toyota leadership 
Quick results Patient 
Proud Humble 
Climb ladder rapidly  
Learn deeply and horizontally and 
gradually work the way up the ladder 
Results at all costs The right process will lead to right results 
Accomplish objectives through people Develop people 
Overcome barriers 
Take time to deeply understand problem 
and root cause before acting 
Manage by numbers and graphs Deeply understand the process 
Source: Liker and Hoseus (2008) 
 
In summary, the current leadership tenet of the Toyota Way can be summarized as: 
(1) Support the culture: Toyota invests years to develop leaders who carry the DNA 
of the company in their thoughts, words and actions. In turn, the leaders should 
make efforts to support the culture in order to create the environment for a 
learning organization. 
(2) Support the people doing the work: The absolute core of the Toyota philosophy is 
that the culture must support the people doing the work (Liker, 2004:176). This 
feature of Toyota leadership is sometimes described as “servant leadership”. The 
higher leaders go, the less direct power they have. 
(3) Toyota wants leaders who live the core values, including the spirit of challenge, 







job and job instruction 
4.5.2 Principle 10: People management  
A famous saying by Toyota leaders can be borrowed to describe the theme of 
Principle 10, which states that “Toyota does not just build cars. They build people.” 
Basically, the rationale for principle 10 lies in Toyota’s philosophy that people are 
truly the greatest asset. This is the fundamental principle that has guided the 
company to decide on a series of human resource policies to cultivate its employees 
and to grow with them. Liker and Hoseus (2008) highlighted that the Toyota 
Production System would not function well without high performance teams on the 
shop floor. The main mechanism for transmitting the Toyota culture is the basic work 
team. Principle 10 in short addresses three issues: first is to develop excellent 
individual work, second is to promote effective teamwork within Toyota, and the last 
is Toyota’s unique organizational structure.  
 
Develop individual work and training 
Toyota spends an immense amount of time and effort in screening prospective 
employees and carefully develops them. Different forms of training and development 
programmes have been established at Toyota aiming to nurture the workers to 
perform well and to deliver better-quality products. A number of unique Toyota 
training programmes are outlined in the next sections following the process of 


















Figure 4.7 Step-by-step progression to stable job performance  
(Source: Liker and Hoseus, 2008) 
 
Normally it is an on-going long-term process. Prior to the team members being 
assigned to the team, they receive training in what Toyota calls “fundamental skills”. 
Fundamental skills 
training 
Job breakdown to work 
elements for specific job 
Job instruction 
training 
Follow up and support 







Workers are then assigned to a team with a team leader and group leader who 
introduce them to the first job they need to learn. This job has been broken down into 
tiny work elements that are taught piece by piece using the Toyota job instruction 
training method. In addition, the individual member continues to be supported full 
time until he or she is comfortable with doing the job (Liker and Hoseus, 2008). 
 
(1) Fundamental skills training 
Fundamental skills are necessary for people to be able to successfully perform their 
work. This is the basis for the further development of additional capabilities, such as 
improving communication skills and leadership abilities, planning, and developing 
new methods or procedures.  
 
(2) Job instruction training 
Job instruction training is the key to developing the employee’s exceptional skills, 
which is also known as the four-step method. The four steps are to prepare workers, 
present operations, try out performance and follow up. It is based on two main 
processes: the training material and the training method. The training method is 
developed within a stable environment, where the work has been broken down to the 
tiniest details under the principle of standardization. Liker and Hoseus (2008) advised 
that because most companies cannot have the high degree of stability or level of 
standardization as Toyota does, it would be more appropriate for them to be selective 
about processes or areas and develop some level of stability in that area for training 
purposes. The learning in these pilot areas can then be extended to other areas and 
eventually across the plant. 
 
(3) Building team associates for the long term 
Some work done on a day-to-day basis can decrease the level of “excitement” after 
some time. This is especially true in a repetitive working environment that does not 
require a high skills level. The Toyota Way promotes the growth and development of 
all employees by maintaining their morale and commitment, and by offering various 
kinds of optional and required courses. Moreover, all the Toyota employees are 
encouraged to participate in activities and programs including suggestion 
programmes, quality circles, leadership development programmes, and kaizen teams. 
 Toyota suggestion programmes: Suggestion schemes represent an individual 
mechanism for capturing worker knowledge and thereby improve the quality of 
the product and manufacturing process. It differs from most traditional suggestion 
programmes based on the premise that people inherently want to improve their 
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work environment, and that the contributions of the employees provide long-term 
continuous improvement (Liker and Meier, 2006). Moreover, the benefits of the 
Japanese system are often measured by looking at the number of suggestions 
per employee and year (Karlsson and Åhlström, 1995). This is an important 
element of the lean production model. 
 Quality circles: Quality circles are an essential part of kaizen in Toyota. These 
have been an ongoing management tool for productivity and quality improvement 
for decades and are excellent to promote teamwork and develop the capacity of 
individuals to make continuous improvement. The circle is responsible for setting 
goals and meeting schedules, and the group leader acts in an advisory role. Most 
circles deal with issues in the work area, where meetings are conducted.  
 Developing team associates for leadership roles: Selecting and developing team 
members for leadership roles is a critical matter in Toyota (Liker and Meier, 2006). 
The leaders are responsible for teaching and coaching others in the Toyota Way. 
They must convey the message to the next generation and also be responsible 
for sustaining the daily operation and for continuous improvement. 
 
Multi-functional teams 
Karlsson and Åhlström (1995) highlighted that the most salient feature of the work 
organization in lean production is the extensive use of multi-functional teams. 
According to Olivella et al. (2008), the possession of multiple-skills implies flexibility, 
provides team members with an overall vision of the work to be done, and facilitates 
learning and continuous improvement. The aim of forming multi-functional teams is to 
have employees who are able to perform more than one task in the team. These 
teams, in the manufacturing context, are often organized along a cell-based part of 
the product flow and each of them is given the responsibility of performing all the 
tasks along this part of the product flow. Monden (1998) noted that Toyota uses a job 
rotation system to cultivate multi-functional workers, according to which each worker 
rotates through and performs every job in the workshop. One of the benefits of 
utilizing multi-functional teams is that the number of job classifications decreases, as 
the employees perform many different tasks during a single day. Dependence on a 
single person automatically decreases. Achieving this multi-functionality, however, 
requires efforts to be made in staff training (Karlsson and Åhlström, 1995), as well as 
overcoming resistance to increase the number of tasks they perform (Sánchez and 





Toyota sees teamwork as the foundation of the company and that all systems are 
there to support the teams doing value-added work (Liker, 2004, p. 185). The role 
and use of team working is an important element of lean production (Womack et al., 
1990). Table 4.5 compares the effects of flow in team function in the mass and lean 
environment.  
 
Table 4.5 Effects of flow in team function in mass and lean environment 
 
Mass environment 
One-piece flow environment 
(Toyota) 
Work nature 
Mass production process enables 
the workers to work individually with 
focus only on their individual tasks. 
Flow involves tight coordination 
between each step in the process 
and this coordination facilitates 
building teamwork (Liker, 2004). 
Operatives’ 
responsibility 
Only the white-collar or skilled 
technician is responsible for 
problem-solving, quality assurance, 
equipment maintenance, and 
productivity. 
The front-line workers are 
developed, empowered and 
motivated to discover and solve the 
problems in their daily work. 
 
Types of work groups in Toyota  
Toyota builds its culture and organization around the basic unit of the work group 
(Liker and Hoseus, 2008). There are two roles for teams, according to Liker and 
Hoseus (2008): one is to support individuals as they do their work and the other is to 
solve problems to improve how the work is done. These are referred to as work 
groups and problem-solving groups respectively. Work groups are usually comprised 
of a small group of five to seven people on the shop floor in Toyota. These workers 
report to a team leader, while several of these small groups report to a group leader. 
They are mainly responsible for the daily work to be done, and in the process, they 
find opportunities to continuously improve the way the work is done. They can be 
seen on the organizational chart as part of the formal reporting structure. Problem-
solving groups are often temporary and usually do not appear on the organizational 
chart. These teams work as task force, quality circles, and temporary cross-functional 
teams to solve particular problems. They often deal with problems that occur across 
different departments of the organization. For Toyota, all of these types of teams are 
essential. In them, workers feel a sense of belonging, and the small groups help 
them feel connected (Liker and Hoseus, 2008). 
 
Organization structure 
Toyota strives to establish a relatively flat organizational structure while still 
maintaining the right group size so that people can effectively work together in 
solving problems. Toyota discourages making the organization completely flat, 
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through a large span of control; instead Toyota’s system heavily relies on teams led 
by highly skilled leaders. Hence, in the Toyota Production System, shop-floor work 
groups are the focal point for problem solving, and consists of team members, team 
leaders and group leaders (see Figure 4.8).  
 
Figure 4.8 A typical work group in Toyota  
(Source: Liker and Hoseus, 2008) 
 
In Toyota language, workers are called “team member” who perform manual jobs to 
specified standards and are responsible for problem-solving and continuous 
improvement (Liker, 2004; Liker and Hoseus, 2008). Team members are managed 
by “team leaders” who themselves report to “group leaders”. Team leaders has a 
number of important roles including responding to andon pulls, auditing the 
standardized work, ensuring that safety and ergonomic procedures are followed, and 
facilitating the process of solving problems. The team leader is an hourly employee 
who has learned all the jobs in the team and has a set of off-line responsibilities, but 
whose first duty is to respond to andon calls. The group leader is the first-line 
supervisor, who has broader planning responsibilities as well as overall production 
responsibility for several work teams. Liker and Hoseus (2008) summarized three key 




(1) The team leader role as practised in Toyota is virtually nonexistent in most 
companies, in which there may be a “utility” person who can substitute for others 
when he or she is absent, or on leave, but there is no functioning team leader 
role to respond to andon and support daily production and problem-solving. 
(2) Team leaders at other companies support departmental mandates and enforce 
policies, rather than providing the daily support seen in Toyota. 
(3) First-line supervisors at other companies act as fire fighters, disciplinarians, and 
an arm of management, rather than providing leadership, coaching, teaching, and 
planning support for team members. 
 
4.5.3 Principle 11: Partner relationships 
The concept of supplier networks implies that a company has strategic and long-term 
supplier relationships. It is widely known that Toyota has invested heavily in supplier 
partnerships over many decades. The primary reason for Toyota to sacrifice the 
short-term cost reduction for longer term supplier partnership is driven by quality 
(Liker and Meier, 2006). Toyota has the ability to show other organizations how to 
efficiently operate to achieve good quality products. As a result, suppliers can win 
initial contracts with Toyota; however, to be rewarded more contracts, suppliers have 
to adopt Toyota philosophies and efficiencies (Liker and Choi, 2004). Like the 
associates who work inside Toyota, suppliers eventually became part of the 
extended learning enterprise who grew and learned the TPS (Liker, 2004). 
 
The strategy that Toyota adopted for its partners and suppliers is in line with the way 
it treats its employees within Toyota. Principle 11 states that “respect your extended 
network of partners and suppliers by challenging and helping them improve” (Liker, 
2004). Liker and Choi (2004) revealed that Toyota and Honda shared a common 
supplier relationship strategy by following the six distinct steps: 
(1) Understanding how the suppliers work 
(2) Turn supplier rivalry into opportunity 
(3) Supervise the suppliers 
(4) Develop suppliers’ technical capacities 
(5) Share information intensively but selectively 
(6) Conduct joint improvement activities 
 
It is worth noting that Toyota or Honda were recognized by most vendors as the best 
and toughest customers was not because only they exercised one or two elements 
but because they used all six elements together as a system (Liker and Choi, 2004). 
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Inspired by the general guidelines highlighted by Liker and Choi (2004) as well as 
Toyota Way principles, a number of key characteristic of Toyota’s partnering 
principles can be summarized as given below: 
(1) Respect: As pointed out in the Toyota Way, fairness, high expectations and 
challenge characterized how Toyota treats its suppliers, which is the definition of 
respect from Toyota’s perspective (Liker, 2004). This is because the business 
goal is always to maximize profits, but not at the expense of suppliers. As Ohno, 
cited in Liker and Meier (2006): “the achievement of business performance by the 
parent company through bullying suppliers is totally alien to the spirit of the 
Toyota Production System.” As Toyota challenges its own people to improve, the 
challenges are extended to its suppliers which include a series of aggressive 
targets to meet. 
(2) Reduced supplier base: Lean production requires close coordination with 
suppliers to achieve the desired levels of quality. Toyota has done well at this, 
which under a general rule, have sole or two suppliers for every component; it 
also shows Toyota’s trust in them. Most importantly, this partnership is 
established on a long term basis except for the most egregious behaviour of the 
suppliers. Moreover, Toyota has developed a tiered structure, in which Toyota 
works most closely with the top tier suppliers and a few critical lower-tier 
suppliers, which supply major subassemblies or modules and major raw 
materials to Toyota’s manufacturing factory respectively. In addition, Toyota 
expects its top tier suppliers to in turn manage the lower-tier suppliers. 
(3) Direct involvement: Good examples exist in Toyota that have applied the direct-
involvement approach to their suppliers by working extensively to teach them the 
way at building and delivering high-quality components just-in-time, often by 
sending their own employees into supplier plants for weeks or months to 
reorganize the process flow, modify equipment, and establish problem-solving 
groups (MacDuffie and Helper, 1997; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Liker, 2004). 
(4) Communication: All kinds of communication approaches are mentioned in the 
supplier-partnering hierarchy, including setting specific times, places, and 
agendas for meetings; using rigid formats for sharing information; insisting on 
accurate data collection and sharing information in a structured fashion. 
(5) Long term relationship: Toyota’s relationship with its parts suppliers can be 
explained by a long-term implicit contract. Once Toyota opens trade with a 
certain supplier, it is accepted that this business relationship will last over a long 
period. This saves transaction and information costs, and suppliers can 
specifically invest in equipment for the production of Toyota parts. Tsuji (2003) 
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reasoned that monitoring and incentive schemes are the two factors required to 
sustain this long-term relationship. 
 
On the other hand, like other Japanese auto-makers, Toyota is an extensive 
outsourcer, which outsourced 70% of the components of the vehicles to its partners 
and suppliers (Liker, 2004).  However, Toyota is very careful when deciding what to 
outsource and what to do in-house. In addition, Toyota has a clear view of its core 
competency and endeavours to become an expert and the best in certain technology 
that is core to the vehicle. Liker (2004) noted that Toyota is humble to learn from the 
suppliers, but never transfers all the core knowledge and responsibility in any key 
area to the suppliers.   
 
4.5.4 Summary of Principles 9 to 11 
Principles 9 to 11 were less discussed in the earlier TPS principles, which mainly 
focused on the shop floor practice. Liker’s (2004) elaboration on Toyota’s leaders, 
employees, teams, and its partners and networks vividly outlined how Toyota 
manages people – the most important asset in Toyota. All the efforts towards people 
and partners have indirectly contributed to add value in the production flow.  Based 
on the discussions above, Table 4.6 breaks down the key features of Principle 10 of 
the Toyota Way model as operationalized measurables.  
 
Table 4.6 Operationalized measurable from the Toyota Way People and Partner 
model  
Toyota Way People and 
Partners model 
Operationalized measurables 
P9. Leaders and leadership 
 
 Genchi Genbutsu practice 
 In-depth knowledge of their work 
 Support the people doing the work (ability to develop, 
mentor and lead people) 
 Support the culture 
P10. People management  
 
 Carefully screening prospective 
 Various training opportunities 
 Multi-functional skills 
 Teamwork 
 Activities are organized to improve team cohesion 
 Level of hierarchies in the organizational structure 
 Forms of work group 
P11. Partner relationships  
 Degree of challenging the work partners 
 Number of supplier base 
 The degree of direct involvement of people 
 Communication 




4.6 Toyota Way Problem-solving model  
The problem-solving approach used in Toyota today comes from multiple sources 
(Sobek and Smalley, 2008). Firstly, this was simply the culture of the company 
tracing back to its founders, Sakichi Toyota and his son, Kiichiro Toyoda, who 
established the early culture of Toyota and its inventive spirit. Liker (2004) highlighted 
that the practice of genchi genbutsu is deeply rooted in the country’s culture. Nisbett 
and his associates, cited in Liker (2004, p.235), concluded that “Westerners prefer 
abstract universal principles. East Asians seek rules appropriate to a situation, and 
the East Asians see the same situation in more details than the westerners.” This 
explained why Toyota’s people are keen to go and see. This also implies that it would 
be more difficult for the westerners to emulate. The second input was the personality 
of Taiichi Ohno and his insistence on going to the shop floor in order to investigate 
the root cause of a problem. Thirdly, Toyota was deeply influenced by a high-level 
methodology initially developed by Walter Shewhart of Bell Laboratories in the 1930s, 
and later adopted by Edwards Deming who became its biggest proponent (Sobek 
and Smalley, 2008). The methodology is the PDCA cycle, also called the Deming 
Cycle. The PDCA cycle begins with the Plan step, in which the problem solver 
thoroughly studies a problem or opportunity to understand it from as many viewpoints 
as possible, and then analyzes it to find the root causes.  
 
The last three principles of the Toyota Way work hand in hand in Toyota. The 
problem-solving methodology is a skill that runs deep and strong at all levels of the 
organization within Toyota and across all functions, from manufacturing to 
purchasing to sales and the rest of Toyota. Without a practical and continuous 
problem-solving process that is used on a daily basis, there will be a gap in any 
company’s lean transformation (Liker and Hoseus, 2008). The problem-solving 
method starts with Toyota’s people seeing problems as opportunities, solving the 
problems aggressively and systematically to find a better way to do things, and then 
rigorously verifying that the better way is indeed better. This method encompasses a 
critical and logical thinking process. It requires thorough evaluation and reflection 
(genchi genbutsu) (Principle 12), careful consideration of various options to reach a 
consensus (Principle 13) and a high level of continuous improvement (Principle 14). 





4.6.1 Principle 12: Genchi Genbutsu 
Principle 12 can be summarized as comprising the following three elements: 
(1) Solving problems and improve processes by going to the source, which in 
Japanese is referred to as genchi genbutsu. 
(2) Think and speak based on personally verified data rather than theorizing on the 
basis of what others or the computer screen tell you. 
(3) Top management is encouraged to go and see things for themselves. They will 
accomplish more when they have the skills to analyze and thoroughly understand 
the situation. 
 
The first requirement of problem-solving is to determine the merit of solving the 
problems. The first step of the Toyota Way in dealing with the problem is genchi 
genbutsu. It is viewed as one of the founder’s philosophies in Toyota (Osono et al., 
2008), infers that the root cause of problems are revealed by on-site investigation 
and inquiry. Hence, when there is a problem on the production floor, the practice of 
genchi genbutsu requires that the Toyota leaders must “go and see” the shop floor 
firsthand, and really understand the actual situation at the shop floor level. It also 
means talking with the people involved to find out exactly where the problem 
occurred, when, and under what circumstances. According to the Toyota Way, a 
superficial impression of the current situation in any division of Toyota will lead to 
ineffective decision-making and leadership. Moreover, this fundamental philosophy 
has been mentioned earlier in Principle 9, in which The Toyota Way requires that the 
employees and managers must “deeply” understand the processes of flow, 
standardized work, etc. More importantly, the Toyota Way emphasizes staff’s abilities 
to critically evaluate and analyze the work in the shop floor (Liker, 2004, p.224). The 
advantages of genchi genbutsu includes (1) enhanced communications, (2) 
increased level of trust, and (3) it reflects the commitment from management on 
quality control. 
 
Making decisions based on facts, instead of intuition is one of the foundations for 
effectively reducing variability in a production system. Many problems can be solved 
readily using a combination of production management principles and experience 
without any assistance from data collection. However, non-trivial situations, such as 
the solutions for complex engineering difficulties, or the introduction of a new 
technology require substantial preparation and consideration. In such cases, data 
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from all possible angles is a fundamental requisite to obtain effective solutions (Imai, 
1997). 
 
4.6.2 Principle 13: Consensus decision making  
Making decisions based on facts may seem such an obvious statement that is not 
even worth discussing. However many managers in most companies make decisions 
based on very limited information (e.g. reports generated and summarized by 
subordinates). For Toyota, how the decision being made is just as important as the 
quality of the decision (Liker, 2004). The management knows that people do make 
mistakes. Hence, instead of focusing on the correction of any particular decisions, 
the management also values the process through which the decision was made even 
though the decision-making process yielded a bad result. As Liker (2004, p.138) 
commented: “management will forgive a decision that does not work out as expected, 
if the process used was the right one.” There are five critical elements that form the 
decision-making process in Toyota, which are summarized by Liker (2004): 
(1) Finding out what is really going on, including genchi genbutsu. 
(2) Understanding underlying causes that explain surface appearance – asking “Why” 
five times. 
(3) Broadly considering alternative solutions and developing a detailed rationale for 
the preferred solution. 
(4) Building consensus within the team, including Toyota employees and outside 
partners. 
(5) Using every efficient communication vehicle to do the above one through four, 
preferably on one side of one sheet of paper (A3 paper). 
It can also be concluded that the last three principles of the Toyota Way model, 
forming the problem-solving philosophy, are structured based on these five critical 
processes in sequence (Liker, 2004). Apart from the principle of genchi genbutsu 




“5 whys” is a tool used to keep asking “why” until the root cause(s) are determined. 
Ohno (1988) pointed out the Toyota Production System has been built on the 
practice and evolution of this scientific approach. The problem-solver would start the 
question with “why is this problem occurring?” Upon answering it, he or she would 
have identified a cause to the observed effect. The problem-solver asks the same 
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questions again, aiming to turn the cause into an effect, to identify a deeper cause. 
The problem-solver continues this inquiry until the root cause can be probed. When 
completed, the problem-solver has a clear and coherent cause-effect chain that 
demonstrates an in-depth understanding of the problem in context, noting how the 
root cause is linked to the observed phenomenon (Sobek and Smalley, 2008). Take 
countermeasures at the deepest level of the cause that is feasible and at the level 
that will prevent reoccurrence of the problem. In cases that the root cause cannot be 
analyzed from the five-why techniques, Sobek and Smalley (2008) commented that 
structured tests or experiments can otherwise be used to eliminate possible causes 
and in problems related to organizational processes. 
 
Alternative solutions 
Compared not only with the U.S. automobile manufacturers but also with other 
Japanese car manufacturers, senior engineers and managers in Toyota were trained 
to think in sets of alternative solutions as well as to think in a set-based concurrent 
engineering scenario (Liker, 2004). In the course of devising countermeasures for a 
given problem, problem-solvers are strongly urged to consider multiple alternative 
countermeasures even at the risk of delaying decisions. Not only does this approach 
foster creativity in problem-solving among the employees, but it also offers the other 
participants more tangible inputs into the final agreement.  
 
Consensus 
The Japanese management style requires a consensus to be reached before any 
decisions are made (Ouchi, 1981). As noted by Keys and Miller (1984), the 
consensus decision process appears to be an application of the American concept of 
participative management. Consensus is generated by taking inputs from many 
people and evaluating many alternatives. Toyota Way’s Principle 13 also includes the 
important process of nemawashi: making decision slowly by consensus, thoroughly 
considering all options, implement rapidly (Liker, 2004, p.241). Nemawashi literally 
means binding the roots of a plant before pulling it out, and refers to the practice of 
broad consultation before taking action (Vogel, 1975). By the time the formal 
proposal is ready for a high-level approval, the decision is probably finalized. Figure 
4.9 describes the decision-making methods used in Toyota in different circumstances. 
Once a plan is made, everyone knows what to do and how to complete their task. 
This has been practiced by Japanese construction organizations where less planning 
and monitoring meeting within the project team are needed compared with their U.K. 




suppliers and other stakeholders to contribute their inputs to enrich the alternative 
solutions. This principle can be applied in the construction industry where efforts are 
required from various stakeholders that include the designers, contractors, sub-
contractors, and other practitioners to reach a consensus on certain problems that 






















Figure 4.9 Alternative Toyota decision-making methods  
Source: Liker (2008) 
 
Efficient communication vehicles 
The A3 report, particularly referred to in this problem-solving principle, is a key part of 
the process of efficiently getting consensus on complex decisions. The A3 report is 
so named because it fits on one side of an A3-sized sheet of paper, which is roughly 
equivalent to an 11x17 inch sheet. A3 is a powerful lean tool that is based on, and 
supported by the Deming Cycle (Liker, 2004; Sobek and Smalley, 2008). It serves as 
guidelines for addressing the root causes of problems that arise in and around the 
workplace. Shook (2009) concluded that the ultimate goal of the A3 report is not to 
simply solve the problem, but to make the process of problem-solving transparent 
and teachable that fosters learning for problem solvers. 
 
4.6.3 Principle 14: Reflection and continuous improvement 
The Toyota Way’s Principle 14, sitting at the peak of the 4P model, is an ongoing 
process in Toyota, which aims to create a learning organization through relentless 











































highlighted that “to become a true learning organization, the very learning capacity of 
the organization should be developing and growing over time.” To learn means 
having the capacity to build on your past and move forward incrementally (Liker, 
2004). Toyota’s learning organization has four key elements according to Liker 
(2004): (1) identify the root causes and develop countermeasures, (2) use hansei, (3) 
utilize policy deployment (hoshin kanri), and (4) kaizen. 
 
Identify root causes and develop countermeasures 
Toyota identifies root causes primarily using a very simple method called the “5 
whys”. This simply entails asking the question “why” as many times as possible to 
determine the root cause of a problem. This problem-solving tool has been 
elaborated in Principles 12 and 13. 
 
Use hansei  
Hansei is a unique Japanese culture that roughly means “reflection on 
mistakes/weaknesses and devising ways to improve”. Liker and Hoseus (2008) 
highlighted that there are three key components of hansei: 
(1) The individual must recognize that there is a problem – a gap between 
expectations and achievement – and be opened to negative feedback. 
(2) The individual must voluntarily take personal responsibility and feel deep regret. 
(3) The individual must commit to a specific course of action to improve. 
 
Hansei is one of the most difficult things Toyota has ever had to teach, but it is an 
integral ingredient in Toyota’s organizational learning (Liker, 2004). Hansei is not only 
a philosophical belief system in Toyota, but a practical tool for improvement. Hansei 
(reflection) can be used at key milestones and after completing a project to openly 
identify all the shortcomings of the project and to follow up by developing 
countermeasures to avoid the same mistakes again. Within Toyota culture, hansei is 
considered essential for kaizen (Liker and Hoseus, 2008) and it is the “check” stage 
of PDCA.  
 
Utilize policy deployment (Hoshin Kanri) 
According to Lee and Dale (1998), hoshin kanri, sometimes called “policy 
deployment”, was developed in Japan in the early 1960s to communicate a 
company’s policy, goals and objectives throughout its hierarchy. Lee and Dale (1998) 
noted that Toyota adopts this process and sets aggressive objectives at the 
executive level and cascades the objectives down to the work group level (Liker, 
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2004). Each work group level in turn would develop measurable objectives for the 
year, designed to support the executive-level goals. The PDCA cycle is extensively 
applied to the planning and execution of a few critical strategic organization 
objectives (Lee and Dale, 1998; Liker, 2004). Furthermore, it is usual for the plant 
manager to audit the process being made by each team member towards the hoshin 
kanri objectives on a quarterly basis. Liker (2004) highlighted that the “check” and 
“act” part of PDCA are critical to turn the planned goals into effective action.  
 
Kaizen (continuous improvement) 
Most of what is discussed today about continuous improvement comes from 
interpretation of the Japanese practice called “kaizen”. Kaizen means continuous 
improvement involving everyone – top management, managers, and workers (Imai, 
1986). Brunet and New (2003) summarized three key characteristics of kaizen: (1) 
kaizen is continuous – which is used to describe this unique nature of the practice 
and also its place in a never-ending journey towards quality and efficiency; (2) 
incremental in nature – in contrast to organizational or technological innovation; and 
(3) participative feature – which entails the involvement and intelligence of the 
workforce. In the kaizen philosophy, improvement in all areas of business serves to 
enhance the quality of the firm. Thus Evans and Lindsay (2008) outlined that any 
activities directed towards improvement falls under the kaizen umbrella. According to 
Evans and Lindsay (2008), a successful kaizen program usually consists of three 
basic elements: (1) operating practices, (2) total involvement, and (3) training. First, 
the activities discussed under the principles of the Toyota Way (Process part) such 
as the implementation of the just-in-time production system, standardized work, and 
visual management to reveal waste and inefficiency as well as poor quality will lead 
to improvement. Second, in kaizen, every employee strives for improvement and top 
management sees improvement as an inherent component of the company strategy 
and provides support to improvement activities (Evans and Lindsay, 2008; Imai, 
1997). Finally, training is required both in the philosophy and in the tools and 
techniques for the employees. It includes suggestion system, and self-development 
programs that teach practical problem-solving techniques. 
 
Kaizen and problem-solving 
Kaizen is a holistic approach to problem-solving and is people-centered rather than 
system-centered (Huda and Preston, 1992). The starting point for improvement is to 
recognize the need. This comes from recognition of a problem (Imai, 1986; Huda and 
Preston, 1992). If no problem is being recognized, there is no recognition of the need 
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for improvement. Therefore, kaizen emphasizes on problem-awareness and provides 
clues for identifying problems (Imai, 1986). Once problems have been identified, 
these problems must be solved consequently. Thus Imai (1986) highlighted that 
kaizen is also a problem-solving process which requires the use of various problem-
solving tools. When improvement reaches new heights with every problems solved, 
such improvement must be standardized in order to consolidate the new level of 
awareness. It explained why Liker (2004) and Imai (1986) commented that: “Kaizen 
cannot be achieved without standardization”. This is where the concept of involving 
people becomes crucial, because instead of just following instructions, the worker is 
able to explore and think and assume responsibility for improvement. Besides the 
standardized process, there are another two key prerequisites for implementing 
kaizen, namely management support and culture change (Evans and Lindsay, 2008): 
(1) Management support: It does not necessarily call for great investments to 
implement kaizen; it does however call for a great deal of continuous effort and 
commitment 
(2) Culture change: The difference between kaizen and innovation has been well 
elaborated by Imai (1986). In short, the West tends to think of each innovation in 
building practice as a major step change, while the Toyota people, or more 
broadly speaking the Japanese, constantly look at what they are doing, look for 
problems and compare themselves with what others are doing, and try to better 
their performance 
(3) Standardized process: The other key prerequisite for implementing kaizen is to 
stabilize and standardize the process before-hand. In another word, once a 
stable process has been established, continuous improvement tools can be 
employed to determine the root cause of inefficiencies and to apply effective 
countermeasures.  
 
4.6.4 Summary of Principles 12 to 14 
Problems, if not solved, may adversely affect organizational production and 
processes, leading to defects, high costs, safety issues, customer dissatisfaction, 
decreasing competitiveness, and so on. Goetsch and Davis (2009) outlined two 
models for solving and preventing problems, namely the PDCA cycle and the Toyota 
model. The Toyota Way for problem-solving has been elaborated earlier with a 
practical problem-solving process. Moreover, the PDCA cycle is a series of activities 
pursued for improvement, and it is also understood as a process through which new 
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standards are set to be challenged, revised, and replaced by newer and better 
standards (Imai, 1986). 
 
Problem solving and decision making are fundamental to total quality. On the one 
hand, good decisions and solutions will decrease the number of problems that occur. 
On the other hand, the workplace will never be completely problem-free (Goetsch 
and Davis, 2009). Even the best-managed organizations have problems. Toyota’s 
recent recall incident indicates that even though Toyota was committed to quality 
control and problem-solving, problems can still emerge. The last three principles of 
the Toyota Way form the core of Toyota’s problem-solving approach. These are 
concerned with problems that can impact the organization or its customers in some 
way – usually negative. It starts with the Toyota leaders’ genchi genbutsu initiative, 
which places great commitment on problem-solving and objective data for decision-
making. Next, the Toyota Way on how consensus can be achieved is considered. 
Lastly, Toyota as a learning organization emphasizes on continuous improvement 
(kaizen) and reflection (hansei). Table 4.7 lists a number of operationalized 
measurables from the “Problem Solving” layer of the Toyota Way model. 
 
Table 4.7 Operationalized measurable from the Toyota Way Problem Solving model 
Toyota Way Problem Solving model Operationalized measurables 
P12. Go and see for yourself to 
thoroughly understand the situation 
(Genchi Genbutsu) 
 Processes the skills to analyze and thoroughly 
understand the situation 
 Think and speak based on personally verified data  
 Solve problems and improve processes by going to 
the source 
P13. Make decisions slowly by 
consensus, thoroughly considering 
all options, and implement rapidly 
 Practice of 5 Whys 
 Alternative solutions 
 Practice of consensus 
 Effective communication 
P14. Becoming a learning 
organization through relentless 
reflection (Hansei) and continuous 
improvement (Kaizen) 
 Identify the root causes and develop 
countermeasures 
 Reflection 
 Policy deployment  
 Kaizen activities (continuous improvement) 





4.7 Development of the Toyota Way model for construction 
4.7.1 Introduction 
In this section, as a starting point, the Toyota Way model is proposed to solve some 
of the inherent limitations of the frameworks that are currently available in the lean 
construction domain. The Toyota Way model was briefly mentioned earlier: to 
reiterate, it comprises of 14 principles in 4 layers. Each layer can be viewed as an 
individual model. The first task with respect to the Toyota Way practices is to 
operationalize each principle into actionable attributes within the construction industry. 
Under the Toyota Way model, the underlying principles should have positive 
implications for the construction industry. In theory, the model equally values the 
“process” and “people” aspects, as well as other. This would be an appropriate 
choice, since most lean construction frameworks have a strong technical focus, with 
limited attention on the human dimensions.  
 
4.7.2 Implementation of Process model in construction 
The lean construction literature reports a number of construction projects that have 
already interpreted and exercised some principles from the Toyota Production 
System in the construction industry. However, as Picchi and Granja (2004) observed, 
in most cases the building professionals only put one lean construction tool into 
practice and missed the need to interact with other lean tools. In this section, efforts 
are made to discuss the implementation of the eight core Toyota Way principles 
under the “Process” category in the construction industry. Moreover, to overcome the 
difficulties due to the differences between the two sectors, Ballard’s (2000) Last 
Planner System (LPS) is employed to interpret a few Toyota Way principles from an 
alternative perspective. The LPS has perhaps achieved a greater degree of industrial 
penetration (Green and May, 2005), and shares some common grounds with a 





4.7.2.1 Linking Toyota Way to the Last Planner System (LPS) 
As discussed earlier, Last Planner System serves as one of the theoretical 
foundations of lean construction (Koskela et al., 2002), and in some circumstances 
the LPS turns out to be synonymous with lean construction (Green and May, 2005). 
The LPS is now regarded as the most powerful and well-known planning and control 
system from all the lean construction techniques and tools (Kenly and Seppänen, 
2010). According to Ballard (2000), the LPS builds on the principle of systematic 
reactive work planning executed on the lowest possible level in the hierarchy of 
planners – the last planner. The underlying philosophy is to ensure that all the 
prerequisites needed for performing distinct construction work are in place before it is 
assigned to a work group (Ballard, 2000; Ala-Risku and Karkkainen, 2006). It uses 
the overall project plan as the general framework, but suggests that the daily 
activities of the production should be managed by a more flexible approach that is 
cognizant of the actual progress of the project. There are four main categories for 
any executable project task, namely SHOULD, CAN, WILL, and DID (see Figure 
4.10):  
(1) SHOULD: tasks that need to be performed in the near future according to the 
overall project plan. 
(2) CAN: tasks that have all their prerequisites ready: e.g. previous project steps are 
completed, necessary materials are at hand, and workforce is available. 
(3) WILL: the tasks that are commenced before the next planning round. 











Figure 4.10 The Last Planner System  








Planning Process WILL CAN 
Production Resources DID 
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The overall objective of the LPS is to increase plan reliability, and thus to serve as a 
framework for addressing waste deriving from uncertainty and plan deviance. The 
Last Planner System employs a four-level hierarchy of schedules and planning tools: 
master plan, phase (pull) plan, look-ahead plan, and weekly work plan (Ballard, 2000; 
Kenley and Seppänen, 2010, p.110). 
 
Master and phase plan 
The master schedule is the overall project schedule, which is developed from the 
design criteria and supports the client’s project objectives. It consists of milestones 
and items with long lead times. Milestone dates are determined by using the “pull” 
process from successor milestones (Pappas, 1999). The plan is then developed by 
those responsible for building the phase together with subcontractors, starting 
backward from the planned phase completion date (Kenley and Seppänen, 2010, 
p.110). The process reveals what must be done to release work for production. 
 
Look-ahead plan  
The Look-Ahead Plan represents an intermediate level of planning. It is a schedule of 
potential assignments, typically for the next 6 to 8 weeks (Ballard, 2000). The number 
of weeks over which a look-ahead process extends is determined by project 
characteristics, the reliability of the planning system, and the lead times for acquiring 
information, materials, labour, and equipment (Ballard, 2000). The work is planned 
on assignment level, which means something that can be communicated to workers 
(Kenley and Seppänen, 2010, p.112). Management continues to break down the 
activities into more details and screen the resulting smaller activities throughout the 
look-ahead window, until the activities are essentially assignment-level tasks 
(Pappas, 1999). 
 
Weekly work plan  
The weekly work plan is an assignment-level schedule. Detailed schedules are 
derived from the look-ahead plans on a weekly basis. The weekly work plan is 
formed based on the mechanism of Last Planner System, which aims to transform 
what SHOULD be done into what CAN be done, thus forming an inventory of ready 
work. In the meanwhile, examination of the prerequisites can take place when this 
level of detailed schedule can be achieved (Kenley and Seppänen, 2010, p.112). A 
typical weekly work planning procedure proposed by Ballard and Howell (1998a) 




Percent Plan Complete (PPC) 
This is another key feature of the LPS, which tracks what is known as Percent Plan 
Complete (PPC). It is calculated by dividing the number of completed assignments 
(what “did” get done) by the total number of assignments each week (what was 
projected “will” get done) and reasons are identified and acted on for failures to 
complete assignments. A high PPC means that the LPS allows for reliable 
forecasting of work, and that tasks made ready are being completed on schedule.  
 
The Last Planner System nicely works out some application problems in terms of the 
inherent differences between the manufacturing and construction sector. When it is 
argued by construction practitioners that the Toyota Way or lean principles cannot be 
adopted in the construction industry, the LPS offers a number of similar grounds to 
facilitate this. Principles 2 to 5 of the Toyota Way can in particular find their 
application template in construction with the last planner in the area of planning and 
control (see Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.8 Linking a number of Toyota Way principles to the Last Planner System 
Toyota Way 
principles 
The Last Planner System Explanation 
Principle 2: One 
piece flow – creating 
a flow stability 
Weekly planning 
 Controlling planning reliability as the approach to improve workflow reliability, and finally to 
achieve the flow stability (Ballard and Howell, 1998a).  
 The weekly planning process is deliberately intended to shield production from poor planning.  
 The LPS prevents work which cannot be completed from being scheduled, thus shielding the 
crews from waste generated by interruption.  
Principle 3: Pull 
system 
Look-ahead plan 
 LPS is a type of pull system, for example a look-ahead plan ensuring assignments are ready is 
explicitly an application of pull techniques (Ballard, 2000). 
 Pull can be understood as ultimately a derivative from target completion dates, but specifically 
applies to the internal customer of each process (Ballard, 2000). 
Principle 4: Level-out 
workload (Heijunka) 
Weekly planning and 
Look-ahead plan 
 Developing a weekly plan is very much similar to application of “heijunka” in construction. 
 The look-ahead plan is supposed to maintain a backlog of workable assignments for each 
production unit, which requires estimating the amount of load and capacity of the production unit. 
The weekly plan specified who is to do what during each week as regards planning and control.  
 Work is selected in the right sequence – that is, so as to best move the project towards its 
objective. Sequencing decisions can also be made by last planners (foremen) based on their 
intimate knowledge of working conditions and constructability issues. 
 The right amount of work is selected: that amount of work that uses the labour and equipment 
capacity as directed by the schedule. By reviewing and signing off on quality plans beforehand, 
management validates quality plans and can then focus on controlling execution of the plans. 
Principle 5: Built-in 
quality 
Weekly planning 
 The construction analogy to stopping production rather than passing on a defective product is to 
make only quality assignments (Ballard and Howell, 1998a). 
 Weekly work plans are effective when they meet specific quality requirements for definition, 
soundness, sequence, size, and learning. Quality assignments shield production from work flow 
uncertainty (Ballard and Howell, 1998a). 
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4.7.2.2 Implementation of Toyota Way principles (Principles 2-8) 
Apart from the Last Planner as an important template with which Toyota Way principles 
can be implemented in the construction industry with a planning and control focus, 
attempts had been made to seek the alternative means of implementing of the Toyota 
Way principles in the construction context. As a production philosophy, it seems that the 
seven principles of the Toyota Way model have much in common with the JIT 
philosophy, especially in areas of material management, site layout, and so on. 
 
One-piece flow (P2)  
As discussed earlier, one-piece flow can be achieved through collective efforts such as 
takt time, U-shape machine layout, pull systems, and so on. Continuous flow and takt 
time are most easily applied in repetitive manufacturing and service operations (Liker, 
2004). In construction, creating a continuous process flow on-site is a huge challenge 
due to its fragmented nature, low standardization patterns of activities, the one-of-a-kind 
features of construction products, and so on. (Koskela, 2000). However, repetitive 
operations can also be reflected partially in construction; hence, this principle can be 
applied accordingly, with necessary treatment. For example, in a house construction 
project, Yu et al. (2009) defined takt time as the rate at which a home builder must build 
the house to satisfy customer demand. More specifically, the takt time is determined by 
the average volume of sales in the previous months and the available workdays in a 
certain month. Based on the takt time on hand, the number of kanban for each of the 
tasks in the value stream can be determined; hence the production paces of working 
stations are synchronized. This research, however, does not intend to investigate 
whether takt time is or can be used in the Chinese construction industry. Instead, there 
are three elements, namely waste elimination (Sowards, 2007; Polat and Ballard, 2004), 
labour flow (Thomas et al., 2003), and material flow (Akintoye, 1995), that can reflect this 
one-piece flow principle in the context of construction industry. 
 
Pull  kanban system (P3)  
Potential applications of the pull (kanban) system have already made their appearance 
in the construction industry. More specifically, the kanban or pull system can be used in 
procurement of materials at the right time and in the right quantities based on the actual 
demands on-site (Low and Chan, 1996; Low and Mok, 1999; Khalfan et al., 2008). 
Arbulu et al. (2003) developed the kanban strategy to manage the replenishment of 
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certain types of made-to-stock products from preferred suppliers to site. The kanban 
system enables construction teams to get products from the marketplace on a daily 
basis, according to site needs. This kanban strategy cannot be realized until some 
components are available, including (1) marketplaces or main site store, (2) collection 
vehicles or “milk runs”, (3) satellite stores, and (4) an inventory management system 
(Arbulu et al., 2003). It criticized the traditional approach that generates orders in big 
batches on a weekly or biweekly basis. However, the big-batch-mentality is one of the 
most important challenges in the implementation of the kanban strategy (Arbulu et al., 
2003). Apart from the on-site practice, the pull mechanism is also suggested as one of 
the principles within the JIT framework that would assist building professionals in the 
construction supply chain to enjoy the similar benefits. In this regard, Low and Choong 
(2001) suggested that each empty truck returning to the plant was a kanban. In a case 
study reported by Khalfan et al. (2008) in the UK construction industry, an e-procurement 
system was employed as kanban signals by the client, where they placed an order for 
the required product on-site with specific dates and specifications, as well as delivery 
time. Due to the differences between the manufacturing and construction sector, the 
kanban principles, most of the time, serve as a supplier kanban to help contractors better 
control their materials and inventory requirements. Furthermore, Jang and Kim (2007) 
acknowledged that kanban is able to fulfil the functions of visibility, production control, 
and progress monitoring. Moreover Jang and Kim (2007) suggested that the kanban can 
also be used as a safety control tool because safety information can be added on each 
kanban.  
 
Heijunka (P4)   
Heijunka, or leveling out the workload, is perhaps the hardest to implement in the 
construction industry. Compared to manufacturing, the key difference is that the 
elements of construction require different amount of time. It is worth mentioning that 
there are a number of points of commonality between the last planner system and the 
principle of heijunka. Both aim to achieve a stable and reliable workflow. The last planner 
system is well documented in the literature and sometimes it has been used to represent 
lean construction. Apart from adopting Ballard’s (2000) four levels of plans, including 
master plan, phase plan, looking-ahead plan, and weekly plan, one of the important 
issues here is that the foreman needs to be empowered to make his own commitment on 
105 
 
what day-to-day or week-to-week tasks he can actually deliver in a given time. By doing 
this, foremen can have a sense of ownership of the project programme.  
 
Built-in quality (P5)  
The principle of built-in quality can be interpreted as “do it right the first time”, which is 
the overarching goal of Total Quality Management (TQM). However, the quality culture in 
the construction industry prefers to use the inspection period to fix occurring problems 
rather than to apply the Toyota Way’s built-in quality approach to eliminate the defects in 
the first place. In this case, principle 5 of the Toyota Way could be understood as the 
adoption of prevention approaches as well as whether employees’ attitudes towards 
quality parallel to “stop-and-fix”. To achieve “do it right the first time” requires a mindset 
change, as employees should be encouraged to expose problems as well as trained to 
upgrade their capacity to identify problems. In addition to these, the ISO9000 series has 
played a role in setting a quality assurance standard that also drives the construction 
firms’ efforts towards quality management. Love and Li (2000), however, argue that 
quality assurance does not provide enough benefits to justify its implementation in terms 
of cost. To reap the benefits and improve the overall cost competitiveness of 
construction, one needs to implement a company-wide TQM system, which requires a 
culture built around ISO 9000 and continuous improvement. Moreover, similar to the 
andon practice which needs empowerment from the top management, employee 
involvement and empowerment from management were identified as key measureables 
to reflect TQM performance in the construction industry (Low and Teo, 2004). Nesan and 
Holt (1999, p.220) outlined a three-phase empowerment for implementation in 
construction organizations and highlighted some of the crucial organizational factors 
such as organizational structure, process-control mechanisms, and employees’ attitudes 
towards empowerment, as well as the dynamic nature of the built environment which is 
characterized by constant changes with respect to the workforce, client requirements, 
project goals, technology, and economy. 
 
Standardized work (P6) 
Standardization implies that all work should be highly specified in terms of timing, 
content, sequence, and outcome. Creating standardized work requires identifying the 
repeatable elements of a process, assessing the best way to perform those elements, 
developing a reliable method to ensure the performance of those elements, and then 
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performing the reliable method according to a required time. Construction practitioners 
may express scepticism that standard work is not possible in construction because each 
construction project is unique and is strongly affected by external factors. The 
implementation of standardization (Principle 6) in the construction industry can be 
treated as:  
(1) the promotion of standardized components such as using off-site techniques in the 
prefabrication sector. 
(2) standardized tasks in the construction process in which repeatable elements of a 
process in identified.  
 
The rationale for prefabrication is that economies of large-scale production can be 
reaped by standardizing the components, along with other benefits including improved 
quality with better quality controls, reduction in wastage, less labour-intensive operation, 
and faster production of building components (Low and Chan, 1996; Low and Choong, 
2001). Hence, industry experts advised the construction industry should use more offsite 
techniques and standardization in order to increase quality and reduce cost and time. 
Cooke and Williams (2009) emphasize that lean thinking can be successfully applied to 
various forms of assembly technology to smooth the construction process. However, 
standardization has changed over the years, with efforts being made to meet clients’ 
needs and produce customized individual buildings, while still using standard 
components and employing standard processes to ensure success (Gibb and Isack, 
2001). Low and Choong (2001) advocated that, in order to meet the needs for greater 
variety, prefabrication should move towards lean production rather keep the old-fashion 
way of mass production, which refers to the production of smaller but economically 
viable volumes of standardized components, specially tailored for a project. This exactly 
mirrors Ohno’s (1983) strategy for Toyota to produce fewer quantities of cars but with a 
greater range of products. 
 
In terms of the standardized tasks, Santos et al. (2002b) examined two indicators with a 
focus on the “bricklaying” process, namely (1) the number of bricklayers who are aware 
of the written standard, and (2) the number of revisions of the standards per year. It has 
been found that written standards were ineffective due to the lack of teamwork and 
problem-solving activities (Santos et al., 2002b). The construction firms have developed 
standards, but often failed to implement and maintain their standards in practice. 
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Moreover, the written standards have little value if the workers do not have sufficient 
knowledge of their contents or motivation to apply them in practice. 
 
Visual control (P7)  
Few studies report on visual management in construction, due to a number of factors 
such as the physical environment involved, construction technology, and contractual 
relations that result in difficulties visualizing the flow of work in progress on-site (Sacks et 
al., 2009; Tezel et al., 2010). As far as the construction practitioner is concerned, visual 
control can be achieved in many ways. In a technical report conducted by Salford 
University scholars (Tezel et al., 2010), 18 visual management practices were 
collectively reported in a construction context. These practices covered a range of areas 
and employed tools such as kanban, mistake proofing, good site practice such as “5-S”, 
prototyping and sampling, and others. Basically, the visual management practices can 
be classified into different layers of visual workplace framework (see Galsworth, 2005), 
namely visual order, visual standards, visual measures, visual controls, and visual 
guarantees. For example, one company in Peru installed lights in the control trailer that 
corresponded to each floor of the building under construction. The crew working on that 
floor would set the light switch according to their requirements: green means that all is 
OK, yellow means that they are going to be out of materials in 30 minutes, and red 
means that work has stopped. Moreover, Sack et al. (2009) demonstrated how building 
models can generate 3D visualization of a construction process, helping the construction 
practitioners to better manage their work. Although these software-oriented visual control 
tools have been found useful in improving flow processes on construction sites, a longer 
time might be needed for them to be employed in developing countries. At Toyota, as 
Liker (2004) revealed, the creative use of any means is the best available approach to 
create true visual control. The 5-S concepts can be readily applied in construction sites, 
as these do not need sophisticated software requirements. However, 5-S concepts are 
not well recognized by practitioners in the construction industry presently (Low and Ang, 
2003). Low and Ang (2003) reported that numerous improvements to site layout – 
including decreases in the demand for storage space, minimal movement and handling 





Adoption of reliable technology (P8)   
/Most likely, every organization wants to be on the cutting edge of technology. This is 
also true in the construction industry, which is still very labour intensive. Building 
professionals have attempted various new technologies, in the hope of improving 
performance, in an industry which is known for its slow rate of adopting new technology. 
Yet most of the time, it ends up creating unrealistic or unsustainable expectations. Liker 
(2004) suggests a view of adoption of new technology in the Toyota Way thinking that 
includes principles such as: 
(1) new technology must be thoroughly tested and proven to be reliable. 
(2) new technology must support continuous flow in the operation (process). 
(3) new technology must help employees perform better (people). 
The important implication of the above for the construction industry is obvious. It also 
provides valid justification for new technology adoption when cost is considered.  
 
In summary, Table 4.9 translates seven Toyota Way principles that belonging to the 
“Process” layer of the Toyota Way model to the construction context. It implies that the 
implementation of Toyota Way in construction largely draws on lean construction 
practices, which are closely related to planning and control activities on the construction 
site. According to Ballard and Howell (1994), lean construction distinguishes itself from 
traditional construction management in two aspects: (1) waste management, and (2) flow 
management. Similarly, these seven principles work hand-in-hand to eliminate waste 
throughout the construction process. These include the introduction of the Just-in-time 
(JIT) process, 5-S, visual control, and others, in order to improve the construction 
process. On the other hand, the implementation of Toyota Way principles in the 
construction context can initiate a production control system, such as the adoption of the 
Last Planner System, to have a strategic procurement plan, where reliable production 
planning is required. Both reflect the operations and tactical aspects of lean construction, 





Table 4.9 Operationalized measurables of the Toyota Way Process model in the 
construction industry 
Sub-principles 
Operationalized measurables in Toyota 
Way 
Operationalized measurables 
in construction industry 
P2. One-piece flow 
to bring problems to 
the surface 
 Waste elimination 
 Takt time 
 Use flow oriented layout (U shape) 
 Synchronize production activities 
so that one does not start until the 
previous activity has finished (pull) 
 Standardized work to stabilized 
flow 
 Waste elimination 
 Workforce flow 
 Material flow 
 Work flow (weekly plan) 
P3. Use pull system 
to avoid 
overproduction 
 Pull from customer end – including 
both internal and external 
customers 
 Use visual control – kanban system 
 The level of material 
inventory 
 Look-ahead plan 
P4. Level out the 
workload (Heijunka) 
 Eliminate overburden to people and 
equipment (muri) 
 Eliminate unevenness in the 
production schedule (mura) 
 Level out the workload of all 
manufacturing and service process 
 Weekly plan 
P5. Build a culture 
of stopping to fix 
problems 
 Deliver perfect first time quality 
 Reveal and solve problems at the 
source as they occur 
 Keep quality control simple 
 Create culture – involve and 
empower employees to 
continuously improve 
 Deliver perfect first time 
quality 
 Reveal and solve problems 
at the source as they occur 
 Quality circle 
 People involvement and 
responsibility for quality 
P6. Standardized 






 Standardized operating procedure 
(SOP) 
 Continuously improve the 
standardization 
 Empowered employees to 
participate in the writing of standard 
procures 
 Level of off-site technique 
usage 
 Level of standardized work 
 SOP 
 Level of employee 
empowerment to 
improvement the standards 
P7. Use visual 
control so no 
problems are hidden 
 Practice of 5-S 
 Integrate the visual control systems 
to the value-added work 
 Practice of 5-S 
 Practice of visual control 
P8. Use only 
reliable technology 
that serves people 
and process 
 Thoroughly test new technology 
 Technology must support people 
 Technology must improve flow 
 Technology must support the 
company values 
 Thoroughly test new 
technology 
 Technology must support 
people 
 Technology must improve 
flow 
 Technology must support 





4.7.3 Implementation of the People and Partner model in construction 
The three principles dealing with “People and Partners” imply that companies should 
develop leaders who live the philosophy of the company and for whom mutual respect is 
present between the suppliers and the “main company”, as well as between 
management and workers. This is applicable to the construction practitioners, namely 
the leaders, individuals, suppliers, and partners. 
 
Leaders and leadership  
Similarly, Toyota leaders must have a combination of in-depth understanding of the work 
as well as the ability to develop, mentor, and lead. In the construction context, project 
managers are required to develop two types of skills, namely specific skills and general 
skills (Edum-Fotwe and McCaffer, 2000). The former relate directly and only to 
construction projects, and reflect their specific skills; the latter are essential for the 
project manager to function effectively with his or her specialist knowledge, and include 
leading, communicating, negotiating, and problem-solving skills (Edum-Fotwe and 
McCaffer, 2000). Other than the essential skills required of Toyota leaders in Toyota 
Way Principle 9, Toyota’s unique organizational structure is highlighted by Liker (2004), 
and reflects Toyota’s philosophy of adding value to its employees. In construction, Orr 
(2005) compared the traditional stakeholder’s organization with its lean version. 
Traditionally, the stakeholder’s organization may be drawn as a pyramid as illustrated in 
Figure 4.11 (the left one), with the director at the top, and the tradesperson at the base.  
 
Figure 4.11 Organizational structures in the traditional and lean perspective  
(Source: Orr, 2005) 
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The principle is that, in a traditional organization, directions are given from the top in a 
command-and-control manner. Inspired from the team leader concept in the lean (TPS) 
philosophy, another pyramid (this time inverted) was proposed by Orr (2005), as 
illustrated in Figure 4.11, where the tradesperson is at the top and is supported by the 
rest of the stakeholders. This mirrors the servant-leadership concept in the construction 
context. If the upside-down pyramidal organization structure can be successfully 
implemented in the construction industry, it will enable the leaders to use all efforts, as 
well as all necessary resources, to help the front-line workers. In construction, leadership 
is of prime importance, and is required to smooth and activate effective teamwork at the 
site level. For example, site managers are no longer simply inspectors to check the work 
after its completion. Instead, they must devote time to solving problems by going and 
seeing the source first-hand, and being responsible for achieving and maintaining 
productivity excellence.  
 
People management  
Toyota strives to develop excellent individuals, and this involves four major activities: 
careful selection, a variety of training, effective teamwork, and an upside-down 
organization. This reflects that the Principle 10 of the Toyota Way – people management 
– is a soft model of HRM that treats human resources as valued assets. According to 
Green (2002), the dominant culture of construction industry currently emphasizes the 
hard model of HRM, which sees humans as a resource to be “provided and deployed” as 
needed to achieve organizational objectives. Pursuing Principle 10 of Toyota Way in 
construction can be interpreted as encouraging the soft model of HRM. The literature 
has covered various elements of the soft model, including teamwork, training, 
empowerment, and so on, in the context of construction (Nesan and Holt, 1999; 
Loosemore et al., 2003). According to Nesan and Holt (1999, p.51), the practice of 
teamwork through an organization is an essential component of lean production 
implementation, as it builds trust, improves communication, and develops 
interdependence. All members of the team should strive for continuous improvement and 
customer satisfaction through teamwork. Apart from extensive training, multiskilled 
employees are not uncommon in companies that practise lean. However, the 
construction industry is characterized as craft-based, with extensive labour-only 
subcontracting prohibiting investment in training. Multi-skilled workers can be seen in 
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Europe, such as in the construction industries of Germany and the Netherlands, as 
reported by Clarke and Wall (2000). 
 
Partner relationships 
Partnering in the construction industry is not a new concept. In response to stimulating a 
radical change in the construction industry in terms of value for money, profitability, and 
reliability, partnering has become a common pretender requirement for government-
funded capital building projects (Beach et al., 2005). Moreover, as there is increasing 
recognition of Just-in-time and Total Quality Management among building professionals, 
construction organizations have acknowledged the benefits of having a few good 
suppliers with whom they have worked closely on a long-term basis. Furthermore, 
manufacturing firms outsource their work through contractual arrangements with other 
parties. Similarly, most construction work undertaken by subcontractors can be 
categorized as being outsourced. In order to generate sustainable profit margins, but 
also to add value throughout the construction process, harmonization between 
contractors and subcontractors was argued to be a prerequisite for encouraging lean 
construction (Miller et al., 2002). In this regard, the Toyota way of treating its partners 
includes mutual cooperation, trust, and the sharing of benefits on a long-term basis, all 
of which can foster harmony between construction firms and subcontractors. 
 
4.7.4 Implementation of the Problem-solving model in construction  
Problem solving characterizes much of the management activities in construction (Li and 
Love, 1998). However, the contractors and the construction industry in general do not 
perform this in the way intended by Toyota. This is because construction problems are ill 
structured in terms of various uncertainties (variables) and variations, the lack of 
understanding of the interrelationships between these variations, and the multiple 
solutions to construction problems (Li and Love, 1998). Most often, the contractors solve 
problems, but are not concerned about learning from the situation or finding the root 
cause of the problem. Experiential knowledge is what they rely upon heavily, even 
though this is not well codified in books and is weakly organized in memory (Li and Love, 
1998). Moreover, construction problem solving often lacks a clear procedural structure 
(Li and Love, 1998). In this regard, the Toyota Way principles of problem solving have 
the potential to improving the problem-solving practices employed in the construction 
industry. Furthermore, becoming a learning organization is the ultimate goal of 
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implementing the Toyota Way model (Liker, 2004). However, the learning process in the 
continuous improvement philosophy (kaizen) is not adopted in a broad manner within the 
construction industry. According to Love et al. (2003), few construction organizations 
have a system for systematically acquiring, capturing, converting, and connecting the 
lessons they have learned, a few demonstrate any interest in doing so. Love et al. (2004) 
provided a conceptual framework of nurturing a learning organization in construction. 
This framework employs TQM as an enabler, and embraces the concept of 
organizational learning.  
 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter provides an in-depth review of the Toyota Way model. Four building blocks 
of the Toyota Way model as well as correspondent principles were carefully examined. A 
number of measurable parameters therefore were derived consequently. It is important 
to note that the Toyota Way model is more than a set of methods for eliminating waste. 
In contrast, the Toyota Way can be viewed as a socio-technical system that recognizes 
the importance of people and the lean manufacturing tools. Moreover, this chapter took 
the Toyota Way model as a framework for discussing its application to the construction 
industry, following the 4Ps – philosophy, process, people/partner, and problem-solving 
philosophy. In the discussion of the “process” part of the Toyota Way model, an 
endeavour has been made to link a number of Toyota Way principles to the Last Planner 




5 THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
5.1 Overview 
This chapter aims to explain the theoretical support from the mainstream theories 
towards these fourteen principles. In order to better understand the Toyota Way model, 
each individual layer (i.e. Toyota philosophy, process, people/partner and problem-
solving) will seek the theoretical support from the mainstream theories. The theory of the 
business, production theory, different schools of management thingkings, and theory of 
quality management seem to be relavent and can be used as the theoretical sources.  
(1) Theory of the business: Peter Drucker’s (1994) theory of the business can be used to 
link the Toyota Way Philosophy model. 
(2) Production model: Koskela’s (2000) interpretation of production has been elaborated 
earlier (see Chapter 2). In this part, it starts with discussing the Flow model of the 
TFV model with the process layer of the Toyota Way. Efforts are then made to 
connect the TFV model to the remaining layers of the Toyota Way model.  
(3) Human resource management: These will seek the theoretical support for the Toyota 
Way People and Partners model. Management theories in the production 
management domain have been reviewed in Chapter 2. It provided a general 
understanding of each school of management thought which are based on 
somewhat different assumptions about human beings and the organizations for 
which they work. However, this section discuses the leadership theory and 
motivation theories that the Toyota Way model uses to develop their leaders and 
employees respectively.  
(4) Quality management paradigm: The problem-solving principles of the Toyota Way 
can be understood as Toyota’s quality management philosophy. This is because 
Toyota is dedicated to continuously solve root problems that drive organizational 
learning. Hence, the theory of quality management and learning organization will be 
reviewed.  
 
5.2 The Toyota Way Philosophy model: linking the theory of the 
business 
Peter Drucker (Drucker, 1994) contended that every organization operates to a “theory” 
of its business built upon an assumptive framework which guides and nurtures the 
organization’s activities and that it can be a powerful catalyst for business sustainability 
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and growth. A theory of the business has three parts, which are outlined below (Drucker, 
1994, pp.99-100): 
(1) There are assumptions about the environment of the organization: society and its 
structure, the market, the customer, and technology. 
(2) There are assumptions about the specific mission of the organization. 
(3) There are assumptions about the core competencies needed to accomplish the 
organization’s mission. 
 
The assumptions about environment define what an organization is paid for. The 
assumptions about mission define what an organization considers to be meaningful 
results, in other words, they point to how it envisions itself making a difference in the 
economy and in the society at large. Finally, the assumptions about core competencies 
define where an organization must excel in order to maintain leadership. The first 
principle of the Toyota Way under the theory of the business in terms of the above three 
sets of assumptions is examined below: 
(1) The Toyota Production System was invented in response to the severe external 
environment (e.g. oil crisis, recession and slow economic growth) and establishes 
“cost reduction” as its goal with advocating the absolute elimination of waste (Ohno, 
1988). These reflect that Toyota had made good assumptions about the external 
environment of the organization. 
(2) According to Liker (2004), the true mission of Toyota consists of three parts that are 
summarized as: First, contribute to the economic growth of the country in which it is 
located (external stakeholders); Second, contribute to the stability and well-being of 
team members (internal stakeholders); and Third, contribute to the overall growth of 
Toyota. This mission drives Toyota to make excellent products and to challenge its 
workers to contribute to Toyota and to create history (Liker, 2004). 
(3) Toyota holds a strong sense of self-reliance, rather than to rely on outside business 
partners (Liker, 2004). Toyota’s strategy on partnering with the suppliers reflects the 
last assumption. For example, in the circumstance that Toyota outsourced 70% of its 
work to the suppliers, Toyota still works hard to develop its core competencies by 
mastering the new technology if it is core to the vehicle production and to learn with 




5.3 The Toyota Way Process model: linking production model 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, lean production borrowed the idea of stable and 
standardized processes and time study from the work of Taylor on scientific 
management. Faced with an inadequate theory of production, the TFV model of 
production was proposed by Koskela (2000) as a main contribution to developing a new 
production philosophy. In this section, efforts need to be made to connect the TFV model 
to Toyota Way principles. Among all the fourteen principles of the Toyota Way, the 
process-related principles were regarded as most relevant to production on the shop 
floor. Furthermore, the TFV model can also be extended to bridge the people and 
problem-solving principles of the Toyota Way model. 
 
5.3.1 Flow model and the Toyota Way Process model  
The comparison of Koskela’s (2000) TFV model of production and Liker’s (2004) Toyota 
Way Process model is needed, because both offer fundamental principles in the domain 
of production management. Moreover, since the advent of Lean thinking, there is no 
further theoretical improvement on lean production until Liker (2004) proposed the 
Toyota Way model. Both flow concepts of the TFV model and Toyota Way Process-
related principles have been articulated earlier in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 respective. 




Table 5.1 Linking the Flow model of TFV to The Toyota Way Process model 










Reducing the share of non-value adding 
activities (waste). 
Waste elimination is the chief aim of the Toyota 


















Eliminating non-value adding time is a basic 
improvement rationale to compress the lead 
time. To achieve that, a number of heuristic 
implementation approaches were listed 
(Koskela (1992, 2000), including: 
(1) Reduction of batch size 
(2) Reduction of work-in-progress 
(3) Minimization of distance 
(4) Isolation of value adding activities from 
supporting activities 
(5) Changing the order of the process 
(6) Synchronization and smoothness of 
flows 
(7) Solution of control problems and 
constraints to a speedy flow 
(8) Reduction of variability 
Principle 2 of the Toyota Way – create continuous 
process flow to bring problems to the surface – 
demonstrates that the Toyota production process 
is mainly created based on the flow concepts. It 
highlighted that continuously seeking to remove 
the non-value adding wastes is fundamental in 
this principles. Principle 2 employs the similar 
concepts and techniques (see the following five 
critical elements) which are in line with the flow 
concept of the TFV paradigm to achieve the same 
goal. 
(1) Takt time 
(2) Flow manufacturing on U-shaped production 
lines 
(3) Pull production control 
(4) Jidoka 















The practical approach to decreasing 
variability is made up of the well known 
procedures of the statistical control theory. 
The basic heuristic approaches to reduce 
variability are:  
(1) Standardization of activities 
(2) Installing poka-yoka devices into the 
process 
(3) Measuring, detecting and eliminating 
the root cause of a problem 
(4) More expensive transformation 
technology will provide for less 
variability (Koskela, 2000) 
Principles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12 of the Toyota Way can 
be connected to the sub-principle (reduce 
variability) of the Flow model. 
(1) Standardized task (P6) is the foundation for 
continuous improvement 
(2) In building a culture of stopping to fix 
problems (P5), poka-yoka is one of the lean 
tools that help the employees to detect the 
defects and halt the process 
(3) Measuring, detecting and eliminating the root 
cause forms a major discussion in the P 12 
(4) Principle 8 of the Toyota Way indicates that 
Toyota only uses reliable technology that 







Koskela (2000) proposed two means that 
can promote the concept of simplification: 
(1) By eliminating non-value adding 
activities from the production process, 
and by reconfiguring value-adding parts 
or steps 
(2) Organizational change can also bring 
about simplification. Multi-skilled or 
autonomous teams can eliminate non-
value adding activities 
Principles 2, 6 and 10 of the Toyota Way can be 
connected to the sub-principle (simplify) of the 
Flow model. 
(1) One-piece flow (P2) is in line with the concept 
of simplification (see elements of P2 above) 
(2) Standardization (P6) is viewed as a practical 
approach to simplification 
(3) Providing training to the employees to 
become multi-skilled front line workers who 
can handle more work tasks and increase 
















Koskela (1992) submitted that practical 
approaches to increase flexibility, including: 
(1) Minimize lot size to closely match 
demand 
(2) Reducing the difficulty of setup and 
changeovers 
(3) Customizing as late in the process as 
possible 
(4) Training multi-skilled workforce 
Principles 2 and 10 of the Toyota Way can be 
connected to the sub-principle (increase flexibility) 
of the Flow model. 
(1) Minimizing the lot size and reducing the 
difficulty of setup and changeovers are the 
necessary requirements of achieving one-
piece flow. Moreover these are also the 
perquisites of the pull system 
(2) Principle 10 explained multi-skilled front line 
workers who can handle more work tasks to 


















Koskela (1992) offered practical 
approaches for enhanced transparency that 
include the following: 
(1) Maintain a clean/order workplace (5-S) 
(2) Making the process observable 
(3) Rendering invisible attributes of the 
process visible through measurement 
(4) Incorporating process information in 
work areas, tools, container, materials 
and information system 
(5) Utilizing visual controls to enable any 
person to immediately recognize 
standards and deviations from them 
(6) Reduce the interdependence between 
work stations 
Visual control is able to significantly enhance the 
transparency of the production system, which has 
been explained by Liker (2004) in three Toyota 
Way principles: Kanban (P3) works as a major 
instrument for communicating orders from 
downstream to upstream workstation; andon 
system (P5) and visual management tools (P7). 
(1) The first attribute of “increasing the 
transparency” –maintain a clean/orderly 
workplace is in line with the 5-S practice in 
Principle 7 
(2) “Rendering invisible attributes of the process 
visible through measurement” can be 
achieved by utilizing other visual tools in 
Principle 7 as well 
(3) “Incorporating information into the processes” 
plays an important role on the workforce 
perception of effectiveness. The adoption of 
visual tools is able to help employees work 
smart. Incorporating process information in 
work areas was also discussed in Principle 7 
such as the use of A3 papers 
(4) “Reduction of interdependencies” may be 
achieved through improvements and 
innovations in design, production methods or 
simply by carrying out changes in the 
schedule 
 
5.3.2 TFV model and the Toyota Way model 
The Flow concept of production finds a number of common grounds with the Process 
layer of the Toyota Way model. In addition, similarities between the TFV model of 
production and the remaining three “P” categories of the Toyota Way model namely 
Philosophy, People and Partners, and Problem-solving are also sought in this section.  
 
Philosophy 
As Liker (2004) described, in Toyota, there are several ways Toyota pursues the idea of 
social contribution. “Customer focus” is the core of the Toyota Way Principle 1. 
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“Customer first” is a basic belief and a lean principle that Toyota holds to serve the 
society. In lean thinking, delivering customer-defined quality becomes the core purpose 
of the organization (Morgan and Liker, 2006). Toyota succeeds at this by focusing 
process, people and tools on clear objectives. Therefore, the “Customer first” philosophy 
that pervades in Toyota captures the principle of the value generation model, namely to 
ensure that all customers' requirements, both explicit and latent, have been captured. 
 
People and partners 
As mentioned earlier in the Flow model, Koskela (2000) highlighted that training a multi-
skilled workforce can help simplify a process and increase flexibility. The Toyota Way 
endeavors to develop the employees into a multi-tasking workforce and to encourage 
them to work in a team to raise their work productivity and efficiency.  
 
Problem-solving 
Koskela (2000, p.78) highlighted that during the value generation process, 
transformations and flows are controlled for the sake of the customers. This is because 
attributes of transformations and flows impact directly on the resultant value. In this 
regard, the major focus of the quality movement was the customer value. The Toyota 
Way sees quality problems as an opportunity that is subject to the PDCA cycle. It is also 
driven by continuous improvement and the problem-solving discipline to minimize waste 
and maximize value during the process.   
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5.4 The Toyota Way People and partner model: linking HRM 
Following the sequence of the “People/Partner” category as discussed in the Toyota 
Way model, this section accordingly seeks human resource management (e.g. 
Leadership theory and Motivation theory) and the conceptual framework concerning 
supplier management as the theoretical foundation to link this part of the Toyota Way 
model.  
 
5.4.1 Linking Leadership theory to Toyota Way 
Various terms have been used to describe leadership as well as different views of how 
one can become a leader or what characteristics a leader possesses. Toyota’s unique 
leadership, also sometimes known as servant leadership, has been discussed earlier in 
Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model (see Chapter 4). It seems that Liker and Hoseus (2008) 
borrowed the term “servant leadership”, which was first coined by Greenleaf (1977), to 
describe the Toyota leaders, by having a combination of in-depth understanding of the 
work and the ability to develop, mentor, and lead people, are respected for their 
technical knowledge as well (Liker, 2004, p.182). In contrast to leaders who utilize 
people as machines in the Taylorism period, servant leaders empower followers to “grow 
healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, and more likely themselves to become 
servants” (Greenleaf, 1977, pp.13-14). Servant leadership theory prioritizes its focus on 
others rather than upon self and on understanding of the role of the leader as a servant 
(Greenleaf, 1977). Russell and Stone (2002) established a practical model for servant 
leadership, which included 9 functional attributes namely vision, honesty, integrity, trust, 
service, modelling, pioneering, appreciation of others, and empowerment. An 
interpretation of the servant leadership attributes that are in agreement with Toyota’s 




Table 5.2 Matching the functional attributes of servant leadership to Toyota’s leadership 
practice 
Functional attributes of servant 
leadership 
(Russell and Stone, 2002) 
Toyota’s leadership practice 
(Liker, 2004; Liker and Hoseus, 2008) 
Vision (Communication) 
Toyota leaders’ vision is to focus on a long-term purpose for Toyota 
as a value-added contributor to society (Liker, 2004). 
Honesty and integrity (Credibility) 
Humbleness is a good trait of Toyota leaders (Liker and Hoseus, 
2008). 
Respect for the individuals is one of the five supporting values of 
the Toyota way (Liker, 2004). 
Trust (Competence) 
Toyota leaders take responsibility to do their best to build mutual 
trust (Liker and Hoseus, 2008) which is what makes it possible for 
individual employees to admit problems and take responsibility for 
solving them. 
Toyota employees trust their leaders also because the leaders 
possess solid technical knowledge that can help them solve 
problems. 
Empowerment (Teaching and 
delegation) 
Empowerment occurs when employees use the company’s lean 
tools to improve the company (Liker, 2004:39). However, 
Empowerment is not placed until individuals and teams really 
understand the Toyota Way and TPS (Liker, 2004). 
Service (Stewardship) 
Toyota leaders constantly work on shop floor and provide timely 
assistance in answering the andon call. Basically, the most 
significant responsibility of Toyota leaders is to add more value to 
the employees. 
Modelling (Visibility) 
Toyota leaders exhibited their dedication in quality by going to the 
gemba – the actual place where the real added-value work is done 
to modelling themselves to the employees. 
Pioneering (Influence and 
persuasion) 
Toyota leaders are willing to meet challenge with courage and 
creativity (Liker and Hoseus, 2008). Leaders always challenge the 
employees to achieve improvement in a production area (e.g. 
double productivity; reduce the changeover time). 
Appreciation of others (Listening 
and encouragement) 
Various motivation theories are practiced at Toyota. 
Note: attributes in brackets are accompanying attributes of servant leadership model.  
 
5.4.2 Linking Motivation theory to Toyota Way  
Motivation theory for the workplace was developed in the middle of the twentieth century. 
The main mechanism behind the theory was that in order to achieve organizational goals, 
managers endeavour to search a way of taking workers’ “hearts and minds” along with 
them (Crowther and Green, 2004, p.38). Many theories including human relations, “soft” 
human resource management approaches and neo-human relations ideas can be 
grouped under motivation theory. These theories share the common goals of increased 
productivity, profitability or cost-effectiveness for the organization. 
Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs  
The motivation theory has its basis in Maslow’s (1954) ideas about factors that motivate 
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people in general. Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs provides a model of human 
needs that range from the basic need to provide personal sustenance for oneself up to 
the fully functioning, self-actualized individual who achieves his fullest potential. 
 
Herzberg’s (1959) hygiene factors and motivation factors 
Frederick Herzberg (1959) identified, based on humans as individuals at work, two 
groups of factors: 
(1) Hygiene factors: must be in place, otherwise people become dissatisfied; and  
(2) Motivation factors: help to increase satisfaction and affects motivation. 
 
Herzberg (1959) explained that some aspects of work have the potential to satisfy higher 
order needs in employees while others do not. Herzberg’s (1959) motivation-hygiene 
theory provided some insights into what actually motivate people at work. In general, 
practitioners believed that by improving employee “on the job” social satisfaction, they 
can also improve productivity. One of the techniques that eventually evolved from this 
movement in the United States was “job enlargement”. It offers the opportunity for 
workers to rotate between tasks as a means of combating boredom and to develop a 
sense of personal competence and responsibility. Followed by the advent of “job 
enlargement”, job enrichment was developed with the goal to make work more 
meaningful. This includes engaging workers in planning and control activities. Toyota 
has performed well in providing for hygiene factors through job security with a safe and 
attractive work environment (Liker, 2004). Moreover, the TPS endeavours to make the 
tasks more motivating especially for those working along the assembly line. Examples 
includes: (1) job rotation which gives the work group ownership over a subsystem of the 
vehicle; (2) feedback on how workers are doing at their jobs; (3) andon system allows 
the worker to be proactive in solving problems; and (4) good autonomy over the tasks. 
 
McGregor’s (1960) XY theory 
Theory Y propounded by McGregor (1960) created the basic foundations for the TPS, 
especially with regards to considering the most valuable assets of a corporation, its 
employees, whose expertise and potential should be developed continuously for the 
mutual benefits of the company and the individuals themselves. Hall (1995) noted 
Theory Y as a precondition in the design of learning organizations such as Toyota. In 
1960, Douglas McGregor introduced his XY theory of management based on opposing 
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assumptions about people at work. McGregor (1960) assigned the following 
characteristics to the two domains:  
(1) Theory X: Management assumes workers dislike work and use the efficiency-rating 
system as a weapon against laziness. The workers are motivated purely by financial 
considerations. 
(2) Theory Y: Takes a more positive view of human nature. Management assumes that 
workers enjoy productive work if permitted to participate in decision-making. 
Management pays workers a fixed monthly or daily wage and guarantees lifetime 
employment. Cooperative company unions are formed and quality control circle 
activities and other company-wide improvement programs are promoted. 
 
The Theory X and Theory Y characteristics probably coexist in every person, but one or 
the other may tend to appear dominant in a given environment. It is the task of 
management to create the conditions which individuals may satisfy their motivational 
needs, and in which they achieve their own goals through meeting the goals of the 
organization (Mullins, 2006). Shingo (1988) highlighted that historically in Japan, it has 
been understood that since the country is poor in natural resources, it cannot prosper 
unless its people work hard. This mentality encouraged a nation of Type Y individuals 
whose inclinations are strengthened by the lifetime employment system and by a welfare 
system based on a fixed daily or monthly payment. 
 
Skinner’s (1948) behaviour modification theory 
Behaviour modification is the most generalized approach of using rewards and 
punishments to motivate (Liker, 2004). Any society may be designed in such a way that 
desirable behaviors are reinforced through the effects linked with behaviours (Skinner, 
1948). This application originated from Skinner’s (1948) experiments on animals that 
showed the effects of rewards and punishments on animal learning. The critical principle 
is that the positive or negative reinforcement comes as quickly as possible after the 
action (Skinner, 1948). In Toyota’s plants, workers are encouraged to pull the andon 
cord to indicate to the supervisors when the problems occur. Leaders constantly work on 
the floor and provide timely assistance that raise employees’ morale to a large extent 
and that builds up employees’ confidence in detecting the problems.  
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Locke’s (1968) goal setting theory 
The goal theory or the theory of goal-setting is primarily based on the work of Locke 
(1968). The basic premise of the goal theory is that people’s goals or intentions play an 
important part in determining behavior (Mullins, 2006). Goal setting consists of 
“purposefully directed action” in the process of developing and setting specific work 
goals or targets for employees to accomplish (Wren and Bedeian, 2009). Locke and 
Latham (2002) explained that goals affect performance through four mechanisms: 
(1) Goals serve a directive function: they direct attention and effort towards goal-relevant 
activities and away from goal irrelevant activities. 
(2) Goals have an energizing function. High goals lead to greater effort than low goals. 
(3) Goals affect persistence: There is often a trade-off in work between time and 
intensity of effort. Tight deadlines lead to a more rapid work pace than loose 
deadlines. 
(4) Goals affect action indirectly by leading to the arousal, discovery, and/or use of task-
relevant knowledge and strategies. 
 
Put simply, people are motivated by challenging but attainable goals and measurement 
of progress towards those goals. Toyota sets goals that meet these standards through 
policy development (hoshin kanri). Policy development in Toyota means objective goals 
were developed in a measurable and concrete form from the top of the company that 
stretch down to the work level. 
 
Furthermore Liker (2004) linked the five most prominent motivation theories discussed 
above to the Toyota’s approach of developing people and team, and commented that 
each was used to great effect in Toyota. According to the way people are motivated, 
Liker (2004) categorized these theories into internal motivations and external motivations, 




Table 5.3 Various motivation theories and the Toyota Way 
 Concepts Toyota’s approach 
Maslow’ (1954) 
hierarchy of needs 
Satisfy lower level needs and 
move employees up the hierarchy 
towards self actualization. 
 Job security, good pay, and safe 
working conditions satisfy lower 
level needs. 
 Culture of continuous 
improvement supports growth 




Eliminate “dis-satisfiers” (hygiene 
factors) and design work to create 
positive satisfiers (motivators). 
 5-S, ergonomic programs, visual 
management, and human 
resource policies address 
hygiene factors. 
 Continuous improvement, job 






Theory X assumes that employees 
are inherently lazy, indifferent, and 
uninterested in excelling on the 
job. Theory Y assumes that 
employees are self-motivated, 
willing to work hard, and rewarded 
by challenging work. 
 Each employee has 
responsibility and is trusted for 
quality control and safety. 
 Various kaizen programmes are 





Reinforce behaviour on the spot 
when the behaviour naturally 
occurs. 
 Continuous flow and andon 
create short-lead times for rapid 
feedback. 
 Leaders constantly work on the 
floor and provide reinforcement. 
Locke’s (1968) goal 
setting theory 
Set specific measurable, 
achievable challenging goals and 
measure progress. 
 Sets goals that meet these 
criteria through hoshin kanri 
(policy deployment).  
 Continuous measurements 
relative to targets. 
Source: Liker (2004) 
 
5.4.3 Theory related to supplier relationships 
Supplier management has been recognized as crucial to the firm's competitiveness. 
According to Kim and Michell (1999), two divergent views concerning supplier 
management have been identified. These are the contractual (arms-length) view and the 
relational view. 
 
The contractual view 
This view is widely practiced in the West, in which minimal dependence was placed on 
suppliers, with the object of maximizing bargaining power and avoiding commitment (Kim 




The relational view 
This view on the other hand plays a key aspect in relationship marketing, which has 
resulted in the success of Japanese firms. In this view, a buyer and a supplier establish 
and maintain close relationships on an ongoing basis. Based on Hunt and Morgan’s 
(1994) trust-commitment theory, Kim and Michell (1999) pointed out that this view 
encourages the long-term relationships between suppliers and buyers to develop as 
partnerships. Hunt and Morgan (1994) posited that the relationship commitment and 
trust develop when firms attend to relationship by: (1) providing resources, opportunities, 
and benefits that are superior to the offerings of alternative partners; (2) maintaining high 
standards of corporate values and allying oneself with exchange partners having similar 
values; (3) communicating valuable information that includes expectations, market 
intelligence, and evaluation of the partner’s performance; and (4) avoid taking advantage 
of exchange partners. Such actions will enable firms and their networks to enjoy 
sustainable competitive advantages over their rivals and their networks in the global 
marketplace (Kim and Michell, 1999).  
 
Moreover, Chen and Paulraj (2004) identified various supply chain initiatives and factors 
to develop key supply chain management constructs. A few critical elements of the 
buyer-supplier relationship were incorporated in their framework, including (1) supplier 
base reduction, (2) long term relationships, (3) communication, (4) cross-functional team, 
and (5) Supplier involvement. These elements can be theoretically supported by the 
relational view of relationship marketing. It is noteworthy that the key aspects identified 
earlier in Chapter 4 (the Toyota Way Principle 11) mirrors those constructs in Chen and 
Paulraj’s (2004) framework. 
 
5.5 The Toyota Way Problem-solving model: what theories can be linked 
Since the last three principles of the Toyota Way focused on two key words, namely 
continuous improvement (Kaizen) and learning organization, efforts will be made to 
explore the theoretical underpinning these two areas. Zangwill and Kantor (1998) 
explained two origins of continuous improvement: the Toyota Way and statistical 
reasoning. The continuous improvement practice in Toyota has been discussed earlier in 
Chapter 4. The second trend underpinning continuous improvement lies with the quality 
movement and statistical reasoning, which were conceived in the 1920s by Shewhart 
(1931). Its contemporary contribution came from W. Edwards Deming’s 1950 lectures to 
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Japanese executives, during which Deming (1986) highlighted the importance of data 
collection and Shewhart’s PDCA cycle (Zangwill and Kantor, 1998). Hence, it appears 
that theories from the quality management domain can be used to support the last three 
principles of the Toyota Way model. 
 
5.5.1 Linking quality management to the Toyota Way 
Many authors have written about kaizen which was often presented as one of the 
underlying principles of lean production or Total Quality Management (TQM). According 
to Imai (1986), kaizen practices were heavily influenced in the beginning by the 
American statisticians W. Edwards Deming and Joseph M. Juran. Their teaching about 
rigorous statistical control, right after World War II, matched very well with the Japanese 
unique holistic, democratic and collaborative behaviour and the urgent need for 
improving quality in their products. Deming (1986) also introduced the “Deming circle”, 
one of the crucial Quality Control (QC) tools for assuring continuous improvement, to 
Japan. Juran was invited to Japan for a seminar on the topic of quality control 
management, the concept of which was dealt with for the first time from the overall 
management perspective (Imai, 1986). In 1962, a QC circle was started. This was 
formed by a small group of volunteers who performed quality control activities within the 
group. According to Levy (1990), the QC concept has caught the attention of the 
Japanese construction industry since 1970s. 
 
Liker (2004) highlighted that the Deming Cycle or PDCA cycle is a cornerstone for 
continuous improvement. The PDCA cycle is used in Japanese companies to initiate, 
track and review improvements. Imai (1986) outlined that this began with a study of the 
current situation, during which data was gathered to be used in formulating a plan for 
improvement. Once this plan has been finalized, it was implemented. After that, the 
implementation was checked to see whether it has brought about the anticipated 
improvement. When the experiment has been successful, a final action such as 
methodological standardization was taken to ensure that the new methods introduced 
would be practised continuously for sustained improvement (Imai, 1986). Sobek and 
Smalley (2008) also noted that the PDCA cycle is the heart of the problem-solving 
approach in Toyota. A close examination of the PDCA cycle and the last three principles 
of the Toyota Way model are tabulated in Table 5.4. In the Plan stage, the genchi 
genbutsu concept (P12) will enable the leaders to come to the workplace to work with 
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the front-line worker to identify the root problems. Problem-solving techniques such as 5 
whys (P13) may be employed. Alternative solutions will be discussed (P13) until a 
satisfactory consensus has been reached. Table 5.4 summarizes how these three 
principles work hand in hand with the PDCA methodology. 
 
Table 5.4 Linking the PDCA cycle and problem-solving in Toyota 
PDCA methodology Toyota Way Principles 12-14 
Plan: before any corrective action is taken on 
the problem at hand, a number of activities 
should be undertaken in the planning stage: 
(1) Define the problem 
(2) Gather relevant information 
(3) Identify the root cause of the problems 
(4) Develop and consider the possible 
solutions 
(5) Select the best alternative for 
implementation 
The Plan methodology of PDCA corresponds 
to Principles 12 and 13 of the Toyota Way.  
(1) The Toyota Way (P12) enables the 
leaders to go and see the actual situation 
for them to understand the problem 
source and identify the problem. 
(2) Make the decision on the verified data. 
(3) 5-whys methodology (P13) as a useful 
tool is employed to probe the rooted 
causes. 
(4) Alternative solutions will be discussed 
(P13) until a consensus is agreed. 
Do: implement the solution chosen as the 
best 
Solve the problem 
Check: monitor the implemented solution and 
gather data of the effects of implementation 
and comparing these with the target or 
prediction. 
Principle 14 indicates that hansei is part of the 
check part of the PDCA cycle. 
Act: Establish the new process, solution, or 
system as the standard if the results are 
satisfactory, or taking remedial action if they 
are not. 
Principle 14: Kaizen activities  
 
5.5.2 Learning organization and the Toyota Way 
Liker (2004) termed the last principle of the Toyota Way as “becoming a learning 
organization”, and mentioned that by continuous improvement (Kaizen) and reflection 
(Hansei), the goal of becoming a learning organization can be achieved. Peter Senge 
(1990) popularized learning organizations as places where people continually expand 
their capacities to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns 
of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are 
continually learning how to learn together. Based on McGill and Slocum’s (1993) four 
types of organizational models (namely knowing organization, understanding 
organization, thinking organization and learning organization), Hine et al. (2004) outlined 
four stages of lean thinking evolvement, which are closely related to the stages of 
development of organizational learning as shown in Table 5.5.  
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Table 5.5 Four stages of lean thinking evolvement 
 1980-1990 



























 Source: Hine et al. (2004) 
 
Learning organization seeks to maximize the learning opportunities of employees, 
suppliers, customers and even competitors (McGill and Slocum, 1993). Garvin (1993) 
suggested that to become a learning organization, companies need to be skilled in the 
following five activities:  
(1) Systematic problem-solving: Relates to the philosophy and methods of the quality 
movement, relying on scientific methods rather than guesswork; uses actual data 
rather than assumptions and simple statistical tools.  
(2) Experimentation with new approaches: Systematic searching for and testing new 
knowledge; but unlike problem-solving, experimentation is usually motivated by 
opportunities and new perspectives rather than current difficulties. It takes two main 
forms: ongoing programmes and one-of-a-kind demonstration projects.  
(3) Learning from their experiences and past history: A review of successes and failures 
and reflecting and self-analysis.  
(4) Learning from experiences and best practices of others: Benchmarking; looking 
outside the immediate environment; openness to the outside world; environmental 
scanning.  
(5) Transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the organization: 
Knowledge transferred quickly and efficiently throughout the organization; 
mechanisms in place to facilitate the process; written and oral reports; site visits; 
tours; rotation programmes; and education and training programmes. 
 
These five activities are pertinent to the last three principles of the Toyota Way and 
extend to other principles as well. The first activity is a summary of the last three 
principles. More specifically, Principle 13 – the Toyota Way of making decisions based 
on the verified data is more relevant. The second activity is in line with the kaizen 
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activities that are carried out throughout Toyota, especially the small ongoing 
experiments that are usually common on the shop floor. The third activity reflects the 
basic meaning of hansei (“reflection” in Japanese), which focuses on learning from past 
experience. The fourth activity stretches to other principles of the Toyota Way, for 
example, the Toyota staff have the attitude of learning from others when they are 
working with suppliers. According to Liker (2004:210), learning by doing process is a 
typical Toyota Way style that is adopted by Toyota to learn with its suppliers. The last 
activity can be linked to Principle 10 of the Toyota Way, which suggests that training 
programmes are powerful tools for transferring knowledge and nurturing people. 
 
5.6 Conceptual framework 
Guided by the research aim and objectives, the proposed conceptual framework adopts 
Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model as a base for development. However, before the 4“P” 
model can be established as a model for application to the large Chinese construction 
firms, different schools of management thoughts and their corresponding applications in 
the manufacturing industry have been reviewed. Following that, the TPS, and later the 
popular term lean production, and finally a systematic view of the Toyota Way were 
reviewed respectively.  
 
In the course of reviewing the 4“P” model of the Toyota Way (fourteen principles in total), 
the distinguishing features in each principle have been identified. Efforts have also been 
made to seek the theoretical support behind the “4P” model. This started with linking 
Peter Drucker’s (1994) theory of the business to the first principle of the Toyota Way 
model. Toyota’s chief goal to reduce cost by eliminating all the non-value adding 
activities (waste), Toyota’s mission and Toyota’s self-reliance culture have mapped well 
with the three assumptions that underpinned Drucker’s (1994) theory of the business. In 
a similar way, the production model integrated with three different views of production, 
namely transformation view, flow view and value generation value, proposed by Koskela 
(2000) were linked to the Toyota Way model (see Table 5.1). This discussed the Flow 
model of the TFV paradigm with the Process category of the Toyota Way as both 
focused on waste elimination on the shop floor. Moreover, heuristic principles derived 
from the Flow model were well mapped with the “tactical” and “operational” aspects of 
the Toyota Way. Efforts were also made to connect the TFV model to the rest of the 
layers in the Toyota Way model. It is worth mentioning that the TFV model was 
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espoused by Koskela (2000) as a “theory” of production that supports a variety of tools 
and techniques (e.g. the Last Planner System) to be applied to the management of 
construction projects. In addition, management theories in the production management 
domain have been reviewed earlier in Chapter 2, among which the servant leadership 
theory and various motivation theories under the Human Relations school in particular 
can be linked to the Toyota Way People and Partner model to reflect how Toyota 
develops and grows with its people and partners. Because the partners are also 
inclusive in this layer of the Toyota Way model, a few critical elements of the buyer-
supplier relationship were adopted as the theoretical support to explain how Toyota 
treats, challenges and grows with its partners. Lastly, the problem-solving principles of 
the Toyota Way can be understood to be Toyota’s quality management philosophy, 
because Toyota is dedicated to continuously solve root problems that drive 
organizational learning. From a practical point of view, the last three principles are 
constructed based on the Deming cycle or PDCA to achieve continuous improvement. 
From a theoretical point of view, they were linked with Anderson et al.’s (1994) paradigm 
of quality management that underlies the Deming management method. Finally, as Liker 
(2004) highlighted that the ultimate goal of becoming a learning organization cannot be 
achieved without multiple efforts including (1) a stable and standardized process that 
provide opportunity to learn continuously from the improvement made when waste and 
inefficiencies are visible, (2) a stable personnel, slow promotion, and very careful 
succession systems to protect the organizational knowledge base, and (3) having 
capacity to identify the root problems and develop countermeasures. Therefore, the 
learning organization concept was also examined. Not surprisingly, Toyota’s problem-
solving practices as well as the training programme provided to the employees and 
kaizen activities conducted in the shop floor were all pertinent to Gavin’s (1993) 
underlying five activities that a learning organization must have. 
 
It is worthwhile to note that the discussions above regarding linking the theories to the 
Toyota Way model are within the scope of production management. This is because 
concepts derived from two functions of production management, namely production and 

























Figure 5.1 Conceptual framework of this research 
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(1) Philosophy: most companies have developed a statement of corporate philosophy, 
or mission, to which operating objectives are closely tied (Chase and Aquilano, 
1992). In Toyota Way model, the overall philosophy of the organization has a 
strong influence and permeates down to influence the principles and methods of 
the other three building blocks. In simple term, without organizational philosophy, 
it is less likely to achieve the production objectives.  
(2) Process: process is one of the five P’s of production management discussed in 
Chapter 2. The process layer of Toyota Way model covers a number of key 
issues in production management literature. These include planning and control, 
inventory management, factory layout, quality management, and so on. Moreover, 
Shingo (1988) highlighted that process should be given top priority in improving 
production and pointed out that the Toyota Production System represented a 
pioneering attempt at a new production philosophy with a focus on process 
improvement. This further formed a basis of flow concept of Koskela’s (2000) TFV 
model which aimed to eliminate the non-value adding activities throughout the 
process. Lastly, it seems that the scientific management theory – time and motion 
studies in particular – had great impact on Toyota in increasing efficiency and 
decreasing waste.  
(3) People and Partners: production system is managed to achieve the production 
objectives, which are directly and indirectly affected by people – the employees, 
the leaders and the partners. This is because all people are different. Their 
abilities, personalities, interest, ambitions, training and experiences vary widely 
(Gaither and Frazier, 1999). More importantly, how to make the employees to be 
more productive, how to grow leaders to be role models of the company’s 
philosophy, as well as what approaches are appropriate for developing 
partnership that are becoming major concerns in the field of production 
management pertaining to the people factor. These lead to discussion of 
teamwork, motivation, leadership and partnership in production management 
textbooks. Furthermore, the evolution of management theory highlights that since 
the Hawthorne studies, human relations school of management theory advocated 
that people were the key to productivity and technology. Management theorists of 
this school were firm believers that only motivated and skilled individuals who 
were committed to organizational objectives were the key to success. This was 
reinforced by the socio-technical system approach that human resource and 
technical aspects of the organization should be treated equally. The research in 
lean community also suggests that lean enterprise should be designed based on 
socio-technical system (Paez et al, 2004; Shah and Ward, 2007).  
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(4) Problem solving: one of the most powerful aspects of Toyota Way is its focus on 
quality at first time. The mechanism behind which is that Toyota employees are 
trained to use PDCA framework to seek the root causes of problems, rather than 
be satisfied with quick solutions. This continuous improvement practices 
eventually lead to the organizational learning. Besides, Toyota Way extensively 
uses a number of useful problem-solving tools such as genchi genbutsu, 5-whys, 
quality circles, etc (Liker, 2004) as well as basic tools for quality control (Ishikawa, 
1990) that are widely encouraged in manufacturing production. They have indeed 
become an integral part of production management literature.  
 
All the discussions undertaken above were within the context of the manufacturing 
industry. The literature review on the lean construction philosophy as well as the 
implementation of the Toyota Way principles in the context of construction in Chapter 
4 explored the potential application of the Toyota Way framework to construction 
organizations. Because of the inherent differences between manufacturing and 
construction, efforts have been made to link a number of the Toyota Way Process-
related principles to the Last Planner System as a necessary modification for better 
implementation. The remaining principles have remained unchanged. As illustrated in 
Figure 5.1, the Toyota Way framework can be potentially implemented within Chinese 
construction firms and help to improve their organization and project performance.  
 
5.7 Summary  
This chapter discusses the theoretical basis of the Toyota Way model. A number of 
theories and paradigms concerning different areas, such as business, production, 
human resource management, and quality management are discussed. More 
importantly, the selected theories and paradigms are also demonstrated to have links 
to, and to support, different layers of the Toyota Way model. As is known, the Toyota 
Way model itself is practically oriented, and it is worth endeavouring to link different 
theories to the Toyota Way in order to allow a balanced understanding of this 
framework from a theoretical perspective. This chapter concludes with a conceptual 
framework that incorporates several concepts from earlier chapters, such as lean 
production and lean construction.   
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6 CHINA’S CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
6.1 Introduction 
China has demonstrated an astonishing economic growth capability to the world. 
Since the introduction of the open door policy, China’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth has amounted to over 8% annually in recent years (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2011). This economic success cannot be achieved without 
contributions from infrastructural and urban development, or without rapid growth in 
the construction industry. According to National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 
2011), the construction industry in China has accounted for approximately 6% of 
GDP since 2006. Employment in the construction industry also accounted for about 7% 
of the total permanent employment in the urban areas of China. A characteristic of 
China’s construction industry is the large share of labour-only subcontracting, often 
on the basis of individual self-employed labourers from rural areas of China. As  
NBSC (2011) noted, by the end of 2010, there were 71,863 registered firms 
employing 41.6 million people in the construction industry, excluding the labour 
subcontractors. This created a total output of 9603.1 billion RMB (approximately 
US$1538.6 billion). Statistically, these figures clearly indicate the leading position of 
the construction industry and its enormous achievements. However, its performance 
over the past several years still suggests that the industry faces serious difficulties.  
 
The following sections firstly examine China’s construction industry, as well as its 
external environment. Next, this chapter investigates the performance of the Chinese 
construction industry and the large construction firms through the measurements of 
quality, health and safety, productivity, profitability, technology development and its 
project management practices. A number of challenges that might potentially hamper 
the implementation of lean or Toyota Way in China’s construction industry are also 
examined. 
 
6.2 China’s construction market, structure and its leading 
construction firms 
6.2.1 Domestic market 
Benefiting from the rapid growth in GDP, China’s construction market has developed 
dramatically in the past years. The construction market in China is expected to 
overtake the United States of America as the world’s largest construction market by 
2018, according to a forecast by Global Construction Perspectives and Oxford 
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Economics (Xinhua, 2009a). As estimated in the same report, the Chinese 
construction market is projected to be worth almost US$2.4 trillion in just 10 years, 
which represents 19.1 percent of the global construction output (Xinhua, 2009a). 
With such potential in the construction market, the China Construction Association 
(2009) highlighted that three outstanding features will occur during the expansion of 
domestic demands: 
(1) A larger scale of construction projects will be needed, given that China has 
accelerated its urbanization process towards building a moderately prosperous 
society. According to MOHURD (2009a, p.85-93), the Chinese construction 
industry will continually grow, with a focus on six major areas: large-scale 
infrastructure construction, residential buildings, “New Rural” projects, coastal 
development, industrial projects, and post-disaster reconstruction projects.  
(2) A high degree of difficulty will be met with in construction tasks, as projects are 
becoming complex (Egbu, 2006), which enables contractors bring in innovative 
systems and approaches to construction.  
(3) Shorter cycles will occur in construction periods, given that the clients both in 
public and private sectors require faster project delivery. 
 
6.2.2 International construction markets 
The global construction market in recent years has witnessed rapid expansion of 
Chinese international construction companies (CICCs). It is worth mentioning that, 
even during the economic downturn period (2008-2009), adverse effects were not 
seen in the CICCS. This is because, according to Hao (2010), the economic 
downturn has had less impact on many developing countries (African and Asia in 
particular), where CICCs have been undertaking numerous huge infrastructure 
construction projects.  
 
According to Engineering News-Record (ENR, 2012a), by the end of 2011, the 
CICCs gained total contracting revenue of US$64.76 billion from their overseas 
construction projects, and was closely followed by the American firms, which took up 
approximately 13.4% of the total overseas market with an amount of more than 
US$60 billion. The latest statistics from the ENR saw 41 Chinese companies (ranked 
by total construction contracting revenue) in the ENR’s Top 225 Global Contractors 
list, and half of the top 10 international contractors are CICCs (ENR, 2012b). The 
ENR 225 list is based on revenues. The companies are ranked by total revenues 
generated outside of each company’s home country for each fiscal year. The 
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possible weakness is that using solely revenue as a measure – as in the ENR list – 
does not take into account other performance factors, such as project quality, 
profitability, and so on. China’s Ministry of Commerce (2009), cited in China 
International Construction Association (CICA, 2010), revealed that the contracting 
value contributed by the major governmental enterprises (known as State-Owned 
Enterprises) accounted for nearly half of the total contract value, led by China 
Railway Group Limited, China Petrochemical Corporation, and China State 
Construction Engineering Corporation. Not only were these encouraged by the 
government to venture into the overseas construction market, but they were also 
attracted by the attractive project margins. Hao (2010) highlighted that the gross 
margin in most overseas construction projects is usually two percentile points higher 
than in domestic projects. The increase in overseas income and the attractive profit 
margins drew more attention from the top management of the CICCs. Hence, a 
number of large Chinese construction companies became determined to expand their 
overseas market with a 3 to 5 year strategic focus (Hao, 2010).  
 
6.2.3 Structure of Chinese construction industry 
Before the study goes further into the analysis, this section shed light on the structure 
of the construction industry in China, as well as define the scope of the term “large 
Chinese construction firms”. According to the NBSC (2011), there were 71,863 
registered construction firms operating in the Chinese construction industry in 2010. 
Firms in the Chinese construction industry were organized into four categories in 
terms of their ownership: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective-owned 
enterprises (COEs), enterprises with shares, and private enterprises (Chen, 1998; 
Low and Jiang, 2003; Wang et al., 2006; Zeng et al., 2005). During the recent years 
of transition – when reforms in Chinese enterprise were vigorously sought – the 
numbers of both SOEs and COEs decreased (Wang et al., 2006), but they have 
continued to maintain their leading positions in terms of undertaking the most 
construction work (Lu and Fox, 2001). In 2010, among the 71,863 registered 
construction firms in China, there were 4,810 SOEs, accounting for 6.7% of the total 
number of firms, but employing 5.76 million employees (13.8%), earned 1814.8 
billion RMB, or 19.9% of the total output of construction value (9103 billion), and 
contributed 27.5% of the total taxes to the central government (NBSC, 2011). 
Moreover, research undertaken by Liu et al. (2012) revealed that the operating 
revenues of the four largest Chinese construction firms (all SOEs) increased from 10 
percent of total construction revenues in 2003 to 15 percent in 2010. This seems to 
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imply that the state-owned construction firms still hold their leading positions in the 
Chinese construction market though engaging a smaller numbers of firms and 
employees, but obtaining a good proportion of market share (NBSC, 2011).   
 
Alternatively, all the general contractors in China are classified as premier (highest 
level), first, second, or third grade, or below third grade, in terms of their financial 
abilities, management abilities, and technological ability (NBSC, 2011). Contractors 
in different grades can only be allowed to bid for the relevant projects. The latest 
statistics available on the key indicators of the construction firms by different grades 
are from the NBSC (2008), and are illustrated in Table 6.1. The Chinese construction 
industry is characterized by the large number of small firms (with second, third, or 
below in terms of their grades). In 2008, less than 10 percent of firms were premier 
(0.07%) or first (8.3%) grade firms and these categories are viewed as relatively 
larger-scale Chinese construction firms. However, these larger construction firms 
take up a fairly large portion of the construction market share in China, having 58.8% 
of the output value and 66.8% of the total contracted value, respectively.  
 







(100 million RMB) 
% 
Total value of the 
contracting 
(100 million RMB) 
% 
Premier 260 0.07% 8701 19.6% 18531.7 24.8% 
First 2,846 8.3% 17438.8 39.2% 31369.9 42% 
Second 9,961 29.2% 10761.7 24.2% 15176.7 20.4% 
Third and 
below 
21,004 61.6% 7517.6 17% 9554.8 12.8 
Total 34,071 100% 44419.3 100% 74633.2 100% 
Source: NBSC (2008) 
 
Overall, this is consistent with the central government’s policy to accelerate its efforts 
to revitalize a number of construction companies as future leaders in the industry with 
a competitive edge in their construction business (MOHURD, 2008; Zeng et al., 
2005). These leading Chinese construction firms have emerged with large-scale 
operations, solid construction capabilities, and strong initiatives. In addition, they 
have been recognized in various rankings, including the Annual Engineering News-
Record (ENR)/Construction Times China ranking. Among these large construction 
firms, the research focus of this study is on general contractors with the capability to 
plan, design, and research and develop, because these capabilities are similar to a 
typical manufacturing company in which lean concepts can be applied. This is 
supported by Bhasin's (2012) observation that the larger organizations view lean as 
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an ideology and perform better. Secondly, as it may not be possible to implement 
lean concepts in all Chinese construction firms, it is necessary to narrow the targeted 
construction firms to those with sound financial capacities, equipped with advanced 
technology, and/or with relatively advanced management practices, because lean 
implementation requires a long-term philosophy, strong financial backup, and so on. 
For this reason, large Chinese construction firms appear to be suitable candidates for 
the study of lean implementation in the Chinese construction industry. 
 
Subcontracting  
With the rapid development of the construction sector in China, and the huge 
demand for the construction labour force, subcontracting is, however, becoming 
unavoidable. In fact, the Chinese general contractors have been reducing their 
reliance on a permanent workforce since 1984, when a reform programme entitled 
“separation of management from field operations” was launched (Lu and Fox, 2001). 
For example, Table 6.2 shows the continuing changes in labour-only subcontractor 
indicators in China. The number of labour-only subcontractors increased 
approximately 3 times from 2,021 in 2003, up to 6,443 in 2011. The number of 
people employed in 2003 underwent a nearly five-fold increase, up to 2.45 million in 
2011, which brought about 129.74 billion RMB revenue – an almost ten-fold increase 
over 2003.  
 
Table 6.2 Changes in subcontractor indicators in the Chinese construction industry 
from 2003 to 2011 
 No. of firms 






2011 6443 2.45 129.74 3 
2010 6835 2.57 94.1 2.49 
2009 6756 2.15 74.28 2.05 
2008 6837 1.89 62.09 2.03 
2007 4357 1.47 37.89 0.89 
2006 3748 1.12 25.37 0.63 
2005 3101 .86 18.27 0.6 
2004 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
2003 2021 .57 11.05 0.39 
Note: data for 2004 is not available.  
Source: NBSC (2011) 
 
These figures indicate that the subcontracting sector has been booming in recent 
years. However, the subcontracting system is problematic, according to Lan (1999) 
and Lan and Jackson (2002). Firstly, there is no clear relationship between 
contractors and subcontractors (Lan and Jackson, 2002). Hence it is unclear what 
percentage of construction jobs is or should be undertaken by subcontractors. In 
140 
 
most cases, the general contractor outsources almost all of the work to low-tier 
subcontractors, and also transfers risks and labour recruitment to them (Pun and Lu, 
2010). On projects, general contractors only take charge of project management and 
arrange equipment for the subcontractors (Pun and Lu, 2010). Secondly, many 
contractors seek profits by illegally leasing their licenses or by subcontracting their 
jobs to unqualified firms (Lan and Jackson, 2002). Arising from this, there was a 
terrifying mishap in Hang Zhou, China in 2008, where a subway tunnel collapsed as 
a result of construction work being illegally subcontracted out four times (Shanghai 
Daily, 2008). Thirdly, unlike the harmonious relationship that can be seen between a 
general contractor and subcontractors in a project using lean concepts, the 
subcontracting sector in China is sometimes still subject to violence, arguments and 
fights, due to the tense relationship between subcontractors and frontline workers, 
most commonly related to delays in payment (Pun and Lu, 2010).  
 
6.3 Status of the Chinese construction industry 
6.3.1 Quality 
Broadly, there are two views of quality in Chinese construction projects. On the one 
hand, a number of symbolic projects have helped China to win many accolades, and 
indeed these exemplary projects (such as the National Stadium, the Three Gorges 
Dam, and the Shanghai World Financial Centre) reflect the highest level of Chinese 
construction quality. Having observed these enormous achievements, Yung and Yip 
(2009) underlined that Chinese construction quality is expected to improve on a 
continuous basis, but at a decreasing rate as the economy develops. Moreover, 
Yung and Yip (2009) have highlighted that improved construction quality in China 
cannot be achieved without (1) the gradual implementation of mandatory construction 
supervision systems; (2) improved labour productivity; (3) the availability of resources, 
including machinery and labour; and (4) the use of more plant or machinery.  
 
However, these exemplary construction projects do not represent the average level 
of the Chinese construction industry in terms of quality. On the other end of spectrum, 
there are the criticisms and complaints relating to poor construction quality, which 
appear to continue unabated elsewhere in the country. Poor construction quality was 
recognized as one of the critical problems in China in the 1990s (Chen, 1998; Lam 
and Cheng, 2004) and it is still a major problem (China Daily, 2010a). There has 
been an alarming increase in fatal accidents caused by bad construction quality 
across the country. For example, a large number of schools and hospitals collapsed 
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during the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, resulting in thousands of students being 
killed or seriously injured. In June 2009, a 13-storey building in the Lotus Riverside 
residential complex in Shanghai toppled, killing one worker. One recent tragedy 
includes the collapse of a bridge in northern China, at Harbin, which killed three 
people and injured five (Xinhua, 2012). This was at least the eighteenth collapse 
since 2007 (South China Morning Post, 2012). The national news agency, Xinhua 
(2012), investigated the incident further and discovered that the real cause of the 
collapse was that the bridge was planned to take three years to complete, but was 
actually completed in eighteen months. The blind pursuit of quick delivery at the 
expense of quality is to blame in this case. Earlier, the collapse of Hangzhou subway 
in 2008 was due to the malpractice in subcontracting practices. This irregular 
contracting has become a major cause of poor-quality housing and infrastructure 
projects in China (Xinhua, 2012). Some projects have been outsourced repeatedly 
between many contractors and subcontractors, making it difficult to manage and 
supervise construction quality. Apart from the failing of the legal environment 
affecting Chinese construction industry, the use of inferior construction materials for 
projects is also common. For example, inspections by state officials have found raw, 
unprocessed sea sand in at least 15 buildings under construction in Shenzhen, 
including a building which, when finished, was set to become China’s tallest. 
 
How quality management works in China 
Although quality management is increasingly practised in China, its implementation 
appears to be uneven (Li et al., 2003). In China, construction quality is generally 
achieved under the supervision of (1) supervision firms (known as jianli), (2) relevant 
government authorities, and (3) the construction firms’ own project management 
teams.   
(1) Supervision firms: The roles and responsibilities of Chinese supervision 
engineers are in line with those of US design professional engineers (Wang et al., 
2009). They act as the quality control team on site. However, Wang et al. (2009) 
have pointed out that the supervision professional’s unclear scope of quality 
liability and safety liability in current laws, along with low level of competence 
seen in the practice of quality supervision, have become major causes of 
supervision liability risks, and ultimately would affect construction quality 
supervision. 
(2) Government authorities and the building quality check programme: According to 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD, 2010a), a 
number of quality awareness activities (e.g. “Safety Year activity”) have been 
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organized, to continue to stress the importance of quality awareness. 
Nevertheless the expected improvement is slow and disappointing.  
(3) Construction firms: Attempts have been made by the Chinese government since 
the 1990s to implement the TQM framework, and to introduce ISO 9000 
certification (Zeng et al., 2003). Tang et al. (2003) and Zeng et al. (2003) have 
pointed out that TQM has been accepted and applied in the construction industry 
in China, and there is a popular trend to obtain the ISO 9000 certification. 
 
Role of government  
In more recent years, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
(MOHURD, 2008) realized that there is a need to fine-tune strategy for construction 
firms from simple the “pursuit of output expansion to enhancing quality improvement 
as part of their cooperation culture”. Subsequently, the government carried out a 
series of measures to improve the quality of construction works, such as setting up 
quality supervision stations, establishing professional project management systems, 
and promoting the implementation of ISO 9000. The construction industry is under 
constant scrutiny for its quality of work (Chini and Valdez, 2003). According to 
MOHURD (2009b), the government ordered a nationwide quality inspection of 
housing construction immediately after a residential building under construction in 
Shanghai collapsed. This quality inspection programme involved 90 cities across 
China, including 180 on-going projects. The results of the national quality check 
suggested that quality was under control in most projects (MOHURD, 2009b).  
 
6.3.2 Productivity 
Low productivity is always an issue in the construction industry. The construction 
industry is still very much a crafts-based industry. Unlike some developed countries 
where labour shortage was largely a concern of their governments, China seldom 
worries about such issues in the construction sector. However among the millions of 
construction labour force, the outstanding issue that started to emerge is that skilled 
labourer and qualified project management teams are in demand. The basic 
definition of productivity as a ratio of output and input, where the calculation involves 
dividing the measure of output (i.e. gross value added) by labour input (number of 
workers) (Crawford and Vogl, 2006). A number of countries and organizations (see 
Abdel-Wahab et al., 2008; Crawford and Vogl, 2006) have preferred to measure 
productivity in this way, due to its two advantages, namely that (1) governments have 
an interest in both input and output, given that this measure shows the net value 
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(output) added from construction activities to the economy, and (2) it is easy to 
calculate and estimation is less subject to data limitations. Using this indicator, 
construction productivity in China has improved from only US$500 per person in 
1980, rising impressively to US$6,471 per person by 2010 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China (NBSC), 2011). This revealed that the Chinese construction firms 
have made progress during the last ten years. Figure 6.1 compares value added per 
person per year between the construction industry and the manufacturing industry in 
China since 2000. The gap shows that the productivity of the construction industry 
was one third that of the manufacturing industry in 2000 and was about one fifth of 
the industry in 2007. Xue et al. (2008) were concerned that there remained large 
gaps in the productivity levels between different regions and recommended that the 




















Figure 6.1 Productivity in the construction and manufacturing sectors, 2000-2010 
Note: data for productivity of manufacturing industry from 2008 onwards is not 
available.  
Source: NBSC (2011) 
 
Furthermore, the construction industry in China is much less productive than in other 
countries. Xu et al.’s (2005) study shows that China’s construction productivity in 
year 2000 lagged behind three developed countries that include the United States, 
Japan, and the United Kingdom, with the output per person being only one twentieth 
of the general level in the three developed countries. However, the research 
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productivity comparison using China against developed countries. By comparing the 
labour productivity of US and Chinese counterpart at the activity level (i.e. quantity 
installed per labour hour using published national average productivity data),  Shen 
et al. (2011) found out that in terms of labour-intensive activities, small labour 
productivity gaps are found between China and US. Moreover, Singapore’s Minister 
of National Development, Khaw Boon Wan, has reflected on the productivity 
differences between Singapore, Hong Kong, and China, and noted that the Chinese 
construction productivity is not very high, but has the advantage that its ample 
resources can be quickly mobilised to achieve fast construction, often 24 hours round 
the clock (Khaw, 2012). Khaw (2012) mentioned that Singapore’s BCA visited 
Changsha to glean some learning points, since CNN featured a construction project 
there that proceeded with record-breaking speed in Changsha, in which a new hotel 
of 30 storeys was built in 15 day. This was a unique case, but implies that if the right 
technology (prefabrication) is used, plans, teamwork, and precise execution is in 
place, high levels of productivity can be achieved.  
 
6.3.3 Profitability 
Under the previous planned economy, construction output in China was planned at 
the national level (Huang et al., 2012). Construction firms were given the freedom to 
determine their profit margins by tendering and other methods until the economy 
transited to a market-oriented economy (Wang et al., 2006). The competitive 
environment has been changing considerably since China was admitted as a 
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In the competitive market, 
instead of relying on the government’s allocation, maximizing profits, achieving the 
projected annual output, and increasing market share have become the top three 
major concerns of decision-makers from the construction firms (Wang et al., 2006). 
However, many local firms are still plagued by low levels of profitability (Cheah et al., 
2007; Zeng et al., 2005). Due to the fierce competition in the contracting market, 
excessive reduction of contract prices imposed by the client on the contractors during 
the contract negotiation stage has been normal (Wang et al., 2005). Other abnormal 
behaviour of the client, including asking contractors to finance projects during 
construction, delays in payment, and others, have caused severe financial difficulties 
for Chinese construction firms (Wang et al., 2006). This has resulted in the profit 
being squeezed so much so that the majority of the profitable construction firms are 
only marginally profitable (Wang et al., 2006). For example, according to Wang (2012) 
who reported that the NBSC’s Shenzhen team - which investigated 15 local 
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construction firms in Shenzhen, China - declining profit margins are one of the 
problems that all these firms are currently facing. With fierce competition, the local 
construction firms must to squeeze their margin down further in order to win projects. 
Such competition is not healthy, and results in shrinking margins and increasing 
potential operating risks, as well as increasing labour costs. It also shows that 
workers’ salaries in Shenzhen have gone up by 8.9%, compared to the previous year 
(Wang, 2012).  
 
Figure 6.2 shows the difference in the ratio of profit to gross output (a measurement 
of profitability commonly used in the Chinese construction industry) generated in the 
manufacturing and construction industry in China. The data revealed that the 
profitability level in the Chinese construction industry is lower than in the Chinese 
manufacturing industry. The gaps between the two trends in Figure 6.2 are notable. 
Although the ratio of profits to output value has increased gradually since 2000, up 
until the slight decline in 2008, the ratio is lower than the benchmarked profit rates 
suggested by the government of 3% to 6% (Xiong, 2007). According to Li (2012)4, the 
profitability of SOEs in Chinese construction industry is only around 2.5%, which 
seems low, but is nevertheless much higher than that of regional private builders, 















Figure 6.2 Comparison of profitability level of manufacturing and construction sectors 
in China, 2000-2010  
Source: NBSC (2011) 
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In line with MOHURD (2009a), Figure 6.2 infers that the overall operational efficiency 
of the construction sector is still low. This seems to reflect the fact that budgets in the 
construction business were being pushed down, and company’s profit margins were 
further squeezed. These added difficulties to construction business operations. 
However, Li (2012) also warned that caution should be exercised when viewing a 
company’s financial reports so as to understand the company’s operations and 
financial condition. It can be difficult to obtain accurate information, as project profits 
are split across different stakeholders. Only a small portion would be reported at the 
company level. Cheah et al. (2007) explained that one of the possible reasons for 
this was the lack of long-term strategies for survival and growth in the Chinese 
construction industry. Hence, under such circumstances, it may appear difficult for 
firms to adopt lean principles because the tangible benefits cannot be reaped so 
readily in the short term. 
 
6.3.4 Technology development  
Xu et al. (2005) have noted that Chinese construction firms have for a long time 
neglected the use of advanced technology and new equipment. Inevitably, much 
work undertaken on construction sites is manual, rather than machinery-based, while 
advanced equipment is only used for large or major construction projects (Xu et al., 
2005). Since the 1990s, there has been the development of technology improvement 
in China’s construction industry, as measured by value of machine per person (see 
Figure 6.3). In 1991, the value of machines per person was only 2,527 RMB/person. 
In 2003, this amounted to 9,957 RMB/person, an increase of nearly four times. 
However, this metric has declined from 2003 to 2006, and saw a slight improvement 
during 2008-2009. Although the data in Figure 6.3 points to an increasing trend in 
terms of the value of machinery and equipment over the past decade, the efficiency 
and effectiveness of construction equipment is less utilized in China and appears to 
be a major factor contributing to the difference in productivity between China and the 



















Figure 6.3 Value of machines per person from 1991 to 2010 in China’s construction 
industry 
Source: NBSC (2011) 
 
Zheng Yi-jun, President of the China Construction Association (Zheng, 2008) noted 
that China was still lagging behind the technologically advanced countries in terms of 
the construction technology they used. Some areas identified as being particularly 
weak in China were: (1) technology innovation, (2) level of technology and equipment 
in use, (3) construction mechanization, and (4) prefabrication technology. At present, 
the level of construction technology and equipment in use in China is approximately a 
quarter less than those in developed countries; a considerable number of companies 
are still largely relying on manual labour and on-site operations (Zheng, 2008). For 
example, the strength of steel and concrete used in China is 1-2 grades lower than 
those in developed countries and the consumption of steel per m2 floor area is 10-25% 
greater than that in developed countries.  
 
Nevertheless, at the company or project level, there are arguably several leading 
construction firms in China have recognized the role of technology management in 
their construction business, with incorporating the concept of “self-design” and “self-
development” (Li-Hua and Khalil, 2006). For example, Shanghai Construction Group 
(SCG)’s strong IT and R&D capability have helped SCG achieved high performance 
in a wide range of projects such as high-rise intelligent buildings (Cheah and Chew, 
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Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Railway Project has obtained encouraging results in 
technological improvement in several key areas, such as deep-water long-span 
bridge construction technology, foundation settlement control technology for deep 
spongy soil, and so on. These technologies were introduced into project practices 
and increased the efficiency of construction. However, this is rare and does not 
represent the whole industry. At present, these large Chinese construction firms are 
more enthusiastic to use cutting-edge technologies, given they are essential to 
support the competitiveness of companies (Li-Hua and Khalil, 2006). Toyota’s 
philosophy positively offers certain insights for Chinese construction firms on how 
they can adopt suitable technology. 
 
6.3.5 Project Management 
The management systems in the Chinese construction industry have changed 
towards a commercial approach (Chen et al., 2009). One example is that competitive 
bidding has become the common practice for Chinese construction firms to obtain 
contracts (Wang et al., 2006). Wang et al., (2006) also noted that a majority of 
Chinese construction firms have changed from satisfying only the state target to 
prioritizing firms’ commercial objectives, such as profit maximisation. Chen et al. 
(2009) added that one major reform was the introduction of western project 
management concepts and practices. In the past, the World Bank was a key 
facilitator in this process by its introduction of competitive bidding and international 
contractors for the first time in the Chinese construction industry, in one of the Bank’s 
early projects, Lubuge (鲁布革) (Chen et al., 2009). This project was investigated 
later in great details because it was completed to a high standard of quality and with 
the project schedule shortened by 5 months. Thus the “Lubuge impact” triggered a 
top-down approach to reforming the management systems in the Chinese 
construction industry (Chen et al., 2009). Chen et al. (2009, p.1017) commented that 
“Project management concepts and practices, after being piloted and proved as 
effective, and have been widely pursued in the Chinese construction industry”. 
 
However, Chen et al. (2009) argue that research on project management in the 
Chinese construction industry has usually been inadequate and single-faceted. They 
hence examined the project management practices in China’s construction industry 
from a holistic perspective, and noted that the Chinese construction organizations 
have put and are still putting efforts in to improve their project management skills and 
capabilities. Observations such as “lack of project management skills in China” have 
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repeatedly been highlighted in the book “Building Modern China”, which presented 
twenty-one extraordinary individuals’ views of the state of the Chinese construction 
industry (CIOB, 2009). 
 
6.4 The need for change 
The literature reviewed in the previous chapters has reported that the application of 
lean principles in construction works is relevant in China, although it may be in its 
infancy stage. Based on the evidence presented thus far, lean practices can help 
construction firms across the globe to address competitiveness issues such as 
quality improvement, improved productivity, cost reduction, and so on (see section 
3.4.5). To remain competitive, several world-leading construction firms have already 
embarked on lean construction, and shared the benefits claimed on their websites. 
These include Turner Construction Company (4th in the ENR ranking), whose project 
team working at a project in Maryland, US, used lean construction methods to reduce 
waste and rework and to improve operation efficiency (Turner Construction Company, 
2012). Another large construction company, Erhardt Construction (2012), based in 
the US has highlighted that “through Lean's reliable work flow, projects are delivered 
better, faster, and at a lower cost to our clients.” In Europe, one high profile 
contractor, Skanska, (7th in the ENR ranking) reported on a residential project (a 
block of 18 apartments) in Finland which used lean construction methods such as 
standardized prefabricated elements and Building Information Modeling (BIM) and 
was built in six months – a substantial time reduction (Skanska, 2009). Moreover, 
Thomassen et al. (2003) studied the largest contacting firm (MT Højgaard) in 
Denmark, which has been implementing lean construction for years, aiming to create 
competitive advantage. Thomassen et al. (2003) discovered that lean construction 
projects undertaken by MT Højgaard enjoyed 25% more profits compared with non-
lean construction projects.   
 
Although China’s construction industry over the past three decades has achieved 
much progress in areas of quality, productivity, technology, overseas market shares 
and so on, there is room for further improvement. The disturbing trends that exist and 
discussed earlier have driven large Chinese contractors to adopt initiatives to 
enhance their competitiveness and change for the better. Lu et al. (2008) 
investigated the critical success factors for the competitiveness of contractors in the 
context of the Chinese construction industry, and found that the sustainable 
development of human resources, quality management, and site management are 








Remaining effects of the 
financial crisis 
closely relevant to these areas, and are thus considered to be important factors that 
need to be addressed. Figure 6.4 highlights the forces behind the potential for 























Figure 6.4 Driving forces behind the need for introducing lean principles in Chinese 
construction firms 
 
6.5 Lean implementation in China 
6.5.1 Introduction 
Lean implementation has been exercised in China for more than a decade, but the 
practice can only be seen in manufacturing joint venture organizations, as well as 
their ancillary companies in the supply chain (Zhao, 2006). Since China became a 
world-class manufacturing hub, foreign supply chain executives see the opportunities 
that opening a manufacturing facility in China would bring with it, including lower 
labour costs and increased profit margins. However, they also understand that 
certain cultural practice can make a lean initiative more difficult to implement. In 
recent years, the state-owned and private companies have gradually started to 
accept the lean approach. So far, according to Zhao (2006), most companies have 
only focused on the application of lean tools and very few have fully started the whole 
lean enterprise transformation. Chinese firms held two different attitudes towards 
lean (Zhao, 2006): 
(1) Many companies claimed they are lean companies only because they have 
already implemented 5-S activities, or kanban activities or etc., but they have 
Becoming lean enterprises and be more competitive 
in both domestic and international markets 
The need for introducing 
TPS concepts to the large 













failed to appreciate the interrelationships between many other tools. Practicing 
only one lean tool does not allow the desired results to be fully reaped. 
(2) Some companies thought that they completed their lean transformation years ago. 
It is a misconception that these companies failed to acknowledge that TPS/lean is 
a continuous improvement process of pursuing perfection.  
 
Morris and Lancaster (2005) highlight that management ideas, during their 
transferability from manufacturing to other sectors, have to be adapted sufficiently to 
local conditions, which otherwise may generate barriers. Much work has focused on 
the implementation models of TPS/lean from the manufacturing sector to the 
construction sector. To generate a better understanding of the TPS/lean framework 
in the China context, this section will examine the barriers during the transferability 
process of TPS/lean in China. Paolini et al. (2005) observed that the challenges for 
lean implementation in Chinese manufacturing firms come mainly from: (1) cultural 
differences, (2) workforce challenges, and (3) supplier challenges.  
 
6.5.2 National Policy in the Chinese construction industry  
In developed nations such as the UK, Singapore and Australia, there exists “master 
plans” for the improvement of the construction industry. An examination of several 
key reports from the UK (Egan, 1998), Singapore (Construction 21 Steering 
Committee, 1999), and Australia (Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 
1999) highlights that the adoption of lean construction or other relevant tools and 
techniques is one of the initiatives that these countries have recommend for future 
development to tackle the problems identified in their own construction industries. 
The Chinese construction industry lacks such a national strategy or policy to highlight 
the importance of lean and to recommend it for nation-wide implementation. 
MOHURD (2010b) however has mentioned that Chinese construction firms need to 
enhance their management efficiency. In MOHURD’s (2010b) report, lean 
management was mentioned for the first time. MOHURD (2010b, p.74-75) did not 
elaborate what lean management or its tools and techniques are in-depth, but did 
report how lean management can be implemented in four cases. These are: 
(1) Company A restructured its organizational structure and project structure in a 
lean way. Efforts were made to reduce project costs by centralizing the purchase 
of key materials (63.2 billion RMB) and equipment (2.45 billion RMB).  
(2) Company B revamped its organizational structure, optimized its construction 
methods, and layout plans, along with the resource plan. In company B, 
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centralized purchasing was adopted, and project finance and budget were closely 
monitored by a new unit.  
(3) Company C reconstructed its organizational structures in a way with multiple 
centres (a technical centre, a finance centre, and a procurement centre). 
(4) Company D published a series of internal documents, such as “enterprises 
guidelines”, “operation manual”, “company/project procedures”, etc., aiming at 
establishing norms for company governance and process standardization. 
 
It seems that their attempts to implement lean were focused on organizational 
restructuring, centralized purchasing, management standardization, and so on. 
These endeavours are indeed part of lean implementation in the Chinese context, but 
are far from the Toyota Way model, which is more comprehensive and prescriptive. 
Moreover, it appears that these changes are meant to occur at the company level, 
while the chief target of lean is to take the non-value adding activities out of the 
process, which implies a connection with shop-floor process improvement. The 
Toyota Way model has one layer dealing with lean tools which can be utilized to 
improve performance at either the operation or project level, which has a place in the 
Chinese construction industry.  
 
6.5.3 Chinese cultural influence on lean implementation 
Many researchers have investigated the cultural constraints of lean implementation 
(Atkinson, 2010; Lewis, 2000; Pailini et al., 2005; Sim and Rogers, 2009). Lewis 
(2000) noted that lean implementation is more than technical adjustment but is a 
culture change. Atkinson (2010) argued that lean is all about cultural issues. Given 
that the Toyota Way has strong cultural roots in Japanese management (Liker, 2004; 
Low and Gao, 2011; Marksberry, 2011), this section briefly discusses the cultural 
influence on lean implementation in the Chinese context. It should be noted that this 
discussion is in the context of scant literature available on the relationship between 
Chinese cultural influence and lean implementation.  
 
As far as culture is concerned, it is commonly agreed that the concept has many 
definitions. At the national level, Hofstede and Hofstede (2005) categorized national 
culture into power distance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, 
uncertainty avoidance, and long vs. short-term orientation. Moreover, Pun (2001), 
based on the research work done by Hofstede and Bond (1988) and Martinsons 
(1994), listed a number of cultural elements that distinguished Chinese culture from 
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the western culture. This includes intuitive, holistic thinking, family-oriented, high 
power distance, collectivism, implicit communication, relationship-oriented expression, 
personal trust, and top-down information system. Moreover, Burrill and Ledolter 
(1999, p.298) regard culture as “a set of values and patterns of behaviour that focus 
on customers, quality, and individuals of the organization’’. Discussions on 
organizational culture seem to be more appropriate as lean initiatives are usually 
undertaken at the organization level, where changes are expected to occur away 
from those of traditional management. The research undertaken by Paolini et al. 
(2005), one of the few, cautioned that the cultural difference must be acknowledged 
and managed for lean concepts to be successful in China. Three cultural elements 
were discussed in Paolini et al.’s (2005) study, including (1) concept of guanxi, the 
Chinese practice of building relationships, (2) perceptions of personal empowerment, 
and (3) a tolerance for an untidy or disorganized workplace. These three cultural 
elements are relevant to workforce characteristics, which could be shaped by 
organizational culture. It is worth mentioning that these workforce behavioural 
features are viewed as barriers to lean implementation in China (see Paolini et al., 
2005; Aoki, 2008, Taj, 2005). For example, at Toyota, operators are encouraged to 
expose problems as much as possible for continuous improvement, and where 
stopping the production line is often seen to occur. In a similar situation with guanxi, 
managers may adopt a quick solution that does not address the problem’s root cause.  
 
In addition, Ling et al. (2007) examined how foreign architectural, engineering and 
construction (AEC) professionals manage cross-cultural encounters in China. 
Several cultural elements examined by Ling et al. (2007) bear implications for lean 
implementation in China’s construction industry, including: 
 Lack of team spirit: the Toyota Way approach places an emphasis on teams and 
team-working (Liker, 2004). If the Chinese building staff are calculative, 
uncooperative, holding their own views, and reluctant to implement what the team 
had decided (Ling et al., 2007), it is difficult to bring them together, to work 
together, for a common objective. 
 Procedure driven and obey many rules and regulations: the standard work at 
Toyota not only demands employees to follow the SOP closely, but also 
encourages employees to be innovative and to improve the existing SOP with 
kaizen thinking (Liker, 2004). If the Chinese culture at the workplace promotes 
obedience to rules and regulations without continuous improvement, it may slow 
down the adoption of lean practices.  
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 Lack of initiatives in solving problems and unwilling to take additional 
responsibilities: in the context of lean, employees are good problem-solvers and 
they see problems as opportunities. Given that uncertainty (i.e. risks and 
problems) avoidance is a feature of Chinese culture (Fan, 2000; Singh et al., 
2003), the Chinese workers are unlikely to take the lead to try to solve the 
problems, as they are uncomfortable with problems or unstructured situations 
(Zuo et al., 2009). Instead, they will wait for the supervisor to discover and then 
act. If the supervisor has other priorities, nothing gets done. Moreover, the culture 
of “avoid taking additional responsibilities” would hinder the practice of genchi 
genbutsu, as it requires a high level of commitment and responsibility.    
 Culture of distrust: lean workplaces usually show higher level of trust (Olivella et 
al., 2008; Forze, 1996). Companies, like Toyota, trust their employees’ 
capabilities, and thus treat them as valuable assets. Ang and Ofori’s (2001) study 
found that trust is one of the most important cultural values of the Chinese. 
However, according to Ling et al. (2007) and Zuo et al. (2009), project managers 
in China do not fully enjoy a high level of trust by the stakeholders whom they 
were engaged. Thus, this seems to suggest that lean is more likely to fail in these 
Chinese construction firms, particularly in the area of empowerment, collaborative 
planning, and partnership where mutual trust is required.  
 Strong networking culture: the Chinese culture values networking and 
appreciates long-term partnership (Wang and Huang, 2006; Zuo et al., 2009) in 
construction business. This cultural element is also a key facilitator to lean 




6.6 Challenges for lean implementation in China’s construction 
industry 
This section describes Figure 6.5 to examine the potential challenges faced in the 























Design with low buildability 
China has a very well established system of design institutes (Low and Jiang, 2003), 
with a large number of professionals who are equipped with the necessary 
qualifications and know-how relating to construction technology, economics and 
management (Xu et al., 2005). Traditionally, as Bajaj and Zhang (2003) observe, 
China’s construction industry was influenced by the planned economy system, with 
design institutes and construction firms in most cases allocated different tasks. The 
very limited interaction between the designers and the contractors, as well as the 
designers placing more emphasis on building appearances, have resulted in the low 
level of buildability in China (Liu and Low, 2007). Liu and Low (2007) suggested that 
the Chinese construction industry could learn from Singapore’s experience of 
incorporating buildability into the designs, processes, construction techniques, 
products, and materials, in the hope of enhancing efficiency and standardization in 
the construction industry. As presented earlier, standardization is one of the crucial 
























Limited use of design and build procurement mode 
Ballard and Howell (1998b) argue that the traditional design-bid-build system 
parallels mass production’s wasteful sequential method, making it virtually impossible 
to achieve improvement and to avoid suboptimization. Currently, the most widely 
adopted procurement system in the Chinese construction industry is the design-bid-
build approach (Chen, et al. 2010). It was implemented by the Ministry of 
Construction (MOC), and means that domestic design institutes and contractors are 
responsible only for their own work. Hence they fail to fully foster collaboration prior 
to the completion of the drawings (Liu and Low, 2007). According to Xu and 
Greenwood (2006), the MOC recommended the “Conditions of Contract for Works of 
Building Construction” as a template for competitive (design-bid-build) tendering. This 
form of contract was prevalent because it can be modified to suit individual projects 
(Xu and Greenwood, 2006), since China does not yet have standard conditions for 
design-and-build contracts. Only few construction companies have adopted this 
mode. A survey by the MOHURD (2008) to investigate the use of design and build 
(D&B) procurement in China showed that only 18 out of 37 large construction firms 
surveyed were experienced in D&B. In addition, the number of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) experienced in D&B was far less than the proportion of the 
large firms. Again, the limited use of D&B procurement in China has directly 
discouraged buildability. Thus, the Chinese construction industry seems to be far 
from an ideal situation for applying lean techniques, as the traditional design-bid-build 
procurement form does not facilitate lean approaches to project planning and 
execution. This will ultimately and indirectly hinder the practice of standardization on 
site as well.  
 
6.6.3 Onsite practices 
Poor material management and construction waste 
China is an intensive user of raw materials. Chen (1998) highlighted that China’ s 
construction industry consumed 20% to 30% of the country’s total steel production, 
70% of cement, 40% of timber, 70% of glass, 50% of paint and 25% of plastic 
products each year. It was believed that the increasing demand for the raw materials 
was due to China’s high demand for infrastructure construction in recent years. 
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According to Deputy Minister of Construction Qiu Baoxin5, China has the most new 
buildings in the world in each year; the newly constructed area in each year is about 
2 billion square metres, equivalent to 40% of the world consumption of cement and 
steer. However, the construction last only 25 to 30 years on average (China Daily, 
2010b). In addition, rising oil prices, raw material prices, fuel prices, and 
transportation costs will inevitably and continually have a direct impact on the 
building materials industry (MOHURD, 2008). To take advantage of the discounts on 
prices, Chinese contractors usually order large amounts of materials and place early 
purchase orders from their suppliers. This was identified as a normal practice in 
developing countries by Polat and Arditi (2005). Moreover, poor material 
management in Chinese construction sites appears to be a serious problem, leading 
to the following undesirable consequences: 
(1) Bulk materials are often stored on site, taking up valuable space in often 
confined sites. Stored materials are also susceptible to damage. 
(2) Poor estimation and know-how in fabricating materials (e.g. cutting reinforcement 
bars) on site, thus also causing a large amount of waste and air pollution. 
(3) Poor material procurement schedule and congested traffic conditions, especially 
in large cities, usually lead to frequent delays. Suppliers’ inability to deliver 
materials on time has been identified by Zou et al. (2007) as one of the risks in 
China’s construction industry. This is usually caused by the unskilled 
construction workers and poor project management skills. 
 
Limited use of prefabricated components 
According to Lu (2002), the prefabrication industry in China experienced rapid 
development between 1970 and 1990, before falling into a period of recession. Tens 
of thousands of prefabrication plants of different sizes were set up in urban and rural 
areas during the prefabrication boom period, more than 90% of which were small-
sized rural companies. Lu (2002) identified the deterrent factors that set back the 
precast concrete industry below:  
(1) The price mechanism of the prefabricated components in the planned economy 
largely restricted the development of companies in the area of technological 
innovations. 
(2) Low level of product quality standards. 
                                                     
5
 Qiu Baoxing is Deputy Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. The quotation 
was part of his speech delivered at the 6
th
 International Green Building and Energy 
Conservation General Assembly. 
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(3) The industry placed undue emphasis on saving construction materials as a 
strategy in manufacturing prefabricated components in the 1970s, which resulted 
in poor quality products that jeopardized the industry’s reputation. Moreover, the 
existing bias misled the industry, suggesting that traditional site in-situ 
construction can provide a better solution than prefabrication. It seems that only 
in-situ concrete technology was considered a modern technology at that time. 
Consequently, this has badly affected the development of the prefabrication 
industry in China. 
 
Recently, The China Daily (2010b) reported that a six-storey energy efficient Expo 
pavilion was built in less than a day during the Shanghai Expo construction period. 
The Chinese construction industry has begun to recognize the potentials of 
prefabrication and to acknowledge that this may become a prevalent approach for 
the construction of future residential communities, offices and hotels (China Daily, 
2010b). 
 
6.6.4 People and Partners 
Poor labour skills and insufficient training (workers) 
It is important to note that the Chinese construction industry is a highly labour 
intensive industry, and a large number of construction workers are peasants and 
unemployed workers. Most of the people at the worker level are unskilled and many 
are not round-the-year construction workers (Chan et al., 1999). The construction 
workers can be recruited easily as a result of the relatively low requirements for skills 
in construction and massive urban development needs in China. It is common to see 
many construction workers beginning work without any professional and/or 
vocational training, thus leading to problems. On average, the educational level of the 
construction employees is rather low. According to Xu et al. (2005), 97% of the 
educational level of the construction employees is below that of a diploma. Lu and 
Fox (2001) also noted that 50% of the 600,000 migrant workers working in 
construction sites in Beijing have received no more than primary education and over 
10% are illiterate. The official statistics from the Ministry of Construction revealed that 
only 10% of the 32 million farmers who became construction workers had basic 
training in their new career, compared with more than 70% in developed countries 
(Xinhua, 2009b). Ling et al. (2005) noted that the level of professional work was so 
low that workers required very detailed drawings for them to operate. It is recognized 
that training is very important in the Toyota Way. Thus poor labour skills and 
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insufficient training will therefore pose a large hurdle for the implementation of 
TPS/lean concepts. 
 
Lack of project management practice (project managers) 
Researchers have highlighted that project management skills in China are lagging 
behind those of developed countries. Limited management skills have prevented 
work from proceeding efficiently. Inadequate project management skills were 
identified by Zhao and Shen (2008) as the most significant weakness of the Chinese 
contractors in the international market. About half of the Chinese construction firms 
have not established an effective project management system (Hu, 2003). It has 
increasingly been recognized that it would be difficult to systematically and effectively 
manage a project without a sound project management system. Consequently, due 
to the lag in project management knowledge and techniques, it is likely that there is 
little awareness of TPS or lean concepts in the Chinese construction industry. 
 
Poor organizational structure 
As Zeng et al. (2003) note, most Chinese construction firms have three or four layers 
of hierarchy in their organizational structure. There is, however, a vague division of 
work and economic relationships between these layers. Each level sets its own 
objectives, liabilities, and targets, and carries out its individual tasks. This perceptibly 
poor organizational structure results in project managers having to bear the risk in 
making decisions and solving problems. This also explained why the Chinese 
manager is poor at taking on responsibilities (Flanagan and Li, 1997). Flanagan and 
Li (1997, p.154) have also noted that “They avoid making decisions and prefer to 
report to their supervisors to get approval. None seems to want to take the risk and 
responsibility and too many people are involved in decision making.” 
 
Chan et al. (1999) also noticed that the Chinese construction managers lacked the 
motivation to carry out the work in the most cost-effective way because they were not 
given enough authority to make decisions and were not responsible for profits and 
losses. Furthermore, Chen and Partington (2004) compared the cultural differences 
between Chinese and Western project managers’ way of handling construction 
projects, and highlighted that management processes in China have been heavily 
influenced by the relationship culture, which emphasized hierarchy and the need to 
maintain harmony, as well as valuing long-term cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Nevertheless, it was observed that the construction industry in China provides little or 
no opportunity to construction practitioners, particularly the lower level workers, for 
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personal enhancement, which in turn badly affects workers’ commitment.  
 
Supplier relationships 
The bargaining power of local building material suppliers in China has gradually been 
eroded over the last decade (Lan and Jackson, 2002). The risk relating to suppliers 
with low bargaining power is that they have to bear the extra costs of delivering the 
materials in small quantities (Harber et al., 1990) if the JIT delivery system is to be 
implemented. Lan and Jackson (2002) explained the reasons for this: 
(1) Conventional building materials were in excess supply due to deregulation. This 
ensures the supply of materials within a short time, so loss due to late arrival of 
goods at a job location is a low risk event (Fang et al., 2004). 
(2) Low concentration of production in building materials manufacturing. There were 
more than 200,000 building material suppliers throughout China in the mid-1990s, 
with no key player in the industry. In most cases, long-term partnership between 
a single source supplier and the main contractors is rarely seen. 
(3) Guan xi (relationship) is still a critical factor in determining who the suppliers are. 
 
Moreover, Lu and Yan (2007) highlight that the current strategic partnering 
applications in China are only observed in the tender preparation stage. Further 
applications at the project level, for instance the strategic relationship between 
contractors and suppliers, are rarely seen because most Chinese construction 
companies do not understand formal partnering approaches clearly, and cannot 
perceive the project-based benefits of partnering. Therefore, establishing long-term 
relationships with suppliers should be encouraged in China in order to reduce risks, 
such as those relating to “poor quality materials”. 
 
6.6.5 Legislative controls 
Another potential obstacle to the successful implementation of TPS/lean concepts is 
the intervention of regulatory authorities and the tedious approval process required in 
the construction industry (Koskela, 1992, p.48). In China, intervention by 
governmental authorities exists throughout the whole construction process, which 
imposes difficulties in managing construction projects (Chan et al., 1999). The risk of 
government intervention in construction was ranked very high by Fang et al. (2004) 
from the Chinese contractors’ perspective. For example, in the pre-construction 
period, clients are required to submit very detailed business and economic 
information of their projects to the government for feasibility assessment. In the 
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tendering stage, because the assessment of a tender has to be carried out with the 
joint efforts of the government tender administration department and the client, the 
contract may not be awarded to a competent contractor who has worked with the 
client for a long time. Moreover, during the construction phase, it is compulsory to 
engage the government quality inspection office to monitor the major construction 
activities, which thus duplicates the works of the supervision unit (Chan et al., 1999). 
These stringent requirements demand approvals from many governmental bureaus 
(e.g. Construction Bureau, Fire Bureau, Environmental Bureau, etc.) and are a result 
of the multi-layered and fragmented nature of the governance structure in the 
Chinese construction industry (Chan et al., 1999; Cheah and Chew, 2005). For most 
construction and design work, this will potentially delay the commencement of 
construction works. The associated inefficiency would have a knock-on effect on 
hampering a construction firm’s planning and coordinating with other stakeholders 
(e.g. suppliers and subcontractors). The complex and time-consuming processes to 




The previous chapters have shown that construction companies have adopted the 
lean production philosophy (lean construction) or the Toyota Way principles in order 
to reap benefits similar to those that many manufacturing firms have reaped earlier. It 
appears that an increasing number of studies have been conducted on the 
transferability of this operational system beyond manufacturing to a non-
manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, little has been studied on its applicability to the 
Chinese construction industry. This current study addresses that gap. In this chapter, 
after examining the status quo of the Chinese construction industry, the study shows 
that the Toyota Way principles have the potential to improve the performance in the 
following five aspects: quality, health and safety, productivity, profitability, and 
management. Furthermore, this chapter follows the road map of the process, 
involves people and the partner’s chain in China’s construction industry, and 
identifies a number of challenges that may potentially impinge on the promotion of 




7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the choice of research methodology for this study. It begins 
with an overview of the general approach and methods used in the research. As the 
focus of the research is on investigating Toyota Way-styled practices within large 
Chinese construction firms, the methods commonly applied to lean construction 
studies are discussed. The choice of the mixed research method is justified as an 
appropriate research strategy. The determination of the study sample and the 
techniques of data collection are also described.  
 
7.2 Fundamental concepts 
According to Lincoln and Guba (2000), research is always constructed on the basis 
of people’s ontological, epistemological, and axiological beliefs about the world. 
Klenke (2008) noted that the researcher’s philosophical assumptions about these 
three aspects are critical in framing the research process, and require transparency.  
 
Ontological belief concerns the nature of knowledge or the nature of reality (Lincoln 
and Guba, 2000; Fellows and Liu, 2008). It is about whether the research views the 
world from an objective or a subjective perspective. On the ontological level, this 
research has adopted a realist position, as implementation of lean and Toyota Way 
may exist in China, but practitioners sometimes do not recognize or follow a 
structured procedure or processes that would make the implementation effective. 
The ontological stance of this study is to explore whether Toyota Way-styled 
principles have been implemented within LCCFs.    
 
On the other hand, epistemology concerns the question of what is (or what should be) 
regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2004). It is about “how 
we know”, and the methods through which knowledge is acquired (Klenke, 2008). 
Klenke (2008) emphasized the importance for every researcher of bringing some set 
of epistemological assumptions into the research process, and that these 
assumptions influence how the data are understood and interpreted. 
Epistemologically, there are two ways of viewing the world - positivism or 
interpretivism. The former advocates the application of the method of natural science 
to the study of social reality and more. It is of the belief that the world conforms to 
fixed laws of cause and effect, and that complex issues can be tackled using 
simplified or fundamental approach. It is therefore possible for the researcher to be 
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objective from the detached position of the research situation. This research holds to 
the positivistic position in the sense that it identifies the relationship between the level 
of Toyota Way implementation and the performance of various projects. 
Interpretivism advocates the absence of a universal truth and places more emphasis 
on understanding the meaning of actions from actors’ perspectives. This research 
also maintains that the Toyota Way model, as a comprehensive and complex model, 
can be proposed as a way for implementation. In this research, inquiries are made to 
consider the meaning and possible implementation opportunity for each Toyota Way 
principle within large Chinese construction firms.  
 
Axiology deals with the question of what is valuable in research. According to Klenke 
(2008), values are part of the “basic beliefs” that undergird and affect the entire 
research process: research problems, guiding paradigm, framework, data collection 
methods, analysis strategy, and others. It is worth mentioning that values play a 
significant role in the study of lean or Toyota Way, especially as evidenced, for 
example, in the fact that the primary aim of lean is to maximize value to the customer. 
Yet the principles of Toyota Way reflect Toyota’s endeavours, not only in managing 
production well by adding value to the process, but also by adding value to people, 
the company, and society at large.   
 
7.3 Research design, approaches, and methods 
Kumar (2005) describes a research design as a procedural plan that is adopted by 
the researcher to answer questions validly, objectively, accurately and economically. 
Yin (2008, p.26) sees research design as a “blueprint” for researchers. According to 
Kumar (2005), the following two objectives need to be fulfilled in a research design: 
(1) To conceptualise an operational plan and to undertake various procedures and 
tasks required to complete the study. 
(2) To ensure that these procedures are adequate to obtain answers to the research 
questions. 
 
Research strategies can be broadly categorized as either quantitative or qualitative. 
Quantitative research is objective in nature (Johnson and Harris, 2002; White, 2000). 
It usually requires respondents to record their attitudes, opinions, or beliefs on a five 
or seven-point scale measured with numbers. The scores are then analysed using 
statistical procedures to test the hypothesis (Creswell, 1994). Three main 
approaches were suggested to collect the data: asking questions of respondents by 
means of questionnaires and interviews, undertaking experiments, and performing 
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extensive reviews of the relevant literature (Johnson and Harris, 2002; Fellows and 
Liu, 2008). On the other hand, qualitative research is subjective in nature (Naoum, 
2007). It relies on observing people in their own environment, communicating with 
them in their own language, and on their terms, with an equal relationship between 
the researcher and the participants. Hence, the data are gathered primarily in the 
form of words and observations, as opposed to numbers, and are then analysed to 
discover the unifying concepts and patterns that give meaning to the data (Johnson 
and Harris, 2002; White, 2000). Fieldwork and case studies are the major types of 
qualitative study. In addition, a research study using both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches can be called a “mixed methods” approach or “methodological 
triangulation” (Creswell, 2003). The mixed method is based on the premise that an 
effective body of research on a topic should include more than one research 
approach.  
 
7.4 Research methodology employed in this study  
7.4.1 Selected research approach 
The nature of each objective (see Chapter 1) implies that one overarching approach 
would not be appropriate for this research. This research concerns both qualitative 
and quantitative characteristics, which are explained below: 
(1) Quantitative aspects of this research: 
 Objective 2 is concerned with the implementation of Toyota Way principles 
(identified as measurables) within LCCFs, as well as the perceived 
importance of the attributes to the company. 
 The potential barriers to the implementation of Toyota Way principles by 
Chinese construction firms are inherently relevant to a number of quantitative 
variables, which were reviewed and identified in the literature and pilot study.  
(2) Qualitative aspects of this research: 
 Investigation into the status quo of LCCFs’ site management practice, HRM, 
problem-solving behaviours, and others similarities and differences (gaps) 
with the Toyota Way standard. These are featured with qualitative elements. 
Interviews and case studies appear to be more appropriate for capturing 
these relevant information.   
 Clarification of how the implementation of Toyota Way principles can be 
fulfilled by multiple case studies of construction projects. This again depends 
on an overall understanding of the Toyota Way approach in the whole 
process of a project.  
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 The development of the implementation framework also depends on the 
understanding, interpretation, and summary of the research findings by the 
researcher. 
 
Despite the reported growing presence of lean initiatives in construction, there has 
been limited research conducted into China’s construction context addressing the 
attitudes and actions towards Toyota Way-styled practices. Therefore, mixed-
methods research seems to be appropriate, and is helpful in gaining a better 
understanding through an in-depth study of the new phenomenon. As can be seen 
from the research aims and objectives outlined in the earlier chapter, this research 
concerns both qualitative and quantitative characteristics, which are explained in 
Table 7.1. 
 






Objective 1:  To breakdown the Toyota Way 





Objective 2: To investigate the status quo of the 
Toyota Way principles having been implemented 
by large Chinese construction firms (LCCFs) 
Phase I Quantitative 
Objective 3: To investigate how the Toyota Way 
principles can be (better) practised by large 
Chinese construction firms 
Phase II Qualitative 
Objective 4: To establish the Toyota Way model 
implementation framework for Chinese 
construction firms 
Discussion 
This can be concluded 
on the basis of the 
findings arising from 
phases I and II 
 
7.4.2 Selected research methods 
The approach to data collection should be based primarily on the nature of the 
investigation and on the type of data and information that are required (Naoum, 
2007). So that the aim of the study – to establish an implementation framework of the 
Toyota Way model within the large Chinese construction firms – could be met, a 
diverse range of methods to collect applicable data were employed. This included 




Questionnaire survey  
The survey method involves collecting information from a larger sample of the target 
population, which is selected based on systematic and representative sampling 
methods, by means of a standardized questionnaire administered identically to all the 
target respondents in the sample population (Creswell, 1994). Among the research 
conducted into the area of investigation – concerning the application of lean 
production or lean construction methods – questionnaire surveys appear to be a 
popular method for assessing the level of lean construction implementation (see 
Salem et al., 2005; Diekmann et al., 2004; Johansen and Walter, 2007). With this in 
mind, in this study the questionnaire survey was also used to obtain information 




In the event that a questionnaire survey might not easily allow the researcher to 
probe some themes highlighted in response to a certain question on the survey 
(Fellows and Liu, 2008), interviews were employed to supplement the information 
required. An interview involves questioning a respondent through discourse on a 
defined theme or subject area to obtain responses aimed at addressing a research 
hypothesis (Naoum, 2006). In this research, interviews were a suitable data 
collection method for answering the question of “how” (see Table 7.1) in relation to 
the development and/or fine-tuning of the Toyota Way principles, in order to guide 
Chinese construction firms in implementing the lean concept.   
 
Case studies 
The next level of this research employs case study analyses. Yin (1994, p.13) gave a 
widely accepted definition of a case study as an empirical inquiry that “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially where the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. This definition 
is highly relevant, because the implementation of the Toyota Way principles in the 
Chinese construction industry is indeed relatively new. In contrast with the 
questionnaire survey with its rigid limits, a case study can lead to new and creative 
insights, the development of new theories, and can have high validity with the 
practitioners who are the ultimate users of the research findings (Voss et al., 2002). 
 
The objective of case study analysis is two-fold. First of all, one of the hypotheses 
proposed that the Toyota Way principles are applicable in China’s construction 
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industry. The evidence used to test this hypothesis in the questionnaire survey may 
be inconclusive. The projected data will only reveal to what extent the Toyota Way 
principles are applicable to LCCFs, but they do not tell us how. Yin (1994) 
recommended that for research projects of this nature focusing on “what, why, and 
how” questions, the case study approach is ideal. The case study, in contrast to the 
questionnaire, allows the researcher to uncover how in daily practice the Toyota Way 
principles can affect the work of construction firms. Overall in this research, the case 
studies aim to give an in-depth understanding of Toyota Way implementation in 
practice.  
 
7.5 The research framework   
Figure 7.1 outlines the research steps taken in this study. The structure of this 
research has three stages: Literature review (planning), two-phased data 
collection/analysis, and validation. 
 
7.5.1 Literature review  
Literature review was undertaken to obtain an overall understanding of the Toyota 
Way principles and lean principles. This also explains why Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way 
model was chosen over TPS, lean production, and others: the Toyota Way model is 
a totality which embraces philosophy, process, people, and problem solving. To build 
the solid theoretical foundation on this model, a group of theories from various 
domains have been linked. Moreover, the discussion of potential applications and the 
adaptation of the underlying principles of the Toyota Way to construction add to the 
practical combinations of the Toyota Way model. Lastly, the state of the Chinese 
construction industry has been reviewed, as has the performance of the leading 




























Need for research 
A need to introduce Toyota management 
principles to large Chinese construction firms 
Research questions 
Are Toyota way principles applicable in 







 Project management 
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7.5.2 Phase I – Quantitative Instrument Development  
Questionnaire design  
The questionnaire design is divided into four parts, each part including questions 
corresponding to the section topic. The four parts are as follows (see Table 7.2). The 
survey questions are provided in Appendix – 1 Questionnaire Survey. 
 
Table 7.2 Structure of the questionnaire designed for this research   
Sections Focus Descriptions Scales 
Section 1 
Profile of company 
and individual 
Firms: records firms’ grade, 
ownership, etc. 
 
Individuals: records their 
positions, years of working 











The list of predefined actionable 
measurements (91 attributes in 
total) was generated from a 
review of the Toyota Way model, 
also taking consideration of its 
linkage to lean construction 
domain 
Level of implementation:  
1 = “not at all” 
5 = “to a large extent” 
 
Level of perceived 
importance:   
1 = “not important”  




The indicators include profitability, 
productivity, quality, delivery of 
project, and client satisfaction. 
Performance:  
1 = “very poor 
5 = “excellent” 
Section 4 Perceived barriers  
It assesses the respondents’ 
attitudes to potential barriers 
during the implementation of 
Toyota Way within their firms 
Barriers:  
1 = “not a hindrance”  
5 = “a hindrance”  
 
Survey sampling 
The population of a research is defined as the units belonging to the category of 
interest (Creswell, 1994). In this study, the population of interest is LCCFs. Using two 
indicators, namely “total revenue” and “value of assets owned”, China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBSC, 2003) categorised Chinese construction firms into “large”, 
“medium”, “small”, and “micro” (see Table 7.3).  
 








Total revenue (R) R ≥ 80000 6000 ≤ R < 80000 3000 ≤ R < 6000 
Value of assets owned 
(VA) 
VA ≥ 80000 5000 ≤ VA < 80000 300 ≤ VA < 5000 
Note: 10,000 RMB = US$1,585. R≥ 125 million (in US$) is for large scale firm.  
Source: NBSC (2003) 
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Referring to classification, all the “premier” and “first” grade construction firms fall in 
the large category, and thus form the population of this study. The reasons that the 
study is focused on these large Chinese construction firms are:  
(1) They play the most important role in China’s construction industry, and thus 
represent a typical business model in terms of management style, site 
management practices, HRM, and others in China.  
(2) Some of the leading Chinese construction firms have gained a reputation on the 
international stage. The Toyota Way model, which is highly promoted in this study, 
can serve as a ready strategy for them to enhance their competitiveness in the 
international construction market.  
(3) LCCFs have abundant resources, which increase their likelihood of embark on the 
lean/Toyota Way: the implementation of some principles may require investment 
and managerial effort, which Chinese SMEs may not be capable of doing 
presently.   
  
Data collection  
It has been acknowledged that it is difficult to achieve a satisfactory response rate for 
a questionnaire survey in China’s construction industry (Liu et al., 2004; Kang, 2006). 
To avoid the constraints regarding direct access to construction companies in China, 
questionnaires were actually sent out by the researcher’s personal contact in China. 
Basically, the sample frame for this study is the list of LCCFs (of “premier” and “first” 
grade) registered with two organizations, namely the Chinese Construction 
Association (CCA), and Beijing VENCI consulting. 6  In this way, 93 completed 
questionnaires were obtained from 400 firms contacted, representing a 26 % 
response rate.   
  
Data analysis  
The questionnaire was designed using a Likert scale, which is ordinal in nature. 
Concerns over ordinal data are not new, and have been the subject of considerable 
debate in construction-management literature (Fellows and Liu, 2008). Several 
researchers in the domain of construction management suggest that ordinal data can 
be appropriately analysed with procedures that require rank-order information, such 
as non-parametric methods (see Fellow and Liu, 2008; Naoum, 2007). However, in 
the studies of assessing lean production or lean construction implementation, one of 
the primary statistical methods employed was based on the average mean value 
                                                     
6
 Beijing VENCI has partnered with the CIOB (Chartered Institute of Building) China to set up 
the VENCI-CIOB learning centre for Chinese building professionals. 
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calculated. For example, Salem et al. (2006) used a five-point Likert scale to measure 
a number of lean construction tools, which were adopted in case projects selected. 
Panizzolo (1998) assessed the degree of lean production adoption by looking at the 
percentage of plants that rated them as “adopted” or “fully adopted”. Panizzolo (1998) 
also employed Likert scales, with average mean values to investigate whether each 
lean programme was pervasive or significant. Doolen and Hacker (2005) used mean 
values to measure the implementation level of lean practices, though with non-
parametric data. Similarly, the use of mean values as the chief form of statistical 
analysis is also found in assessing other new management philosophies, such as 
TQM (see Valmohammadi, 2011; Yusuf et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2000) and JIT (see 
Fullerton and McWatters, 2001; White et al., 1999). Hence, in this research, in order 
to make the statistical analysis more robust and rigorous, mean values is adopted, 
but only for the purpose of outlining the overall picture of the status quo of large 
Chinese construction firms in implementing the Toyota Way-styled practices. More 
information can be referred to the in-depth discussion in Chapter 8.  
 
7.5.3 Phase II – Interviews and Case studies 
Interviews  
The design of the semi-structured interviews was based mainly on the research 
objectives, especially for the one concerning “how to better implement the Toyota 
Way principles within Chinese construction firms”. Prior to the interviews, their 
contents were tested with two Chinese academic experts. Minor alterations were 
made as a result of this pre-test.  
 
During the fieldwork, the interviews were conducted with a selected range of 
participants who had agreed to further take part in the study. These consisted of 
companies’ deputy managers and production managers at the company level, as well 
as project managers, chief engineers, and foremen from the projects. For some 
companies, site visits were allowed in addition to interviews. This was the best 
opportunity to confirm the findings from Phase I – whether Toyota Way-styled 
practices had been actually implemented, and to what extent. The interviewees were 
chosen by a snowball sampling method. The first point of contact at the company was 
usually a project manager or a chief engineer. Once the research was explained and 
the first contact was requested to connect the researcher with people in various roles, 
they pointed the researcher to colleagues within their firms or counterparts outside 
the firms. The interviews usually took one hour or more for each participant. The 
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interviews focused on various aspects of Toyota Way’s 4P model. Additionally, the 
status quo of the construction management approach was first investigated, and from 
there suitable Toyota Way practices were introduced. In summary, in each interview, 
the interviewees were asked a subset of the following questions: 
(1) How do you implement this particular Toyota Way principle in your current project?  
(2) What are the gaps between your current practice and this particular Toyota Way-
styled practice? 
(3) What are the main issues that hinder the implementation of this particular Toyota 
Way principle? 
 
Interviewing a number of Chinese building professionals assisted in understanding 
the present status of their company philosophy, site management and practices, 
people management, and problem-solving behaviours. In addition, the results of the 
interviews also helped to identify the gap between their current practice and the 
Toyota way principle indicators. In carrying out interviews, advices from the 
interviewees were also given, which were actually quite helpful in contributing to the 
Toyota Way model, as they concerned very practical issues.    
 
Case studies: determination of the number 
For a given set of available resources, Voss et al. (2002) highlight that the greater the 
number of case studies, the greater the opportunities for in-depth observations. This 
is because, as they highlighted, two limitations exist with a single case: the first is the 
limit on the generalization of the conclusions drawn, and the other is the presence of 
biases, such as misjudging the level of representativeness of a single event or 
exaggerating the importance of easily-available data. Furthermore, it can be 
anticipated that a single case study will not supply enough evidence to validate all the 
principles of the Toyota Way and its corresponding approaches in the study. Multiple 
case studies look at several different construction projects, in order to reach more 
general conclusions than those provided in a single case. Although multiple cases 
may reduce the depth of the study when resources are constrained, it can both 
augment external validity and help guard against observer bias (Voss et al., 2002). 
Hence, a multiple case study approach appears to be most appropriate for this 
research, because it offers the following three important advantages (Yin, 2006, 
p.115): 
(1) It shows the audience that the complete cycle of case study research can be 
practiced with more than a single case, reducing the suspicion that the 
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researcher’s skills are limited to a single case that may also be personally special 
to the researcher in some way. 
(2) It better responds to a common criticism of single case studies: that the case in 
question is somehow unique and idiosyncratic. 
(3) It gives modestly greater amount of comparative data. 
 
The case-study method is prevalent in the context of lean construction research. 
Santos (1999) employed six cases to investigate the implementation of flow principles 
in the construction industry. In the USA, Kim (2002) selected eight cases to assess 
the implementation of lean construction. In this study, the units of analysis chosen are 
two projects from Company A and one project from company B. Companies A and B 
are private and state-owned, respectively. This choice was made partly because A 
and B presented a convenient sample and were available. Moreover, it also 
represents a diverse choice for the case studies, as companies of different natures 
are covered. The purpose was to ensure the data gathered enable the sufficient 
generalisations of the findings.   
 
Selection of case studies  
Creswell (2003) wrote that a case for study needs to be (1) revelatory (when an 
investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomena previously 
inaccessible to scientific investigation), (2) unique, and (3) critical to testing the theory. 
In addition, case study choices should provide opportunity to replicate and generalise 
the study. The selection of the case studies in this study observed the theoretical 
considerations and practical considerations, as described below: 
(1) The relationship between the case study firm and the author had already been 
developed. This assisted in obtaining access to the companies for detailed 
information. 
(2) The case study firms should reflect or present the current practice of site 
management, people management, as well as the problem-solving practices of 
LCCFs.  
 
The case study research firms are presented in Chapter 10. With respect to data 
collection, Jankowicz (2000) stated that semi-structured interviews are a powerful 
data-collection technique when used in the context of a case study research method. 
This is because in organizations such as construction companies, project managers 
are always very busy on site, due to the pressure of an aggressive schedule; they are 
unlikely to allow research access to their organizations unless they can see some 
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commercial or personal advantage that can be derived from it. Therefore, this issue 
should be taken into consideration before an interview technique is selected. A 
particular type of respondents in case projects is focused on: the high level project 
leader/manager who generally has the most influence over the degree of adoption of 
new management philosophy, such as Toyota Way-styled practices.  
 
7.5.4 Validation  
The validation of the framework will be conducted by interviewing a number (5-10) of 
Chinese building professionals in Singapore. The purpose is to see if they agree or 
disagree with the implementation framework based on the Toyota Way model, as well 
as with the strategies proposed for improving implementation, especially those that 
address the need to modify several Toyota Way-styled practices in the Chinese 
context. It is worth noting that these 5-10 Chinese building professionals will be 
different people from those who participated in the questionnaire survey phase. The 
design of the validation effort is the result of professional judgment. With respect to 
the numbers of participants for the validation process, researchers such as O’Keefe 
et al. (1986) and Bryman and Bell (2003) suggested that for a group of professionals, 
less than 10 would be appropriate for validating the results.  
 
7.6 Summary of the research process 
This chapter justifies and explains the research approaches and methods adopted in 
this research. Acknowledging the characteristics of the major research approaches 
and methods, methodological triangulation is designed by incorporating both a 
qualitative and quantitative approach into a two-stage research process. A 
questionnaire survey, the most common method for collecting quantitative data from 
a large sample, was conducted to allow more rigorous testing of the hypotheses in 
this research. It also provides an overall picture of the extent to which the Toyota Way 
principles that Chinese construction firms may have adopted.  
 
The methodology adopted in this study includes desk research, questionnaire survey, 
and case studies. Firstly, literature review is undertaken to obtain an overall 
understanding of the Toyota Way model, including its background and history, its 
sub-principles, techniques and tools, the typical approaches to TPS in construction 
(lean construction), and the challenges faced when applying the Toyota Way 
principles in construction. Secondly, once the quantitative and qualitative aspects of 
this study have been discussed, a three-phased research design is proposed. The 
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questionnaire survey and follow-up interviews will be used to explore the current state 
of the application of the Toyota Way in the Chinese construction industry, as well as 
the challenges the Toyota Way practice faces in China. Cases studies will be used to 
answer the question of how the Toyota Way model can be applied to the large 
construction firms in China. Lastly, the framework for implementing the Toyota Way 
model in the Chinese construction industry will be established based on the three-
phase research findings as well as on references from the Toyota Way guidance 




8 SURVEY DATA ANALYSIS 
8.1 Overview 
This chapter is structured according to research objectives two and three, and 
presents the findings and results of the survey, in particular concerning the extent to 
which Toyota Way-style practices are implemented by LCCFs. The survey questions 
are provided in Appendix 1. Each of the 14 principles of the Toyota Way is denoted 
by the abbreviations Principle 1 (P1) to Principle 14 (P14). A distinct scale, containing 
5-9 actionable attributes or practices, was included in the survey for each Toyota Way 
principle.  
 
8.2 Data analysis procedures  
The collected data were analysed in four stages, using the statistical package SPSS 
version 17.0. In the first stage, the degree of implementation, as well as perceived 
importance of each attribute under various Toyota Way principles, was assessed. 
The assessment was made purely on the basis of the respective mean values. 
Following this, tests of significance were carried out in order to investigate the 
difference between the levels of implementation of the Toyota Way and their 
perceived importance. In the third stage, a correlation analysis was performed to 
determine the relationship between the firm’s (project) performance and the level to 
which each Toyota Way principle was implemented. In the final stage, the potential 
hindrances encountered by large Chinese construction firms in adopting the Toyota 
Way were investigated. It is worth mentioning that a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 
used to determine whether the data were normal. It was found that, for a large 
majority of the variables, the distributions were significantly different from normal (p < 
0.05). Hence, it is not possible to conduct a parametric analysis. 
 
8.3 Sample characteristics 
A total of 400 copies of the questionnaire were sent to potential respondents in 
February, 2011. By the end of May 2011, 93 completed copies had been returned, 
representing a valid response rate of 24 per cent. Table 8.1 presents the 
characteristics of the respondents. Among the respondents, a large majority are 
highly experienced, with 75 per cent and 33.3 per cent having more than 10 years 
and 20 years work experience respectively. There were 10 missing entries in the 
work experience, which accounted for the remaining 13.1 per cent. Moreover, a 
majority of the respondents were managerial personnel working in Chinese 
construction firms. This included 34 general (deputy) managers (36.6%), 23 project 
177 
 
managers (24.7%), and 15 engineers (16.1%). Respondents from these three groups 
have a good understanding of construction works, and can thus provide reliable 
answers to the questionnaire. With respect to the respondents’ firms (see Table 8.2), 
three-quarters of the responding firms were general contractors, and the remaining 
one-quarter were qualified to conduct business as professional contractors 
(subcontractors). There were 55 (57.4%) firms registered in the “Premier” category of 
firms’ qualification, which outnumbered the first grade (41.7%) firms. In terms of the 
ownership of firms, the sample comprised 62 stated-owned firms and 31 private firms.  
 
Table 8.1 Characteristics of the respondents  
Description Number Percentage 
Position (N = 93)  
General (deputy) Manager 34 36.6% 
Project Manager 23 24.7% 
Engineer 15 16.1% 
Contract manager  5 5.4% 
Quality manager/technician  4 4.3% 
Regional Manager   3 3.2% 
Not stated 9 9.7% 
Working experience in China  (N = 93)  
1-5 years 17 18.3% 
6-10 years 19 20.4% 
11-15 years  8 8.6% 
15-20 years 11 11.8 % 
Above 20 years 28 30.1% 
Not stated 10 10.8% 
 
Table 8.2 Profiles of the responding firms  
Description Number Percentage 
Type of firm  (N = 93)  
General contractor 71 76.4% 
Professional contractor (subcontractor) 18 19.3% 
Both  4 4.3% 
Type of ownership (N = 93)  
State-owned 62 64.9% 
Collective 0 0% 
Private 31 33% 
Grades (N = 93)  
Premier  54 57.4% 




8.4 Reliability tests  
Reliability refers to the extent to which there is a consistency in responses on 
repeated application of the same measurement tool (Blythe and Tripodi, 1989). Such 
measures are necessary in order to ensure that the same results will be consistently 
reproduced in subsequent administrations of the instrument. Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient is used as the reliability indicator. The higher the coefficient (e.g. 0.8 or 
0.9), the stronger the linear relationship of the items is correlated and the higher the 
internal consistency. Overall, as shown in Table 8.3, the scale reliability is high. All 
the adopted Toyota Way principles exceeded the usual recommendation of alpha = 
0.70 (Black, 1999) for establishing the internal consistency of the scale.  
 
Table 8.3 Scale Reliability: Cronbach’s Alpha of the data collected 
Toyota Way principles 
Number of 








P1 Long-term philosophy  9 .882 .845 
P2 One-piece flow 6 .841 .830 
P3 Pull kanban system 5 .793 .792 
P4 Level out the workload  5 .791 .794 
P5 Jidoka 7 .878 .878 
P6 Standardized tasks  5 .859 .860 
P7 Visual management  6 .874 .897 
P8 Using reliable technology 4 .905 .907 
P9 Grow leaders and leadership 7 .895 .882 
P10 People management  7 .920 .930 
P11 Supplier relationships  9 .918 .914 
P12 Genchi Genbutsu  5 .801 .698 
P13 Decision-making  6 .870 .874 
P14 Kaizen  8 .909 .939 
 
8.5 The Toyota Way principles: implementation and perceived 
importance  
This section presents and briefly discusses the extent to which the Toyota Way 
principles are adopted; it then assesses their importance for firms or projects from the 
perspective of the respondents. In addition, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test is 
performed for each Toyota Way attribute in order to ascertain whether any significant 
difference exist between the current implementation of Toyota Way-style practices 
and the level of perceived importance. The practices have been grouped into four 
different models: philosophical model, process model, people and partner model, and 
problem-solving model. The empirical findings are presented in a series of tables (see 
Tables 8.4 to 8.7).   
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8.5.1 The Toyota Way Philosophy model   
Long-term Philosophy (P1) 
The Philosophy model refers to practices relevant to the guiding principles of the 
company. Referring to the bottom layer of the Toyota Way model (Liker, 2004), the 
Philosophy model has one principle which consists of nine attributes. This is shown in 
Table 8.4. 
 
Table 8.4 Descriptive statistics of Principle 1 practices in terms of the implementation 
and importance  




Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank 
P1 Long-term  philosophy 3.81 0.91 - 4.18 0.82 -  
P1.1 Sustain a constant purpose (company 
vision, mission, and values) 
4.07 .779 2 4.48 .714 1 .000 
P1.2 Have a high purpose or mission which 
generates value towards employees, 
society, and customers 
3.73 .997 5 4.12 .926 6 .000 
P1.3 Formulate a plan towards the realization 
of company’s long-term vision  
3.66 1.048 7 4.27 .809 4 .000 
P1.4 Short-term losses affect decision 
making, but are less important than 
pursuing long-term goals 
3.49 .880 8 3.89 .902 8 .000 
P1.5 Have a clear view of the firm’s core 
competency and endeavour to become 
an expert in this area  
4.00 .897 4 4.39 .781 2 .000 
P1.6 Be responsible for products, employees 
and society 
3.68 1.039 6 4.14 .875 7 .000 
P1.7 Understanding the customer’s 
requirement is priority work 
4.01 .886 3 4.21 .760 5 .006 
P1.8 Be able to rapidly respond to meet the 
changing requirement of the customers 
(e.g. design change) 
4.23 .725 1 4.32 .691 3 .299 
P1.9 Treat employees/suppliers as internal 
customers 
3.45 .935 9 3.83 .912 9 .000 
 
On the whole, the mean values of the practices under Principle 1 were rated highly by 
the responding firms in terms of the degree of their implementation and their 
perceived importance. In the case of implementation, as depicted in Table 8.4, four 
attributes have been “moderately” (average mean ≥ 4) practiced by the responding 
firms. Among these, P1.8, “be able to rapidly respond to meet the changing 
requirements of the customers” stood out with highest score received (m = 4.23). 
Following were “sustain a constant purpose” (P1.1), “understanding customer’s 
requirement is priority work” (P1.7), and “a clear view of its core competency” (P1.5). 
The top ranked attribute (P1.8) reveal that the responding firms placed greater 
emphasis on customers’ requirements and were able to respond quickly. This is 




With regard to the perceived importance, it is evident that the respondents placed a 
higher degree of importance on all the attributes than their implementation. Strongly 
supporting attributes such as “sustain a constant purpose” (P1.1), “have a clear view 
of the company’s core competency and endeavour to become an expert in this area” 
(P1.5), and “be able to rapidly respond to meet the changing requirements of the 
customers” (P1.8) were important attributes among the respondents. The importance 
of “constant purpose” has been highlighted by Deming (1986), who believed that it 
should be management’s number one priority and obligation. On the contrary, it was 
found that “employees/suppliers are treated as internal customers” (P1.9) was rated 
as of least implemented and least importance. This indicates that the responding 
firms were not aware of “employees/suppliers are internal customers” as a 
philosophical concept. Something that might contribute to this low awareness is 
probably the high level of worker mobilization. Therefore, for this attribute to be 
adopted and to a larger extent, the workforce should be trained to understand that 
people working in the downstream workflow are actually their customers. Moreover, 
attribute P1.4, “short-term losses affect decision making” was rated as second last in 
implementation and importance. This reflects the way the Chinese construction 
industry is plagued by short-sighted behaviour that contributed to the industry’s poor 
performance. Aiming at short-term profit is likely to kill long-term constancy, and 
hence prevents the continuous improvement advocated in the overall philosophy.     
 
8.5.2 The Toyota Way Process model  
The Process model of the Toyota Way refers to various well-known lean tools or 
practices that have been widely adopted on the shop floor. As with the approach used 
in the analysis of the philosophical practices employed by the responding firms, the 
mean value and standard deviation have been calculated for each of the attributes 
identified under the Process model in terms of their implementation and importance. 
The importance values are generally rated comparably highly by the respondents. As 
can be seen from Table 8.5, the mean value of the implementation ranges from 2.86 
to 4.04, whereas the mean value for the importance ranges from 3.55 to 4.46. In the 
case of the implementation, all the practices scored less than 4.0, except for “usage 
of signage to identify layouts, etc.” (P7.3), which was given the highest mean value 
(m = 4.04) among the 38 attributes.  
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Table 8.5 Descriptive statistics of Principle 2-8 practices in terms of the implementation and perceived importance 
Principles and attributes of the Toyota Way Process model 
Implementation Importance 
P-value 
Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank 
P2 One-piece flow   3.45 .844 - 4.06 .787 -  
P2.1 Employee is concerned with waste elimination  3.39 .765 25 4.13 .779 12 .000 
P2.2 Material flow is adhered to consistently throughout the daily work activities 3.28 .822 29 3.90 .835 26 .000 
P2.3 Material, equipment, and other resources are provided in a “just-in-time” manner when needed 3.56 .890 14 4.21 .746 7 .000 
P2.4 Site layout is organized to enhance material flow, employee movement, etc to minimize wastes 
due to movement, motion, travel, etc. 
3.73 .792 6 4.19 .708 9 .000 
P2.5 Strive to cut back to zero the amount of time any work is sitting idle or waiting for someone to 
work on it 
3.29 .850 28 4.00 762 20 .000 
P2.6 Make flow evident through organizational culture  3.46 947 20 3.94 .890 25 .000 
P3 Pull “kanban” system 3.44 .952 - 3.91 .901 -  
P3.1 Materials are ordered as close as possible to exact needs  3.90 .843 4 4.21 .760 7 .000 
P3.2 Strive for possible low level of (even stockless) material inventory in construction site 3.23 .999 32 3.57 1.000 36 .000 
P3.3 Use simple signals – cards, empty bins, etc to monitor the level of inventory and to order the 
needed material/component 
3.11 .967 36 3.66 .957 34 .000 
P3.4 Monitor the quantity of material/component/equipment that the teams actually take away 3.55 1.043 17 4.23 .860 5 .000 
P3.5 Clear job contents, work time, material requirements, among other information are prepared 
before releasing a work task to a crew  
3.43 .910 23 3.88 .926 27 .000 
P4 Heijunka (level out the workload) 3.55 .852 - 3.99 .804 -  
P4.1 Project manager plans the work with input from other parties including subcontractors, clients, 
suppliers, etc.  
3.73 .918 6 4.11 .836 14 .000 
P4.2 Daily work activities are planned to balance material availability, manpower, machine availability,  
and workload between operations 
3.79 .760 5 4.18 .775 10 .000 
P4.3 Foremen (Last Planners) make commitments on what the crews will do each week based on what 
is ready to be done 
3.56 .824 14 4.00 .776 20 .000 
P4.4 Weekly/Daily work assignments are completed in accordance with the weekly/daily schedule 3.46 .851 20 4.12 .774 13 .000 
P4.5 Levelling the daily work activities without overburdening workers and machinery 3.19 .907 33 3.57 .861 36 .000 
P5 Built-in Quality 3.70 .963 - 4.23 .776 -  
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P5.1 Employees are dedicated to provide “built-in” quality into every aspect of operations 3.67 1.020 9 4.32 .779 3 .000 
P5.2 Preventing defective or “no inspection” assignments from entering the next process 3.70 1.014 8 4.43 .695 2 .000 
P5.3 Rejecting defective materials, components and equipment 3.99 .910 2 4.46 .650 1 .000 
P5.4 Employees are encouraged to seek support from their supervisors when something goes wrong 
at work 
3.92 .797 3 4.22 .735 6 .000 
P5.5 Employees are empowered to be responsible for quality 3.67 .920 9 4.18 .829 10 .000 
P5.6 Employees who work in the same team meet on a regular basis to discuss quality problems and 
lessons learned 
3.41 1.082 24 3.98 .867 22 .000 
P5.7 Feedback about quality is routinely given by the employees 3.57 1.000 12 4.04 .879 17 .000 
P6 Standardization 3.34 .995 - 3.77 .916 -  
P6.1 Established standard operating procedures (SOPs) (e.g. work processes) are practised by 
employees for each major operation/process 
3.57 .861 12 4.07 .806 16 .000 
P6.2 Employees play a key role in creating the SOPs  3.34 .911 27 3.67 .897 33 .000 
P6.3 Employees are encouraged to improve the existing SOPs based on their own practical experience 3.35 .981 26 3.77 .955 31 .000 
P6.4 Incorporate employee’s creative improvement of the standard into new SOPs 3.26 1.077 30 3.78 .941 30 .000 
P6.5 Using standardized prefabricated components from offsite shops 3.18 1.145 34 3.55 .980 38 .000 
P7 Visual Management 3.32 1.036 - 3.87 .934 -  
P7.1 Visual aids are adopted to make wastes, problems, and abnormal conditions readily apparent to 
employees. 
2.86 1.053 38 3.62 1.059 35 .000 
P7.2 The posted information in terms of job status, schedule, quality, safety, etc is in place that most 
workers can see it on a daily basis, and it is up-to-date 
3.24 .991 31 3.80 .957 28 .000 
P7.3 Appropriate signages are used to identify layouts, traffic, safety concerns, etc. 4.04 1.004 1 4.27 .792 4 .003 
P7.4 The construction site is kept clean at all times 3.56 .957 14 4.02 .842 19 .000 
P7.5 Employees take pride in keeping the construction site organized and clean. 3.18 1.077 34 3.80 .957 28 .000 
P7.6 The workplace follows the principles of 5-S 3.03 1.131 37 3.68 .997 32 .000 
P8 Use of Reliable Technology 3.53 .946 - 4.01 .911 -  
P8.1 New technology must support the company’s  values 3.55 .957 17 4.10 .928 15 .000 
P8.2 New technology must demonstrate its potential to enhance processes 3.51 .925 19 3.95 .872 24 .000 
P8.3 New technology must be specific solution oriented 3.59 .921 11 4.03 .921 18 .000 
P8.4 New technology must be thoroughly tested  and proven to provide long-term benefits 3.45 .980 22 3.97 .921 23 .000 
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One-piece flow (P2) 
In this category, only P2.4 (m = 3.73) was rated highly in terms of the degree of their 
implementation. It is believed that the site layout is arranged by the main contractor 
and this highly rated attribute indicates that efforts have been put into the planning of 
site layout by the responding firms to enhance the flow of material, manpower, etc. To 
achieve this, visual management tools are helpful and that might explain why attribute 
P7.3, “usage of site signage” was given the highest mean value amongst all the 
attributes in the Process model. The remaining attributes under Principle 2 were 
centred below the average level of the ranking table.   
 
Pull “kanban” system (P3) 
There are five attributes identified in Principle 3 which collectively assess the extent 
to which the pull principle and its associated tools have been implemented. According 
to Table 8.5, it was found that P3.2, “strive for possible low level of material inventory” 
and P3.3, “using simple signals to monitor the level of inventory and to order the 
needed material” were rated as of the least implemented as well as least important 
attributes in this category. This infers that the pull system is not highly appreciated by 
the respondents. Apart from the technical difficulties, it also infers that the responding 
firms used the traditional way of procuring materials in which orders in big batches 
were generated. This might explain the reason why P3.2 was poorly practised. The 
results are consistent with the findings of researchers such as Arbulu et al. (2004), 
who highlighted that the “big batches” mindset is one of the biggest constraints for the 
development of kanban strategy at a construction site. Moreover, P3.1, “materials are 
ordered as close as possible to exact needs” was ranked among the top five most 
implemented practices in the Process model. Logically, if materials are ordered based 
on site needs, it would yield lower level of inventories. This seems to contradict 
attribute P3.2, “strive for low level of inventory in site” as it was ranked at the bottom 
of the ranking table. One possible explanation here could be that the materials in 
P3.1 might refer to the order-to-construction materials (e.g. ready-mixed concrete), 
which is usually placed immediately upon arrival at the jobsite rather than being 
stockpiled.  
 
Heijunka (level out the workload) (P4) 
The principle of heijunka in this research consists of five identified attributes that 
pertain to project scheduling. Efforts have been made to link the LPS to the heijunka 
principle in the earlier chapter as both aim at achieve stability and reliability in the 
workflow. According to Table 8.5, two attributes namely P4.1 and P4.2 were found as 
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being implemented to a larger extent with mean values of 3.73 and 3.79 respectively. 
The former implies that the Chinese project manager would somehow consult with 
other parties in terms of key resources including people, equipment, work space, etc. 
The latter describes that the responding firms are adhering to the rationale of 
planning for daily activities to balance the different available resources. Despite the 
fact that attribute P4.2 was rated highly, it does not mean that reliable construction 
workflow has been achieved by the responding firms. Liker (2004) introduced other 
objectives of heijunka which include muri elimination – overburden or strenuous work. 
Clearly, as Table 8.5 indicates, attribute P4.5, “levelling the daily work activities 
without overburdening workers and machinery” was rated more poorly than other 
attributes in terms of implementation and importance. This infers that the responding 
firms have seemingly made progress on levelling the work by considering the balance 
of various resources, but issues of alleviating overburden of workers and machines 
are presently not taken into account.    
 
Built-in quality (P5) 
From Table 8.5, it can be seen that five of the top 10 most implemented attributes in 
the Process model are actually from Principle 5, which has made it the most 
implemented principle compared to the remaining process-focused principles. Some 
highly implemented attributes include:  
 P5.3, “rejecting defective materials, components, and equipments” (m = 3.99) 
 P5.4, “employees are encouraged to report problems occurred” (m = 3.92) 
 P5.2, “preventing defective or ‘no inspection’ assignments from entering the next 
process” (m = 3.70) 
These three attributes were given mean values of 3.99, 3.92, and 3.70 respectively. It 
implies that the quality management practices have been in place within the 
responding firms. Meanwhile, these attributes have all, in the respondents’ opinions, 
been crucial for improvements in firms’ performance. This is reflected by the mean 
value given to the degree of their perceived importance too (see Table 8.5). However, 
under Principle 5, two relatively less implemented attributes include P5.6, “quality 
problems discussion and lesson learnt” and P5.7, “feedback about quality is routinely 
given by employees”. Both highlight that the quality culture in the responding firms 
has not been fully established, where the employees/frontline workers seem less 
proactive in discussing quality problems and are lacking a “kaizen” mindset to engage 
in meaningful quality improvement activities for continuous improvement. In addition 
to that, the relatively low mean values given to these two were partly due to the 
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pressure of tight schedule that employees’ time was compromised and thus left them 
with limited time for quality control activities. 
 
Standardization (P6) 
Overall, the principle of standardized work (P6) was the second least-implemented 
principle ranked by the respondents, with an average mean value of 3.34. Under this 
category, the most frequently exercised attribute was P6.1, “established standard 
operating procedures (SOPs)”. Given that the nature of individual construction 
projects is very different, it is comforting to see that some Chinese construction firms 
have defined SOPs to some extent upon processes that may be repeated. Apart from 
P6.1, all of the remaining four attributes were given relatively low scores for 
implementation and importance. Judging from the relatively poor ratings of attributes 
P6.2, P6.3, and P6.4, it seems that employees’ involvement in creating and 
implementing SOPs was limited. This is in line with the standardization of work 
methods that was practised in Taylor’s time, or what Adler and Borys (1996) termed 
coercive standardization. This worked in the way that the new SOP was decided by 
management, and the production employees were required to follow it. Worse, 
employee involvement and creation was simply ignored. Lastly, of all the less 
commonly adopted attributes, “using standardized components” (P6.5) was perceived 
as the least-implemented and undervalued. This is understandable, since 
industrialized construction was still in the infancy stage in China, and so the 
standardized components were not typically used. All the findings seem to suggest 
that none of the remaining key elements of standardized work (with the exception of 
SOPs), i.e. bringing in employees in the course of creating and improving 
standardization, and using extensive standardized components are commonly 
practised by the responding firms. The consequences of non-standardized operations 
have been well documented (Liker, 2004; Monden, 1998). Under such work 
conditions, not only would variations be introduced, that could affect product quality, 
but in the long-term, the development of kaizen activities might be severely affected. 
As Imai (1997) has highlighted, standardized tasks are the basis for continuous 
improvement. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the slow adoption of 
standardized work may affect continuous improvement activities conducted among 
the responding firms.  
  
Visual management (P7) 
In terms of the implementation, Table 8.5 indicates that the responding firms have 
dedicated least amount of attention to visual management practices except using 
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appropriate signage to identify layouts, traffic, safety concerns, etc (P7.3). This 
practice was singled out as the most practised individual attribute in the Process 
model. Extensive use of signage is a good practice of visual management on the site. 
A possible explanation for this is on account of the construction related bureau’s 
efforts in passing laws to make it mandatory for firms to provide visual signages (e.g. 
site banners, corporation image, etc) on the site. In contrast, the remaining attributes 
identified in P7 were given relatively low means. These include: 
 P7.5, “take pride in keeping the site organized and clean” (m = 3.18) 
 P7.6, “5-S practice” (m = 3.03) 
 P7.1, “visual aids” (m = 2.86) 
 
This suggests that visual management has not been pervasive among responding 
firms. In fact, expect “appropriate site signages” (P7.3) were rated highly because of 
the mandatory norms; alternative visual aids (P7.1) such as using mistake proofing 
tool to identify abnormal conditions, established boards with critical information at the 
point of need, etc., were rated as being infrequently practised. This infers that visual 
management is used at a superficial level, and it is poorly practised compared to what 
the manufacturing firms have benchmarked. To reiterate, visual management and 5-S 
need to go hand in hand. The ratings of P7.5 and P7.6 highlight that the responding 
firms put limited efforts in practising 5-S. Again, it is probably due to the frontline 
workers who do not take pride in keeping the construction site organized and clean 
(P7.5).  
 
Use of reliable technology (P8) 
Four attributes identified in this principle were given mean values close to 4 in terms 
of its importance. Under this principle, “New technology must support company’s 
value” (P8.1) was rated 1st in importance, followed by principles such as “whether it is 
specific solution oriented” (P8.3), “whether it has long-term benefits” (P8.4), and 
“whether it has potential to enhance the process” (P8.2). Moreover, P8.3 received the 
highest mean value for implementation. These are clear indicators that the Chinese 
construction firms held a moderately pragmatic attitude towards the acceptance of 
new technology. Their primary concern is whether the new technology could help 
solve the existing problem or supports the firm’s value rather than pursue its long-




8.5.3 The Toyota Way People and Partner model  
The People and Partner model involves issues in leadership, training individuals, 
teamwork, motivational strategies, supplier relationships, etc. that may influence the 
process conditions of the working environment, and therefore improve organizational 
performance. Table 8.6 shows the mean values for attributes listed in the People and 
Partner model. The overall mean values of P9, P10, and P11 for implementation are 
3.68, 3.49, and 3.43, respectively.  
 
Table 8.6 Descriptive statistics of Principle 9-11 practices in terms of the 
implementation and perceived importance   
Principles and attributes of the People and 
Partner model 
Implementation Importance P-value 
Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank  
P9 Leaders and leadership (P9) 3.68 .886 - 4.15 .805 -  
P9.1 Leaders are motivated to inspire people 
to achieve goals 
3.49 1.02 15 4.31 .790 1 .000 
P9.2 Leaders must have in-depth job 
knowledge 
3.87 .806 1 4.31 .748 1 .000 
P9.3 Leaders possess teaching ability and 
are able to pass their knowledge on to 
others 
3.45 .887 17 3.95 .872 18 .000 
P9.4 Leaders must support the employees 
doing their work 
3.85 .789 2 4.13 .797 7 .001 
P9.5 Leaders will take time to understand 
problems and root causes before 
acting 
3.76 .826 4 4.15 .765 5 .000 
P9.6 Leaders strongly encourage employees 
to develop “continuous improvement” 
in thinking and action 
3.71 .980 5 4.11 .823 8 .000 
P9.7 Leaders must understand the company 
policy and procedures, and 
communicate these to their team 
3.63 .892 9 4.06 .840 11 .000 
P10 Develop people and promote 
teamwork  
3.49 .997 - 4.05 .899 -  
P10.1 Select the best person for a given job   3.64 .866 8 4.28 .754 3 .000 
P10.2 Training is provided to equip the 
employees with the required skills 
before they are assigned to work 
3.59 .966 11 4.14 .887 6 .000 
P10.3 On-the-job-training is provided to 
further develop employee’s 
exceptional skills 
3.49 .959 15 4.04 .903 13 .000 
P10.4 Employees are cross-trained to 
perform additional functions 
3.13 1.04 23 3.79 .971 19 .000 
P10.5 Training materials are standardized 3.50 1.18 14 4.01 .989 16 .000 
P10.6 Employees are encouraged to 
cooperate with others to complete the 
whole task 
3.62 .963 10 3.99 .898 17 .000 
P10.7 Daily work activities are organized into 
team function 
3.59 .966 11 4.11 .836 8 .000 
P10.8 Internal motivation methods  3.43 .967 20 4.02 .916 15 .000 
P10.9 External motivation methods  3.45 1.07 17 4.07 .942 10 .000 
P11 Respect partners relationships 3.43 .997 - 3.81 .940 -  
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P11.1 Respect partners’ capabilities 3.65 .839 7 4.06 .865 11 .000 
P11.2 Challenge the partners by setting 
collaborative targets 
3.34 1.02 21 3.72 .977 22 .000 
P11.3 Take part in partners’ production 
process 
3.69 .916 6 4.03 .861 14 .000 
P11.4 Work with the partners to improve 
project effectiveness 
3.09 1.22 24 3.63 1.040 23 .000 
P11.5 Work with the partners in various 
areas to develop their technical 
capabilities 
3.09 1.05 24 3.54 .958 25 .000 
P11.6 Share information with partners in a 
structured manner 
3.19 1.04 22 3.62 .963 24 .000 
P11.7 Conduct joint improvement activities 
with partners to solve problems  
3.44 .99 19 3.79 .938 19 .000 
P11.8 Strive to establish a long-term 
relationship with reliable partners 
3.82 .915 3 4.19 .846 4 .000 
P11.9 Limit the number of suppliers  3.53 .985 13 3.74 1.015 21 .008 
  
Leaders and Leadership (P9) 
As Table 8.6 indicates, overall, the attributes listed in Principle 9 have mean values 
below 4 (“moderate” level). Four attributes were placed at the very top ranks in the 
People and Partner model. P9.2 (m = 3.87) is in the first place, then P9.4 (m = 3.85) 
in second place, followed by P9.5 (m = 3.76) and P9.6 (m = 3.71), in the order of 
implementation. This shows that the leaders from the responding firms, possess “in-
depth job knowledge” (P9.2) to a moderate extent,  intend to “provide support to the 
employees while they are doing their work” (P9.4), intend to “take time to understand 
problems and root cause” (P9.5) and “encourage employees to develop a ‘kaizen’ 
mindset in thinking and action” (P9.6). This is reflected in the fact that the Chinese 
building professionals who are in leadership positions do exhibit some of the good 
qualities and abilities that are in line with the Toyota Way-style leadership features. 
With respect to perceived importance, both P9.1 and P9.2, which concern leaders 
capability to “inspire people to achieve goals” and the extent to which leaders must 
“possess in-depth job knowledge” have been assigned the maximum points (m = 
4.31), putting them in the first place on the importance scale in the People and 
Partner model. Furthermore, according to Table 8.6, of all the attributes identified in 
Principle 9, attribute P9.3 “possess teaching ability and pass knowledge on to others” 
which is one key element of leadership, was given a relatively low rating in terms of 
implementation and perceived importance. One interpretation of this low rating is that 
passing in-depth knowledge to followers is not a strength of Chinese leaders, even 
though they are described as technically knowledgeable (P9.1). Together with P9.1, 
“leaders are motivated to inspire people”, which was also poorly rated, the inference 
seems to be that Chinese construction professionals may not view themselves as 
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strong in soft skills such as inspiration to lead, coaching, motivating employees, etc. 
Conversely, visible leadership characteristics such as providing support to employees 
(P9.4) and taking time to understand problems (P9.5) were more highly appreciated 
and practised than the less tangible behaviours just mentioned. Slattery and Sumner 
(2011) explained that this could be due to the dynamics of managing projects within 
the construction industry, in which managers take responsibility to lead the team to 
achieve tangible results.  
 
People management (P10) 
In contrast to the other two principles of the People and Partner model, P10 was 
notably practised poorly, with a mean value of 3.49 for implementation. Under this 
principle, four key practices were assessed, namely personnel selection (P10.1), 
various forms of training (P10.2 – P10.5), teamwork (P10.6 – P10.7), and 
motivational strategies (P10.8 – P10.9). Only the first attribute (P10.1), pertaining to 
personnel selection, was given a relatively high mean value (m = 3.64) as it was 
agreed upon by a majority of the respondents that its importance ought to be stressed. 
The mean values for training, teamwork, and motivational strategies were not high. 
This seems to suggest that the responding firms only focus on the first step of human 
resource management – personnel selection, whereas disproportionally small efforts 
were made in the areas of training, teamwork, and use of appropriate motivational 
strategies. Moreover, all the training opportunities, crossing training (P10.4) was rated 
the least practised and least important attribute, compared to the other two pre-job 
training and on-the-job training (P10.2 and P10.3). One possible explanation for this 
low mean value might be the resistance to multi-skill training of most respondents 
who are in senior management positions and have also specialized in certain 
functions. For this reason, they were less interested in any change that might result 
from multi-skill training. Additionally, multi-skill training demands more resources and 
a greater budget to develop the training plan, and this may discourage 
implementation too, as resources for such investments are normally limited.    
 
Partner relationships (P11) 
The concept of partnership has long been applied among Japanese manufacturing 
firms and has also been promoted through Latham’s (1994) report in the construction 
context. The results pertaining to P11 in Table 8.6 shows that P11.8, “establish long-
term relationships with suppliers” emerged as the top-ranked attribute both in terms of 
implementation and perceived importance. However, it is reasonable to doubt that 
this practice is in fact well implemented by the responding firms. It seems that their 
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efforts are limited to describing the importance of long-term relationships, and do not 
focus on effectively changing behaviour or fostering long-term relationships. The 
conclusion can be drawn since a number of attributes that are associated with long-
term relationships were not highly rated, and are ranked at the bottom. These include: 
 P11.9, “limit the number of suppliers”  (m = 3.53)  
 P 11.6, “share information with partners” (m = 3.19) 
 P11.4,  “collaborate with partners to improve project effectiveness” (m = 3.09) 
 P11.5, “develop partners’ technical capacities” (m = 3.09)  
 
One possible explanation for this behaviour could be the differences between 
manufacturing and construction in terms of supply chain characteristics. The Toyota 
Way integrated its tried and tested suppliers into its so-called “extended enterprise” 
(Liker, 2004), in which the suppliers are given the opportunity to learn Toyota’s 
philosophy and lean production skills. Without these perquisites, this principle can 
hardly be implemented in the construction industry. Apart from very large construction 
firms which do have their own material producing subsidiaries, most construction 
firms need to establish relationships with construction material companies or with 
vendors who only process the construction firm’s order and arrange payment to the 
manufacturer.  As project locations change, it is likely that the relationships with local 
vendors simply terminate. Without establishing sound relationships with 
manufacturing firms, we can expect it to be less likely that construction firms are 
involved in partners’ (e.g. in manufacturing firms) production processes, never mind 
offering assistance to develop their technical capacities. Overall, the poor 
implementation of principle 11 reflects the fact that this could be the structural 
problem of China’s construction industry, where severe competitions prevent 
partnerships in which suppliers or subcontractors are not treated as internal 
customers (refer to P1.9), but as competitors.  
 
8.5.4 The Toyota Way Problem-Solving model 
The Problem-solving model of the Toyota Way consists of three underlying principles: 
genchi genbutsu (P12), decision-making (P13), and kaizen and hansei (P14). These 
three principles represent four different stages of the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) 
philosophy for problem solving. Table 8.7 shows the mean values and standard 
deviations for the problem-solving practices of the large Chinese construction firms 
surveyed. The overall mean values of P12, P13 and P14 for implementation are 3.78, 
3.43, and 3.56 respectively.  
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Table 8.7 Descriptive statistics of Principle 12-14 practices in terms of the 
implementation and perceived importance  
Principles and attributes of the Toyota Way 
Problem-solving model 
Implementation Importance P-
value Mean S.D. Rank Mean S.D. Rank 
P12 Genchi Genbutsu (P12) 3.78 .901  4.07 .804   
P12.1 Solve problem by going to the places 
where problems are discovered 
4.01 .898 1 4.22 .819 1 .005 
P12.2 Analyzing and thoroughly understand 
the situation before making decisions 
3.81 .883 3 4.30 .669 2 .000 
P12.3 Making decisions based on the verified 
data 
3.77 .955 4 4.20 .742 4 .000 
P12.4 Making decisions based on 
management team’s past experiences  
3.65 .839 8 3.63 .961 18 .928 
P12.5 Genchi Genbutsu  has become part of 
the company culture  
3.67 .932 7 3.98 .829 13 .000 
P13 Consensus decision-making (P13) 3.43 .944  3.86 .835   
P13.1 Using appropriate problem-solving 
methodologies (e.g. 5 Whys) to 
determine the root causes of problems 
3.56 1.01 12 3.99 .874 12 .000 
P13.2 Possible experiments are conducted to 
test the potential cause of a problem 
2.99 1.10 19 3.46 .980 19 .000 
P13.3 Broadly consider alternative solutions 3.59 .835 11 3.97 .714 14 .000 
P13.4 Valuing the process through which the 
decision was reached 
3.49 .913 15 3.84 .780 17 .000 
P13.5 Building consensus within the team, 
including employees and outside 
partners 
3.41 .921 17 3.85 .829 16 .000 
P13.6 Addressing the root causes of 
problems via effective communication 
vehicle 
3.55 .887 13 4.07 .833 10 .000 
P14 Kaizen (P14) 3.56 .953  4.10 .882   
P14.1 Reflection on mistakes (e.g. defects, 
rework, safety issues, etc) on a regular 
basis 
3.65 .947 8 4.14 .850 6 .000 
P14.2 Management treats problems as 
development opportunities for 
employees 
3.69 .939 5 4.14 .911 7 .000 
P14.3 Kaizen activities are conducted in your 
workplace 
3.47 .991 16 4.07 .871 11 .000 
P14.4 Management supports the kaizen 
activities 
3.68 .964 6 4.12 .949 8 .000 
P14.5 The improvement will be codified into 
documents and/or policies used by 
organization  
3.06 .925 18 3.89 .873 15 .000 
P14.6 Each hierarchy of the organization 
develops measurable objectives as 
well as actions to support the 
executive-level goals  
3.85 .939 2 4.23 .822 3 .000 
P14.7 Managers are keen on measuring the 
objectives and give feedback 
3.63 .892 10 4.11 .861 9 .000 
P14.8 PDCA methodology is used to solve 
problems 




Genchi Genbutsu (P12) 
Table 8.7 shows a much higher level of certain genchi genbutsu practices than the 
remaining principles in the problem-solving model. These include: 
 P12.1, “going to the place where problems are discovered” (m = 4.01) 
 P12.2, “analyzing the situation before making decisions” (m = 3.81) 
 P12.3, “relied on the verified data”  (m = 3.77) 
Moreover, these three attributes were ranked at the top in terms of their perceived 
importance. The practice of genchi genbutsu is considered to be a valuable quality 
and ability of a leader. This also corresponds to one of the highly rated attributes 
identified in P9, measuring a leader‘s attitude to problem solving (P9.4). It reinforces 
the idea that Chinese building professionals have a serious attitude to deal with 
problems by seeing them at first hand. Furthermore, “making decisions simply 
depends on past experience” (P12.4) is technically not lean behaviour. Although it 
was not highly rated, it can be inferred that mixed approaches were adopted by 
managerial people in the course of making decisions, in which reliable data was also 
consulted. 
 
Consensus decision-making (P13) 
Table 8.7 reveals that practices concerned with decision-making were relatively 
poorly implemented in practice. For example, “possible experiments are conducted to 
test the potential cause of a problem” (P13.2) was rated among the least practiced, 
with a mean value of 2.99. It is understandable that there are few circumstances in 
which experiments need to be performed at the project level. The most common one 
that can be seen at construction sites is conducting routine quality checks on the 
incoming materials. It is particularly true that when a problem is discovered at site, 
where the situation might become so chaotic that time is in short supply, and the 
likelihood of carrying out experiments may be lowered. In addition, other key 
attributes identified in Principle 13 such as “using the 5 whys to determine the root 
cause of problems” (P13.1) and “consider alternative solutions” (P13.3), were only 
moderately adopted by the responding firms. Moreover, it is noteworthy that “building 
consensus within the team” (P13.5) was ranked the second lowest among all the 
attributes under principle 13. This reflects how consensus has not been widely 
adopted, as in some cases employees (e.g. frontline workers) were not allowed to 
participant in the decision-making process. Rather, the project manager and other 
managerial personnel were in favour of the authoritative method, whereby the 
decision was made in a top down manner. Similarly, another low-ranking attribute, 
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P13.4, “valuing the process through which the decision was reached” highlighted the 
way that the entire decision-making process is not undertaken with sufficient attention.  
 
Kaizen or continuous improvement (P14) 
The last principle of the Toyota Way contains several management practices that are 
unique to the Japanese culture, such as reflection (or Hansei in Japanese) (P14.1), 
kaizen (P14.2 – P14.5), policy deployment (P14.6 – P14.7), and the PDCA method 
(P14.8). According to Table 8.7, key element of policy deployment, such as 
“measurable objectives as well as means to support the executive-level goals” 
(P14.6), and kaizen-related practice, such as management “treats problems as 
opportunities” (P14.2) and “support the kaizen activities” (P14.4), were most 
frequently practised by the respondents. Both the highly rated attributes P14.2 and 
P14.4 pertain to management’s role in kaizen, whereas P14.3 and P14.5 which 
require employees’ efforts and participation in kaizen were given low scores. This 
seems to suggest that kaizen is sufficiently recognized among top management, that 
they stressed its importance and put effort into promoting it. However, when it comes 
to the operational level relating to employee participation, the results suggest that the 
penetration was low and the kaizen activities were not effectively conducted in the 
site. Clearly, this is a gap which needs to be filled. It is important to secure 
management commitment in kaizen actives (Imai, 1997; Liker, 2004), and the 
success of kaizen additionally depends on employees’ skills, mindset, and motivation. 
These are the areas that LCCFs need to enhance. Furthermore, it is worth 
mentioning that using the PDCA approach in problem solving (P14.8) was perceived 
as an important management philosophy, but the result suggests that in the actual 
workplace, the use of PDCA to resolve problems was still immature.   
 
8.5.5 The Implementation-Importance Gap 
The above data reveals the status quo at large Chinese construction firms in terms of 
adopting Toyota Way styled practices. With respect to the perceived importance, a 
one-sample t-test comparing the attribute scores with the mid-point (3 = “neutral”) 
was performed, and 99 percent confidence was selected. The t-test showed that 
respondents had positive view towards all of the Toyota Way attributes, and agreed 
that they are all significantly important (p = .000). Moreover, in comparison to the 
measures of the implementation dimension, it is interesting to note that all attribute 
measures in the “perceived importance” dimension are rated comparably higher, with 
the exception of P12.4 (making decisions based on management team’s past 
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experiences), which showed a higher mean score on the implementation dimension 
(m = 3.65) than on the “perceived importance” dimension (m = 3.63). In order to 
ascertain whether there was any significant difference between implementation levels 
and perceived importance, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank two-tailed test was used. This 
non-parametric test for significance between attributes is the most appropriate, as the 
attributes were measured on a Likert-scale (ordinal). One hypothesis was formulated, 
and a 5% level of significance used. To test for a significant difference between the 
practice (P) and the perceived importance (I) for the sample, the following hypotheses 
were formulated: 
a. H0: μP – μI = 0, i.e. there is no difference between the implementation level and 
perceived importance 
b. H1: μP – μI ≠ 0, i.e. there is a significant difference between the implementation 
level and perceived importance 
 
The calculated p-values are shown in the extreme right columns of Tables 8.4 – 8.7. 
As noted, if the significance value is less than .05, there is a significant difference. If 
the significance value is greater than .05, there is no significant difference. With the 
exception of two of the attributes (P12.4 and P1.8), statistically significant differences 
were found between the actual implementation level and the perceived importance. 
This implies that the responding firms were aware of the importance of Toyota Way 
practices, but were not yet fully ready to implement them. One possible explanation 
for this is that since many of the responding firms are in the early stages of 
implementing such a management philosophy in their work, they are not aware of the 
whole spectrum of its implementation. Their lack of understanding of what is needed 
for the implementation of the lean or Toyota Way philosophy might have affected their 
focus and thus their implementation level. Hence, the overall statistical description in 
this section shows that more efforts need to be focused on promoting all aspects of 
the Toyota Way practices within Chinese construction firms. As mentioned earlier, 
two attributes namely P12.4, “decision-making depending on experiences” (p = .928) 
and P1.8, “quick response to clients” (p = .299) were implemented to the same extent 
as they were perceived as important (p > 0.05).  
 
Furthermore, if one normalizes the scales and plots the aggregated responses using 
the median response as the point where the two scales cross, one can examine the 




Figure 8.1 Implementation – Importance Gap (normalized)  
 
From a somewhat linear relationship, where principles that are ranked high in terms 
of implementation are also ranked high in terms of importance. In most cases, the 
Toyota Way principles are centred on two categories of extremes, namely High-High 
and Low-Low. In a few cases, these means cross over into contradiction (High-Low) 
for cases (P2, P10, P8 and P4) that are close to the borderlines. Following the line 
from P7 to P1, it appears that more attention and resources are put into Toyota Way 
P1, P5, and P9, whereas several other principles (such as P6, P7 and P13) are areas 
of less importance and thus less effort is put into their implementation. 
 
Following the discussion above, it is a further challenge that priority needs to be given 
to certain attributes, on account of their low implementation level. To reiterate, since 
the majority of attributes were perceived to be of importance, the limited resources 
and efforts need to be given to those least implemented. Hence, a one-sample t-test 
was also conducted to compare the mean of all the Toyota Way styled attributes, in 
terms of their implementation level, with the mid-point 3 (3 = “somewhat”). It was 
shown in Table 8.8 that of 91 attributes, 15 attributes were found not to be 
significantly implemented, or insignificant efforts were put into implementing these 
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Table 8.8 Descriptive statistics and one-sample t-test of Toyota way attributes in 
terms of implementation 
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Note: a p > 0.01, b p > 0.05 
 
8.6 Relating the Toyota Way practices and project performance   
Project performance has been assessed according to different indicators (see Table 
8.9). In general, the responding firms evaluated their results higher than the 
performance of their competitors. The highest scores are allocated to clients’ 
satisfaction (m = 3.98), followed by project quality (m = 3.87) and project delivery time 
(m = 3.72). On the contrary, profitability (m = 3.59) and productivity (m = 3.63) are 
rated the lowest. All these indicators are what the Toyota Way model endeavours to 
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improve at the shop floor. It implies that there is much room for improvement in these 
areas if Toyota Way principles could be implemented.  
 
Table 8.9 Descriptive statistics of performance indicators  
Qualitative performance measures Mean S.D 
Profitability 3.59 .811 
Productivity  3.63 .762 
Quality  3.87 .765 
Delivery time 3.72 .739 
Client satisfaction 3.98 .703 
 
The performance indicators used in this study were chosen on the basis that in the 
literature, it has been reported that the application of lean could enhance 
performance in these areas (see section 3.4.5). Admittedly, the measurement of 
these performance indicators is, however, not as strong in a Likert scale, which has 
been criticized as being subjective. Nevertheless, as Whitelaw (1969, p.51) has 
noted, ”it is better to have a less-than-perfect standard, the shortcomings of which are 
known, than to have no standards at all.” Investigating the relationship between the 
Toyota Way practices and project performance can at least provide a snapshot of 
what the relationships are between the two domains in the Chinese construction firms. 
To assess the relationship between various practises of the Toyota Way and project 
performance (e.g. quality, productivity, profitability, and so on), Spearman’s rho 
correlation analysis was performed. Again, due to the ordinal nature of data, 
Spearman’s rho correlation is regarded as the most appropriate to measuring the 
strength and direction of the linear relationship between the pair of variables. The 
level of significance was set at p < 0.01. When p < 0.01, the conclusion is that there is 
a significant correlation. When p > 0.01, there is no significant correlation between the 
two variables. The results of the correlation analysis are shown in Table 8.10. As 
expected, all correlation coefficients are positive. This indicates that better 
performance is associated with more extensive use of the Toyota Way principles. 
Most coefficients are highly significant at p < 0.01 (with**). It is worth mentioning that 
the correlation coefficients between the Toyota Way principles and productivity and 
quality measures are relatively higher than the other correlation coefficients.    
 
By examining the individual correlations from Table 8.10, one can observe that 6 out 
of possible 70 correlations between the Toyota Way principles and the performance 
measures are above 0.5. These are denoted as high correlation (H). Each of these 
six highest correlations is between quality performance (Q) and one of the following 
Toyota Way principles: 
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 P11 – supplier management (r = .584, p < 0.01) 
 P7 – visual management (r = .583, p < 0.01) 
 P5 – built-in quality (r = .529, p < 0.01) 
 P10 – employee management (r = .527, p < 0.01) 
 P9 – leadership (r = .509, p < 0.01) 
 P14  – Kaizen (r = .501, p < 0.01) 
 
Additionally, correlation coefficients between 0.3 and 0.5 are denoted as medium (M), 
while correlation coefficients below 0.3 are classified as low (L). This classification 
should help to develop an overall portrayal of the various Toyota principles correlating 
to the performance measures. In contrast, among the 70 possible correlations, the 
Pull kanban system (P3) is found to be insignificantly correlated with client 
satisfaction (r = .189, p = .68), while Genchi Genbutsu (P12) exhibits an insignificant 
association with profitability (r = .15, p = .152). It is worth noting that these are the 
only two correlation coefficients below 0.2 whose p-values are greater than 0.05.  
 
8.6.1 The Toyota Way Philosophy model  
The effects of the implementation of principle 1 on all the performance indicators are 
statistically significant. Of all the associated performance indicators, the most 
significant correlations are with quality (r = .496, p < 0.01), followed by client 
satisfaction (r = .485, p < 0.01). A closer examination of the correlations of 9 
attributes and performance indicators (see Appendix 3) shows that P1.4, “short-term 
losses affect decision-making, but are less important than pursuing long-term goals”, 
was found not to be significantly correlated with client satisfaction. It was 
understandable that decisions that potentially cause short-term financial losses would 
affect client satisfaction. Overall, each of these significant correlations indicates that 
firms which put more effort into principle 1 practices were more likely to achieve 
better performance. 
 
8.6.2 The Toyota Way Process model  
As is evident from Table 8.10, all the seven principles that underlie the Toyota Way 
Process model are statistically significant in their correlations with all six performance 
measures, expect for P3 and client satisfaction. This correlation of several Toyota 
Way Process principles and (project) performance measures contains a number of 
surprises. First, it seems that the magnitude of the correlation coefficient of both the 
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Pull kanban system (P3) and the adoption of reliable technology (P8) is small in 
association with most performance measures.   
 
In the case of P3, there is a significant correlation coefficient with delivery time (r 
= .238) and with profitability (r = .211), even though its magnitude is classified as low. 
Moreover, P3 does not have a significant correlation with client satisfaction (r = .189, 
p > 0.05). This suggests that putting more effort in pull system in terms of managing 
materials can increase various aspects of project performance, but has virtually no 
impact on client satisfaction. Greater understanding can be gained if the relationship 
between operationalized pull attributes and performance measures are further 
analysed (see Appendix 3). For example, one operationalized pull practice, “materials 
are ordered as close as possible to exact needs” (P3.1) is found to be statistically 
insignificant with all the performance indicators but profitability (r = .274). Another pull 
practice, “achieve as low a level of inventory as possible” (P3.2) is found not to be 
significantly correlated with the increase in all the performance measures. 
Theoretically, a pull system is often credited with facilitating a faster work-flow and 
faster project completion, through using JIT material delivery based on actual 
demand. However, the insignificant correlations in P3 suggest that the effort devoted 
to using the pull system in minimizing the site inventory (P3.2) does not contribute to 
higher client satisfaction, faster delivery time, or better profit in the Chinese 
construction context. This result may also suggest that the survey participants have 
limited knowledge of using kanban to control material. A possible explanation is that 
high levels of commitment to implementing the pull system with the hope of reducing 
on-site inventory may suffer from potential risks, including late delivery by the 
suppliers, materials going out of stock, and so on. All of these will result in 
unnecessary project delay and client unhappiness. Moreover, given the increasing 
logistical costs, as well as the fluctuating material market, it is entirely understandable 
that the pull practices such as P3.2, P3.3, and P3.4 would put construction firms in a 
position where they suffer from financial loss if the materials are purchased at the 
time when the price is at its peaks. 
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Table 8.10 Correlations between the use of the Toyota Way practices and project performance measures  
 Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time Client satisfactory 
Average 
correlation 
The Toyota Way Philosophy model       











The Toyota Way Process model       



















(L) .189 (p = .068) .26 

























































The Toyota Way People and Partner model       

































The Toyota Way Problem-solving model       







*   
(L) .30 























** denotes the correlation is significant at the 0.01 level;  
* denotes the correlation is significant at the 0.05 level;  
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Moreover, P8 is another principle that has relatively low correlation coefficient to all 
performance measures. Similar to the pull kanban system (P3), P8 is found to have a 
small correlation coefficient but is significantly associated with client satisfaction (r 
= .262), project delivery time (r = .224), and profitability (r = .285). This suggests that, 
for specific performance measures such as client satisfaction, project delivery, etc., 
the influence of adopting reliable new technology may operate in an indirect manner. 
One possible explanation is that clients may not be satisfied to see their own projects 
employing new technology, which may require high initial investments, even if it is 
shown to be reliable. In most cases, the client is the one who needs to pay for all the 
purchase of the technology. Furthermore, operationalized attributes under this 
category, such as (P8.2) “new technology must demonstrate its potential to enhance 
processes” is found to be insignificantly correlated with project delivery time (r = .149, 
p > 0.05) and client satisfaction (r = .262, p > 0.05). This may suggest that Chinese 
clients, who tend to be more results-oriented, usually lack the patience to see the 
potentials of technology that would add value to project. Moreover, the adoption of 
new technology may affect project delivery as it demands a necessary learning 
process for people to master the utilization of the new technology.  
 
Additionally, both P6 and P7, which are rated the least implemented Toyota Way 
principles, and thus fall in the Low-Low (low implementation, low importance) 
quadrant in Figure 8.1, are surprisingly found to be strongly and significantly 
associated with various performance measures. Profitability (r = .385) has the largest 
correlation coefficient with P6, whereas quality (r = .583) and client satisfaction (r 
= .483) have the largest correlation coefficient with P7. It is worth noting that visual 
management (P7) is a multi-variable that contains various useful visual aids (P7.1) 
which in many areas can be used to identify abnormal features and defects. For 
example, thanks to visual tools like andon, poka-yoke, etc., which are regarded as the 
primary approaches to exposing non-conformance to operatives (Monden, 1998; 
Liker, 2004), it seems that quality defects could be prevented at an early stage. Apart 
from the use of andon and poka-yoke, 5-S practice (P7.4-P7.6) is found to be 
positively and significantly associated with all the performance measures. This 
suggests that by keeping the workplace clean and tidy, the client can be more 
satisfied.  
 
The remaining Toyota Way practices in the Process model also offer insights into 
project performance. The principle of the employees building in quality (P5), for 
example, is less significantly correlated with all performance measures except for 
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quality performance (r = .529). The correlation coefficients for all the operationalized 
practices listed in P5 are positive and statistically significant for quality performance. 
P5.3, “rejecting defective materials, components and equipment” has the largest 
coefficient (r = .504) and is significant. This is followed by P5.1 (r = .497) and P5.2 (r 
= .450) in that order. These indicate that proactive quality programmes, processes, 
and procedures do increase quality. In other words, these efforts build quality in. 
Conversely, except for quality performance, the potential influence of P5 appears to 
have moderate or weak associations with the remaining performance measures, such 
as productivity and profitability, in the short-run. More specifically, it was found that 
P5.7, “feedback about quality given by the employees” and P5.6, “employees meet 
regularly to discuss quality problems” are not significantly correlated with delivery 
time and with client satisfaction. It seems logical then, that if defects and rework due 
to quality problems become extensive, delivery time and client satisfaction would then 
be adversely impacted.  
 
8.6.3 The Toyota Way People and Partner model  
All the three underlying principles in the People and Partner model are significantly 
and positively associated with all the performance measures, in particular, quality, 
which has the largest correlation coefficient with P9, P10, and P11.  
 
In the case of leaders and leadership (P9), the results indicate that project quality and 
productivity are significantly correlated positively with all the features of leaders’ 
behaviour and leadership skills. One possible explanation for this is that when 
employees are working in a team where everyone is motivated to think and act with 
“kaizen” thinking (P9.6), the leaders are helpful in interpreting the policy and 
procedures from the firm level (P9.7), etc. They could improve their abilities to 
become more quality-oriented and to take on more responsibilities. All these may in 
turn improve project quality and productivity. Moreover, even though “leaders 
possess teaching ability and are able to pass their knowledge to others” (P9.6) was 
rated as a poorly implemented practice, the results indicate that a significant positive 
correlation can be found between P9.6 and all the performance measures. This might 
be explained by the fact that this practice is perhaps the most effective way to 
enhance employees’ abilities, which in turn benefits the projects themselves in 




Similarly, as noted from the results, quality performance is found to have significant 
and positive correlations with all the features and practices identified in employee 
management (P10). It is understandable that when individuals are selected through 
high-standard and quality-selection processes, and are giving training that goes far 
beyond simple teaching, but also includes problem solving techniques, problem 
analysis, and work within a team environment, that all of these elements could act to 
improve the employee’s skills in building-in quality when performing their jobs. 
Moreover, there is a positive but insignificant correlation between profitability and a 
number of employee management practices, including P10.2, P10.3, P10.4, P10.5, 
and P10.7. This seems to suggest that various kinds of training do not actually 
improve project profitability. A possible explanation for this might be that current 
housing methods are so mature that training could be regarded as ineffective.  
 
Lastly, as can be seen from the results, it is worth mentioning the relative impact that 
these operationalized practices have on project performance measures. All the 
supplier-relationship practices are positively correlated with almost all the 
performance measures, particularly with quality. In the meantime, the correlations of 
P11.7 (r = .201) and P11.8 (r = .149) with delivery time are found to be positive but 
not significant (p > 0.05). One possible explanation is that joint-improvement 
approaches to problem-solving involving partners may enhance quality while also 
affecting the delivery time negatively, if consensus is not quickly reached. Likewise, 
P11.1 to P11.4 are found to be significantly correlated with quality performance (r > 
0.5). This suggests that project quality is likely to improve when firms show more 
respect for their partners’ capabilities (P11.1), when more challenges are given to 
suppliers in terms of collaborative targets (P11.2), when more active participation is 
taken in their working  process (P11.3), and when more opportunities are given to 
collaboratively work together (P11.4) arise. 
 
8.6.4 The Toyota Way Problem-solving model  
In Table 8.10, project performance measures are examined in their relationships to 
three specific principles underlying the Toyota Way problem-solving model, namely 
P12, P13, and P14. For all the correlation measures listed, only one correlation 
coefficient between quality performance and kaizen (P14) is found to be greater 
than .05. When firms are dedicated in kaizen activities, Imai (1997) found that there is 
an improvement in the quality of work. In contrast, the principle of genchi genbutsu 
(P12) is found to be insignificantly associated with profitability (r = .15, p > 0.05). First 
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of all, P12.4, “decision making based on management past experience”, has a 
negative coefficient (r = -.043) and is insignificant (p > 0.05). Secondly, P12.1 and 
P12.3 have positive but insignificant coefficients. This suggests that several genchi 
genbutsu practices do not impact profitability with any degree of statistical 
significance.  
 
8.7 Hindrances to implementing Toyota Way practices  
Certain barriers exist to the successful implementation of the Toyota Way in 
construction. Understanding this and the use of appropriate strategies to overcome 
these barriers should increase the chances of the Toyota Way being successfully 
implemented. A number of these barriers have been reported in the literature review, 
but may not be limited to the area of lean construction. This section examines the 
extent to which this list of factors can be considered as the hindrances to 
implementation. Table 8.11 presents responses to the question concerning 
hindrances between “premier” and “first-grade” Chinese construction firms. The 
higher the mean, the greater the importance of the hindrance. It can be seen from 
Table 8.11 that all listed hindrances in both groups received a mean value greater 
than 3.0, which implies that these items are somewhat hindering them from 
implementing Toyota Way-style practices. 
 
No matter what group the respondents belong to, the most significant barriers that 
can be ascertained from the rank are H1, “Lack of a long-term philosophy”; H2, 
“absence of a ‘lean’ culture in the organization”; and H6, “multi-layers subcontracting”. 
Clearly, these three items appear to be of central concern to Chinese building 
professionals and need to be addressed at an organizational level. Establishing a 
long-term philosophy and forming a lean culture are of paramount importance for 
firms embarking on the lean journey. These might seem abstract, but they serve as 
powerful guiding principles for firms in this changing world. As the hierarchical Toyota 
Way model implies, the cornerstone of this is possession of a long-term philosophy. 
Moreover, without a stable lean culture, initiatives such as genchi genbutsu, built-in 
quality, and others will remain empty promises. In the context of China’s construction 
industry, the ranking infers that the two groups of respondents recognized the 
importance of these two philosophical elements but yet were still found to be lacking. 
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Table 8.11 Ranking of hindrances to implementing the Toyota Way Principles in China 
Hindrances 






 Ranking Mean 
a
 Ranking Mean 
a
 Ranking 
H1: Lack of a long term philosophy 3.84 1 3.81 2 3.84 1 .202 
H2: Absence of a “lean” culture in the organization  3.81 2 3.85 1 3.81 2 .127 
H3: Limited use of design and build procurement mode 3.21 23 3.26 20 3.21 22 .063 
H4: Construction firm’s limited involvement in the design stage 3.21 23 3.20 22 3.21 22 .001 
H5: Foremen’s (last planner) insufficient knowledge on project planning  3.59 11 3.33 19 3.59 10 10.72* 
H6: Multi-layers subcontracting 3.81 2 3.78 3 3.81 2 .891 
H7: Limited use of off-site construction techniques (e.g. prefabrication) 3.23 22 3.22 21 3.19 24 .015 
H8: Lack of project management skills (e.g. leadership skills, problem solving skills, etc.) 3.77 4 3.65 6 3.69 5 .284 
H9: Lack of support from the top management 3.75 5 3.65 6 3.71 4 .967 
H10: Frequent turnover of workforce 3.66 9 3.65 6 3.62 9 .089 
H11: Insufficient training  3.67 8 3.67 5 3.63 8 .037 
H12: Employee’s resistance to change 3.31 21 3.35 18 3.28 21 .381 
H13: Management’s resistance to change 3.68 6 3.78 4 3.64 6 1.34 
H14: Employee’s tolerance for an untidy or disorganized workplace 3.40 18 3.20 22 3.36 18 4.03* 
H15: Absence of a “lean” culture in the extended network of partners  3.47 16 3.43 13 3.39 16 .231 
H16: Unhealthy competition among suppliers 3.52 14 3.41 14 3.48 14 1.32 
H17: Inadequate delivery performance  3.60 10 3.50 11 3.56 11 1.55 
H18: Hierarchies in the organizational structure 3.33 20 3.17 24 3.30 20 3.98* 
H19: Financial constraints 3.68 6 3.63 9 3.64 6 .096 
H20: Less personal empowerment 3.39 19 3.37 17 3.35 19 .002 
H21: Avoid making decisions and take responsibility 3.54 13 3.44 12 3.50 13 1.12 
H22: Using “guan xi” or relationships to conceal mistakes/errors 3.56 12 3.56 10 3.52 12 .011 
H23: Stringent requirements and approvals 3.47 16 3.41 14 3.39 16 .204 
H24: Lack of support from the government  3.49 15 3.41 14 3.46 15 .582 
Note: 
a 
All the listed hindrance was scored from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating not a hindrance, to 5 a very important hindrance. * p < 0.05. 
b
 Kruskal-Wallis H-values have been reported for all hindrance.  
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Furthermore, “multi-layers subcontracting” (H3) was among the top 3 most significant 
barriers. Given that multi-layered subcontracting is not uncommon in China’s 
construction industry, the problem is that multi-layered subcontractors may have 
different company culture and different business philosophies. This suggests that it 
might be a challenge to implement the Toyota Way or lean principles, unless the 
subcontractors align their firm culture to the general contractor. Moreover, given their 
relatively high rankings, the barriers “Lack of support from the top management” (H9) 
and “Management’s resistance to change” (H13) were also found to be significant 
obstacles for Chinese construction firms. On the other hand, it is surprising to note 
that the two groups of respondents rated “limited use of off-site construction 
technique” (H7) and “limited use of design and build procurement” (H3) as 
insignificant hindrances. Arguably, lean practices such as just-in-time, built-in quality 
(jidoka), one-piece flow, etc. could be more adaptive to the prefabricated environment, 
which shares much similarity with the manufacturing setting. In countries like 
Singapore and Japan, as well as in the Nordic countries where tremendous efforts 
have been made in promoting greater use of off-site fabrication, construction sites 
have increasingly become places where the various parts of buildings are assembled. 
However, the low-ranking of this hindrance implies that the majority of construction 
projects in China still operate in a conventional way, where off-site fabrication 
techniques have not yet been commonly adopted. Furthermore, with respect to 
design and build procurement, Johansen and Walter (2007) outlined that the lack of 
integration between design and construction is a sign of the early stage of lean 
construction. They argued that traditional procurement forms do not facilitate lean 
approaches to project planning and execution. In contrast, this poorly ranked H7 
seems to suggest that design and build procurement is not commonly adopted in 
China’s construction industry. 
 
Since the data are ordinal and the responses may not naturally distribute, non-
parametric tests have been used in the analysis. Table 8.11 also has a bearing on the 
last research objective, concerning the extent to which premier and first-grade 
construction firms (two groups) in China perceive hindrances. As the Kruskal-Wallis 
H-value indicates, for most factors listed in Table 8.11, there were statistically 
insignificant differences between the two groups. However the difference between the 
two groups’ perception of H5, H14, and H18 was statistically significant (at α = .05 
level of significance). In the case where the foreman was insufficiently capable in 
planning (H5), the premier construction firms believed that their foreman’s planning 
ability was relatively better, and so they see this factor as a less significant hindrance. 
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Other outstanding disparities can be found in the way that respondents viewed 
organizational structure (H17) as well as employees’ tolerance for an untidy 
workplace (H14). The literature review highlighted how hierarchical structure, along 
with a top-down leadership style, is one of the many culture barriers that cause lean 
initiatives to fail. It was surprising to see that premier construction firms did not see 
this factor as a significant hindrance to the implementation of the Toyota Way, and 
have ranked it at the bottom. This seems to imply that, even though the organization 
structures in the responding firms were hierarchical in nature, management practises 
“servant” leadership that is intended to facilitate lean initiatives. In the case of H14, it 
is implied that the premier construction firms perceived their employees as having 
less tolerance for an untidy workplace compared to their counterparts from the first-
grade firms, thus they will be more willing to practice housekeeping on the site.  
 
8.8 Summary 
This chapter presents the results of the questionnaire survey. The questionnaire 
survey investigated the responses of building professionals in large Chinese 
construction firms to questions relating to the importance of attributes derived from 
the Toyota Way model, as well as to the current status of implementation in their 
firms. The results indicated that there is positive acknowledgement among the 
respondents as to the importance of the various attributes. The results also 
highlighted that large Chinese construction firms seem to have implemented Toyota 
Way practices rather unevenly, which implies that they have both strong and weak 
capacities in adopting different practices of the Toyota Way. The result of this is that 
significant differences were found between the actual implementation level and their 
corresponding perceived importance. The reasons behind this will be explored in the 
following interview stage. In addition, with respect to the impact of the implementation 
of Toyota Way practices on project performance, the survey pointed to strong positive 
correlations between implementation of the Toyota Way principles and performance 
measures, except that the pull system was found to be insignificantly correlated with 
client satisfaction, and genchi genbutsu exhibited an insignificant association with 
profitability. The last part of the questionnaire survey is concerned with possible 
obstacles hindering implementation of the Toyota Way, and its findings have several 
important implications for managers. For example, they confirmed the widely held 
view that successful implementation of the Toyota Way in the Chinese context is 
found among firms possessing a long-term philosophy and a “lean” culture. Without a 
culture shift to embrace a long-term philosophical statement, and without a culture of 
commitment, little is likely to be achieved by Toyota Way implementation.  
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9 INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
9.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the interview findings to explore in more depth the survey 
questionnaire responses that concern the extent to which the Toyota Way practices 
have been practised. Interviews allow a detailed investigation of each interviewee’s 
perspective to gain an in-depth understanding, for example, of their perceptions on 
the adoption of the Toyota Way-style practices in China’s construction industry. For 
some practices not yet implemented, the interviews also seek to understand the 
barriers to their implementation. It should be noted that the purpose of the interviews 
was not to validate the framework but to supplement the survey findings present in 
the preceding chapter. 
 
9.2 Data Collection  
The data collection method involved multiple interviews using a questionnaire. 
Multiple interviews of key participants were conducted in 16 firms over a period of two 
months (from March to May, 2011). It hoped to provide rich source of data to 
determine whether there is a practical approach that the Toyota Way principles could 
be implemented. The interviewees were selected from the earlier participants who 
showed keen interests in the questionnaire survey. The interviews, which took 
approximately one and a half hour, were conducted at two main venues namely 
interviewees’ site offices and the head offices. The interview coverage is summarized 
in Table 9.1. It comprises 17 site staff (e.g. project managers and engineers) and 10 
management staff (managing directors, deputy managers, and vice president).  
 
All the questions were read out by the researcher from a written form (see Appendix 4) 
and their replies were recorded. After some background questions about the firm, 
their working experience and their overall understandings of “lean”, the topic of the 
Toyota Way model was then introduced. The interviewees were first asked, based on 
their recent projects or past experiences, how each underlying principles of the 
Toyota Way can be implemented in the context of China’s construction industry. Of 
particular interest was to understand if any barriers or opportunities can affect or 
facilitate the implementation process.   
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Table 9.1 Profile of the interviewees and their companies  
Code 
Designation 
(Years of working experience) 
Grade Ownership Location 
A* 1 Project Manager (8) Premier SOE Beijing 
B* 1 Engineer-in-Charge (5) Premier SOE Beijing 
C* 
1 Engineer-in-Charge (7) 
1 Site Engineer (5) 
1 Commercial Manager (10) 
Premier SOE Shanghai 
D 







Premier SOE Wuhan 
E 












 of Engineering Management 
Department (16) 
1 Project Manager* (6) 
Premier SOE Shanghai 
G
#
 1 Vice President (20) Premier SOE Beijing 
H
#
 1 Manager (16) One SOE Beijing 
I
#
 1 Regional Manager (12) Premier SOE Beijing 
J* 1 Project Manager (13) One Private Shanghai 
K
#
 1 Vice President (26) Premier SOE Nanjing 
L* 1 Site Engineer (5) Premier SOE Wuhan 
M* 1 Project Manager (8) Premier Private Zhejiang 
N* 
2 Project Manager (15|7) 
2 Site Engineers (4|2) 
Premier Private Zhejiang 
O* 
1 Site Engineer (4) 
1 Quality Engineer (6) 
Premier SOE Zhejiang 
P* 1 Project Manager (20) Premier SOE Zhejiang 
Note: 27 interviewees in total.  
* denote the interviews were conducted at project site.  
# denotes that the interviews were conducted at firm office. 
 
9.3 Interview Results  
9.3.1 Understanding lean or Toyota Way-style practices  
In brief, the questionnaire survey found that operationalized Toyota Way-styled 
practices have not yet been effectively implemented by the large Chinese 
construction firms (see Chapter 8). Even though there were only a small number of 
interviewees who stated that they have heard of the term “lean” or components of the 
lean approach, such as just-in-time (JIT), quality control, etc., a consensus can 
nevertheless be found on the term “lean management” (“精细化管理” or “Jing xi hua 
guan li”) which has the opposite meaning of “extensive management”. Lean 
management, highlighted by several interviewees, was seen as a management 
approach that requires efforts in planning details, processes, groundwork, execution, 
performance (e.g. quality, cost, time) and continuous improvement. Not surprisingly, 
these have usually been ignored by most practitioners. To be more specific, several 
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responding firms stated that attempts were previously made at introducing several 
new initiatives related to lean principles, including: 
(1) Tight control and meticulous planning on work plans (e.g. Firms F, G, K) 
(2) Making reliable work schedules through diligent coordination between trades (e.g. 
Firms C and I) 
(3) Enhancing the coordination between design and construction in the early stages 
(e.g. Firm D) 
(4) Just-in-time delivery for certain materials (e.g. Firms D and L) 
 
It can be concluded that the term “lean” was interpreted and implemented differently 
by responding firms. This seems to be implied when several senior interviewees have 
some knowledge about lean processes, but these tend to be process-focused 
initiatives rather than a holistic philosophy. Their perceptions of “leanness” fell into the 
first type of lean model identified by Green and May (2005), in which the elimination 
of inefficiencies is set as a priority and which involves various lean production tools. 
Only a few interviewees (e.g. from Firms F and P) mentioned the role of people in the 
implementation of lean approaches. One project manager from Firm P spoke about 
the missing link in implementing any new initiatives, including lean. He stated that: 
 
“They (construction workers) are the most critical element in successful 
implementation of lean or Toyota Way-styled practices. However, Chinese 
construction workers are extremely undervalued in terms of their social status, 
their pays, etc. Their turnover is high. In circumstances like this, it is difficult to 
implement lean.” 
 
In addition to the limited focus on people, industry-specific challenges, such as the 
lack of a supporting environment, also make the task of lean implementation more 
complex and challenging. One project engineer from Firm C added that:  
 
“It is almost impossible if only one party (e.g. the construction firm) determines to 
embark on the lean journey. That construction firm will soon give up. This is 
because lean is about working in a different way that all the involved parties need 
to understand and agree on accordingly. In another word, all the parties (e.g. 
clients, subcontractors, etc) involved in one project should collaboratively 
implement lean, or the desired benefits can hardly be achieved.” 
 
Furthermore, respondents from different type of firms hold different perceptions of 
lean or Toyota Way practices. Those from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) appeared 
to have more knowledge of lean practices, whereas their counterparts from the 
private sector were equipped with less knowledge.  
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9.3.2 Long-term philosophy 
The earlier questionnaire survey relating to the assessment of long-term philosophy 
implementation revealed that Chinese construction firms appreciate these values and 
philosophies, and had implemented some of these practices to significant extent. The 
interview findings reinforced these survey findings, including that these philosophical 
guidelines are not new to large Chinese construction firms.  
  
Sense of constant purpose 
Interviewees noted that, in most cases, constant purpose pertains to their firms’ 
visions, missions, and values, all of which were explicitly highlighted on their firms’ 
websites. One deputy manager from Firm F spoke about how the historical events 
that the firm had experienced would in turn have influenced the firm. He stated that: 
 
“Constant purpose concerns who we are. Our firm was founded with a military 
background and this has been around for a long time. The high quality of military 
norms and conducts were maintained and encouraged by our leadership to apply 
in our daily work. I believe the firm, as well as the employees, have benefited from 
such norms and codes, which later became our constant purpose.” 
 
Be self-reliant and responsible 
In the same way that Toyota takes responsibility for car owners, society, the 
environment, etc., the responding firms that were interviewed also uphold similar 
responsibilities in many areas. To be responsible for the construction quality, for 
decisions made in the bidding, and for employees’ health and safety, to name a few, 
are all considered important. For example, Firm B is one of the few firms that 
addresses the issue of being responsible in terms of what it promised in the bidding 
proposal. One engineer from Firm B highlighted that: 
 
“Since the bidding process is very competitive in China, some bidders deliberately 
squeeze the timeline to win the project.  We assure the client that the project will 
be completed on time, based on what we promised in the bidding stage. This 
shows our responsibility.” 
 
With respect to the issue of self-reliance, a large number of responding firms know 
what their core competencies are and what key technologies they possess. For 
example, Firm D specialises in airport work nationwide, now actively sought 





“We have built several airports both in the domestic market and outside China. I 
am confident that we are the leaders in this area.” 
 
Additionally, Firms I, K and L are construction engineering firms with a strong 
engineering focus, and specialising in steel-structure buildings, nuclear power plant 
projects, and infrastructure projects, respectively. Each firm has its own research and 
development institutions to support their businesses and to enhance their technical 
know-how. Because of their rich experiences accumulated and cutting-edge 
technologies acquired from their in-house research and development department, 
they have become very successful in China.  
 
Long-term perspective 
In the interviews, most firms acknowledged that it is not easy to do business in 
China’s construction industry with complete focus on the long-term perspective. This 
is unlike business in the Toyota Way which is not about making a single profitable 
deal, but is about building long-term relationships with business partners, customers, 
and employees (Liker, 2004). The Chinese construction industry has many short-
sighted players, so much so that some firms have to follow similar practices. This was 
reflected by several interviewees that money is important and perhaps the most 
important aspect of managing a firm or a project. For example, one project manager 
from a large private construction firm (Firm J) revealed that it is common among 
private firms to tend to be more short-sighted in this regard. This is because private 
firms in China’s construction industry are cost sensitive, and therefore place greater 
emphasis on cost control. With such a mindset, it is less likely that they can see a big 
picture from a long-term perspective. This attitude was viewed as one of the major 
problems that affected the Chinese construction firms in developing their employees, 
fostering relationships with suppliers and others.  
 
Client (customer) focus 
A majority of interviewees agreed that client focus was one of their chief priorities in 
the project. Here client focus was interpreted to mean meeting the client’s 
requirement by adding value to the project. This perhaps explains the reason why 
P1.8, “be able to rapidly respond to clients” emerged as a high-order attribute in the 
questionnaire survey (see Chapter 8). From the collective replies, several means 
were mentioned that could be adopted to add possible values to the project as well as 
to enhance clients’ satisfaction. These include: 
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(1) Cost minimization: this can be applied during various phases of a project. When 
applied earlier, such as at the bidding stage, tools including value engineering, 
process optimization and others, can be used to identify opportunities that may be 
associated with cost deduction. Responsible contractors will not propose cost-
cutting ideas that they cannot promise. When applied during project execution, 
one regional manager from Firm I spoke about standing in the client’s shoes, as a 
way to look at opportunities to minimize cost. For example:  
 
 “We understand the fact that the client is sensitive to cost, and therefore 
always look at the cost issue from their perspectives. That encourages us to 
advise the client various ways of how to reduce project costs. For instance, we 
can advise the client which materials could be replaced by others of equivalent 
quality but much cheaper.” 
 
(2) Speedy completion: there seems to be an emerging trend that timely completion 
is becoming clients’ primary concern. To assure the clients that their projects can 
be delivered on time, some interviewees mentioned that their project team should 
be more responsive when the projects were slipping behind schedule. 
Responsiveness is measured by the speed with which the construction firm could 
get the project back on track, as well as the extent to which the construction firms 
were willing to invest in more resources. 
(3) Quality improvement: a majority of the firms interviewed focused on the quality of 
project. For example, one project manager from Firm A highlighted how his firm 
was in the middle of a transition as the emphasis was becoming less “product-
oriented” and more "process-oriented”. One reason for the introduction of the 
“process-oriented” philosophy was that the leadership realized that only the right 
process can yield the quality product and that can further enhance the client 
satisfaction.  
 
9.3.3 Process-related practices  
Open-ended questions during interviews were asked to understand practices which 
the firms interviewed could adopt in order to implement the underlying principles of 
the Toyota Way Process model from their experience or relevant projects. 
Correspondingly, questions in this section covered the areas of uninterrupted 
workflow, material planning system, (built-in) quality control, planning and scheduling, 




9.3.3.1 One-piece flow (P2) 
One-piece flow is concerned with eliminating the waste or non-value adding activities 
that would result in disrupting the flow or efficiency loss. Based on the interview 
findings, it appears that an uninterrupted work flow can be achieved by three possible 
ways that were adopted by a majority of the responding firms, including:  
(1) to maintain a balanced volume of work through good construction plans, 
(2) to ensure that the materials supply is uninterrupted, and 
(3) to ensure adequate workforce. 
 
Maintain a balanced volume of work 
A large number of interviewees replied that an uninterrupted work flow is achievable 
in the context of China’s construction industry. They highlighted that idle crews were 
uncommon in their respective projects. One department head from Firm F pointed out 
that: 
 
“Even at the peak of the construction when the number of our frontline workers 
amounts to more than 2000, there are still gaps which show signs that more 
manpower is needed and that there is sufficient work space to accommodate 
them. So, whoever comes to my project, I will assign jobs to them easily. Hence, 
crew idleness is not an issue we are concerned with.”  
 
This seems to suggest that creating more workface availability and maintaining a 
balanced volume of workface is one effective means of ensuring that the crews can 
work on a continuous flow of work. Some volume of work might be a plan buffer, 
which refers to a step, or some tasks that are part of a plan, but are not yet scheduled, 
or can be rescheduled (Tommelein, 1998). This, however, increases the likelihood of 
space conflicts, because more workers would be working on the site since more 
workfaces are released. To alleviate the space tensions between different trades or 
subcontractors, one of the interviewees – a project manager from Firm A with 10 
years of experience – pointed out that, in large construction firms like Firm A, a 
manual or handbook on “flow construction” was used which provided “how-to” 
guidelines for the project manager in designing the process of flow construction 
involving plot-planning, path planning and sequencing within and between different 
trades and teams.  
 
Uninterrupted materials supply  
Ideally, in the one-piece flow environment, materials are to be delivered only when 
they are needed (Liker, 2004). It is difficult to apply the Toyota Way method of 
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materials management to China’s construction industry, as the interview results 
indicated that the current practice of materials management is to stockpile materials 
on site despite the site being faced with a constraint. With an adequate inventory on 
site, not only is it more likely that rising costs of construction materials (e.g. 
reinforcement bars (rebar)) can be overcome, but that it also allows uninterrupted 
workflow caused by failures in the delivery of the materials needed (Schmenner and 
Swink, 1998).    
 
Role of workforce in creating uninterrupted workflow 
Workers also play a pivotal part in creating uninterrupted workflow. This is because 
one important tenet of one-piece flow is that workers should be capable of identifying 
and eliminating the non-value adding activities that would affect their productivity 
(Liker, 2004). Not surprisingly, the interview results revealed that presently, Chinese 
frontline workers are not regarded as productive compared with their Japanese 
counterparts. Most respondents indicated that a majority of the frontline workers are 
low-skilled migrant workers, and most of them cannot be expected to have a clear 
picture of what non-value adding activities or muda are, let alone to improve the 
process by eliminating them. The way they learn and perform their work is simply 
through observing experienced co-workers or following direct instructions from 
supervisors, and trying things out by themselves. The majority might not bother to 
think about how to improve the present process by eliminating non-value-adding 
activities. Rather, what concerns them most is how much they would be paid at the 
end of the day. Because of the inability of the frontline workers, it is therefore required 
of the project manager and his or her project team to work harder and to be dedicated 
from the outset of the project to removing the uncertainties and creating an 
uninterrupted working environment for the workers. Unlike the frontline workers, most 
interviewees understood the consequences of various types of muda in the 
construction context. Even though some felt that, due to the unpredictable nature of 
the construction site, the non-value-adding activities such as double handling, 
inventory, and defects were not easy to eliminate. A number of areas were repeatedly 
mentioned that were worthy of the project team’s attention, including: 
(1) Optimizing construction plan and site layout design, 
(2) Optimizing site logistics to reduce double handling, 
(3) Enhancing on-site quality management to eliminate defects, 
(4) Closely monitoring the status of frontline workers to quickly identify idle time, and 




9.3.3.2 Pull kanban system (P3) 
The discussion on the implementation of principle 3 mainly focuses on materials 
planning and management. In the construction industry, material management 
consists of materials procurement, delivery (transportation), storage (inventory), etc 
(Thomas et al., 2005).  
 
Pull and Push – a mixed method  
Even though the pull or push system terminology was unfamiliar to the interviewees, 
the interview results suggest that the industry predominantly used the push or just-in-
case method to managing the commonly used materials. Table 9.2 illustrates these 
mixed characteristics in three areas, namely material ordering, delivery frequency, 
and inventory. 
 
Table 9.2 Characteristics of materials planning and management in China’s 
construction industry 
 Practices of Chinese construction firms The pull method  
Materials 
ordering 
 Largely determined by the forecasted 
price of the material (push) 
 Purchase-to-stock if the material price 
is predicted to be low (push) 
 Based on actual needs to 
subscribe needed materials 
(pull) (Monden, 1993) 
Delivery 
frequency 
 Materials such as ready-mixed 
concrete and customized components 
were ordered using pull system 
 Most commonly used materials are 
delivered once or twice every week 
(push) 
 Multiple delivery (e.g. several 
times within a day) from 
suppliers (pull) 
Inventory 
 Relatively high level of inventory 
 The stock can last for several days 
(push) 
 Low level of inventory (pull)   
 
(1) Materials ordering from suppliers 
Through qualitative analysis of the interview results concerning firm’s ordering system, 
it was found that presently, a majority of the firms interviewed have quite 
sophisticated software to calculate the total quantities of various materials used for 
bidding purposes. However, when it comes to the project level, most interviewees 
stated that a simple ordering policy was used. Basically, the project office gives the 
head office (or regional office) its demand figures, usually in a weekly or monthly form 
which is an estimate calculated in accordance with the project’s progress. Other 
factors, such as level of inventory and labour resource were also taken into account. 
The head office then reviewed the materials plan and processed the orders 
accordingly. Generally speaking, there were three approaches for different materials:  
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(i) small items (make-to-order): these materials or items are typically ordered or 
picked from merchants for immediate use such as nuts and bolts. This only 
requires a short cycle time (1-2 days or even within a few hours) for delivery. 
These items are usually kept in the store room at the project site.  
(ii) commonly used materials: these include steel rebar, bricks, etc. Several 
interviewees from SOEs revealed that the project team needed to submit its 
weekly or monthly materials requirement plan a few days in advance to the 
purchasing department in the head office for review and approval, whereas 
private firms decentralized materials procurement at the project level. To request 
for quotations, price requests were sent to potential suppliers, whose particulars 
were listed in the firms’ own databases.  
(iii) special orders: special orders apply to engineer-to-order parts, which are unique 
for construction projects and typically have long lead times prior to their deliveries 
to the construction site. As a result, these parts are ordered on a monthly basis. 
 
(2) Delivery 
In the JIT system, suppliers are expected to deliver small lot sizes of materials 
frequently. The lot size is determined by the actual consumption of materials, rather 
than by forecast demand. According to the interviewees, it is hard to adopt JIT 
delivery when considering how the supply chain works in China’s construction 
industry. Given that one supplier usually has many business partners, the daily 
priority is to satisfy the high or medium volume orders. Because an order of a 
construction project for one piece of material is regarded as small, it is therefore 
harder to demand the supplier to make commitments to multiple deliveries. This is 
particularly true when frequent deliveries are required and logistic costs increase. 
Accordingly, in order to reduce the logistic costs, agreements were made between 
the two parties to the effect that the materials are delivered in large quantities, despite 
causing unnecessary inventory. Several interviewees mentioned that ready-mixed 
concrete was one exception. This type of material could be delivered to the site using 
JIT method, but only if the delivery rate from the concrete firms is compatible with the 
progress of a concrete job in the field.  
 
(3) Inventory 
In contrast to Toyota’s pull system, which results in limited inventory at the shop floor, 
almost all the firms interviewed preferred to keep an accepted level of safety stock in 
the site. The level of safety stock varied, but it was generally agreed by most 
responding firms that it is necessary to maintain an inventory of at least 5 days’ worth 
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of material, or up to 2 weeks for site use. One project manager from Firm A pointed 
out that five day’s worth was the smallest amount of time that his site could achieve. 
Gypsum boards were used as an example by this interviewee: 
 
“If the gypsum board was ordered one week in advance, we are able to get a 
price of about 20 RMB per m2. However, the vendor will charge an extra 0.3 RMB 
per m2 if they are asked to delivery and given only one day notice in advance.” 
 
Not surprisingly, most firms did not have a computerised system to electronically 
monitor the level of inventory at the project level. Therefore, the site personnel has to 
conduct daily, weekly, and monthly inventory checks and inform the project manager 
of the inventory level. In general, the item is re-ordered if its number drops below a 
specified re-order quantity. This practice indicates that, unlike the case of 
manufacturing firms using “kanban” as a vehicle to communicate materials 
information, the Chinese construction firms manually monitor the inventory level and 
file a re-order on a regular basis, whether they need it or not. This is evidence that a 
push strategy is presently applied in most of the firms interviewed. 
 
Causes of high level of inventory  
According to the interview results, the implementation of a pull kanban system with 
the hope of minimizing inventory is often impeded by the external business 
environment – by the unstable price of construction materials, as well as by 
employees’ traditional mindsets. 
 
(1) Unstable price of construction materials 
The upward spiralling costs of important construction materials have put great 
pressure on almost all the firms interviewed. The Chinese construction industry has 
seen a steady rise in the prices of steel, cement, bricks, and other materials. Material 
prices updated in several online agencies showed that the prices vary even from day 
to day. One commercial manager from Firm C highlighted that: 
 
“I am very concerned about the costs of materials going up. The biggest issue is 
the rate of the increase. In the past couple of years, it has escalated significantly.” 
 
Taking steel – the most demanded construction material – as an example, one 
project manager from Firm P outlined that:  
“Steel for construction use has seen its price increase by as much as 35 per cent 
from 4,000 RMB/ton (equivalent to US$700) in 2009 to current 5,500RMB/ton 
(equivalent to US$900) in 2011 March.” 
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Unstable prices are perhaps one major factor that discourages a “pull” system from 
being implemented in China’s construction industry. A majority of the firms 
interviewed have a full-time estimator to keep an eye on the marketplace, and to 
update the budget accordingly. To shield themselves from rising costs, almost all the 
responding firms adopted the strategy of stockpiling, by appropriately and 
economically securing a considerable amount of construction materials (e.g. steel) at 
a fixed price in advance. The commercial manager added: 
“We have to stockpile materials. We also use one estimator to closely monitor the 
price movement. The main purpose is not to protect against unreliable delivery of 
materials, but to manage escalating price.” 
 
(2) Traditional mindset  
Several interviewees highlighted that, apart from unstable prices, keeping safety 
stocks allows production to continue. Such an attitude may be embedded in a firm’s 
culture. Most interviewees were convinced of the superiority of keeping safety 
inventory on site. This agrees with Polat and Arditi’s (2005, p.710) study, which 
concluded that: one possible benefit of keeping inventories on site is shielding 
downstream activities from upstream activities. One interviewee from Firm N 
responded that: 
 
 “The fact is that these materials are only temporarily stored here. Clearly, all of 
them will be consumed eventually when the project progresses. At the end of the 
project, we are very cautious to procure materials as we need them and to 
carefully monitor the inventory. Overall, the wastage of material is under control. ” 
 
Moreover, the interview results showed that keeping safety stocks is also strongly 
associated with the client’s intentions. One interviewee mentioned that, from the 
client’s perspective, a sufficient inventory symbolized that the overall progress of the 
project was good. Excessive inventory on site gave a strong signal that the project 
was ready to release more workfaces for workers. One experienced site engineer 
added that:  
 
“Sometimes, Jianli (known as a site supervisory company) will not allow the job to 
be performed if the material is just the exact amount needed. For example, a 
concrete in-situ job is scheduled to commence in the afternoon and the planned 
amount of cement is 20tons. Jianli will not authorize the construction firm to 
perform the job if there are only 20T of prepared cement on site. This is because 




9.3.3.3 Heijunka – level out the workload (P4) 
Heijunka is a production planning method, which evenly distributes the production 
volume and production variety over the available production time. To translate it in the 
construction context, this study connects the principle of heijunka (P4) with the Last 
Planner System’s four levels of planning phases to find common grounds (see 
section 4.7.2.1). To supplement the survey findings, questions were raised during the 
interviews concerning the followings:  
(1) What levels of project planning are adopted?  
(2) Who is the Last Planner at the project?  
(3) How reliability is project planning (e.g. weekly plan)? 
 
Level of project planning 
The interviewees were asked whether their project plans were designed with 
hierarchical levels (known as master plan, phase plan, look-ahead plan, and weekly 
plan). Table 9.3 illustrates the levels of details in terms of project planning by the 
responding firms.  
 
(1) The master/phase plan 
Table 10.3 indicates that the master plan along with the phase plan are available in 
nearly all the firms interviewed. The master plan was a mandatory requirement in the 
contract which was the contractual agreement between the client and the main 
contractor prior to the award of the contract. One Project manager from Firm D added 
that:  
 
“The master plan incorporates inputs from client’s team in which a few key 
deadlines (milestones) are clearly set. However, the master plan is of little value in 
guiding the daily operations because it only defines tasks at an abstract level. In 
most times, the master plan is more useful to be used in claims for delay against 
the client.” 
 
In addition, the phase plan is derived from the master plan, and is used to guide the 
work of phase package. There are financial incentives agreed by each party that by 
successfully completion of the work package in the phase plan, the financial awards 














Critical roles in the planning process 
Reliability of plan 
(Do they use a matrix; Yes/No?) 
A √ X √ √ 
 Project Manager (PM)  
 PM needs to constantly consult with 
foreman as well as subcontractor  
 Fairly good  
B √ monthly plan √ √  PM 
 Fairly good, but sometimes 






√ √  PM and Project Engineer (PE)  Fairly good 
D √ monthly plan √ √  PM 
 Fairly good, as milestones 
can be achieved, but the 
course to achieving it may be 
different to what is in the 
planned schedule 
E √ monthly plan √ √ 
 PM makes request to subcontractors to 
review their own weekly plans 
 Fairly good. If a delay occurs, 
PM makes a request to the 
subcontractor to engage 
more resources in order to 
make up the lost time 
F √ monthly plan √ √ 
 PM has a critical role in producing the 
plan, but it requires the parent company 
(e.g. Planning/Estimating Department ) 
for approval and documentation 
 Subcontractors submit their weekly 
plans for PM’s approval and reference 
 Reliability is good. However, 
constant minor adjustments 
are needed but acceptable  
G √ monthly plan √ X  PM  Fairly good 
H √ monthly plan √ X 
 PM is in charge, and consults with 
subcontractors who need to feedback 
information on resource, weather, etc 




5 weeks ahead 





√  PM  Good 
J 
√ 








 Not very certain about the 
reliability of weekly plan. 
Sometimes it is ahead, while 
sometimes it is behind the 
schedule. 
K √ monthly plan √ 
Weekly huddle 
meeting 
 PM is in charge, and consults with 
foreman of each trades  
 Fairly good 
L √ monthly plan √ X 
 Full time staff from head-quarter 
 Planning/Estimating Department is 
stationed at the project site 
 Relatively good. Sometimes it 
will get ahead of schedule by 





monthly plan bi-weekly plan X  PM 
 OK. Often the schedule is 
affected by material and 
labour shortage 
N √ monthly plan bi-weekly plan X 
 PM needs subcontractor’s agreement 
on the work contents and target set in 
the given week 
 Labour shortage at the 
moment, so there is a slight 
delay 
O √ monthly plan √ 
Weekly huddle 
meeting 
 PE is in charge and is required by PM 
to submit the plan for his final approval 
 Generally good. If delay 
occurs, PM will request 
subcontractors to engage 
more resources to make up 
the lost time 
P √ monthly plan √ X 
 PM 
 The ultimate purpose of a weekly plan 
is to inform not only the project team, 
but the frontline workers  
 Generally good 
Note:  
“√” denotes that the respondents have implemented. 
“X” means “Not implemented”. 
 “PM” refers to project manager, “PE” refers to project engineer.  
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(2) The look-ahead plan 
Unlike the master plan, a look-ahead plan was found to be absent in almost all the 
firms interviewed. Technically speaking, Firm I is the only one that has real-life 
experience in making a look-ahead plan, but this was undertaken in an international 
project. As revealed by its manager, the look-ahead plan was actually requested by 
the client, when the firm was involved in an overseas project in Singapore. As noted, 
the look-ahead plan aims to establish a plan that contains weeks of workable backlog. 
Similarly, a look-ahead plan has an equivalent term and is more prevalent among the 
responding firms in the form of a “monthly plan”. A monthly plan comprises four 
weeks’ work plan, and provides good look-ahead views of tasks that need to be 
completed in the coming month. However, compared to look-ahead plans, monthly 
plans turn out to be less dynamic and less rigorous. Some responding firms revealed 
that if a monthly plan is produced on day one, no further attempts were usually made 
to update, even if changes do occur.    
 
(3) Weekly plans and weekly meetings 
A weekly plan was adopted by most interviewees at the project level. Only two 
responding firms stated that they used a bi-weekly plan instead of weekly plan, on 
account of clients’ desire to be updated on the project’s progress every two weeks. 
According to the interviewees, before the weekly plan is finalized, it is necessary for 
the planning team to consult with the foreman and subcontractors about the 
availability of resources, the constraints of their current work, and others. As a result 
of these considerations, a weekly plan is created and is announced during the weekly 
meeting, which all relevant parties attend. According to the interviewees, a weekly 
plan generally consists of three parts: 
(i) Overview of jobs/tasks that have been completed in the past week. 
(ii) Overview of jobs/tasks that need to be completed in the coming week. 
(iii) Analysis of roots causes for the schedule delay and associated countermeasures. 
 
As some interviewees revealed, some levels of consensus on these three parts would 
be reached among all the parties. However, this form of weekly plan suffered from the 
lack of details on assigned job, compared to the weekly plan designed in the Last 
Planner System. Also missing were information on the “detailed contents of daily 




(4) Daily huddle meeting 
A few interviewees outlined that there were short meetings held by the project team 
at the start of a workday. The purpose is to convey the daily goals established during 
the weekly meeting to the entire workforce. Issues relating to OHS, drawing variation, 
and others will also be addressed only. A few interviewees stated that a similar type 
of meeting was held at the end of each workday to review what had actually been 
completed and to discuss the potential constraints that the team might encounter the 
next day.  
 
The Last Planner  
As shown in Table 9.3, 14 out of 16 responding firms pointed out that their project 
manager (PM) was expected to play a “critical role” in making a project plan, with 
some assistance from site engineers. Clearly, project planning cannot be done as a 
one-man effort. About half of the interviewees highlighted that it was essential to 
consult the subcontractors or the foreman (concerning e.g. the availability of 
resources, site constraints, etc.) and integrate the work plans with the project team’s 
plan. One engineer pointed out that sometimes the project manager was so busy that 
he or she might not really be involved in the planning process, but was expected to 
review and approve the schedule prepared by his direct subordinates (e.g. engineers). 
This implies that the traditional planning approach in which the plan is prepared by 
the project manager and his team is still predominately used in the Chinese 
construction industry, although consultation with subcontractors or foremen can be 
seen on site. In the end, it is the project manager who makes the final decision on 
what the weekly plan should look like. Moreover, it is rare for the foreman or 
subcontractor to reject the project manager’s proposal – instead, they need to 
hammer out a solution by all means based on the weekly plan announced – i.e. make 
necessary modifications to their own plans.  
 
Furthermore, two possible barriers to the implementation of a bottom-up process of 
project scheduling were uncovered: 
 
(1) Unqualified foreman (Last planner) 
The first and perhaps the greatest barrier is the poor capability of the trade foreman 
or the last planner. It was pointed out that the problem was that subcontractors or 
foremen (of trades) in China’s construction industry tended to concern themselves 
with their own work’s scope, and thus failed to see the bigger picture of interacting 
with other trades or teams. One project engineer from Firm C commented that: 
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“Those foreman or trade leaders basically have no idea of where they are now in 
the flow of work. Therefore, it requires the PM to extensively coordinate between 
different trades to minimize (space) conflicts, idle times etc. In most cases, it 
requires us to employ a top-down plan rather than to do it in a bottom-up way.”   
 
On the other hand, some interviewees seemed to show little confidence in what has 
been promised by the trade foreman in terms of the work that needed to be done by a 
certain date. One senior manager from Firm F added:  
 
“…even though the foremen might have made ‘realistic commitments’ in delivering 
what they call the ‘can-do’ work assignments, due to uncertainties and changing 
site conditions, they would eventually fail to get the work done. I personally have 
no confidence in what they have committed to.” 
 
(2) Tight schedule pressure 
The client’s demand for timely completion of the construction project was another 
barrier cited for the adoption of a bottom-up planning technique (e.g. LPS). Several 
interviewed firms revealed that they were under enormous pressure to produce a 
project plan using scientific planning principles. For example, the manager of Firm F 
explained that: 
 
“A domestic private client requires us to deliver a project of 530,000m2 in 18 
months. If we do not take this job, the client will find a replacement easily. In a 
case like that, if we adopt the LPS as it allowed and encouraged the foreman to 
make commitments to completing workable tasks, we would never expect the job 
to be done on time. It must be a ‘top-down’ approach to enable the project team to 
design and to optimize the job sequence, and give trades immovable deadlines, 
and by all means to provide assistance to help them finish the work within the 
given duration.” 
 
In addition, the same interviewee introduced a so-called “bottom-line” management 
concept in her project to ensure timely completion as required by the client: 
 
“… for example, a curtain wall package for one specialty subcontractor. What I 
mean by the bottom line management is that the curtain wall subcontractor is only 
given “windows”, as well as the latest completion time (the bottom line) for the 
execution of their responsibilities on site. They have no choice but to complete the 
job before the deadline. If the job is delayed, assistance will be provided 
accordingly.” 
 
Reliability of  work plans 
No matter how well the weekly plan is prepared, most interviewees agreed that a 
highly reliable weekly plan was not easy to achieve. This is because site conditions 
are so unpredictable that the weekly plan was sometimes delayed by one or two days, 
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which are then postponed to the following week. The delay calls for immediate 
actions by several means such as allocating more workers and other resources, 
working overtime, etc. to get the project back on schedule as soon as possible. One 
interviewee from Firm J explained that: 
 
“It is always like that (slipped schedule). As long as the milestones in the critical 
path are not affected, this sort of schedule slippage is acceptable. We understand 
it is not uncommon that enormous variations will cause our workers not to 
complete the job on time. Most of the times, it would be like this: one week we are 
a bit ahead of the schedule and the next week some tasks have slipped to the 
week after. Overall, we are always in the middle of re-planning the project, re-
estimating the time, and re-adjusting the resources accordingly.” 
 
It is understandable that in any project, most activities have some leeway or “float” 
that permit them to start at a late time. Properly controlled, this float is valuable in 
regulating the use of workers, materials, and other resources. As part of the lean 
construction tool, Percent Plan Complete (PPC) is widely used as one key matrix in 
lean construction for measuring and monitoring variations in the weekly plans (see 
Ballard, 2000). When asked whether PPC or other forms of matrix were employed to 
monitor schedule reliability, a majority of the firms interviewed stated that these were 
not adopted. Moreover, the use of PPC was criticised by one of the interviewees, a 
senior manager of Firm F, who said that:  
 
“In the Chinese construction context, PPC can only be done in the research 
setting. It is not likely, for my firm at least, to apply this tool even though it sounds 
theoretically feasible. This is because not only are management efforts always 
inadequate on site, but also the pressure of tight schedules do not allow us to 
conduct such matrix work.” 
 
Several interviewees stated that although such a matrix was not used at the moment, 
general constraint analysis was performed on a weekly basis (at the weekly meeting) 
to analyse the causes of variations that may affect the upcoming weekly plans.  
 
Muri and Mari 
Apart from LPS discussed under this principle, muri and mari were also addressed 
during the interviews. Given that labour is still in high demand, the workforce on site 
have no choice but to work longer hours to keep the project on track, without which 
there is only a slim possibility of achieving timely completion. Therefore, it is very 
common to see workers having to work on the weekend, sometimes having only 2 
days off in a month. Even during the holiday period (e.g. Chinese New Year), 
excessive overtime remains prevalent. As a result, the client is assured that the 
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project progresses well, but muri – the uneven work – is frequent and obviously 
ignored by most responding firms. This seems to suggest that the workforce is 
undervalued and is often treated as a machine, rather than as the industry’s most 
important asset. A possible explanation could be that the desired deadline for 
completion is unreasonably short in comparison with a normal schedule based on 
employees’ benchmarked productivity. Several interviewees also attributed this 
unreasonable pressure from the client in the industry’s unregulated environment.  
 
9.3.3.4 Built-in quality (P5) 
Built-in quality (Jidoka) is another key element of the Toyota Way process model. The 
questionnaire survey had assessed the level of built-in quality practices (P5) among 
Chinese building professionals and found that several practices with jidoka thinking 
were in place. The follow-up interview sought to understand this principle in more 
depth. Inquiries included: 
(1) How non-conforming parts are identified? 
(2) What are the challenges in implementing built-in quality in daily operations? 
(3) How is the QC implemented at the project level?   
 
Identification of non-conforming parts 
In response to the question of how “non-conforming parts” were identified, almost all 
the responding firms indicated that – unlike Toyota’s andon system or TQM’s 
promotion of “do it right in the first place” – Chinese construction firms rely on various 
inspections. These included the “in-process” inspections and handover inspections. 
Among multiple participants who are involved in the quality inspection, it is mainly the 
site engineers, and not frontline workers, who take the credit for identifying non-
conformance. It was pointed out that site engineers and foremen spent most of their 
time on a construction site acting as a source of technical advice and quality control. 
While on the job, they were very dedicated to keep their eyes open for improper 
procedures and sloppy work. Site engineers are constantly reminded to adhere 
strictly to the checklist, and encourage to live the belief that “defects or non-
conforming work will not be tolerated”. Once the problems are discovered, these need 
to be solved by any means immediately. For serious quality problems, a formal 
rectification order is issued. In their views, it was hoped that this approach would 
foster quality awareness at the site level as it provides an opportunity for workers to 
minimize inappropriate performance. Because the workers are surrounded by 
technical personnel, occasionally, the workers will seek some help to resolve 
problems. This perhaps explains why one attribute, namely “frontline workers are 
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encouraged to stop the operation and seek assistance from supervisors to solve the 
problem” (P5.4) was rated highly in the questionnaire survey results.  
 
In summary, simply relying on site engineers for quality assurance is inadequate, as 
there is the possibility that a site engineer or supervisor might miss some critical 
checks, with the result that these defects would go unnoticed into the next step. The 
interviewees also commented that to further boost awareness of the built-in quality 
philosophy, total involvement of all employees was required, especially to ensure that 
such ideas would reach the frontline workers, as most construction works are actually 
done by them. 
 
Challenges in implementing built-in quality 
The biggest challenge cited repeatedly by many respondents was that the rapidly 
expanding construction industry in China takes in a great number of unskilled 
construction workers who have fairly low levels of awareness and knowledge of 
quality. As highlighted in the literature, a majority of the frontline workers in China 
were literally migrant workers who were registered with various labour-only 
subcontractors. The chief engineer from Firm C revealed that:  
 
“If the offer is low but still accepted by the labour-only subcontractor, it is very 
likely that they will send the most low-skilled workers to us. It is really hard to 
manage the quality of such workers. Too often, they kept silent about damage or 
results of poor workmanship.” 
 
This was confirmed by a number of interviewees, such as one manager of Firm H, 
who put it that: 
 
“Take wall plastering for instance, given the dry climate in northern China, the 
construction method clearly states that frontline workers must wet the wall prior to 
the wall roughening treatment. The quality of wall will be affected if ’wet’ treatment 
is not properly done and it will lead to cracks in several months. The problem is 
that the frontline workers knew that the cracks would not immediately be 
noticeable by the auditor, and so some irresponsible workers will ‘play smart’ and 
skip this essential step, and proceed to the next.” 
 
A different perspective was offered by one manager from Firm I, who outlined that: 
 
“…built-in quality has not been reached at this moment in most Chinese 
construction firms as far as I am concerned. This is because in construction, each 
project is different and each drawing is different too. Unless the employees or 




Quality-related activities  
All the 16 firms interviewed had embarked on the quality route using quality circle 
(QC) for quality improvement. However, in comparison with the Japanese QC, the 
QC presently conducted in China’s construction industry tended to be characterised 
by some differences, which are highlighted in Table 9.4. 
 
Table 9.4 Comparison of Chinese QC and Japanese QC in construction projects 
 
QC conducted within 
Chinese construction firms 
Japanese QC activities 
Quantities 
 One or two QC were conducted 
within one project  
  No meetings to discuss the 
quality problems 
 A large number of QC activities 
(e.g. per year)  
 Frequent meeting to discuss 
the quality problems  
Enabler 
 External forces such as to fulfil 
the requirements and be 
eligible for the quality 
competition  
 Employees recognize the 
potentials for improvement 
(Imai, 1997) 
Approach 
 Top down approach: Project 
manager determines a QC topic 
for his team to carry out 
 Bottom up approach: 
employees voluntarily 
participate in the QC activities 
(Lillrank, 1995) 
Overall goal 
 Aim at “ad hoc” improvement if 
possible 
 Continuous and small 
improvement (Imai, 1997)   
 
(1) Quantities 
According to the interviewees, QC activities are not actively conducted at the project 
level, even though most responding firms are aware of its importance. Generally, one 
construction project only aims to foster one case of successful QC. As one Quality 
Engineer from Firm O explained, 
 
“It is good enough to have only one QC. This is because if more QC activities are 
conducted, extra management efforts, as well as more human resources from 
different departments are needed, and perhaps more budget for it. We really do 
not have time and resources for this.” 
 
Given that all the firms interviewed are large Chinese construction firms, they are 
expected to have widely-spread sites geographically and projects going on at the 
same time. Fortunately, by the end of the year, construction firms may achieve 
multiple cases of successful QC, as well as attain tangible results. In order to 
recognize the outstanding contributions to project performance and to give the QC 
participants the satisfaction of achieving their goals, a number of firms interviewed 
introduced award schemes to recognize excellence in QC achievement in their 
construction projects. What is more meaningful is that a number of successful QC 
cases were compiled, published, and circulated within the firm and between the 
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projects, so that all employees can learn from the experience. In addition, employees 
with outstanding QC cases are encouraged to compete for higher-level competition, 
i.e. national QC awards. 
 
(2) Enabler 
Today, specific requirements such as to conduct effective QC activities in 
construction projects are indicated in the contract documents. Based on the interview 
results, the by-product of QC, namely employee motivation, was largely ignored. 
Conversely, the ultimate drive for them to carry out QC has nothing to do with striving 
for excellence, but to simply fulfil the contractual obligations, or to use quality awards 
as the selling point to increase the likelihood of winning future projects. 
 
(3) Approach   
As Table 9.4 indicates, QC activities in the Chinese construction industry are pre-
dominantly conducted in a top-down fashion. Many of the firms interviewed pointed 
out that the project manager acts like a moral supporter, rather than a leader of the 
QC team, whereas the real efforts came from the project engineer who is in charge. 
Moreover, the interview findings suggest that some QC teams are inappropriate in 
terms of their structures, in that the frontline workers are often excluded. This implies 
that the QC activity is limited to among the site personnel and the frontline workers 
may not even be aware of the existence of QC throughout the project. It is common 
knowledge that frontline workers and their supervisors know better about the 
processes and are better able to identify the possible problems in their workplace.  
One interviewee from Firm P explained that: 
 
“It is close to impossible, at least at this moment, that our workforce could 
contribute their feedback and be participating in QC activities as their Japanese 
counterparts do. All in all, the quality of workforce is the biggest difference.” 
 
(4) Overall goal 
Some respondents stated that they were currently struggling to define an appropriate 
QC problem to form a QC topic. For a number of projects that the researcher visited, 
most have not yet identify a QC topic even though the QC team has been formed. 
Most responding firms outlined that efforts have been made in searching for relevant 





“It is getting harder for us to choose a topic. Many have been investigated by 
colleagues or industrial practitioners. So far, our QC team has still not decided on 
what to work on. This perhaps is the reason why our project has progressed to 
almost half way but the QC has not yet been formally kicked off.” 
 
9.3.3.5 Standardization (P6) 
The term “standardization” in the context of lean means established standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for workers in performing their job tasks with fewer 
variations. It has a broader meaning in Toyota’s context, which includes 
empowerment to be given to the frontline operatives to continuously “kaizen” the 
current SOP for the better. Not surprisingly, a majority of the interviewees pointed out 
that standardization could work better in the repetitive manufacturing environment, 
rather than in the construction industry where projects are typically one-off and 
unique in nature. This sentiment helps to explain the challenges the industry faces in 
the implementation of standardization (P6). However, in their views, standardized 
work is applicable to some extent and is regarded in a much wider sense. This 
includes two major levels namely, the standardization at the project operation level, 
and the standard practices at the firm level.  
 
Standardization at the project operation level 
Interviews with project managers and engineers revealed the actual use of 
standardization in the construction site, where three forms of standardization emerge: 
(1) SOPs or other written standards, (2) technical preparatory meetings, and (3) 
standardized floor (product). 
 
(1) Standard operating procedures (SOPs)  
The study hopes to understand how the firms interviewed were involved with SOPs. 
One of the ways to assess this is to examine whether the firm’s written standards 
were available (e.g. what is the procedure for setting up the formwork?). According to 
the interviewees, the construction method statement is available at the construction 
site in which work instructions are clearly stated. It contains the sequence of tasks 
that need to be carried out in order, as well as the estimated number of workers and 
materials that are needed. However, the problem was revealed by a majority of the 
interviewees in that only a few foremen or site engineers would actually read the SOP 
and other written standards on the site. This implies that the effectiveness of these 
standards is rather poor. One possible explanation for this is that a majority of the 
frontline workers do not meet a reasonable standard of literacy and hence they do not 
understand the contents. Furthermore, there were no attempts from the project team 
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to discuss the standardized work process among the team members and with the 
foremen. One interviewee from Firm C commented that: 
 
“As long as the workforce can deliver the assigned job on time and within budget, 
we are not concerned too much about the level of standardization they have 
achieved. In fact, the majority of workforce should have knowledge on what they 
are currently doing. They have been doing this for years and this craft work has 
not changed so much.” 
 
When asked whether the workforce will identify new ideas to improve the current 
processes, the interviewees replied that very few senior workers with positive 
attitudes contributed ideas and gave constructive feedback for process improvement. 
One project manager from Firm E revealed that: 
 
“In fact, their workmanship is ‘better’ than anyone from our project team because 
they have been doing this for a very long time and are very specialized in it. For 
some experienced workers, they have the vision of what the outcome will look like, 
and also understand what the working procedures are. So our duty is to ensure 
that they are aware of all the standards that they need to comply with before they 
commence the work.” 
 
With respect to their motivation to improve the current SOP, it appears that this was 
not driven by the kaizen mindset or company culture; it was however largely 
determined by their financial commitments. Basically, they were motivated to work 
faster and more efficiently in order to increase the volume of their work. This is 
because increased work volume can bring them extra earnings. A Project Manager 
from Firm P pointed out that: 
 
“There is actually no need for us to teach them step by step in terms of SOPs, 
driven by the financial incentives; they will spontaneously speed up their work  as 
they are paid by piece rate and we found this payment strategy is quite effective.” 
 
The problem is that the workers may aim to speed up their work but may not 
necessarily follow the established routines or instructions. Conversely, they may work 
using their own means and methods that they simply thought was the right thing to do, 
and by doing that, it can help them to achieve the defined objectives and maximize 
their earnings.  
 
(2) Technical preparatory meetings 
Compared to the written standards that almost no one will consult, technical 
preparatory meetings were mentioned frequently as a standardized process, where 
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attempt was made to transfer a number of key issues and technical know-how to the 
foreman and site engineers. For most firms interviewed, the technical preparatory 
meeting is mandated and is an effective way in which professional engineers deliver 
a “how-to” guide for relevant processes to the foremen and relevant subcontractors 
before commencing a particular work. Basically, the construction firm uses relevant 
codes of practices, SOPs, relevant drawings, and lessons learnt from past experience, 
to highlight the key issues to all the participants who attended the meeting. Once the 
technical preparatory meeting between general contractor and foreman was 
completed, the latter would accordingly carry out their own internal technical 
preparatory meetings with their team members to discuss issues in more details.  
 
(3) Constructing a standardized floor 
Most interviewees shared their views that standardized work can be possibly 
achieved through the “repetitive” process in the construction site. Apart from the 
standardized input (e.g. SOPs) and process (e.g. technical preparatory meetings), 
constructing a “standardized” floor is frequently referred to as another form of 
standardization. The standardized floor can be described as the “best practice”, which 
conforms to customer expectations. Using the standardized floor as a reference, it is 
hoped that the remaining individual floors can be constructed within the same lead 
time, using the same construction methods, completing the tasks in the same 
sequence, etc. One project manager from Firm D added that: 
 
“Because the client is keen on project schedule, we come up with a standardized 
construction method that ensures each floor can be completed within three days. 
If workers do not follow the established standards step by step, it is highly likely to 
fail. For example, we strictly demand that the formwork together with the rebar 
work must be done in two and a half days. By achieving this, it allows another half 
day, at the timeline between 2-4pm, for the concrete job, and this allows the 
concrete curing to be carried out in the Day three night.” 
 
Standardization at firm level 
The project management handbook is frequently referred to as a standard approach 
at the firm level to improve productivity and performance. According to the interview 
results, it is not uncommon for large Chinese construction firms to develop their own 
version of project-oriented project management guidelines based on one of the 
international project management standards (e.g. PMI’s PMBOK). The primary 
intention is for them to reflect on their management experiences to standardize the 
project management procedures, use and application. This allows the project team to 
follow the standardized guidelines to manage all kinds of projects undertaken by the 
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firm. These PM guidelines limit the variety of different management approaches and 
methods and provide the means of support and help to assure the project 
management quality of each project. It also prevents every project manager from 
having to struggle in what they should do and how they should do it. For example, PM 
guidelines introduce the use of standard report forms which allow the collection of 
information in a uniform way. In practice, the parent firm of the Firm D designed 55 
pieces of standardized forms for the project team to use. These forms covered 
various aspects including material usage, health and safety, risk management, 
financial report, and others. One vice-president from Firm D stated that the current 
project management handbook has gone through two major modifications, and that 
this has allowed additional procedures or modifications to be added from collective 
knowledge sharing and continuous improvement. 
 
9.3.3.6 Visual management (P7) 
The questionnaire survey revealed that visual management practices were not widely 
adopted in China’s construction industry. The interview results correspond with the 
survey findings that a majority of the interviewees were not familiar with the terms of 
visual management, but when asked whether its associated tools (e.g. 5-S) could 
have been adopted in their workplace, some examples for visual management in 
China’s construction industry were mentioned as indicated in Table 9.5. Collectively, 
three major aspects were identified, including (1) visual instructions, (2) visual 
monitoring, and (3) 5-S practice.  
 
Table 9.5 Visual Management practices in China’s construction projects  




 to provide general description of 
the project 
 corporate image (CI) 
 project description 
 to highlight work-related 
contents 
 schedules (e.g. master plan, 
monthly plan, etc) 
 work instructions  
 to highlight health and safety-
related issues 
 OHS posters, banners, etc 
 to give material/components 
information 
 material classification 
boards/labels  
 to give logistics-related 
instructions 
 routes, signs, etc 
Visual monitoring 
 to control site operations 
 to enhance the security on site 
 CCTV 






(1) General description 
All the firms interviewed mentioned CI. Some interviewees pointed out that this was 
amounted to practising standardization that was promoted by the head office. In most 
of the cases, CI can easily be seen from outside the construction site. This was 
mainly for the attention of potential customers and put on display for marketing 
purposes. In addition, CI also includes the standardized sign board displaying the 
information to the relevant parties, highlighting the first impression of the project with 











Figure 9.1 An example of firm’s CI sign board 
 
(2) Work-related contents 
In some of the construction firms, construction plans and schedules are simplified and 
displayed in the site meeting rooms for the workers through visual boards. These 
boards are created and updated by the project team according to the site plans. In 
this way, the management and workers can understand the deadlines and their 










Figure 9.2 An example of the master plan  
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Another form of work related visual tools is that simple work instructions were written 
in the jobsite. For example, in some of the rebar works, the foreman simply wrote 
down the instructions for the rebar works (e.g. rebar specifications) on the surface of 
wooden formwork to inform the workers of such requirements. According to some site 
engineers, the more skills the frontline workers gains, the less they would rely on 
these visual instructions. 
 
(3) Health and safety related issues 
Health and safety instructions were widely displayed at all the projects visited. For 
example, Figure 9.3 shows the daily potential hazardous risks identified by the project 
team that was displayed at site for the workers. It also lists the contact persons who 
are in charge of the relevant work sections. This serves as timely information to 
remind the operational workers of the risks they face. Moreover, as Figure 9.4 
illustrates, the safety policies and safety procedures, among other safety information, 












(4) Materials management   
Another emerging method of visual control tools adopted at the project level includes 
labels attached to the materials in the material storage areas so that these can be 
readily distinguished from other materials. Some interviewees pointed out that they 
used to attach the labels to each material for this purpose, but these were frequently 
removed by some irresponsible frontline workers. Hence, given the costs of 
producing these labels as well as ill-disciplined workers, they only used the labels 
occasionally when someone outside the project comes to visit or to conduct routine 
checks.  
  
Figure 9.3 An example of a visual poster 
relating to hazardous risks 
Figure 9.4 An example of a visual poster 
relating to health and safety policies  
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(5) Logistics-related signs 
In some of the projects visited, the logistics-related signs were helpful in directing the 
guests in the site even without any one accompanying them and, who can rely on 
these logistics-related signs for directions.  
 
Visual monitoring 
CCTV was one of the visual management tools most cited by the respondents. 
Approximately 40 per cent of the interviewees reported that CCTV was installed at 
key entry and several workplace points of their respective construction projects. 
Effective use of CCTV in some areas helped to identify the problems and track how 
these were solved. In the night, the CCTV also helps to create a sense of security as 
it prevents the valuable components and materials (e.g. copper cables, pipes, etc) 
from being stolen. In addition, the CCTV cameras were also used to monitor the 
workers and identify those idling. One project manager from Firm A pointed out that:  
 
“It is actually requested by clients to install CCTV on site although a few workers 
have sentiments given the fact that they are being monitored.”   
 
5-S practices 
5-S was classified as an unfamiliar practice by most interviewees. One project 
manager from Firm A, whose firm specialises in the construction installation and 
decoration business, highlighted that as the installation and decoration business uses 
a large amount of materials and components in the site, the workforce was there 
challenged to sort out the materials and components according to classifications, 
locations, quantities and types, and to ensure that these materials and components 
were easily monitored. However, as far as the project manager from Firm A is 
concerned,  
 
“Even though 5-S training is conducted in our company, what we had practiced 
however only correspond to the first two ‘S’ of 5-S on the site, namely to conduct 
housekeeping and classify the materials in order. Apart from that, in terms of 
employees’ disciplines of practising 5-S, it has not so far been developed as it 
perhaps requires more extensive training as well as managers’ support in the 
future.” 
 
Although 5-S is not systematically practised, driven by the construction-related 
bureau, which actively promotes initiatives such as “beautifying the construction site”, 
there is a consensus among most interviewees that efforts were only made to 
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demand the workers to have at least half an hour to clean and tidy the site before 
they ramp up their work.  
 
9.3.3.7 Use of reliable technology (P8)  
Status quo of new technology adoption 
The interview findings indicate that the substantial houses and infrastructures 
constructed every year benefited the Chinese construction industry in that these allow 
the construction firms to apply the technical know-how acquired and to advance 
existing building technologies. When asked whether any types of new construction 
technologies were adopted that produced a high impact on the projects or added 
value to the projects, only five interviewees pointed out that no new technology has 
been sought in their current projects. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
there is no association with the adoption of new technology at the firm level (head 
office). One interviewee explained that: 
 
“Each year, the firm will host annual meeting to promote the timely dissemination 
and exploitation of new technologies that have been adopted in other projects. 
This is a learning experience for my project team who have no experience with it. 
This keeps us updated.” 
 
The common explanation is that the pace of technological change in the construction 
industry is slow. For example, most interviewees agreed that the construction 
methods for a normal residential or commercial high-rise construction were no longer 
sophisticated and these should be re-categorised as conventional methods compared 
to the modern methods of construction such as offsite prefabrication. Naturally, for 
projects that employ conventional methods, there are typically few technical 
difficulties to overcome. This perception was recognized by Ling et al. (2008) as one 
of the major factors that would affect implementation of innovation in firms.  
 
To maintain technological leadership in construction, a majority of the firms 
interviewed understood the importance of identifying and exploiting emerging 
technologies if any. It is reassuring to note that the large construction firms had 
already been active in heeding the construction related bureau’s call of selecting the 
most suitable technologies for their projects. The handbook on “Ten Emerging 
Construction Technologies in China’s construction industry” published by China’s 
Construction Bureau, showcases about 108 specific technologies and methods in ten 
areas that have been implemented in China’s construction industry. Some 
interviewees highlighted that their respective firms have been chosen to contribute 
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their knowledge in the handbook. Because of this, one Project Manager from Firm N 
explained that: 
 
“… some of these so-called 10 emerging construction technologies were not new 
to our companies, but these are indeed useful in certain areas. We have practiced 
some in various projects and have gained rich experiences.” 
 
Table 9.6 illustrates examples provided by five responding firms, which had made 
considerable efforts in using new technologies and encouraging innovation to a large 
extent. All of them have the view that the new technologies have the potential to 
boost productivity, enhance client satisfaction, and quality improvement. Some 
interviewees also highlighted that the improved level of mechanization and 
automation was able to relieve the workers from onerous and repetitive work. As one 
manager from Firm H explained: 
 
“I always prefer to use the best machinery in our overseas projects despite the 
price is 10% – 20% higher than the average. Take the screw piling method 
employed in our Angola project for instance, one unit of the piling machine cost us 
2millions RMB. After thoroughly tested in China’s Hainan Island, where it has the 
similar soil conditions compared to Angola, we decided to use it. The results 
proved that the implementation of such new technology is a success and worthy, 
as it has solved the problem that we encountered in the previous projects that no 
piling method are suitable to Angola’s soil conditions.”  
 
It appeared that driven by external pressures such as rising competitiveness, tighter 
deadlines and shortage of skilled workers, more construction firms are likely to look 
beyond traditional construction methods towards emerging technologies. In such 
circumstances, Toyota Way principle 8 is useful in guiding the firms towards new 
technology adoption.  
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Table 9.6 Adopted new technologies and their associated outcomes 
Firm New technologies adopted The benefits Adhere to the Toyota Way principle 8 
G 
 Procured the “tower-belt” machine from 
the U.S. and used it for concrete 
placement for dam construction. 
 Improved project productivity  
 Yes. The adoption of “tower-belt” machine 
aims to add value to the process as its 
conveyor system is able to provide long 
reach, wide coverage and continuous 
placing of concrete in the accurate position. 
H 
 An innovated method of screw piling 
implemented in Angola’s residential 
project as a pilot test. 
 Cost saving: this piling method proved 
to be cost effective from a long-term 
perspective 
 Improved client satisfaction: this was 
much appreciated by the client 
(Angola’s government project) 
 Yes. Given the unique nature of Angola’s 
soil profile, this method generates least 
disturbance to the soil profile during 
installation and also creates least soil that 
needs to be removed.  
I 
 Special lightweight wall panels were 
designed and adopted to meet the tight 
timeline for the construction of Universal 
Studios project in Singapore. These wall 
panels (known as ACL panels) have 
secured patent in China 
 Improved project productivity  
 Reduced the installation time from 8 
months to 1.25 month 
 Yes.  
O 
 Procured a testing equipment and 
conducted non-destructive testing to 
check the steel structure requirements  
 Improved quality: to ensure quality of 
the steel structure 
 Yes. 
P 
 Placed in inflated tubes along the rebar to 
reduce the load prior to the slab concrete 
job  
 To meet the design requirements 
approved by the client 
 Yes. This is the first trial on this construction 
method by Firm P.  
 A number of sites which had used such 
method were visited for reference. Also, a 
pilot experiment was conducted in the 




9.3.4 People-related practices  
Similar to the Process model, this section presents the analysis of how the People 
and Partner model could be adopted in China’s construction industry.  
 
9.3.4.1 Leaders and leadership (P9) 
Long-term employment  
Of the 27 building professionals interviewed, a majority (17) stated that they had been 
working for their respective firms since they started their careers. Two vice presidents 
shared a very similar career path in that both were “home-grown leaders”. They 
started their first job as a foreman on site, and were gradually promoted to be 
engineer-in-charge, then project manager, and eventually were placed into a 
managerial position in the head office and recently promoted as the vice president. 
They understood the firm’s value and culture thoroughly. In addition to direct day-to-
day affairs, formulate and implement strategies, manage work related problems, and 
others, their current responsibilities also include laying the groundwork for the firm’s 




Most interviewees agreed that the project manager was the key person that made 
significant contributions to project performance. The Chinese building professionals, 
as described by a majority of interviewees, are very knowledgeable in terms of the 
technical skills possessed. This was largely derived from their working experience in 
various projects that profoundly shaped their technical know-how. At the project level, 
they were able to help the engineers to deliver technical analyses, and provide 
resolutions in a crisis situation. One project manager explained that:  
 
“Few problems are expected in my project compared to others. This is because 
our leaders are able to anticipate the risks and contribute to overcoming the 
significant constraints before these actually turn into real problems. This not only 
requires a skill set but also a visionary mind, dedicated heart as well as good 
relationship with clients and other parties.” 
 
People-centric leadership  
The highest calling a project leader has is to guide, motivate, and support each 
person in the project to enable him or her to contribute to the project success (Tener, 
1993). To satisfy workers’ needs and boost their morals, almost all the respondents 
pointed out that the “people-centric” philosophy was adopted as a guiding principle in 
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the firm. However, unlike Toyota leaders who are often credited with supporting 
employees while they are doing the work, the interview findings suggest that leaders 
in China’s context also place high importance on valuing people and in caring for 
them through various means. The examples given for people-centric activities were 
more focused on the well-being of the workers rather than in supporting their work at 
the workplace. For example, people-centric leadership surfaces in the way that the 
project team provided clean and comfortable accommodation (e.g. air-conditioned 
dormitories in summer for the workers), standard set of meals at site, entertaining 
performances, playground, and others. These can alleviate the pressure on the 
workers. The caring environment was observed by Chen and Partington’s (2004) 
study, which showed that the Chinese project managers perceived the team 
members as family members and were willing to take care of, and to support each 
other.  
 
9.3.4.2 People management (P10) 
The interviews sought to understand how Chinese construction firms implement the 
Toyota Way-styled people management principle that relates to people selection, 
training, teamwork, and motivation. The interview results are summarized as follows. 
 
People selection 
All the interviewees acknowledged that selection was probably one of the most, if not 
the most important step to bring the right people (including the sub-contracted 
workers) into the firm. This echoes the survey findings where “select the best person 
for given job” (P10.1) was prioritized and highly practised by the responding firms. In 
addition, the interview findings highlight the increasing challenges that the industry is 
currently facing in terms of attracting and retaining qualified employees at all levels. 
 
Training and continuous learning 
Training in the context of lean production contains various forms and is seen to have 
an important role. It includes pre-job training, on-the-job training, multi-skills training, 
etc. Table 9.7 lists the types of training programmes that target three different groups 




Table 9.7 Types of training programmes provided by the responding firms  
Types of training A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Total 
For frontline 
workers 
                 
Basic trade skills X X X X √ √ X X √ X √ √ X X X √ 6 
Migrant worker 
school (facility) 
√ X √ X √ √ X X X X √ √ X X √ √ 8 
For employees                  
Firm orientation √ √ X √ √ √ √ X √ X √ √ √ √ X X 11 
Mentorship 
programme 
√ √ X √ √ X √ X √ X √ √ √ √ √ X 11 
Staff meetings  X √ X √ √ √ √ X X √ √ X √ √ √ √ 11 
Work preparatory 
meetings  
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 16 
Exchange 
programme with other 
firms  
X √ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 1 
Self-development  √ √ X X √ √ √ √ √ √ √ X √ √ X √ 12 
Cross-department 
training (multi-skills) 
X √ X X X X X X X X √ X X X X X 2 
Training topics                  
Quality-related X X √ √ √ √ √ X √ X √ X X √ √ √ 10 
Health and safety-
related 
X X √ √ √ √ √ X √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 13 
Technical aspects X X √ X √ √ X X X √ √ X √ √ X √ 8 
Project management-
related 
X √ X √ √ √ √ X X X √ X X X X X 6 
Note: “√” denotes that the firms are dedicated to provide this type of training.  
“X” denotes that the firms are not dedicated to provide this type of training. 
 
(1) Frontline workers training 
With respect to frontline workers, most responding firms held the view that, as far as 
possible, training on basic trade skills for the frontline workers is the responsibility of 
the labour-only subcontractor. From Table 9.7, it can be seen that a majority of these 
responding firms (10 out of 16) viewed that there was little provision  for training 
frontline workers. In contrast, Firm P was one of the few, which provided vocational 
training for skills development of frontline workers. One project manager stated that 
the training covered the basic competencies of masonry, bar-bending, carpentry, etc., 
and these were implemented with the help of the local construction associations and 
top management. It is worth noting that the experienced foremen or site engineers 
are also encouraged to explain instructions and methods pertaining to their own trade 
skills to the workers in greater details.  
 
Moreover, about half of responding firms said that at the site level, basic training 
relates to construction quality, occupational health and safety (OHS), etc., and that 
this was available at the migrant worker schools, and where the training was usually 
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conducted during rainy days or at night. However, in most cases, the migrant worker 
schools are either inactive or have been changed for other uses, such as for a 
warehouse or a site meeting room. In summary, the results suggest that site 
management only paid lip-service to this type of training, and as one interviewee from 
Firm O noted, 
 
“The attendance records are quite disappointing given the effort that is made to 
providing training for workers. It seems that the training does not hold interests for 
the workers as they are probably too tired to attend the training courses.”  
 
(2) Site personnel training 
Almost all the responding firms indicated that proper work training is provided to 
newly recruited employees as well as to the existing employees. They might not have 
specified what the types of training were, but from their spontaneous answers, these 
could be categorized into three types: pre-job training, on-the-job training, and off-the-
job training.  
 
Pre-job training 
Firstly, all hires begin with the firm orientation which includes an introduction to the 
firm culture, firm values, personal rules, etc. Most firms do not put much effort in 
detailing the work instructions during pre-job training but only give basic introductions. 
This seems to suggest that the new hires are somehow accepted by their employers 
so far as their technical competence is concerned.  
 
On-the-job training 
From Table 9.8, it can also be seen that various forms of training were given in the 
work place. Most efforts were made in the following three areas, namely: (i) 
mentorship, (ii) staff meetings, and (iii) work preparatory meetings.  
 
(i) Mentorship 
Several respondents recalled that at the time when they were recruited, they were 
assigned a mentor, who was a senior in terms of technical knowledge and skills-set. 
The mentor continuously offered guidance and advice for them. One site engineer 
from Firm L recalled that:  
 
“My mentor was very technical knowledgeable. Every time I went to him with civil 
engineering questions, he always answered it using his experience, and that was 




The mentorship programme usually lasts for 1-2 years or a period which is equivalent 
to an entire project life. In most cases, once the mentorship completes, an 
assessment is followed to evaluate trainees’ technical knowledge, among other skills 
attained during the mentorship. It was then up to the firm to decide whether the 
mentor scheme should continue, or considered successfully completed. If the 
assessment results turned out to be merit orioles, the mentor is awarded bonus for 
his or her efforts.  
 
(ii) Staff meetings 
Staff meetings were also repeatedly mentioned as a valuable training opportunity. 
However, the meeting frequency was relatively low, given that the site personnel 
were busy. Interviews with the building professionals revealed that it was held, on 
average, four times a year.  One project manager from Firm M pointed out that:  
 
“My firm does not have formal training programmes. Instead, what we do is to run 
a quarterly staff meeting that requires all the site employees to attend. I see this 
as a good training opportunity; not only can we meet colleagues working in other 
projects, but also leaders from head office will equip us to better understand the 
new policies that may affect the project and company.” 
 
(iii) Work preparatory meetings 
Similar to staff meetings, this type of meeting was mentioned earlier as a 
standardization process to convey the construction methods, quality objectives, and 
others to trade supervisors and the foremen. It was pointed out such meetings were 
treated as a valuable learning opportunity because most important issues were 
addressed and discussed here.   
 
These results seem to indicate that the current training system relied on a more 
informal approach (e.g. meetings), rather than formal training and presentation. Other 
types of on-the-job training include exchange programmes, cross-department training, 
and so on, but these were only mentioned by a few firms. For example, one site 
engineer from Firm B revealed that his firm had training exchange programmes with 
several leading domestic design institutes (DI) and project management consultants 
(e.g. Arup). There were ample opportunities for engineers and project managers to be 
exposed to different disciplines and to be trained for up to 3 – 6 months to enhance 
their understanding of different aspects of construction management. Furthermore, 
some engineers would be transferred to overseas projects of their firms to learn more 
about international project management. When compared to Toyota, where 
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tremendous efforts are made to standardize and detail on-the-job training for one 
particular job, the on-the-job training system within Chinese construction firms still 
appears to be at the early stage.  
 
Off-the-job training  
This form of training was also adopted by most of the responding firms. As pointed 
out by most interviewees, firms usually post calendars of training activities through 
the firm’s own online portal, most of which relate to self-development programmes. A 
number of interviewees recalled that, each year, technical employees are encouraged 
to renew their qualifications in their own disciplines (e.g. registered builder, registered 
engineer, registered quantity surveyors and others). In the course of preparation to 
retake the test, the necessary expenses for attending lectures, seminars, etc., would 
be covered by the firm. One interviewee from Firm H pointed out that:  
 
“We understand the importance of training. It however depends on individuals. 
They are in charge of their own future, and if they feel they need to learn in certain 
areas, we will be very supportive.” 
 
(3) Management training  
Compared to the site personnel, there appears to be very little provision for 
management training and if any, these only focused on limited areas. The firms 
interviewed that belonged to the China State Construction Engineering Corporation 
(CSCEC), claimed to have the privilege to tap on “in-house” training resources 
provided by the CSCEC management school, a subsidiary firm of CSCEC. Moreover, 
a deputy manager from Firm F stated that one of the main themes of management 
training (at his level or above) was to interpret the national policy that may affect the 
firm’s business. This was echoed by a vice-president from Firm G, who shared that: 
 
“In response to the government’s call to venture overseas, training relating to 
policies, procedures, etc., in doing international construction business is given to 
the leadership of our firm. For example, during an intensive couple of days 
workshop on FIDIC, the instructor uses many cases to explain how the successful 
overseas projects were undertaken by Chinese contractors.”  
 
Skill levels and labour shortage 
The Chinese construction industry is staffed with less-educated migrant workers, 
most of whom are unskilled and where the quality of the skills possessed is uneven. 




“The unskilled workers could be the peasants working in the farm during the peak 
time. When the peak time ends, they put down the agriculture tools and look for 
jobs in urban cities. Quickly, they turn out to be temporary construction workers.”  
 
This results in a labour strategy, namely the use of mixed crews of skilled and 
unskilled workers commonly adopted by most interviewees. However, the portion of 
skilled workers among the entire frontline workforce at the project level is uneven. 
Surprisingly, the structure of subcontracted workers is largely determined by two 
factors: (1) the negotiated contract value between general contractor and labour 
subcontractor, and (2) the client’s requirements. If the contract price is low, it is highly 
likely that the labour-only subcontractor would not send the entire qualified workforce 
to the site. By contrast, unskilled or less qualified workforce would be combined and 
that often takes up a large portion when compared to the qualified workforce. This 
would seriously affect the project quality and client satisfaction. Secondly, the 
requirement on labour is highly associated with client’s requirements. One 
interviewee from Firm F (SOE) pointed out that: 
 
“If the client has priority in the project completion, we make request to our 
partnered labour contractor that the majority of workforce structure should be 
skilled labour, especially those who can work hard in the changing environment. 
In contrast, if the client is from the public sector, who shows less requirements on 
project schedule, a different strategy on labour will then be employed which 
permits the workers to be mixed with a larger portion of unskilled or average 
workers.” 
 
The interview results revealed, overwhelmingly, that all the firms interviewed suffered 
from a high workforce turnover, which forced the construction firms to bring in 
temporary workers to the site. The most convenient way was to hire them from the 
nearby sites by offering them higher salaries. In cases like this, a less meticulous 
selection process was carried out. This directly affected the project quality. To resolve 
the problem, several leading SOEs revealed that efforts had been made to establish 
long-term partnerships with several local governments in small Chinese farming 
counties, which have good reputation for exporting construction workers. Some have 
established their training centres in the counties to recruit and train the young workers. 
Before they are sent to the site, they must go through some basic training. This also 
ensures a sustainable supply of qualified workforce in the long-term.  
 
Multi-skilling 
The interview results revealed that there was an overwhelmingly sceptical view with 
regards to multi-skills training for frontline workers. Not surprisingly, there are 
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presently no multi-skilled workers being employed on site. It is therefore necessary to 
understand if there are any reasons for the lack in providing for multi-skills training. 
The following reasons were given by the interviewees:  
(1) Independent trade skills: the labour-only subcontractor sector comprised of 
various single-skilled trades such as “carpenter”, “rebar workers”, “concrete 
finisher”, etc. Each category of workers only executes their own specialized work, 
i.e. a worker who is a “carpenter” does not perform the duties of a rebar worker 
even if rebar workers are in short supply. Similarly, the concrete finishers only 
come to the site when they are needed and they are not involved with the works 
of other trades. 
(2) Satisfied with the current skill set: most interviewees seem to be satisfied with the 
state quo of current skill set that different trades possess. It implies that multi-
skilled workforce is not considered during a project’s long-term scheduling 
process, as they put it: “They know what they are doing and some are good at it. 
If we (site staff) are placed to do the same job, we are not as productive as they 
are.” 
(3) High mobility: given the high mobility of frontline workers, this would be entirely 
understandable for construction firms to show less interest in fostering multi-
skilled workers. Several interviewees expressed their hesitations to invent in 
multi-skill training as they highlighted that it will be a huge loss when the trained 
multi-skilled workers left the firm for other purpose. 
(4) Increase pay: concerns about pay increase were voiced out that: “The multi-
skilled workers will probably demand higher pay when he/she is trained with multi-
skills. We must consider whether it is a cost-effective means and we are not ready 
to pay them differently within the trades.” 
 
In summary, the industry is characterised by different trades that specialized in their 
own skills. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to consider issues of multi-skilling during 
the planning phase of a project by combining activities that involved similar crafts and 
assigning a complete work unit to a single crew without considering craft boundaries.  
 
Teamwork  
The frontline workers, most of the times, work in a team. According to several 
interviewees, among all the workers who are on the site at one time or another, it is 
easy to find relationships like father/son, siblings, and friends who came from the 
same farming villages. Those who are from the same family or having similar 
background tend to be working together in the same occupational trade. For example, 
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in a group of approximately 70 – 80 construction workers performing the rebar-fixing 
job at the same time, 3 – 4 teams can be identified with each team having a team 
leader. Usually, the team leader is not assigned a regular job, but keeps an eye on 
his team members, maintains good communications, and handles minor problems.  
 
“External” and “internal” motivation 
This study also investigates the motivational strategies adopted within LCCFs. From 
the viewpoint of most interviewees, monetary incentives were extensively used on 
site. At the project level, the  monetary incentives for performance measures – i.e. 
quality, health and safety, as well as progress, were clearly indicated in the contract. 
For example, before the project commences, mutual agreement would be obtained 
on the financial incentives provided if the project wins any prestigious awards, such 
as “Luban” or provincial quality award. With respect to motivational strategy at the 
individual level, most interviewees agreed that the project team imposed few fines on 
construction workers because they were afraid that the workers’ responses to fines 
were not always positive. The workers knew that they would always have some other 
alternative construction sites to go to work for. Several interviewees stated that 
although the frontline workers did not fully comply with safety rules, and did wrong 
things such as smoking on site, not wearing protective equipment, etc., they were not 
fined but only received light verbal warnings. One senior project manager commented 
that a mixture of motivational methods was implemented in his project, namely 
monetary incentives and small fines, but the latter would mainly depend on who the 
parties involved were. He explained that: 
 
“A mixed approach is employed in my project in dealing with different parties. In 
most cases, we impose fines towards the subcontractors if the recurring quality 
problems were discovered or they did not respond to the order for rectification in a 
timely manner. So far, a number of rectification orders have been issued to 
subcontractors; one subcontractor did not make timely rectification and was fined 
1,000 RMB. In contrast, we never fine our workers.” 
 
On the other hand, interview results revealed that non-monetary or intrinsic incentives 
were also adopted. Several interviewees stated that there is a number of recognition 
programmes adopted as non-monetary incentives. The high-performing foreman or 
trades would be recognized for their efforts and contributions. He or she would be 
given the title such as the role model frontline worker, the role model trade member, 
etc. Moreover, workers would be recognized for their participation in QC activities or 
their contributions of constructive feedback and ideas that resulted in process 
improvement. Another commonly adopted non-monetary incentive is direct from the 
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leadership, which conveys the message that the company cares for the ordinary 
workers. In this case, leaders visit the site, the firms provide a comfortable 
environment for their workers in their living areas, etc.  
 
9.3.4.3 Partner relationship (P11) 
In this section, the interviews assess how the Toyota Way principle of working with 
partners can be applied in Chinese construction firms. 
 
Partner relationship 
The following outlines the interview findings pertaining to the relationships between 
the responding firms and their suppliers, subcontractors, and clients. It was found that 
efforts had been made by the construction firms to establish long-lasting relationships 
with them. One piece of evidence for this was that all the firms interviewed had 
established an internal accreditation system for monitoring their suppliers and 
subcontractors. Once a project is completed, the project manager is in charge of 
evaluating the performance of their chosen partners (e.g. suppliers, subcontractors, 
etc.) on a number of criteria, including quality of construction, business relations, 
schedule, cost control, contract fulfilment, etc. The results of the performance 
appraisal are to be submitted to the head office, where a decision would be made on 
whether this partnership would continue, or should be terminated for possible future 
projects. Moreover, it is common to see that the clients tended to nominate their own 
preferred suppliers or subcontractors throughout the project. Often, these nominated 
suppliers or subcontractors might not have been included previously in the 
contractor’s database. In order to satisfy the clients and minimize disagreement, 
these nominated suppliers and subcontractors were likely to be awarded the 
subcontract.   
 
Apart from collaboration with suppliers and subcontractors, all the firms interviewed 
have stated that aggressive targets set by the clients, which the interviewees felt to 
be somewhat unrealistic to achieve, were the most challenging part of their 
relationships with their clients. This state of affairs is not surprising, given that when 
the main contractor does not comply with the client’s requirements, substitutes can be 
easily found. Construction firms were therefore trying their very best not to damage 
their good relationships with clients by engaging more resources or workers, even 




Despite this, a few interviewees indicated that their head office (parent company) had 
gone an extra step by partnering with some big clients (e.g. local governments, 
private developers, etc.). This means that these construction firms would be 
automatically considered as general contractors if the clients intend to expand their 
business in China. One senior manager from Firm F confirmed that the top 10 of 
these so-called “big client” partnerships contributed to 22 per cent of the firm’s total 
revenue in 2010, and this figure was expected to grow in the future.  
 
Multi and single-sourcing of suppliers 
All the responding firms have indicated that, for certain types of materials or 
components, there are at least five or more suppliers which they collaborate with, and 
their particulars were all well documented in the firms’ databases. The main reason 
for keeping multiple sources of suppliers is to help the construction firms minimize 
risks, and enjoy certain level of flexibility. Moreover, unlike Toyota or other Japanese 
manufacturing firms that do not change their suppliers (Womack et al., 1990), it was 
found that the firms’ databases of qualified work partners were quite dynamic. This is 
because every year, new and high performing work partners would be added to the 
databases after evaluation, whereas problematic partners would be removed. When 
asked about the trends of changes in the numbers of suppliers, most respondents 
replied that, due to the rapid development of the Chinese construction industry, more 
suppliers and subcontractors are needed as the construction firms benefit from 
securing increasing volumes of construction work.  
 
Quality products provided by suppliers 
The interview results highlighted most firms interviewed showed little concern for the 
quality of materials provided by some suppliers selected from the firm’s qualified 
supplier database. In most cases, the sources are usually regarded as responsible, 
as their products (e.g. materials, machinery, etc) must pass a thorough evaluation to 
determine whether they are suitable before they can be accepted. One of the key 
dimensions is product quality. In most cases, however, the products were covered by 
the National Inspection Exemption scheme, and so were not inspected to ensure 
these comply with the quality standards. This has become the principal reason why 
suppliers compete mainly on price. More strictly, in the Shanghai area, it is mandated 
for suppliers to register with the local construction authority a list of what materials 
(e.g. concrete) were supplied to which project. This serves as a tracking system to 
assist construction firms in monitoring the material quality and in seeking the root 
 252 
 
cause in a timely manner if a problem occurs. All these efforts reflect a sense of built-
in quality thinking.  
 
Assistance for partners  
However, the real difference between the Toyota Way of treating its partners and the 
Chinese construction firms’ supplier relationships is that limited technical support is 
provided in the latter even if there is a problem on the supplier’s side. It is 
understandable that manufacturing and construction are two different domains. Unlike 
Toyota or other Japanese lean enterprises, which can in the first instance try to help 
the suppliers deal with their problems, Chinese construction firms simply change any 
suppliers who experience delivery problems or whose prices are no longer 
competitive. This is because for any given material or component, the construction 
firms usually have multiple choices. One project manager from Firm M said that: 
 
“We are private firms and we are very sensitive about the price. Given that the 
quality of materials from different vendors is indistinguishable, we are not willing to 
pay anything extra for increased reliability, quality, etc. Low price is the king!” 
 
In contrast, as explained by most interviewees, their firms tended to collaborate with 
subcontractors and were willing to provide the necessary technical assistance if the 
subcontractors experienced a technical problem on the site, especially given that the 
delay was caused by one subcontractor in the preceding job, which would in turn 
affect the “downstream” activities undertaken by a different subcontractor. To achieve 
continuous workflow, the firms interviewed felt that collaborating with subcontractors 
is the key to ensuring that project progress is always on the right track. Of all the firms 
interviewed, Firm P had worked for a Japanese contractor in China for many years. 
One project manager from Firm P shared that his team had learned from and 
benefited from this long-lasting relationship with their Japanese counterpart. 
Whenever they had a technical problem on the site, their Japanese counterparts have 
always engaged enough technicians to help resolve the problem.  
 
Supplier delivery system 
There is a general understanding in the literature of how Japanese manufacturers, 
such as Toyota, enjoy frequent deliveries of small shipments. This is because a 
number of suppliers, especially the first-tier ones, are located close to Toyota’s plants. 
However, this was not the case in the construction context. Having discussed the pull 
kanban system (in P3), the firms interviewed have generally practised bulk lots with 
few deliveries for a majority of the purchased materials and components. According 
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to some interviewees, if their projects, especially large infrastructure projects, are 
located in remote areas, then the materials need to be procured locally in order to 
reduce the transportation costs. This opens new opportunities for new partners. In 
other circumstances, geographical proximity does not seem to be an issue, especially 
in the case of speciality contractors whose replacement would be hard to find. One 
vice-president of Firm K recalled that: 
 
“There were three speciality contractors in LNG storage tank construction and 
installation who have been working for us since probably day one. It is always one 
of them who would be chosen to work for us wherever we go. Yes, they are 
treated as part of our enterprise.” 
 
9.3.5 Problem-solving practices  
This section evaluates the interviewees’ perceptions of how the three underlying 
principles of the problem-solving model can be adopted in China’s construction 
industry.  
 
9.3.5.1 Genchi Genbutsu (P12) 
The problem process begins by defining a problem, or what the Toyota Way refers to 
as the “current condition”. To grasp the current condition, leaders are required to 
implement genchi genbutsu to understand the situation. It was found from the 
interviews that the idea of genchi genbutsu had the support of a majority of the firms 
interviewed. As indicated in Table 9.8, all the interviewees agreed that the first-line 
management should practise genchi genbutsu, however, in terms of whether this 
management idea is worth being applied across all levels of organization, only 3 out 
of 27 interviewees voiced out alternative opinions. As one Manager from Firm F 
explained: 
 
“Good leadership should be more focused on the firm’s strategic development. It 
may not be necessary for them to come and see the problem in a timely manner. 
Instead, in the case of problems that are discovered at the project level, a more 
appropriate means could be that managers select the right candidates to help 
solve it.” 
 
Even though genchi genbutsu was appreciated and strongly encouraged by most of 
the firms interviewed, nevertheless when it came to the actual site (see Table 9.8), 
their attitudes and reactions varied. It is particularly true that while it may not be 
management’s intention to avoid wasting their time to walk around the site, this might 
be attributed to the fact that they were pre-occupied with many other matters, which 
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did not allow them to do so. For example, one project engineer from Firm B revealed 
that the project manager was sometimes asked by head office to join a temporary 
team to work on bidding strategy for the next project. As a result, the project manager 
was not on the site all the time, and the project engineers were tasked to supervise 
the project. 
 








A √ X 
It is more appropriate for leaders to deal with higher-level 
matters rather than practise genchi genbutsu every time. 
B √ √ 
Genchi genbutsu is required but the problem is that the 
leaderships usually engaged in, e.g. project bidding, 
among other matters so that they have no time for the 
current project. 
C √ √ 
PM is expected to be visionary and keep an eye on what 
could possibly occur on site. It is more helpful in 
preventing potential risks and constraints before these 
become real problems. 
D √ √ 
Other than genchi genbutsu, all the new and recurring 
problems were profiled and presented to all the parties in 
the weekly meetings. 
E √ √ 
Genchi genbutsu is practiced. However, in order to 
achieve a state of harmony within the firm, the SOEs 
leaders favour that the problems could be solved in the 
way that “reduce major issues to minor ones, and minor 
ones to nothing”. 
F √ X 
Leaders at the firm level should be more focused on 
strategic issues. However, they are frequently asked to 
be present on the project site to display their commitment 
as it was specifically requested for by the client. 
G √ √ 
For complicated problems, it requires the leader to genchi 
genbutsu and set up a technical committee. 
H √ √ N.A 
I √ √ 
Genchi genbutsu should be applied to all the 
management staff at site. 
J √ √ 
Only the problem relating to quality issues, project leader 
are asked to practice genchi genbutsu. 
K √ √ 
The practice of genchi genbutsu is written in their project 
management handbook. 
L √ √ 
Genchi genbutsu should be applied to all the 
management staff on site. 
M √ √ N.A 
N √ √ 
The project team requests the project leaders as well as 
team members to be on call at all times. 
O √ √ Not much problems occur on site. 
P √ √ N.A 
Note:  
“X” denotes genchi genbutsu is not practised, “√” denotes this practice is present.  
The first-line leaders includes foremen and site engineers; Leaders from all levels 
include project managers and directors. 
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A few interviewees stated that only when the problem was related to serious quality 
or OHS issues, project leaders would not be alarmed nor present themselves on site. 
Good practice of genchi genbutsu included: 
 Relevant norms and codes were established in the firm’s internal project 
management handbook, stating that not only the site engineer but also the project 
manager needs to genchi genbutsu first hand when a problem occurs (e.g. Firm 
D).  
 More stringent rules established that require the PM and engineers to be on-call 
for emergencies all the time, and always be ready for genchi genbutsu (e.g. Firm 
N). 
 
Attitudes towards problems and genchi genbutsu  
Apart from the organizational culture or leadership factors, a closer investigation of 
the interview results showed that the decision of genchi genbutsu actually depends 
on the “difficulty scale” of a problem. The interviewees noted that problems can be 
broadly characterized as “minor”, “major” and “mega”. It is defined in relates to the 
employee’s ability to fix the problem. Through an analysis of the interview findings, 
three emerging scenarios that characterized attitudes towards problems and genchi 
genbutsu were identified and explained as follows.  
 
Scenario 1: this is the most optimistic scenario that would see only minor problems 
occurring on the site. As noted by several interviewees, site engineers are required to 
spend 70% – 90% of their time on the site to spot problems. They are approachable 
and knowledgeable enough to come up with countermeasures to most minor 
problems. Most interviewees agreed that there is no need to wait for instructions from 
supervisors if the site engineer is able to solve the problem in this regards. Moreover, 
recurring quality problems such as “leaks in concrete”, “cutting or bending the rebar 
with wrong size”, etc., were frequently mentioned in this scenario. Several 
interviewees outlined that there were numerous recurring quality problems in their 
projects, partly because the client demanded the crew to focus on speed rather than 
project quality. In addition, some interviewees attributed the cause of recurring 
problems to  workers’ attitude, namely that they “do not care about such a problem” 
or “do not realize this is a problem”. One project manager from Firm M added that:  
 
“In most cases, these problems are caused by human factors. The variation will 
be introduced when workers are carelessly performing the job with a 'do not care’ 
attitude. Despite all the efforts made by the management highlighting that such 
issues are prone to errors again and again in our weekly meetings, it still keeps 
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popping out. My view is that these problems are of little value to learn and 
document.” 
 
Scenario 2: although most site engineers possess outstanding problem-solving skills, 
some may not cope with the problems in the first place. When a problem confronted 
is categorized as “major”, with no obvious solutions, the site engineer or foreman 
needs to get their supervisor – the more experienced project manager or engineer-in-
charge – involved for more guidance into the investigation. Frequently, this type of 
problems cross boundaries, and only someone with a much broader perspective, or 
what some interviewees called, “sophisticated” skills can quickly and effectively 
facilitate resolution. As described by a large number of interviewees, when the project 
manager was involved with the investigations, he typically called a meeting, bringing 
together participants whom he felt were appropriate to assist. At this stage, the 
project manager needed to update the head office about the progress of solving the 
problem (e.g. countermeasures, outcomes, etc).  
 
Scenario 3: the last scenario was described as high-impact but uncommon event. 
The situation was not previously encountered or a specific solution from past 
experience was unknown. Thus, such problems cause the entire project team to 
struggle to come up with appropriate solutions. The project team can quickly turn to 
the head office for more technical assistance. One interviewee shared that: 
 
“In the head office, more resource can be tapped such as professional experts 
and experienced technicians, who will be tasked to investigate the problem.” 
 
An example to illustrate this scenario was given by one project manager from Firm D, 
who shared that a project he had undertaken contained deep foundation pit 
construction. Since the project team had no relevant experience in similar foundation 
construction, experts from the head office were brought in as back up and their 
involvement was written in the bid proposal. At the construction stage, before the 
foundation construction commenced, the expert panel accompanied by the project 
team made several site visits to investigate geological conditions of the site, and the 
surrounding environment, etc. In addition, several rounds of meetings were 
conducted to discuss how best to control the underground water, the supporting 
structure for the foundation, among other matters during the construction. In 
circumstances like this, efforts were accordingly made to document the problem, 
constraints, as well as the solutions proposed. This in turn provided the employees 
with valuable learning opportunities.   
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9.3.5.2 Consensus decision-making (P13) 
Genchi genbutsu is the first step in seeking out root causes. The following steps 
employ various means to determine the root causes.  
 
Root causes  
Root cause analysis is essentially a method or series of actions taken to determine 
why a particular failure or a problem exists, and to establish a means of correcting the 
causes (Hall, 2001). During the fieldwork, only 4 interviewees precisely mentioned 
that the “root causes” need to be thoroughly investigated and that these should be 
done step by step. For example, one project manager from Firm E explained that his 
team used “5W + 1H” to systematically understand the problem. A project director 
from the same firm outlined this as follows: 
 
“If the problem is relating to a health and safety issue, everyone must be very alert. 
In this circumstance, we must find out the root cause. Generally, our employees 
are reminded to follow three principles that have been outlined by top 
management in dealing with problems. This includes: (1) do not proceed to the 
next step until the root causes are determined; (2) do not proceed to the next step 
until all the relevant parties are satisfied; and (3) do not proceed to the next step 
until the one who should take responsibility is identified.” 
 
The remaining interviews shared that they generally asked a few questions to try to 
discover the symptoms of problems, but did not go beyond to find out the root causes. 
 
Employee participation  
It was found that the frontline workers were often undervalued as a source of 
information for resolving actual problems, and of opinions about possible corrections. 
This is because they are usually excluded from all types of site meetings, and do not 
participate in any decision making. In most cases, such as the weekly meetings, 
preparatory meetings, problem investigation meetings, and so on, the foremen – the 
lowest level in the project hierarchy – were requested to attend. Hence, the foremen 
played a critical role in reporting progress to their direct supervisor. For firms relying 
on first hand information of what was happening in the site, foreman should be 
trusted as a reliable source of information. With respect to employees’ participation in 
the decision-making process, one interviewee from Firm G stated that:  
 
“It depends on employees’ capacity. If they are capable of proposing solutions, we 
certainly welcome them offering their opinions. In contrast, what we are more 





Other issues discussed here include whether the final decision or solution will achieve 
consensus from the team. According to most responses, there was basically “no 
consensus” within the project team, in which the project manager usually dictated 
decisions. However, one project manager from Firm K welcomed the idea of 
consensus and highlighted the fact that in his project, top management encouraged 
participants to brain-storm until a better solution surfaced.   
 
9.3.5.3 Kaizen or continuous improvement (P14) 
Kaizen mindset  
Problems that emerge repeatedly in day-to-day operational activities are important for 
identifying improvement opportunities (Tucker et al., 2002; Liker, 2004). A large 
number of interviewees claimed that, in their firms, kaizen activities were completely 
non-existent. They also reported that neither employees nor frontline workers have a 
kaizen mindset. This actually corresponds to the survey findings in which a few 
kaizen related activities received low ratings from the survey respondents (see 
Chapter 8).  
 
Lack of a non-blaming culture  
Culture can be described as the collective, shared thinking, and behaviour of the firm, 
or the team. It has a huge impact on the problem-solving process, as well as on 
kaizen activities, within the firm. In the fieldwork, most interviewees replied that when 
they encountered a problem, they certainly have to consider the consequence of 
surfacing it, and not simply the act of surfacing the root cause. In most cases, 
exposing problems will in turn bring potential economic loss. Moreover, the 
interviewees stated that when faced with problems, some project managers were 
more concerned about who should take responsibility for the problems, or whether 
their leaders from SOEs desire problems to be solved according to their own 
philosophy, such as “reduce major issues to minor ones, and minor ones to nothing”. 
Under such leadership, techniques such as the 5 Whys have no place. If people do 
not look at problems as opportunities to build a better problem-solving system, then 
they will just take the shortest path to remove the symptom. Regardless of how much 
professional know-how and skills they possess, such wrong behaviours can deter all 
progress. One project manager from Firm A highlighted that: 
 
“Construction production is usually one-off in nature, and its uniqueness prevents 
kaizen activities from being conducted. Once this project finishes, our next project 
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could be a totally different one and in a case like this, how can kaizen apply? 
Continuous improvement only works well under the manufacturing settings where 
everything is performed under repetitive flow.” 
 
A manager from Firm H also commented that a recurring problem explained how 
problems were repeatedly exposed in the construction site. Efforts were made, but 
this does not seem to work well. This relates ultimately to working habits and attitudes 
of workers, which from his perspective are lacking in PDCA or kaizen thinking.  
 
Reflection  
One of the common means adopted by the interviewees for conducting “reflection” on 
site matters is to diary the project progress. Minor or major problems would be 
documented in details. In most cases, the diary serves as a technical “bible” that one 
can rely on when seeking resolutions. This practice was adopted by almost all the 
firms interviewed. One young engineer from Firm L pointed out that: 
 
“In my current project, I diary a lot of things, for example project progress, what 
we have  completed each day, solutions to certain problems, lessons learnt, etc. I 
even use this as a checklist for following up certain unresolved issues. By the end 
of my last project, I had completed 2 volumes of diary, which benefited me a lot.” 
 
Learning from other projects 
It is important to observe gemba objectively, and to have many ideas relating to 
possible improvements. In reality, as many of the interviewees reflected, many 
housing projects were homogeneous in nature, and so they tended to be less critical 
of their own projects, as one can easily get used to the current conditions of the site. 
It is not always easy to have many ideas for improvements based only from one’s 
own internal resources and previous experience. Therefore, benchmarking is highly 
recommended. By visiting other good project sites, one can easily observe them 
objectively with severe gemba eyes. The points for improvement found at these good 
project sites can be mentioned to the firm running the site, and can also be reflected 
in one’s own project site. Similarly, by inviting external people to visit one’s own site, 
a similar effect can be expected, receiving opinions of other project teams from the 
third person’s point of view, and obtaining some useful advice.    
 
9.4 Summary 
This chapter presents the results of the interviews, and elaborates on the relevance 
of the current practices of large Chinese construction firms to the Toyota Way 
principles. Overall, the interview findings supported the survey results in indicating 
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that some of its principles and derived attributes were not only familiar to interviewees, 
but also appreciated by them. In some cases, the firms interviewed have effectively 
adopted several Toyota Way principles, such as commitment to reliable plans (P4), 
promotion of standardization at firm and project levels (P6), partnership with suppliers 
and subcontractors (P11), genchi genbutsu (P12), and others. These were supported 
by various pieces of evidence during the interviews. Additionally, attempts were seen 
to be made by these firms to modify some principles and practices of the Toyota Way 
to better fit the Chinese construction industry. For example, in the case of 
standardization, the standard operating procedures (SOPs) were actually perceived 
as less important in operations, given that site management resources are so limited 
that it becomes impossible to keep a constant watch on workers’ SOPs. In view of 
such limitations, it is suggested that the scope of the standardization principle should 
be broadened beyond the frontline site, and should include standardized 
management approaches, such as technical meetings for communicating the 
standardized procedure, using the standardized project management manual for site 
management, concerning every aspects of the operations. Similar endeavours were 
also made for the other principles, taking into account the uniqueness of construction 
projects. These are the encouraging results. However, compared to Toyota’s 
achievements, the interview results seem to suggest that implementation was still 
insufficient. In addition, the implementation of Toyota Way practices are always 
associated with challenges and barriers, i.e. from clients, construction firms, their 
employees, and partners, as well as from conventional industry practices. As such, 
interviewees are often open to selective adoption, but not to the whole suite of the 
Toyota Way principles. For some specific principles – such as pull or single-sourcing 
– the resistance to change is obvious, and attitudes are that implementation of such 
principles would not necessarily benefit day-to-day operations, and may result in the 
opposite outcome. Such concerns imply that the preconditions are not yet fully 
established, and these still remain as threats to full implementation.  
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10 CASE STUDY 
10.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the results of three case studies conducted in selected Chinese 
construction firms. Section 10.2 describes how the cases were selected. An 
evaluation of the three cases is presented in terms of their experiences implementing 
Toyota Way-style practices.  
 
10.2 Case study selection 
The target companies investigated in the case study were not randomly chosen, but 
were selected according to their characteristics, and how these characteristics 
contribute to the research question (Eisenhardt, 1989). The ideal candidate firm for 
this research should possess the following characteristics: (1) it must be a leading 
construction firm in China, and (2) it must be easily accessible and willing to offer 
information, if required. To reiterate, the chief objective of the case study is to provide 
a practical example of how the Toyota Way model could be implemented in the 
context of Chinese construction firms. This study, however, did not present the 
Toyota Way principles to the case-study firms. Instead, endeavours were made to 
evaluate their daily operations, personnel-management systems, problem-solving 
strategies, and so on, at the project level, using the Toyota Way model. Moreover, the 
case study findings are expected to validate the applicability of the Toyota Way model 
within large Chinese construction firms. Three projects were chosen, with the details 
shown in Table 10.1. Two projects (Project A and B) from BAOYE Construction 
Group are included, and another one project (Project C) is from the a subsidiary of 
China Construction Engineering Third Bureau (hereinafter referred to as CCETB). 
 
Table 10.1 Overview of case firms and project descriptions 
Case 
No. 










BAOYE 240 million  
 “Qiantang river” 











Centre project  
CCETB  1.23 billion 







10.3 Case Company A   
10.3.1 Background information on Company A 
BAOYE Construction Group is one of the four construction firms from Zhejiang 
province, China, that was accredited as a “Premier” contractor in the late 1990s. It is 
a large private Chinese construction firm specializing in government and public 
buildings, and residential and commercial buildings. The company operates mainly 
(50%-60% of the turnover) in Zhejiang province and Shanghai, but in recent years, its 
leadership has attempted to explore the new emerging market in China’s western 
regions, partially due to intense competition in the two places mentioned. According 
to BAOYE’s 2011 annual report, by the end of year 2011, BAOYE’s construction 
business achieved a revenue of approximately RMB 12.18 billion (US$1.9 billion), an 
increase of approximately 26% over 2010. Meanwhile, the total contract value for 
construction-in-progress projects was RMB 40.53 billion (US$6.43 billion) by the end 
of 2011, representing an increase of approximately 18% over 2010.  
 
10.3.2 Company A’s guiding principles  
The guiding principles of BAOYE are its vision, mission, and core values. Mr Pang 
Bao Gen, Chairman of BAOYE (2011) clearly states that: “Going forward to the future 
development, BAOYE will continue to adopt entrepreneurship approach instead of a 
businessman like approach in running its business.” The following actions are derived 
from and guided by BAOYE’S vision.    
(1) Not only focus on grasping business opportunities, but to pitch on the corporate 
mission on short term gains without satisfying  longer term perspective. 
(2) Preserving sustainable profitability and innovation capability. 
(3) Making profits from end consumers rather than from downstream dealers or 
intermediaries by fulfilment of demands and requirements. 
Messages from Chairman Pang in response to the firm’s vision are encouraging. The 
first one reveals that BAOYE is thinking differently, not to go for more immediate 
gains, but to urge all the employees to resist the temptation to sacrifice the firm’s 
mission for short-term gains. The second highlights BAOYE’S constant purpose – the 
highest calling and purpose is to preserve sustainable profitability. The last one 
implies the company’s changing focus, which is on the end-users. It seems to be a 
win-win strategy that company wants to gain more profits from end-users, while 
making sure that they get the maximum return. Moreover, as can be found on 
BAOYE’s website, the company’s mission is described as “from construction to 
manufacturing, leads the construction industry towards industrialisation in China” 
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(BAOYE, 2011). This reveals the company’s determination in adopting industrialized 
means to construct buildings. It also shows where BAOYE is heading, and what is 
important to the firm. BAOYE’s core value consists of four parts, including:  
(1) “More pay for more work” under the contractual management model. 
(2) Human capital is the most valuable asset of the company.  
(3) The value of BAOYE is made of financial assets, hard working spirit, employee’s 
knowledge and management’s capacity.   
(4) To maintain an effective human resource management system, and to eliminate 
those having unsatisfactory KPI scores.  
It can be seen that maximizing clients’ values are not directly listed in BAOYE’s 
guiding principles. It seems that BY is more concerned with the interests of 
employees, from their knowledge, skills, to salaries, etc. If BAOYE chooses to 
implement or adopt some underlying principles of the Toyota Way, these guiding 
principles should be revisited in the light of the Toyota Way principles.  
 
10.3.3 Company A’s general human resource strategy  
BAOYE’s human resource strategy states that, “we do not purposely chase ‘overseas 
degree holders’, or hunt ‘successful CEOs’; we only chase after those who in BY’s 
view are the most appropriate candidates.” This is in agreement with Toyota’s 
strategy in leaders, where the company is focused on growing their own leaders, 
rather than bringing in outsiders (Liker, 2004). BY does not justify the reasons behind 
this strategy, but from the interviewees’ responses, it is clear that leaders must fist 
thoroughly understand the company culture at BAOYE. This explains why most 
middle-level managers (i.e. project managers) in BAOYE have been working for 
BAOYE for a very long time – long enough to witness this private firm, based in 
Shaoxing, Zhejiang, expands its market across China, and eventually becoming a 
listed firm on the Hong Kong’s stock market.  
 
10.3.4 Company A’s organizational structure  
An examination of the firm’s structure reveals that project managers and their teams 
played key roles in the firm’s success. It was found that BAOYE has presently 107 
project teams belonging to 19 regional offices (i.e. Hangzhou, Shanghai, etc.). For 
convenience, each project team is named after its project manager (PM), who may 
commit to several projects at the same time. Internally, case studies Project A and 
Project B were managed by Manager Ma’s team and Manager Chen’s team, 
respectively. To some extent, these PM teams are very independent and have a 
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sense of ownership over their projects. In addition, the agreement between these 
PMs and the head office allows the PMs to tap on BAOYE’s established management 
system, company brand, tendering, etc. However, they do need to follow the site 
rules and management standards established by BAOYE, and they are subject to 
various quality audits as well as health and safety checks. In return, as much as 8% – 
10% of the total contract value will be allocated as a management fee to reimburse 
the head office, with the project team sharing the remaining profits.  
 
10.3.5 Overview of two case study projects  
Two building projects were provided by the case-study Company A, which were 
contracted by its Hangzhou and Wenzhou offices, respectively. The Hangzhou 
project (Project A, “Huafeng”) is located in Hangzhou’s future central business distinct, 
with a built-in area of 74,335.5 m2. The Hangzhou team has been working on this 
RMB 240 million (US$38 million) project since October 2010, and is expected to 
deliver the project on budget by 30 March, 2013 (a total duration of 1,030 calendar 
days). The height of the building is 150 m, and the structural form is a framed tube 
structure, with 29 floors above the ground level and three underground levels used as 
basements. Similarly, Wenzhou’s Guomai project (Project B) is an office tower, with a 
total built-in area of 73,785 m2. The tower consists of two basements provided for car 
parking. The upper 23 floors are intended to be utilized as offices for the city’s 
Department of Communication. Both sites are relatively small and their organizational 
charts are also similar. Most of the project team members at Project A and B were 
interviewed, including the project managers, the materials managers, engineers, 
several site engineers, and others (see Table 10.2).  
Table 10.2 Information on the interviewees from Project A and B  
No. 
Project A Project B 
Role of the interviewees 
Working 
experience   
Role of the interviewees 
Working 
experience   
1 Project Manager (Mr. Ma) 15 




Deputy manager (Mr. 
Chen) 
11 Chief Engineer (Mr Pan) 7 
3 
Materials Manager (Mr. 
Shen) 
7 Site Engineer A 2 
4 Chief Engineer (Mr. Zhang) 9 Site Engineer B 4 
5 Site Engineer A 5 Site Engineer C 5 
6 Site Engineer B 4 Foreman A 6 
7 Site Engineer C 12 Foreman B 7 
8 Site Engineer D 7 Carpenter A 10 
9 
 
Rebar worker A 6 
10 Jianli supervisor A 25 
11 Jianli engineer A 13 
 265 
 
10.3.6 Project A   
This section presents the findings of Project A, which involves the main components 
of Toyota Way-style practices. 
 
10.3.6.1 Process-oriented practices 
One-piece flow (P2)   
At the time the fieldwork commenced on project A, the concrete work for the second-
floor basement ceiling was intended to be carried out in about two days. Under the 
principle of “one-piece” flow thinking, the whole site team was clearly aware of the 
progress of the project. To ensure that the concreting team could mobilize into the 
site in a JIT manner, engineers urged the carpentry and rebar tradesmen to speed up 
their work, without however compromising on quality or safety. The chief engineer 
interviewed pointed out that, when the date of concrete pouring was approaching, the 
contractor employees became more diligent in aligning their progress with the 
concreting team and in keeping them updated about the project’s progress. It is worth 
mentioning that concreting work is often performed by a licensed concreting trade, 
which is only employed to perform concrete work as and when the site requires. The 
concrete placing team has very flexible working schedules, and is typically committed 
to a number of jobs within the same region. One of the value adding activities 
observed on site was that the chief engineer held a pre-pour meeting with the 
concreting trade before pours, with the intention of discussing issues associated with 
the process of concrete pouring.  
 
Moreover, in a typical “one-piece” flow scenario, materials are expected to be 
supplied in the right quantities, in the right time, and to the right place. In Project A, 
although it is hard to see the daily consumption of material being specified in the 
plans, it was one of the themes of the weekly meeting agenda, discussed as part of 
the weekly materials resource plan. In most cases, as observed on site, the materials 
were ordered in quantities a lot greater than was needed on a daily or weekly basis, 
and so there is no need for engineers or foremen to worry about materials being in 
short supply and affecting the implementation of the “one-piece” approach. 
 
Pull kanban system (P3) 
At Project A, the project team pays much attention to materials management. The 




“This is because given that the nature of our firm is private, the price of materials 
can easily affect us in a negative way. We have to effectively manage materials, 
especially price-sensitive ones.” 
 
Based on the necessary procedures associated with the incoming materials, the 
materials manager reflected on the materials procurement processes and 
commented,  
 
 “Actually, the so-called ‘pull’ concept is practised in a way. Take this incoming 
batch of rebar for instance: it will not be allowed to stay in the storage area or 
fabrication yard for long, but will be quickly consumed. Because our strategy is 
based on calculating the procurement time backwards from the date when the 
tradesmen ask for it [the material], and we will arrange procurement and delivery 
accordingly.”  
 
Following this thought, the materials manager continued, to indicate the cycle time 
between the point of delivery of an incoming batch of rebar, and point of use is about 
three days. This is the case, because shortly after a new batch of rebar is delivered to 
the site, at least two days are needed for a sample of the rebar to be delivered to the 
local authority, where it is examined for quality, specifications, and other details. This 
is a mandatory procedure, since the jianli (the supervision firm) will not authorise the 
use of the arriving materials (i.e. rebar) unless test results show that the new batch is 
defect-free and complies with all the specifications. Concurrently, another day or two 
days is needed to fabricate the rebar for different design requirements. Apart from 
this, the following two reasons highlighted why inventory might sometimes be held:  
(1) In order to receive a discount or a low price when buying a lot of materials, the 
supplier may require the payment to be paid in full, and may demand that the 
materials be transported away from supplier’s location. 
(2) All the incoming rebar needs to be fabricated into different pieces. Some of this 
may not be used immediately, and may thus become on-site inventory. 
The materials manager seems not to be bothered by this temporary on-site inventory, 
as he even commented that when this Project A is completed, the estimated wastage 
of rebar will properly be limited to less than 10 tons, which is acceptable and perfectly 
within contingent considerations.  
 
Planning and control (Heijunka)  (P4) 
(1) Plans and the planner 
Like most projects in China, agreed milestones are established in the master plan 
between client and contractor, prior to the commencement of the project. Project A’s 
deputy project manager pointed out that a monthly plan was developed based on 
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three key inputs, namely (1) the master plan, (2) the monthly materials resource plan, 
and (3) the actual plan which reflects real-life progress. With respect to who 
contributed most to the planning, it was not surprising to learn that the planning power 
was very much concentrated in the hands of the project manager (PM Ma), who 
outlined that, 
“The leadership style determines who should take the planning job. At my site, I 
am the one making the plans and have the final words on it. The progress actually 
reflects my intention.” 
 
Under such leadership, it appears that only the PM and perhaps his colleagues in the 
same office know the schedules, whereas little information pertaining to work 
schedules and plans was expected to cascade down to the worker level. Workers 
were only informed of the workloads over very short periods (i.e., one or two week), 
and also the locked deliverable dates. Hence, most workers in Project A do not have 
a complete picture of work progress.  
 
(2) Weekly meetings and weekly plans 
In contrast to LPS, which encourages foremen or last planners to make 
“commitments” in what they can actually do in the plans, Project A reveals the 
schedule information to lower level workers in a top-down way. The weekly meetings 
become important moments in which the PM discussed the plans. In a weekly 
meeting (11/04/2012) that the researcher was permitted to attend, it was confirmed 
that the weekly meeting agenda was being closely followed. The meeting began with 
the PM summarizing the performance in the last week, and announcing the work 
contents, along with the achievable targets of the coming week to the participants (i.e. 
the foremen, site engineers, etc.). He also reinforced several key deliverable dates. 
What followed were essentially the PM’s responses to issues raised by the jianli at 
the workplace. For instance, the most urgent concern expressed by the jianli was that 
progress on the formwork for the second-floor basement appeared to be slow, which 
might affect succeeding work. Without seeking out the root causes, it was quickly 
pointed out by the PM that the insufficient number of carpenters on site was the 
cause of the slow progress in the formwork erection. To resolve this issue, the PM 
then agreed to take actions to urge the supervisor of the carpenters to increase the 
size of the workforce by any means.  
 
(3) Challenges in achieving even workload 
On levering the workload, in the PM’s word, currently, the amount of available labour 
is not very stable. This hinders the daily work from being assigned in an even manner, 
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which in some ways is negatively affecting the progress of the project. On the positive 
side, the shortage of labour in a way helps to eliminate the idle time within certain 
trades, since there were always working spaces available for a smaller number of 
workers to undertake. However, the cost of alleviating this “short-of-labour” condition 
was to demand that frontline workers work overtime. They then started their work at 
6:30am, and finished at 6:30pm, with a two-hour break in between.  
 
Built-in quality  (P5) 
Being aware of the difficulties in using the andon system on site (Nakagawa, 2006), 
this case study intends to investigate whether the project team’s (including frontline 
workers’) attitudes to quality and their resulting actions are in agreement with the 
“built-in quality” (BIQ) principle. What matters most is to foster a culture in which 
workers are encouraged to stop and fix defects before they proceed to the next 
operation. What contradicts this BIQ thinking is the traditional mindset that relies on 
quality inspection. As shown in Table 10.3, Project A employs BIQ thinking in some 
limited areas, whereas inspections appear to play a bigger role in quality control.  
 
Table 10.3 Implementation of BIQ thinking and quality inspections in Project A 




 Perform quality check 
on materials 
 Any defective 
materials must be 
rejected before use 
 Materials division  
BIQ Operations 
 Technical review 
meeting 
 Stand-up meeting  
 Engineering division 
Inspection Operations 
 Engineers’ site walk 
 Workers’ self-check 
 Handover check 
 Site engineers  
 Frontline workers 
 Project manager, jianli 
and client 
representative 
Inspection General   Quarterly inspections 
 Head office’s quality 
department  
 
Clearly, the contractor personnel did devote efforts to quality control. Apart from two 
areas in which BIQ thinking was observed (see Table 10.3), it was discovered that 
inspections were widely adopted as a key approach when completed operations were 
waiting to be checked. Unlike Toyota workers who are trained to execute operations 
with BIQ thinking, in Project A, the participants engaged with BIQ are actually 
contractor employees, who safeguard the materials quality and help to create 




“We need to be realistic, as we cannot expect that all the employees and frontline 
workers will be able to detect problems in a timely manner and report them to 
nearby supervisors. The quality inspections are still very much needed.” 
 
(1) Engineers’ site walk  
Several site engineers claimed that most minor problems could be discovered during 
their site walk. These site walks seemed to be quite spontaneous, as the site 
engineers were seen with no standardized check lists or other tools for evaluating 
workers’ performance; they instead proceeded based only on their experience. The 
chances are high that defects or noncompliance will be entered into the subsequent 
operations without being rectified. In contrast, jianli engineers seemed more 
professional and more rigorous in their checks, as they followed their own audit 
system (i.e. a standard check list) to evaluate quality and to reflect on the issues in 
the weekly quality reports.  
 
(2) Workers’ self-check and handover check  
No matter what level of quality has been built in, a quality check is still needed, and in 
many ways is helpful to assure that the quality is in line with requirements. The “self-
check” concept has been institutionalized, and is also stated in the project plans. This 
practice requires employees to conduct a self-check prior to higher-level quality 
assessment or handover to the succeeding trade.    
 
(3) Company-wide inspections 
Furthermore, BAOYE’s head office performs company-wide quality assessment of all 
on-going projects on a quarterly basis with announced dates. This is part of the 
company’s initiative to promote “transparent” competition. A recent quality inspection 
was conducted on 1/March/2011 in Project A, and the problems spotted by the head 
office’s audit team include (1) part of reinforced threaded connection is not in place, 
and (2) poor welded techniques on several steel columns. It is worthwhile mentioning 
that the brief assessment results are published via the company’s office automation 
(OA) system, in which the high-performance project with the least problems found is 
announced here, as well as the worse projects which will be subjected to a fine of up 
to RMB 10,000 (US$1,580).  
 
Standardization (P6) 
Several standardized practices – developed in the implementation framework of the 
Toyota Way model – were adopted in Project A. This includes: 
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(1) Management standardizations: at the first level, various “standards” set by the 
head office were available at the site office, and were referred to by the PM as 
“management standardization requirements”. All the standardized items and 
procedures can be found in the company’s project management guidelines.  
(2) Technical review meeting: at the second level, “technical review meetings” and 
“stand-up meetings” were conducted. These meetings serve two purposes here. 
One is to create awareness of quality, in the hope of building quality into the 
mindsets of the workers. The other purpose is to reinforce the standardized 
sequence in the minds of the relevant parties, the activity components, the “Do’s” 
and “Don’ts”, etc., that make up certain processes. At the time of the site visits, 
Project A had conducted eleven key “technical review meetings” to focus on major 
processes, including bored pile construction, excavation, RC works, formwork, 
and others.     
(3) Standardized work at the activity level: In Project A, standardization at the activity 
level seems “less satisfactory”. The challenge is that the contractors’ employees 
do not seem to pay much attention to day-to-day standardized work. Instead, 
what they do concern themselves most with is whether the subcontracted work 
can be accomplished on time. The chief engineer pointed out that, “The project 
team will not micro-manage matters such as SOPs. Instead, our job is pretty 
much done once we conduct the review meeting and convey the basic knowledge 
of construction methods and its associated quality objectives, health, and safety 
issues, etc., to the relevant parties.” In the daily operations, the foremen can be 
trusted to allocate jobs to their team members more efficiently. To them, 
“standardization” is not their primary concern. Experienced foremen would let the 
same team stick to what they were asked to do repeatedly (i.e. floor by floor). For 
example, those who perform rebar placement for columns will do the same thing 
repeatedly throughout the building process.   
  
Visual control  (P7) 
Overall, visual management in Project A was not so well implemented. This was 
reflected in several instances which were documented in a number of site 
assessment reports conducted by the jianli concerning “site health and safety” 
aspects, between October, 2010 and March, 2011 (12 times in total). The results 
reinforced warnings concerning several weaknesses in visual management exercised 
at the site. The reoccurring themes are highlighted below (see Table 10.4). These 
may be contributing factors that make the site less organized and subjecting it to 
more health and safety risks.  
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Table 10.4 Site assessment concerns “health and safety” aspects  
Items 
Total number of 
observations from 
Oct 2010 to Mar 2011 
(1)  Mass of materials piled up in the rebar fabrication area, lacking 
an attached classification signboard  
6 
(2)  Temporary electrical installations must meet installation 
requirements 
6 
(3) Unused formworks, square wood, and other debris, are 
massively placed on nearby roads, leading to road congestion 
4 
(4) The boundary between site, dormitory, and site office is not 
clearly specified. 
1 
(5) The operating procedures of machines, and other instructive 
posters, are absent 
3 
(6) Site water was not cleaned up in a timely manner 2 
(7) Several workers did not wear personal protective equipment 
(PPE) 
5 




These listed issues were frequently addressed by the jianli. Not surprisingly, the 
whole list can run to some length, and certain items kept recurring. Quite clearly, the 
majority of items listed in Table 10.5 are relevant to health and safety issues. It 
appears that some basic visual control activities such as sorting (item 8), 
straightening (item 1), cleaning (item 3 and 6), and other visual signs (item 4 and 5) 
were either absent or poorly practised. The poor health and safety record can 
therefore easily become one qualifier for applying visual management and 5-S 
principles.  
 
New technology adopted (P8) 
Project A aims at the “Zhejiang benchmarking project in applying emerging 
technologies award”, which is intended to showcase the technologies deployed, 
which have been used in the whole project. It was learned that the so-called top ten 
emerging technologies were not new to the project team, and the application of some 
of these to certain areas was proposed. In order to qualify for a model project in terms 
of the use of new and reliable technologies, the Zhejiang Construction Bureau set out 
the rules requiring that participating construction projects must showcase some new 
technologies taken from at least six large categories in “10 emerging technologies”. 












and new material 
for exterior wall   
Hollow concrete block Wall 
Extruded polystyrene board used for 
thermal insulation 
Roof and exterior wall   












Rubber Waterproofing Membrane Roof  
 
Unlike Toyota’s philosophy of adopting new technology, the use of new technology in 
Project A was heavily driven by the possibility of winning an external award. In 
proposing some of the new technologies, fundamental principles – such as whether 
the technology would improve the construction process appeared to be ignored. 
Furthermore, in the two cases mentioned here, the so-called emeging technology 
actually involves using newly improved materials with better functions, or in more 
sustainable forms. 
 
10.3.6.2 People-oriented practices  
Leaders and leadership (P9) 
(1) Organizational structure and leadership  
The typical organizational structure of Project A is highlighted in Figure 10.1. 
Technically, Project A is managed by one of PM Ma’s team, which belongs to 
BAOYE’s Hangzhou office. Unlike other project managers in BAOYE, PM Ma 
currently manages only one project, hence he has the real power in Project A. Project 
A’s leadership appeared to be more authoritative. Supporting evidence for this 
includes the fact that the project manager there (PM Ma) was fully in charge of project 
planning and decision making, whereas the workforce was doing only what the 
workers were asked to do.  
 
(2) People-oriented 
Unlike irresponsible construction firms, which effectively abuse the legitimate rights 
and interests of the frontline workers, Project A’s PM outlined that: “protecting our 
workforce has been integral to BAOYE’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
philosophy since 2000”. BAOYE has set up a working group of 30 staff specifically 
over dealing with issues concerning frontline workers’ legal interests. For example, 
the timely payment of wages was a major concern, especially during the Chinese 
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New Year holidays. The company has also set aside a certain amount of funds for 



















Figure 10.1 A project chart of BAOYE in Project A 
 
People management (P10) 
(1) Workers and teams 
Basically, the different tradesmen are from the labour-only subcontractors (as boxed 
in by the dotted line in Figure 10.1). One of the key features of the frontline workers is 
that their composition keeps changing, sometimes with low-skilled replacements. 
Moreover, within each trade, there are usually several team leaders who supervise 
the work, as well as a high-level supervisor who often has multiple teams committed 
to different projects (i.e. 3-10) for the same trade. The supervisor pays a small 
amount of management fees to his affiliate agency (a labour-only subcontractor), and 
that allows them to do business legally. An interview with some of the site engineers 
revealed that the management of low-skilled labour is ineffective and problematic. 
One challenge is that Project A was affected by the high turnover in the frontline 
workforce. According to one technical engineer, it really depends on the workers’ 
moods. If they are not happy, they will probably consider quitting or get a job 
elsewhere. The engineer added that the trade supervisors are quite reliable in terms 
Technical engineer 
Deputy PM 
(In charge of 
operations) 
Project Manager  
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of long-term collaboration. Normally, they would still be working with the project team 
on the next project, while some frontline workers are dismissed at the end of the 
project.  
 
(2) Workers selection  
With respect to the selection of workers, several project team members revealed that 
supervisors can be trusted, and play a key role in hiring workers. In line with Li and 
Peng’s (2006) observation, these supervisors are in charge of recruiting workers and 
know where and how to seek out cheap workers. The project manager has no 
preference over the frontline workers, as he knew one cannot expect too much of 
them. Moreover, when it comes to specialists or machine operators, the project team 
always carefully verifies their qualification certificates and sends their identification to 
the project office for records.    
 
(3) Training and multi-skills 
It is common to see that the average contractor personnel understands more or less 
most of the relevant knowledge that the Project A may require. Based on the 
organization chart of the project, as outlined in Figure 10.1, the team working on site 
is small, and so it is easier for the engineers or others to be exposed readily to new 
knowledge, and to pick this up quickly. When the PM was asked his opinion of multi-
skilled workers, he commented that, 
 
“Although one particular worker left us to work for another site, he will still be 
doing a similar job. This is because he has no opportunity to be trained for multi-
skills.” 
 
Relationships with partners (P11) 
(1) Multi-sourcing  
Reviewing the material records and other relevant documents confirms that a multi-
sourcing supplier strategy is presently adopted in Project A. Take rebar, for example. 
In the case of this material, every single purchase record was filed. It was found that 
there are a number of different types of rebar required, which are specified in the 
structural work plan. These range from HPB235 φ8, through HRB335 (φ10-φ22), to 
HRB400 φ20. No one single type of rebar was supplied through a single source, but 
instead multiple sources were used, involving up to six steel manufacturers in total. 
This is because the steel companies may not have the capacity or business interests 
in manufacturing all kinds of rebar. Nevertheless, Hangzhou Huaqing steel trade 
company was the only vendor, acting as an intermediary to supply whatever types of 
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rebar are needed from the steel companies for Project A. Meantime, this local vendor 
can also be found in BAOYE’s internally qualified vendor list, for supplying materials 
exclusively in the Hangzhou area. This again validates the interview findings that 
Chinese construction firms may not necessarily have direct partnerships with large 
manufacturers (e.g. steel companies), but through its partners/vendors, they use 
known products from the large manufacturers. 
 
(2) Long-term relationships 
A number of suppliers have worked with Project A for a very long time. The project 
team believes that their prices are reasonable most of the time. Unlike small 
construction firms, Project A understands the impact of the changing environment (i.e. 
price spread) could cause some SME suppliers to lose money, as the contract has 
already been signed. In circumstances like this, Project A would be willing to agree to 
a slight increase in price, especially if the negotiation had been carried out in the 
hope of achieving a long-term relationship.  
  
(3) Lean thinking is lacking at the supplier side 
Part of Toyota’s success is credited to its suppliers, which also practised the Toyota 
Way-style practices or lean thinking. However, Project A’s materials manager asserts 
that “lean thinking” is absent from the suppliers they collaborate with. For example, it 
is convenient for the contractor to offload materials or components with better 
packaging and organization. The challenging part is that some suppliers are still poor 
at this. One example relating to material packaging was given by the materials 
manager interviewed. When steel tubes are delivered by one tube vendor, they are 
never delivered in carefully organized packages. Due to this poor preliminary 
classification of tubes, non-value-adding activities need to be performed by the 
recipients (the contractor), to re-count and reclassify the different tubes according to 
the right specifications. Although Project A has more than once suggested that the 
supplier to improve its delivery service by focusing on the details, the supplier has 
never listened and continues to avoid practicing in a leaner way, despite the small 
amount of efforts required. There are many cases like this, where it is challenging to 
extend management skills to downstream partners or to consider them a part of the 




10.3.6.3 Problem-solving practices 
Genchi Genbutsu (P12) 
As indicated earlier, the project manager among other site-managerial employees, 
was quite active in genchi genbutsu, and hence had a good understanding of the site. 
The PM is quite close to his site team, although he sometimes appeared to be quite 
authoritative in delegating certain things such as planning and control. He has good 
analytical and listening skills. As he stated, he would investigate things personally if 
time allows, or he would ask the site engineers to report their first-hand observations 
to him. That became the basis of his and his management team’s decision making, 
and so they did not rely purely on experience. This is in line with the assessment 
results of the quality audit carried out by the headquarters, which the “leadership” 
category, PM Ma, along with his management team was rated as being “visible on 
site, and willing to get their hands dirty”. It is worth mentioning that among 102 
projects audited in the first quarter of 2011, 29 project managers were rated as “not 
fully in place”, meaning that they are frequently out of reach when problems are 
encountered.  
 
Decision making (P13) 
Due to the limited time available to the researcher in Project A, no forms of decision 
making were actually observed. Yet according to the responses of the PM and site 
engineers on this matter, it was revealed that most key decisions, such as those 
affecting the design of the site layout, project plans, and others, were made through 
consensus among core members of the project team. Meanwhile, the weekly meeting 
and other forms of meetings are the best venues in which decision making can be 
observed. According to Project A’s PM, a QC topic is still being sought for after even 
though the QC team have already reached out possible alternatives.  
 
Kaizen (P14) 
In Toyota’s view, kaizen is critical to everyday life for those working in Toyota. In 
Project A, it seems that this was least concerned about, since kaizen is not reflected 
in how they do things at the site level. However, an interview with PM Ma and the 
chief engineer confirmed that it is more feasible and with greater opportunities out 
there at the company level for kaizen to be conducted. For example, their regional 
office would help PM Ma and his team to access some other good project sites in the 
same region for them to learn about other practice. There are plenty of learning points, 
including a better workplace safety plan, a demonstration of the application of a new 
material or method for construction, and others. On the other hand, if Project A  has 
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shown something special that would enhance project performance, the regional office 
would also help the visiting teams to engage Project A for learning and sharing.    
 
10.3.7 Project B  
During the site visit, it was learnt that Project B was currently under schedule 
pressure. The project was then at the basement construction stage. There were two 
basement floors with a total area of 20,000 m2. Basement level two was completed, 
and workers were proceeding to carry out the work at level one. In addition, three 
specialized subcontractors were involved in the project: namely the installation, cable, 
and steel structure subcontractors. Data collection on this site concentrated on daily 
operations in the basement work.  
 
10.3.7.1 Process-oriented practices 
One-piece flow (P2) 
The basement area was divided into five pours, according to a number of “pour strips”. 
In each segment, several activities were performed in sequence: formwork erection, 
rebar embedment and installation, concrete placement and curing, and formwork 
removal. It was observed that the work was conducted under the “flow-line” 
philosophy. One of the young engineers interviewed spoke of the “flow-line” approach 
as “not very difficult, but a common approach for organizing construction”. An 
example of the flow-line approach could be seen when carpenters completed the 
formwork erection in segment 2, and then carried on the same work in segment 3. 
When the formwork in segment 2 was partially erected, free working space became 
available for the rebar embedment team, who was then able to squeeze in to begin 
their work, given that their work followed the formwork erection. By doing so, the 
workforce could be better utilized, and idle time minimized. It should be pointed out 
here that once the workers’ turnover increased, it might badly affect the flow of work. 
In Project B, the jianli supervisor has on more than one occasion warned the engineer 
that the carpenters’ progress affected the entire process, since their turnover 
appeared to be quite high.  
 
Waste elimination is the chief aim of the one-piece flow principle. In Project B, a 
number of waste or non-value-adding activities were spotted, including:  
(1) Waiting: Waiting for materials in Project B appeared to be a normal occurrence. 
For instance, it was seen that one type of rebar which should have been 
fabricated was in short supply, and that resulted in the rebar team becoming idled. 
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To quickly reduce the waiting time, an urgent note was sent to the rebar yard at 
short notice. One rebar worker spoke of the difficulties in getting the right amount 
of materials: “It is quite frequent for us to receive urgent orders to fabricate rebar, 
and to deviate from the original plan.”  
(2) Inventory: Inventory was frequently found all over the site, which were also 
claimed by several interviewees to be the safe level of inventory. There seems to 
be no solution for reducing inventory to the extent that a manufacturer could 
achieve.  
(3) Overproduction: In Project B, overproduction might be enhanced by the fact that 
the ordering of product (e.g. rebar) was faster than its consumption by 
downstream practitioners in the supply chain. Figure 10.2 illustrates that, as the 
site was constrained in size, materials such as rebar had to be piled up on the 














Figure 10.2 Inappropriate storage of rebar at Project B 
 
(4) Unnecessary transport and motion: It was clear from Figure 10.2 that some of 
these rebar still need to be fabricated before use. This would  require time and 
effort on the part of the workers to transport these materials to the right place for 
fabrication, since the rebar yard was at the side of the site.  
(5) Defect: Defects or “noncompliance” could easily be found on site (according to the 
jianli engineers). This was evident that the weekly report issued by the jianli 
always mentioned numerous defects and items that do not comply with the 
standards, and which the contractor was required to rectify. Admittedly, although it 
was claimed that quality management was implemented, it was implied that the 
“do right at the source” culture was not fully fostered in Project B. A majority of 
contractor personnel interviewed seemed aware of the consequence of rework, 
and would indeed support the idea of reducing rework by all means, but these 
statements would seem to came across empty promises.  
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Pull kanban system (P3) 
The researcher came to understand how the material was managed in Project B, in 
terms of whether it follows the “pull” principle or otherwise. There was no evidence to 
indicate any pull-associated activities or devices similar to the kanban system being 
used on site. Instead, the very conventional inventory-control means was mentioned 
by one of the interviewees: 
 
“The amount of materials that we procured mainly depends on the material price 
as well as on our weekly and monthly checks of material inventory. Basically, 
using the online reference price, as well as our experience or hunches, we 
determine whether it’s a good time to replenish the material. One thing is certain – 
if the price appears to be reasonable and the site condition allows for it, we will 
certainly procure in bulk”.  
 
Such a sentiment reflected that the concept of “zero inventory” was hardly feasible in 
Project B. Two possible reasons cited were in agreement with the interview findings, 
namely (1) price of materials, and (2) people’s high tolerance for inventory. The chief 
engineer conceded that they have found no better solution but to stockpile some 
materials on the supporting structure, even at the risk of violating the safety rules. 
Moreover, since the project manager might have committed himself to several 
projects, thus even if Project B was completed with extra rebar left unused, these 
would soon be transferred to other projects for use, or simply sold. This attitude 
explains why the personnel were slow in taking up the pull concept. However, it was 
pointed out that once the project approached its end, a tighter approach to material 
control would be adopted to minimize unnecessary wastes.  
 
Planning and control (Heijunka) (P4) 
(1) Last Planner  
According to the chief engineer in charge of project planning, the inputs to making 
weekly work assignments were not collected from the foremen or last planner of each 
trade. The foremen were not called to participate in these meetings, as they knew 
that their individual interests would not be taken into account when decisions were 
being made in the weekly plans. Conversely, in line with the interview findings, the 
chief engineer drew up weekly working plans for each trade and for the 
subcontractors, based on his own observations of the site process; this was 
considered to be the prevalent practice. Later, the weekly tasks would be shared with 
the foremen or the team leaders of the trades. To assist the chief engineer to put the 
weekly plan into practice, the foremen would allocate their existing labour resources 
based on the given schedule. Eventually, all this information would be conveyed to 
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the frontline workers. They might not be informed of the entire weekly plan all at one 
time, but it would gradually be communicated to them through their daily stand-up 
meeting. The chief engineer pointed out that the foremen and their trade members 
preferred to perform the given job within a finite amount of time, rather than to ask for 
their “commitments” in making their own plans. Apart from their poor skills in planning, 
this was also because they feared pinning down their commitments in written plans. 
In one engineer’s words, when the delay occurred or the workers failed to accomplish 
the assignments within the given time frame, they would not be willing to investigate 
the root causes, but instead quickly sought excuses to justify their poor performance, 
typically by blaming the plan from the project team for not taking into account their 
capabilities. This attitude was a big challenge in the implementation of LPS in the 
Chinese context. One foreman pointed out that, 
 
“Empowering plans to be made in a bottom-up way seems like a trap to me, since 
a fine or penalty will be imposed if the plan fails to be accomplished on time as 
promised.”  
 
(2) Weekly meeting  
The general contractor (BAOYE) met the subcontractors, foremen, trades supervisors, 
and others once every two weeks at the site meeting, where the issues that needed 
to be addressed included (1) issues that require the client or jianli to coordinate; (2) 
recurring problems discovered by the jianli and; (3) resource schedule for the coming 
week. In particular, when BAOYE met a client, they would not voluntarily expose their 
weakness or problems, but would request coordination on certain challenging issues. 
In (3), the discussion of resource schedule was of great importance. For example, in 
the event that the tower crane was in high demand, participants would discuss a 
detailed time table for the tower crane in the meeting to better utilize these limited 
resources.  
 
Built-in quality (P5) 
(1) General quality management 
Reviewing the documentation for quality management, as well as observing actual 
site operations, revealed that the basic requirements and instructions of quality 
management practice were followed. In a recent quality assessment conducted by 
the head office, the evaluation of Project B is not satisfactory in a number of areas. 
These included: 1) Quality: Ineffective development of rebar in tension in the joint of 
the stair slab and beam. In several places, vertical rebar is found to be offset. 2) 
Health & safety: In basement scaffolding erection, an insufficient number of horizontal 
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bars was used. 3) Machinery: One of the tower crane’s trolley wheels is damaged, 
causing constant friction and collision of trolley and lifting arm.  
 
It is also noted that the leadership was marked as “not in place”. In contrast to Project 
A, more quality problems and health and safety risks were identified by the audit team, 
thus reflecting that the commitment of the leadership to quality was absent.  
 
(2) Built-in quality(BIQ) thinking  
Instilling BIQ thinking into employees’ mindset requires a change in their thinking 
patterns. When asked whether BIQ was implemented into the operations, it was 
learnt that Project B also seems to rely heavily on quality inspections. An analogy 
referring to BIQ thinking was given by one site engineer in Project B:  
 
“The daily ‘tool box’ meeting could somehow serve as a kind of BIQ thinking, in 
which we repeatedly address the quality issues with the workforce, in the hope of 
creating a basic awareness for them to understand and act rightly and 
conscientiously.” 
 
Project B has a large quality management team, including one chief engineer, five 
site engineers, one quality engineer, and several quality engineers from the jianli. 
During operations, when the foremen and site engineers were walking around the site 
to act as sources of technical information, it was observed that they were not stopped 
by the workers for assistance. This would seem to be a missing link, where the 
culture of encouraging workers to raise questions and exposing problems has yet to 
be established.  
 
(3) Quality Circles  
Recently, QC in China has become mandatory for projects that intended to pursue 
quality awards. In order to qualify for such local quality awards, it is not uncommon to 
see a situation like Project B, where the formation of the project’s QC team was 
already proposed in the project plan. The QC plan was written into the agenda from 
the beginning, which was indeed a good starting point. In checking the QC-related 
meeting notes and preliminary results, it was found that, since the time the project 
commenced in late 2010, the planned QC team had never meet to discussed quality 
problems. This suggests that there appears to be a desire to delay QC activities to 
the very last minute, unless an appropriate reason for investigation was established. 
It is understandable that Project B was then still in the early stage of construction, and 
searching for a reason to investigate became their primary concern. Moreover, QC is 
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understood here as the publication of improvements for newly discovered issues that 
have not been encountered in other projects. That explains why the Project B team 
has taken so long to search for a topic – they do not want to repeat things that other 
projects had done before.  
 
Standardization (P6) 
(1) Standard operation procedures (SOPs) 
Standard operating procedures here did not meet the level of details, one would see 
in a Toyota assembly plant, in which every single step in the entire process follows a 
standard procedure. In Project B, construction plans for major processes, along with 
detailed technical drawings and others were checked. The staff only made sure that 
the elements of standardization – the work sequences – were illustrated. These were 
good examples of standardization, but could only be accessed and consulted in the 
project documentation room.    
  
(2) Technical review meeting 
At Toyota, information on SOPs is available in the form of standard worksheet and is 
visible at each worksite. Anyone would be able to check whether or not standardized 
work procedure is being followed simply by looking at such sheets. Construction is 
different, but these technical review meetings do serve a similar purpose, in which 
instructions are visually and verbally presented to the participants prior to the 
commencement of work. Figure 10.3 illustrates how the level of details of technical 
clarifications has progressed in Project B. It shows a simple relationship between the 
level of detail discussed in technical review meeting (Y-axis) and the level of 
participants’ position in the review meeting (X-axis). Simply put, as technical meetings 
migrate towards lower positions, more details needs to be explained. Generally, this 
starts with the regional office’s engineering department conveying the knowledge to 
the corresponding engineer in Project B. The online project management system 
ensures there is no need for the regional office engineer to be present on site, 
































Figure 10.3 The change of details in technical review meeting 
 
Once this step is completed, the project chief engineer, in a pre-work meeting or 
technical review meeting, then highlights key issues and instructions to the foremen, 
ensuring that they understand how to perform the work. Later, the foremen need to 
explain the same thing to their team leaders in a more detailed and practical way. 
This is because team leaders are less educated and less experienced than the 
foreman. Therefore, the foreman is required to explain more. Lastly, the team leaders 
will pass this know-how to their team members, using layman’s terms. At this stage, 
the meeting is usually conducted on site in an informal way. If team members 
encounter problems or hesitate to proceed with unclear issues, team leaders call for a 
quick site meeting at the gemba (the actual place), and repeat the key instructions. 
The problem is in the process from A to B (see Figure 10.3): it was discovered that 
sometimes no review meetings were conducted at all in Project B. This is to allow the 
crews to rush their work by cutting short or skipping the meeting. Instead, the project 
engineer printed out what the regional office has forwarded to them, and simply 
passed these print-outs to the foremen. As one site engineer explained: 
 
“It is common that such review meetings are skipped. When foremen encounter 
problems, they will come down and seek your help. That is very common. Project 
engineers are busy with day-to-day matters and have no time to engage in this. 















Visual management (P7) 
On several site visits to Project B, simple visual control in the form of large visual 
boards and small signals, dealing mainly with health and safety issues, were 
observed. However, from the engineers’ point of view, these visual efforts are just 
rote actions, and do not contain much information to reveal the variations that actually 
occur during operations. The visual control efforts were required by criteria of the 
“excellent construction site” award, initiated by the provincial construction bureau in 
Zhejiang, China. Because of this, quality engineers and site engineers needed to 
collect completed project photographs in order to reflect their efforts in keeping the 
site tidy, organized, etc. Additionally, they were also requested to take photographs to 
track the quality of part of their project, or of certain parts of the structure such as the 
levelness of a wall. The site PM claimed that such efforts are a key part of visual 
management.  
 
New technology adopted (P8)   
It is more appropriate to examine company B’s strategy in acquiring new technology 
at the firm level. Given that BAOYE has over 100 projects, it is more likely that the 
use of new technology derived from meeting the varying design requirements of 
different clients would be seen there. On the other hand, BAOYE is very active in 
promoting the use of prefabrication technology, and this too was reflected in 
BAOYE’s mission statement. To this end, BAOYE has been committed to research 
on industrialized housing since the time it became one of the national pilot companies 
for industrialized housing, nominated by the Ministry of Construction in 1997. So far, 
BAOYE has invested 200 million RMB to set up a R&D centre with nine individual 
laboratories focusing on structural safety, interior testing, durability, curtain wall, 
earthquake resistance, etc. Referring to the overarching significance of principle 8, 
the purpose of doing so is not only driven by the company mission, but also bearing 
the meaningful purpose of providing industrialized housing projects featuring 
“comfortable, low carbon, and recycled” products to society. The group has gained a 
number of patents derived from its R&D efforts and positioned BAOYE in the forefront 




10.3.7.2 People-oriented practices 
Leaders and leadership (P9) 
The team under PM Chen’s leadership has been working together for quite a long 
period. The leadership at site was rather confusing especially for outsiders. The 
project manager was Mr Chen, who was often away from the site. However, when he 
does show up, it was mainly to deal with issues relating to clients or visiting civil 
servents. The deputy PM, Mr Zhou, is a relative of the PM. Before Mr Zhou took over 
this project, he had limited knowledge of construction. The chief engineer (Mr Pan), 
on the other hand, acted the role of both project manager and technical advisor 
simultaneously, and he basically needs to take care of every matters on the site. The 
chief engineer pointed out that he checked the site operation twice a day. To achieve 
better time management in his position, he delegated some of these day-to-day 
responsibilities in order to have the time he needed to plan and reflect on daily 
matters. Some responsibilities, however, must be retained by the chief engineer – for 
example answering or clarifying technical questions from the subcontractors, foremen, 
and others.  
 
People management (P10) 
(1) Recruitment and retention  
Generally, the construction labour force is unstable and subjected to high turnover. In 
an interview with one carpenter, who recently joined Project B after the Chinese New 
Year (2011), he explained that he and his friends came to help the supervisor of the 
carpentry crew, or whom he referred to as the “boss”. This supervisor earned a 
reputation as a good foreman by valuing his team, offering generous and timely pay, 
and being close to his team members. The newcomers promised to work until the 
jobs assigned by the boss are done. Their boss usually runs 3 – 10 projects. This 
made it possible for him to facilitate labour mobility.      
 
(2) Training  
Overall, very little training was given to enhance the capabilities of the contractor 
personnel, not alone the frontline workers. According to the interviewees, the head 
office organizes training for the project engineers twice a year, in order to let them 
catch up on developments in engineering and to update their skills in the areas of, 
e.g., construction technology in high-rise buildings, and deep excavation pits. More 
commonly, the head office directly posts training information on a regular basis 
through the company online project management system. In terms of the on-the-job 
training, the newly recruited site engineers for example, would be assigned a mentor, 
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following the so-called in-house mentorship scheme. According to one engineer, 
normally they do not have on-the-job training, but the site itself is a good classroom 
as his direct supervisor encouraged him to ask questions. In receiving the answers, 
he would learn the skills to tackle similar problems.  
 
(3) Motivation 
It is not easy to educate frontline workers, especially in terms of their behaviour and 
ways of operating. Warnings are among the most common punitive measures 
adopted by the managers. Fines are the least commonly seen measure, as they are 
viewed as ineffective. In terms of the financial incentives, the project team has 
consulted with clients on the issue of the extent to which these incentives should be 
deployed. The bottom line was that financial incentives would not be given just for 
following the basic site rules and standards. Further, the project team thought it would 
be more effective to organize competitions. For example, a “safety awareness 
competition” was conducted in Project B, aiming to raise awareness of the safety 
culture at the workers level. The competition contained 100 safety-related questions, 
and a token award is given to the employees who answered the most questions 
correctly. It was agreed that good pay is the most effective approach to motivation. 
An interview with several carpenters confirmed this: one carpenters came to work for 
Project B because of the good pay of 170 RMB/day. Their counterparts working at 
nearby sites doing the same job were paid 20 RMB less. In addition, this carpenter 
has promised to work until the end of this project with the team, when he would 
receive his total wages as a lump sum.  
 
Relationship with partners (P11) 
BAOYE has its own list of qualified partners. At the outset of the project, the project 
team can seek the advice of the head office in selecting regional qualified partners. 
Once the project has been completed, the project team can in turn recommend the 
high-performing partners to the company’s procurement department for consideration, 
with the purpose of enlarging the company’s partner list. Project B has adopted the 
evaluation criteria created by BAOYE’s head office, in order to assess firms for first 
time collaboration. There are nine areas as shown in Table 10.6 that require suppliers 
or subcontractors to provide relevant and concrete information. These include three 
key criteria: business status quo, service, and process. Moreover, according to the 
project manager, all the partners listed undergo a so-called thorough assessment on 
completion of their work. The next task is to work on partnerships with some of them. 
So far, for weak or poor performing suppliers, the approach taken was to simply 
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remove them from the list. Trying to help them improve their work is not seen as a 
practical future plan in Project B.  
 
Table 10.6 Three key criteria and their underlying evaluation items  




Business scope and related 
qualifications (i.e. “premier”, “first”, 
“second”, etc.) 
Previous projects  Rewards  
Reputation   Client royalty and satisfaction   
Service 
Price  Compared to the market price  
Schedule Delivery ability (i.e. is JIT adopted?) 
Quality of product or service  




Production capacity to meet the 
changing requirements  
Quality management  TQM, ISO certified, etc.  
Health and safety 
Plans of health and safety training, 
records 
Environment management  ISO14000 certification  
 
10.3.7.3 Problem-solving practices 
Genchi Genbutsu (P12) 
The management team at the site level is reasonably visible in the workplace except 
for Mr. Chen (the PM). On a number of visits, the various managerial personnel could 
often be seen on site, checking on workers’ performance. As revealed by Project B’s 
chief engineers, site engineers are required to spend about 90% of their time working 
on the site. Their frequent presence on the site provides easy access for workers if 
things go wrong, and also for just-in-time clarification and solutions.  
 
Decision making (P13) 
Overall, many quality problems were detected in Project B in the quality assessment 
exercise, conducted in March, 2011. For example, rebar alignment problems were 
spotted. However, this issue did not receive enough attention from Project B’s site 
team, since as weeks after the assessment, similar problems were found: after the 
basement second-floor concrete pours, the vertical steel rebar in one of the columns, 
was out of alignment by up to 50mm, owing to the pressure that resulted from the 
concrete pours. The chief engineer quickly came to the site to understand the causes. 
It was quickly diagnosed as a quality problem – the impact resulting from the concrete 
pours, as well as the poor workmanship of the rebar placement. As the jianli 
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engineers were not aware of the problem, the chief engineer – without discussing 
countermeasures with his site engineers or attempting to achieve consensus – 
ordered the workers to cut off the misaligned rebar, and to let the carpenters seal the 
formwork and cover up the defects. The chief engineer did not give reasons for this 
decision. Later, one site engineer explained that his “cut-the-corner” strategy was 
aimed at not exposing the problem to the jianli and getting him in trouble.   
 
Kaizen (P14) 
From the case highlighted above, it can be seen that continuous improvement was 
also lacking in Project B. Since Project B commenced in October 2010, no QC team 
members have sat  down to discuss improvement. Instead, the list of items that 
needed to be rectified or improved actually came from the jianli’s notes, which as an 
external source urged the project team to improve on the defects that have been 
spotted.  
 
10.4 Case Company B  
10.4.1 Background information of Company B 
Company B is based in Wuhan, Hubei province and operates in the public and private 
sectors across China. Company B has a revenue of RMB20 billion (US$3.17 billion) 
in 2011, and had a workforce of 3,300.  
 
10.4.2 Company B’s guiding principles 
To obtain information on the company’s philosophy of conducting business, two 
interviews were conducted; one with a deputy manager of company B, and the other 
one with the project manager. The core values of Company B are stated as follows: 
(1) to provide the best service to clients, (2) to maximize value for shareholders, (3) to 
enhance the well-being of employees, and (4) to improve the living environment for 
people. It is worth mentioning that company B is a third-tier subsidiary of a leading 
large-scale Chinese construction firm, which is organizationally complex, with multiple 
departments and systems. Given these relationships, the core philosophies of the 
company are actually taken from its mother company. How the guiding principles 
impact project operations, people management, and other functions at both the firm 




10.4.3 Overview of Project C 
Project C was selected to review the extent to which Company B’s daily operations 
are in line with the Toyota Way principles. Project C is located in Wuhan, Hubei 
province. Given that this project is poised to become an important venue to 
commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution 7 , the stakeholders 
involved were fully aware of its political significance. The contractor is company B, 
and the client is a leading real estate developer in China. This was a RMB 1.23 billion 
(US$195 million) project to construct two hotels, three office buildings, two malls, and 
five high-end residential buildings on a site area of 106,200 m2. Because of the 
enormous size of the project, it was decided to develop the project in two phases. 
Taking into account the required deliverable dates of each building, as well as the 
status of ongoing site demolition works, Project C was further divided into five distinct 
sites (see Table 10.7).  
 











(South plot site A) 




- 5A- class office building x 1 42 
Phase 2 
(South plot site B) 




- Mall x 1 3 
Phase 2 
(North plot site C 
and D) 
1 Mall x 1 3 
190,000 m
2
 2 & 3 High-end residential building x2 43 
6 & 7 High-end residential building x2 42 
Phase 2 
(North plot site E) 




9 & 11 SOHO Office building x 2 22 
10 Office building x1 10 
8 Shopping Mall x1 3 
Note: Building No.4 was omitted because the number 4 was inauspicious in Chinese 
culture and was thus not used by the project team. 
 
As highlighted in Table 10.7, Phase 1 contains South plot site A, which has a total 
gross floor area of 130,000 m2. This involves the construction of a 22-storey five-star 
hotel and a 42-storey 5A-class office building with two basements. Phase 2 includes 
the South plot site B, and the whole north plot, which contains another three 
individual sites. The sequence of Project C started with the construction of site A on 
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the South plot, and then proceeded to South plot site B, followed by the construction 


















Figure 10.4 Project C’s site plan 
 
Each site consists of five stages of work: foundation and piling, earthworks and 
internal support systems, basement construction, main structure, and exterior and 
interior finishes. Although these can run concurrently, each site contained its own 
subprojects and required distinctive leadership, capacities, and processes. 
 
10.4.3.1 Challenges encountered in Project C 
The difficulties and challenges associated with Project C were noted. Apart from 
some technical difficulties, such as health and safety issues involved in excavating 
the phase I foundation area (which covering an area of 13,600m2), and the massive 
concrete pours, several external challenges also needed to be tackled. These include: 
(1) poor preliminary preparation, (2) the pressure of tight schedule, and (3) design 
changes.  
 
Firstly, one of the biggest challenges in the early stage was some of the incomplete 
elements that emerged when the project was about to commence. The preliminary 
preparations appeared to be poor and inadequate. For example, drawings were 
incomplete, site demolition works were incomplete, and so on. All these “incomplete 
jobs” contributed to a delayed start to the actual construction of Phase 1. It also 
caused much inconvenience for project team in planning the work efficiently. 
Secondly, the total period for construction was set to be 1,025 days. Given that the 
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three Chinese New Year periods and three winter construction periods. This is 
because in China, the labour situation, as well as the harsh climatic conditions in 
winter, would slow the progress of work during these periods. Thirdly, there were a 
few design changes (see Table 10.8) endorsed by the client, which created more 
work. Logically, the deadline should have been moved forward, but since the added 
work was associated with an up-scale hotel and office building, it was natural that the 
client wanted the project to be completed earlier, so that revenues and tenants could 
be secured earlier. Consequently, the deadlines were also affected.   
 


















2009.10.10 2010.4.30 2010.9.15 2 floors 
added to 
20 floors 
Adjusted 2009.11.11 2010.5.20 2010.8.30 







2009.10.10 2010.5.20 2011.3.21 8 floors 
added to 
34 floors 
Adjusted 2009.12.29 2010.5.20 2011.1.10 
Difference delay 80d no change 150d earlier 
 
Overall, Project C had a delayed start, and was undertaken in circumstances in which 
the deadlines of sub-projects were drastically affected. There was also the high 
likelihood of potential penalties being imposed if the project was not completed on 
schedule. 
 
10.4.3.2 Process-oriented practices 
One-piece flow (P2) 
(1) The uninterrupted workflow  
The construction site of Project C is huge, and the work was well in progress on 
several sites, where people were working in sequence on their given tasks. Guided 
by well-thought out designed work plans, almost no idle time was expected, and 
everyone had work to do. An interview with several site managers confirmed that 
among all the factors, (1) maintaining stable manpower, (2) having a complete set of 
detailed designs, and (3) commitments made in detailed planning, were the key 
factors highlighted in achieving “one-piece” flow in Project C. Firstly, in the case of the 
selection of workers, the project was in favour of not only those who had prior 
experiences with similar projects or with the same client, but also those high-
performing work teams with high levels of morale, commitment, and productivity. The 
project manager believed that retaining high-performance work teams is one solution 
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to make one-piece workflow successful. Project C also had an agreement with 
several other teams to keep them as “spare teams” in case of labour shortages being 
encountered, or of the project going off the scheduled track. Secondly, following a 
discussion dealing with the problem of the unnecessary waiting time that might be 
caused by incomplete designs, the project team came up with a proactive initiative to 
turn up the heat on the design institute: they sent a full-time engineer to coordinate 
and exchange the information that is needed. Thirdly, the project manager 
acknowledged that tremendous efforts were made in planning and control. The 
planning team was very committed and gave much attention to details. Take for 
example the 5A office building on site A: Prior to the concrete being poured for its 
foundation slab, the concrete plan was already carefully drawn up, with all the details 
considered. The concrete pour was expected to be undertaken in a one-piece flow 
manner, to ensure that the work would be done right in the first instance. The plan 
started by setting out the quantities of concrete needed for each section 8 , as 
highlighted in Table 10.9. In order to ensure that concrete can be pumped 
continuously, two nearby concrete batching plants were used. The number of 
vehicles needed to transport the ready-mixed concrete in a timely fashion to feed the 
pumps was also considered in the context of the following factors: the average output 
of a pump (30 m3/h), the maximum volume of each truck carrying ready-mixed 
concrete (8 m3), the speed of the trucks, distance between the concrete batching 
plants and the site (20 km), and the allowable waiting time (2 hours). The end result 
was that each pump was associated with twelve trucks.  
 
Table 10.9 Quantities of concrete needed for six sections of 5A building’s foundation 
slab 
Sections S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 
Quantities (m
3
) 3,580 1,640 1,200 780 1,050 8,230 
Hours (h) 60 27 40 26 35 92 
No. of pumps 2 2 1 1 1 3 
No. of trucks 24 24 12 12 12 36 
  
Furthermore, transportation routes were discussed and finalized as illustrated in 
Figure 10.5. In Figure 10.5, the green line represents the route of the trucks, which 
transport the ready-mixed concrete, and the blue line highlights the sequence of 
concrete pours in each section.  
 
 
                                                     
8
 The site was divided into six sections based on the number of “pour strips”. 
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Given all the challenges highlighted, the Phase I project was completed within budget 
and ahead of schedule, and received commendable comments from the clients. It is 
worth mentioning that the main structure of the 5A office building was completed 152 
days earlier than originally planned.  
 
Pull kanban system (P3) 
(1) Phase I: push to support full scale construction 
Project C adopted mixed pull and push strategies for material procurement in different 
phases. In Phase I, given that the construction volume was relatively small, and 
under great pressure to deliver the sub-project on time, the push strategy was 
adopted. This is because it was the first time that Company B is working with the 
client. Strategically speaking, if Phase I can be successfully completed in time, the 
company would win more confidence from the client. The project team decided to 
prepare the material and equipment resources as much as necessary in order to 
support Phase I construction to be carried out at full speed. Furthermore, the 
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conditions of the site also allowed for much inventory to be stockpiled. In other words, 
there is no need for materials procurement to take into account the site requirements; 
this can simply be based on bills of quantities. 
 
(2) Phase II: pulled by site needs   
When the project progressed to Phase II, in which many more working spaces were 
released on different sites, many more workers were brought in, more constraints 
were encountered. Subsequently, the project team conceded that the material 
strategy for Phase I was no longer appropriate and needed to change. Firstly, in the 
case of rebar procurement, Project C set up a “rebar team” – an independent team 
under the materials department – to deal with all matters associated with rebar, 
including rebar planning, procurement, quality checks, storage, fabrication, and 
others. This “rebar team” consisted of five full-time employees with their job scope 
and responsibilities clearly identified. This also resulted in frequent communications 
with supervisors in different sites, suppliers and steel vendors. 
 
For example, in one of the sub-projects of Phase II (i.e. residential building No. 2), the 
rebar team ordered rebar based on the cycle time of 5-floor intervals, rather than for 
each single floor use. The reason why five floors were taken together as a unit was 
that the project plans mandated the removal of formwork every five floors for reuse 
purposes. To the rebar team, this then meant that the use of rebar should 
accommodate the five floors worth of production. As the deadline window was locked, 
it was therefore necessary for the crew to construct one floor in about three days, or 
five floors in 15-16 days. The procedures for rebar purchase were explained by the 
PM as follows. It started from setting out one floor of the No. 2 residential building. 
Once the setting-out information was available, the rebar team could produce a 
material resource plan for five floors of use. The plan was then submitted to the 
technical department for a thorough review, including validation of whether the plan 
was technically and economically viable. Before finally placing the order, the site 
manager’s review and approval was also required. 
 
This process explains the reason why a moderate level of rebar inventory was 
observed during site visits. The PM outlined that it was possible to shorten the 
delivery cycle into three days in order to accommodate just one floor, but that this 
was not economically feasible. Such frequent delivery would result in unnecessary 
transportation costs; it would add risks for both sides, since the rebar prices changed 
on a daily basis.  
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Planning and control (heijunka) (P4) 
(1) Four levels of plan  
Table 10.10 illustrates the key elements of the plans, along with the relevant 
departments and employees involved in the planning process. As with the LPS’s 
hierarchical structure, the project plan used in Project C has four sub-elements.  
 
Table 10.10 Project C’s hierarchical plans  
Level Name of plans Planners  Reviewers 
1 Milestone plan 
Client and general 
contractor (GC) 
- 























Daily plan  
 
(2) Project Planning Taskforce  
At the outset of Project C, the project team set up a “Project Planning Taskforce” 
(PPT), whose main tasks and responsibilities consisted of the following: 
a) Keeping the master plan and phase plans up to date.  
b) Releasing daily plans, as well as daily resources plans. 
c) Coordinating with various site teams on their progress, given that space conflicts 
were common. A detailed timetable was requested to highlight working 
sequences and allocated duration. 
d) Checking and analysing the status of activities on a daily basis, and announcing 
daily progress at the daily meetings.  
e) Adjusting the daily plan in a timely manner for the following day, including the 
adjusted resources plan. 
It was claimed by one PPT member that, in order to achieve a high level of accuracy 
and reliability in the daily plans, it was necessary for top management to show their 
commitments. This explained why the management staff of Project C stayed in the 





(3) Daily plan and control 
Most projects break down the master plan into weekly plans, and this approach may 
work well for smaller projects whose risks are known. However, taking into account all 
the challenges mentioned above, extra efforts were needed. The taskforce introduced 
a simple spreadsheet, entitled “daily plan control”, to break the daily workload further 
into detailed sub-tasks for the relevant parties. The project would arrive at the 
situation captured in Table 10.11 (for example) by diligently checking against the 
completion status of the daily work assigned, and the availability of machinery, labour 
resources, material inventory, etc. Thorough factor analysis and the removal of 
constraints rewarded the site team of Project C a better understanding of the 
schedule.  
 
(4) “Accomplished item” control sheet 
In addition to the daily plan, there was another daily meeting later in the day to review 
the extent to which the tasks that were given to related parties had been 
accomplished. The number of pages for the control sheets were long, but the 
procedure was straightforward: simply select the present date (i.e. 12 December, 
2010), and a list of tasks with starting date 12 December, 2010 was quickly shown to 
the participants. Figure 10.6 would be more or less in line with PPC (one component 
of LPS). Similarly, the so-called accomplished item control method was introduced, 
and was thought of as a very dynamic tool for monitoring “commitments” in 
completing assigned work.  






Table 10.11 An example of daily plan adopted in Project C  








Status quo  
by 21
st
























(1) Formwork panels 
of second floor 
basement wall is 
completely removed 
(2) Scaffold support 
beams has been 
erected 
(3) Setting out the 











Need to carry out 
waterproofing 















work at several 
points.  
(2)The concrete 
team should also 
squeeze in and 










excavation up to 500 
m
3










Carry on earthwork 





trucks used to 
remove the soil  















@E, G, and J axis  
(2) rebar cage 
fabrication at 

































(1) around 1/3 of the 
beam rebar 
placement work is 
completed  
(2)  around ½ of 
formwork for wall and 














(1) Finish wall 
formwork and 
column formwork  
(2) Complete 
replacement of rebar 
within walls and 2/3 
of beams 
Rebar workers  
(60, 60)  
Carpenters  











Status quo  
by 21
st























 April,  
2011 
Clean up the pit 
Rebar team 
mobilizes 
into the site 
Rebar work 
840 t (740t) 
(1) Complete 
replacement of rebar 
at pit  
(2) Finish earthwork 
excavation  
(3) Concrete cushion 











Quality status on 21
st
 April:  
1. It was found at two places where a row of beam hoop reinforcement is not installed: beams at podium zone 2-1: K/2-3 axis. 
2. Check with jianli that elevation of slab at basement first floor, and formwork of podium zone 2-1 is within scope of specifications. 
7 
Site health and safety records:  
1. Serious water leakage problem between supporting piles @zone 3.   
2. Pit wall slope crack unhandled near gate entrance #1 (@zone 3) area.   
3. The following processes do require extensive monitoring: (a) the installation of 3# tower crane, (b) stability of excavation slope and material 
platform, and (c) shear wall formwork removal @zone 1). 
8 
Main constraints:  
Acceleration is needed in installing 1# and 3# cranes. 
  
Potential obstacles would affect the plan: 
1. Insufficient numbers of rebar workers at the pit area. 




As shown in Figure 10.6, the anticipated dates of completion for each sub-task were 
also indicated, as well as the level of priority (urgent, important, less important, etc.). 
To differentiate between completion statuses, those that have been “accomplished” 
successfully were marked in grey. If a slip occurs, the reasons for the delay must be 
stated in the margin, in the “remark” column. A first warning would be issued to those 
responsible. Accordingly, a new completion date must be justified by the relevant 
party in a timely fashion. At this stage, no fine would be imposed, as the buffers 
allocated in the original plan to protect against uncertainties may suffice here. All the 
relevant parties (i.e. subcontractors, trades, etc.) are allowed to adjust their 
completion dates up to three times. If the assigned tasks remain uncompleted when 
all three allowable adjustments have been used up, the project team would impose a 
penalty in proportion to the costs and inconvenience caused to others. Overall, this 
simple “accomplished item” control method embraces the principles of visual 
management (P7) to present daily work, as well as the principle of pull (P3) to remind 
the participants of the sequence of related tasks. 
 
(5) Are the outcomes LPS practices  
Endeavours were made to provide more details in the plans, as shown earlier. To 
reiterate, each of the four hierarchical plans were closely monitored, and timely 
adjustments were quickly made. The PPT members analysed the variations derived 
from the original plans, removing constraints and adjusting the plans accordingly. All 
these efforts ensured that the master plan would stay on track. Principally, this 
scheduling method is in line with the principles underpinning the last planner system 
(LPS). Both focused on the reliability of agreed daily and weekly plans. As a result, 
the outcomes were rewarding. The Phase I projects, including two buildings, were 
successfully handed over to the client, both ahead of the original plan. Furthermore, 
one engineer interviewed, who was also aware of this practice, explained that to 
ensure the daily plan works well, workers are required to work in two shifts. At peak 
hours in Project C, when most workers were needed, there were 3,000 workers at the 
same time, along with hundreds of machines and equipment. The workers gave up all 
their public holidays, and turned long holidays into “construction golden weeks”.  
 
Built-in quality (P5) 
(1) General quality management  
In an interview with a project manager from Project C, it was disclosed that there is 
no shortcut when it comes to quality issues. According to the interviewee, the concept 
of “good quality does not result from monitoring and inspection, but from building it in” 
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was employed. However, numerous defects were still spotted every day. Unlike the 
conventional way in which the quality-control team is set up within the project team, 
here the established quality team at project C was supervised by someone directly 
from head office (Company B). In other words, the quality supervisor is independent 
from the project team, and his duties include conducting monthly meetings to discuss 
quality problems arising from the site. The status of quality issues would be directly 
reported to the corresponding department at the company level. This was a strong 
message to Project C that the head office was very keen on project quality, even 
though the client seems to be more interested in speed over quality. It is worth 
pointing out that the quality objective set by the client was merely targeting for each 
unit of construction to pass the first inspection with 100% acceptance rate, whereas 
Company B aimed for a high-level quality award as part of its strategic intent.   
 
(2) Built-in quality  
The request to implement built-in quality has appeared in the method statement in 
several areas, including floor-concrete construction, steel construction, waterproof 
construction, joint construction, and interior finishing. The reason for this is that the 
cost of rework in these areas would be high, if defects were to be found. Moreover, 
the project manager believed that the most effective way of instituting built-in quality 
is to select a high-performing work team with the right attitude to take ownership of 
project quality.  
  
Standardization (P6) 
A number of standardizations for major construction processes could be found on site, 
including “formwork”, “concreting”, “windows and doors”, and others. The written 
standards for these were based on lessons learnt from past similar projects, and from 
taking this present project’s unique characteristics into account. For example, the 
construction plans for rebar construction clearly described the fabrication of rebar, 
rebar joints, and rebar placement in standard ways. More specifically, the rebar 
placement for different structural parts was designed to have their own standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). In addition, other standardized items included quality 
of work, inspection procedures, and others.  
 
(1) Repetitive process  
Project C included several high-rise buildings, whose superstructure with standard 
floor design could be seen as a repetitive process. As highlighted in Table 10.12, 
each floor was planned to be completed on a 3.5-day cycle.  
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2010.7.30 2011.1.10 2011.10.20 
3.6day/floor Adjusted 2010.6.1 2010.9.26 2011.3.10 







2010.7.30 2011.1.10 2011.10.20 
3.7day/floor Adjusted 2010.6.1 2010.9.30 2011.3.20 
Difference 59d early 43d early 155d early 
 
Initially, the floor cycle took about four days, but after overcoming the learning 
process, the cycle of building one floor was reduced to three days, and the project 
proceeded smoothly as the workers become more efficient. To successfully apply the 
same production rhythm on the remaining floors, this should be carried out in 
accordance with the standards set in completing the first floor (also called the 
benchmarking floor). In a very restricted way, crew composition, daily construction 
activities and volume, crew size, and the required tools and equipment are carefully 
designed.  
 
(2) New standardization development 
One project engineer interviewed spoke of the difficulties in getting workers to 
suggest new ideas to bring current standardization efforts to a new level. The biggest 
challenge cited was the quality of the workers. These frontline workers lacked 
creativity, and simply do what they were told to do. However, there would always be 
positive contributions made by some senior workers, to whom the project engineer 
did not hesitate to give credit. For example, compared with the conventional methods 
of supporting formwork used for high-rise elevator shafts – which used traditional 
metal-frame scaffolds – a new idea came from one experienced frontline worker, who 
proposed an improved scaffold system using a triangle-steel-structured platform 
which could be hoisted up. This resulted in a safer work environment. The project 
team appreciated the potential of this improved method, and offered assistance to the 
worker to put this new elevator shaft formwork on paper. A patent was later filed. This 
improvement quickly drew the attention of the local construction authority, and its 
application was encouraged in the remaining high-rise buildings in Project C, and also 




Visual Management (P7) 
This project had all the CI boards displayed to the public, as required on site . This 
includes project information, project team structure, etc. In addition, at the entrance to 
the site, a large LED screen was placed, displaying a countdown to the completion 
date of certain major processes. Figure 10.7 is one example of this, highlighting to the 
project team and the workers that there were 92 days to 30 June 2011 – the deadline 












Figure 10.7 An electronic board displays the next handover day of façade finishing  
 
10.4.3.3 People-oriented practices 
Leaders and leadership (P9) 
(1) Leadership quality and development  
Given that Project C was viewed as a key project, the project team was carefully 
assembled to garner success. The project manager is a leader with a wealth of 
experience in quality management, scheduling, etc. from his previous work on similar 
mega-projects. Based on the PM’s experience and understanding of the company 
culture, the PM pointed out that Company B is committed to nurturing two “skills 
paths” for its future leaders: The first path deals with “width”, meaning that leaders are 
expected to gain experiences from different departments, and to have good exposure 
to various functions. The second concerns the “depth” of the leaders’ professional 
knowledge: the company values their existing skills sets with specializations in certain 
areas. It was then hoped that a complete skills sets could help to solve problems and 
contribute to the project’s success. Simply put, prior to placing someone in a 
leadership position, Company B paid much attention to the candidate’s prior 




(2) People-oriented leadership  
Effective labour management on site was the key to team stability and harmony, 
which eventually led to project success. This was especially true when the project 
progressed to a period, when there are more than 2,000 frontline workers working at 
the same time – a situation which gave unexpected challenges to management. 
Reportedly, during the spring festival in 2011, many groceries were bought and 
stored in a chilled storage place rented by the management of Project C exclusively 
for the workers. Meanwhile, the project team purchased fresh vegetables and other 
goods from the market for the workers. These illustrated the concern management 
had demonstrated for the workers.  
 
Teamwork and exceptional employees (P10)   
(1) People selection  
Company B has an established human resource recruitment policy. According to 
Company B, four aspects of potential candidates were highly valued. Their moral 
virtue was valued, so were their work experience, work performance, and peer views. 
In additional, the primary focus was placed on working experience. As explained by 
the project manager, 
 
“Experience is the key and the source of aspiration. It also provides leaders the 
platform to develop, exercise, and improve their (critical) thinking, (long-term) 
vision, decision making, and problem-solving skills.” 
 
(2) Mentorship for recruits 
Company B’s fast growth and development in recent years has seen urgent demands 
for both skilled managerial and technical personnel. Company B has employed more 
than 1,000 employees since 2009, although the general manager claimed that staff 
recruitment, along with the acquisition of technology, seemed to lag behind, and 
cannot appropriately accommodate the company’s rapid development. At the project 
level, it was reported that about 50 fresh employees joined the Project C’s site team 
since 2010. The project team encouraged a high-quality mentoring scheme. The site 
managers interviewed from the five main sites confirmed that it has become a 
mandated norm that new employees must work along with identified mentors for a 
period of time. For this reason, workshops were conducted to discuss how to select 
the most suitably experienced “mentors” for the new recruits. Not only has the training 
materials describing “what knowledge mentors need to teach their students” been 
standardized, the desirable outcome of the mentor scheme has also been defined. By 
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the end of 2010, Project C, for the first time, ran an “Excellence in Mentorship” 
competition to recognise the most high-performing mentor-student pairs.  
 
It was anticipated that when the present project (Project C) was completed, a few 
potential employees would be recommended to the head office for better future 
career opportunities and development. Those young recruits would be placed in key 
positions in various departments, or would continue to work on iconic projects. It is 
also important to highlight that Company B evaluated employees’ performance as 
one key element, but also took account of their moral and disciplinary behaviour.  
 
(3) Teamwork  
When labour demand reached its peak, another matter that increased was the 
number of working spaces, along with the associated health and safety risks. 
Traditionally, in smaller projects, the subcontractor has one supervisor to manage the 
teams and who was responsible for the entire team’s results. The site managers 
interviewed asserted that this model was obviously inadequate in Project C, given 
that there were substantial numbers of frontline employees working at the same time. 
Instead, Project C introduced a new approach that demanded empowerment and 
teamwork. As noted, the site managers expanded their roles to a lower level, to 
include smaller teams (i.e., 10-12 team members), with one supervisor serving as the 
team leader. These team leaders quickly became the focal points, and took 
responsibility for setting goals, making decisions, providing information, removing 
barriers, and simple planning. It was observed that team members gathered around 
the team leader at the beginning of each working day, and the team leader would 
then allocate tasks, specify the work contents in details, analyse the points of 
potential risks and hazards, etc. The stand-up meeting ended with a check of 
everyone’s personal protective equipment (PPE). When the work was done at the 
end of the day, the team leader also organized the team members to clean areas as 
necessary. After the team leaders have checked their work, they then pointed 
comments on the current status of the work.  
  
(4) Training  
At the project level, the PM conceded that time was scarce in this project. As a result, 
not all relevant solutions to the labour shortage, such as training, could be considered. 
Rather, what they adopted was to simply dismiss workers with poor attitudes and 
skills sets. In order to replace them, the project manager would then asked the 
labour-only subcontractors for new replacements. However, in some ways, training 
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has to be provided. With a small investment of time and goodwill, the contractor could 
overcome out a crisis, for example when it was difficult to find someone with skills 
that can customize reinforcement cages. The Project C team invited several 
professionals from a nearby factory that specialized in customizing rebar, and asked 
them to provide hands-on training for their on-site ironworkers. To make it more 
formal, officers from the local construction bureau were also invited to assess and 
issue certificates for these specialists, once the training was completed.  
 
(5) Multi-skills 
Multi-skills training is another core element of the training system. Over the past 
several years, there has been increasing recognition by top management of the need 
to equip new recruits with multi-skills or cross-departmental training. The project 
manager pointed out that in Company B, the rotation of young employees through a 
wide range of positions has been implemented for many years, in order to enhance 
their experience. For instance, those with technical backgrounds (civil, M&E, etc.) 
were more likely to be rotated to work in a management-related department, while 
those with their primary skills sets in management training would be placed in 
commercial departments, such as bidding. The top management noted the 
importance of, and the need for, training in various skills that extend beyond the 
topics they already trained in. This would allow employees to develop a full range of 
knowledge and skills now expected by the modern construction industry. It was also 
good for employees to find out what their true passion and interests were.  
 
(6) Outcomes of motivation  
The result of Company B’s people management approaches turned out to be 
rewarding. At the company level, 90% of the new recruits became the backbone of 
the business. Among them, a hundred young employees became project 
management assistants serving in various projects. Moreover, with respect to the 
workers’ contributions to improving certain parts of the construction process, the 
project team not only gave financial incentives, but also recommended one crew to 
the head office for competing in the “best crew award” of 2011.  
 
(7) The undesirable effects of lean  
In the period of schedule acceleration, the workers devised slogans to motivate 
themselves. These included, “men work like machines, women work like men”, or “no 
leave, no sickness, and no home”, etc. All these implied that the workers were 
operating under enormous pressure. Furthermore, the on-site first aid station 
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revealed that 80% of employees had consulted with the doctor during the project. In 
the Chinese view, these facts reflected the workers’ resilience and strong ability to 
endure the hardship. On the other hand, it should be realized that their sicknesses 
and hospitalization were caused by fatigue and hard work, which was precisely what 
Liker (2004) explained as another form of waste – Muri (overburden).   
 
Relationships with partners (P11) 
(1) Supplier and subcontractor management  
The project team highlighted that there was rigorous assessment of suppliers, 
vendors, subcontractors, and other partners on a yearly basis at the company level. 
The purpose was to evaluate their performance and to maintain a long-term 
relationship. However, if a supplier did not show sustained delivery performance to a 
satisfactory level, Company B would confirm with the supplier to remove its name 
from the qualified list. According to the PM, evaluating suppliers’ performance in 
Company B appeared to be quite hierarchical, given that Company B is a third-tier 
subsidiary of a complex organization. The evaluation starts from the project level, 
where the project team would recommend good partner candidates to Company B for 
review. Later, the assessment results would need to be forwarded to Company B. 
Within Company B, there is a list of all the qualified partners, categorized based on 
region. In other words, when company B ventured into other regions outside Wuhan 
or Hubei province, it would firstly consult this list to select local suppliers from the 
corresponding regions. As indicated earlier, this was the first time Company B worked 
with the client. It was not therefore unusual for the client to introduce a few capable 
long-term subcontractors whom they have long-term partnership with to Project C, 
whose names were not in Company B’s list. When Phase I was completed, the 
project team took the initiative to recommend these subcontractors to a higher level 
for consideration and review. In the following year, some of these subcontractors 
were successfully included in the qualified pool, and became new members.  
 
(2) Centralize the procurement function 
Company B has introduced framework agreements with “approved suppliers” for 
major material supplies. There was actually no necessity for full tender exercises for 
these suppliers since the client was also aware of the reputation of these suppliers 
and their approved products. The project manager outlined that they continued to 
centralize its procurement function to aim to lower the costs of materials, as the PM 
believed that individual contractual arrangements offered less value for money, 
compared to those negotiated through centralized procurement. The construction of 
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Phase I revealed that this approach helped the project to save substantial money, up 
to one million RMB, as well as to achieve better quality. The project manager 
estimated that the centralized procurement for steel would have led to savings of 
about 10 percent, in comparison with traditional means. According to the commercial 
department’s field work, the price of steel using centralized procurement was 300 – 
400 RMB/ton lower than the average market price (approximately 5,500 RMB). In 
addition, the steel’s appearance and quality were also good. Moreover, by using 
centralized procurement, the supplier partner was able to provide customized 
products to accommodate Project C’s requirements. For example, the project needed 
77 tons of 8-metre length steel, as well as 23 tons of 9-metre length steel, which the 
supplier agreed to provide as customized products. As a result, this set up easily 
helped the project saved 17% and 12% of the costs of 8-meter and 9-meter steel, 
respectively. 
 
10.4.3.4 Problem-solving practices  
Genchi Genbutsu (P12)  
Owing to the enormous pressure of the project scheduling described earlier, quality 
defects were commonly seen on the site of Project C. In order to attain the largest 
decrease in schedule time with fewer quality problems, the quality team kept their 
responsibilities and objectives in mind, and hence genchi genbutsu was implemented 
at the site all the times. Meetings were held about once every 20 days in order to 
refresh the team on recent non-compliances, defects, quality issues, etc. The key 
effort here was to highlight the quality problems that had recently occurred, using 
PowerPoint slides, to all participants – including the subcontractors and managerial 
staff. This allowed the participants to raise questions and discuss root causes and 
countermeasures.  
 
Decision making (P13)  
Due to the pressures of time, a considerable amount of efforts was put in developing 
a detailed schedule (e.g. a daily plan) to ensure that the client’s requirements could 
be met. The successful on-time completion of the main structure of Phase I, its 
subprojects (buildings 2 and 7) was set as the main goal of QC activity. The QC 
members appeared to be quite astute in accomplishing these by utilizing Company 
B’s strong technical backup, and aligning this with the team and member efforts. The 
QC meeting records were carefully reviewed, and it was found that during one of the 
brainstorming sessions, the acknowledgement of the challenges (see Figure 10.8) 
was decided as the key agenda. This started from brainstorming the possible 
 308 
 
difficulties in accomplishing the given deadlines: It was eventually agreed by the 
participants that the two key difficulties were (1) oppressive milestone, changes in 
orders, and compression of the schedule, and (2) difficulties in resource allocation 
and utilization. Following these discussions, a “multiply-whys” method was employed 
to further seek the root causes that might have contributed to these two challenges. 
As a result, another brainstorming session was carried out, and eight causes were 
quickly identified. At the same time, the level of importance was also discussed. In 













Figure 10.8 Analysis of causes 
 
The following meeting discussed possible countermeasures (see Table 10.13) to the 






























Lack of prompt 
efforts in re-
planning to get the 
plan back on track 
Lack of internal 
communication 












Table 10.13 Causes and proposed countermeasures  
Item Causes  
Counter-
measures  


















 Enhance communications 
between various parties, i.e. 
collecting information pertaining 
to progress.  
 Project planning taskforce was 
established to be responsible 
for this.  
 Hierarchical plans  
 Daily meetings to check status 











 Storage and appropriate 
allocation  
 Early involvement of suppliers, 
 Select capable teams from 
various interviewed 
subcontractors, those who have 
long-term relationships with 
contractor or client would be 
given special consideration  
 More rewards and motivation 
Note: some of the actions derived from item 1 have been illustrated in earlier sections.  
 
The outcome of this was rewarding: the main structure of the 5A office tower and 
hotel was completed in 152 days, and 52 days ahead of the original schedule.  
 
Kaizen (P14) 
Project C was constantly praised by the top management of Company B as “a 
benchmarked project which did an excellent job of meeting unique challenges”. Its 
outstanding performance in various areas, including site organization, attention to 
progress, faster scheduling, standardized management approaches, etc was highly 
recognized by the various stakeholders. Project leaders from other projects both 
inside and outside of Company B came for site tours to learn about the “best 
practices”, and to reflect on the relevance of what they learned to their own job sites. 
A number of project managers visiting the site showed interests in many learning 
points and details that Project C focused on, while others inquired about issues 
pertaining to people management, cost control, and other management approaches. 
It was highlighted that recently, such sites tours have increasingly become training 
programmes held in Company B for project managers to exchange information and to 
discuss “best practices”, with the hope of applying the lessons learnt in their own 





In parallel to what Toyota has implemented to encourage frontline workers to propose 
new ideas and feedback that might result in continuous improvement, Project C has 
also experimented with such initiatives to respond to Company B’s call for feedback. 
An initiative known as “golden ideas” was conducted in Company B since 2000. As a 
result, although the number of so-called “golden ideas” was not comparable to what 
Toyota was able to achieve, an array of creative ideas and feedback have been 
voiced by different people in Project C. These ideas included: 
 To introduce a deep-well system in Phase II, using an appropriate amount of 
groundwater to solve the problem of insufficient water during Phase II 
construction.  
 Washing vehicles using water obtained from dewatering of foundations  
 In the summer of 2010, Wuhan city imposed limits on the traffic, especially on 
traffic involved with construction. This was the time when Project C was in the 
piling phase, in which large volumes of excavated soil needed to be removed. 
One golden idea proposed, which hinged on “sustainable thinking”, was to utilize 
the concrete mixer truck to load soil. This piece of feedback, which gave multiple 
uses to the truck, not only helped the project saved money, but also satisfied 
clients and local government. 
 
Reportedly, at the level of the firm, Company B has received more than 200 ideas 
and feedback in various areas, including ways to improve processes, to reduce costs, 
etc. In addition, of all the ideas and feedback collected in a year, Company B 
rewarded those with  the most creative ideas that could most help projects. 
 
10.5 Summary  
In this Chapter, three projects of two companies, A and B, were selected for 
evaluation of their site practices, people management, and problem-solving 
behaviours, as compared with Toyota Way principles. These project-specific case 
studies revealed that different firms with different characteristics, nature, resources, 
and capacities, would adopt the principles of the Toyota Way to different extent, in 
order to suit their projects’ interests and needs. Overall, in the two companies and 
three projects visited, many elements of the Toyota Way principles were seen in 
place, but none of the case study projects implemented the full suite of the Toyota 
Way principles in a holistic way. Although manufacturing terms were not frequently 
heard or discussed on site, the evidence confirmed that the terminology used shares 
common ground with the Toyota Way principles. In the case of Projects A and B, the 
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efforts in terms of site management relevant to the Toyota Way principles appeared 
to focus on productivity and quality-improvement activities. On the other hand, Project 
C (undertaken by company B), seems to have picked up some Toyota Way 
knowledge, especially in the area of material procurement using pull thinking, 
hierarchical planning, with built-in commitments, and others. They were driven by 
their efforts to meet the client’s requirements. These areas were identified as the key 
factors that might affect the schedule – which happens to be the priority of the client.  
 
These cases also provided examples of how the Toyota Way implementation model 
may be used in real-life projects. It was seen that the principles of the Toyota Way 
model could be used as appropriate guidelines, but the interpretation of these 
principles into action depends on the awareness and understanding of lean, or other 
similar management approaches. The findings actually confirmed that the crucial role 
of people in the deployment of lean or Toyota Way practices should be emphasized. 
It should also be noted that the commitment of management, as well as their 
awareness and understanding, is the most important prerequisite, without which it is 
not possible to successfully implement this model in practice.  
 
Lastly, it can be concluded that these three case study projects have arrived to 
different levels of maturity in their implementation of the Toyota Way. It seems to 
suggest that firms need not necessarily follow the practices presented in the Toyota 
Way model too strictly, but should take the project uniqueness, client requirement, 
partners, employees, and others into consideration and thus develop appropriate 




11 DISCUSSION AND VALIDATION  
11.1 Introduction  
This chapter uses SWOT analysis to discuss the results presented in Chapters 8 to 
10. The discussion in this Chapter reinforces what the findings from the earlier 
chapters suggest, and how the research results relate to the literature review. The 
implications and strategies for LCCFs are also included. This chapter ends with a 
validation of the strategies proposed.  
 
11.2 Overview  
This research aims to establish the implementation framework of the Toyota Way 
model to guide LCCFs in their lean transformation. To achieve this aim, the research 
has employed mixed methods to investigate “to what extent” and “how” Toyota Way-
styled practices (from four layers) can be practised within LCCFs. Generally speaking, 
all evidence points to the fact that knowledge of implementing Toyota Way-styled 
practices in the Chinese construction industry is insufficient. Nonetheless, the 
quantitative studies have shown some encouraging results: a number of Toyota Way 
principles have nevertheless been adopted, implying that in a few cases the LCCFs 
have demonstrated their basic knowledge and employed tools that fit the description 
of the Toyota Way. Yet the face-to-face interview findings portrayed a rather different 
situation. Since their aim was to investigate how the Toyota Way-styled practices 
could be (better) implemented through identifying possible constraints or challenges, 
the interview findings pointed to a gap between the status quo of current practices 
and the authentic Toyota Way-styled practices. Additionally, under each Toyota Way 
principle, constraints or challenges were revealed (see Chapter 9). Based on the 
interview findings, as well as on the case projects examined, it seems that no single 
LCCF has fully demonstrated its ability, capacity, or readiness to implement Toyota 
Way-styled practices.  
 
11.3 Discussions and strategies 
In order to discuss the findings arising from both the survey and interviews in a 
holistic way, SWOT analyses were conducted in this section to summarize the results.  
SWOT has become an increasingly popular analytical tool adopted by researchers in 
the construction industry. For instance, at the firm level, Lu et al. (2009), Zhao and 
Shen (2008), and Ling et al. (2009) used SWOT methods to examine Chinese 
international construction companies, foreign construction companies in China, and 
Vietnamese ACE firms, respectively. Moreover, there are also reports that used 
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SWOT to investigate individual construction firms. For example, one of the largest 
Chinese construction firms, China Communications Construction Company’s SWOT 
analysis was published in Datamonitor 9 ’s (2011) database. At the project level, 
Milosevic (2010) undertook a SWOT analysis from both the investor’s and the 
contractor’s viewpoint in the planning, contracting, and construction of a project. 
 
This chapter pinpoints the main strengths (S), weaknesses (W), opportunities (O), 
and threats (T) for LCCFs in terms of the implementation of four different themes of 
the Toyota Way model. Simply put, strengths are those factors which LCCFs are 
already performing quite well, which can also help them to facilitate or improve their 
lean implementation or lean transformation. Despite these strengths, it can be easily 
recognized that some notable weaknesses also exist in LCCFs, concerning the 
application of the Toyota Way model. It is important to determine such weakness, 
because LCCFs need to correct them in order to stay in the right direction for 
implementing the Toyota Way. In addition, interview findings reflected the 
opportunities and challenges (or threats) for firms adopting the Toyota Way model in 
the context of construction. All the findings mentioned earlier in Chapters 8 to 10 can 
usefully contribute to the SWOT analysis. This SWOT information is useful in 
matching the resources and capabilities to their (future) lean transformation. As such, 
it is instrumental for strategy formulation. By understanding these four aspects of the 
situation, a firm can better leverage its strengths, correct its weaknesses, capitalize 
on opportunities, and deter potential threats (Barker and Smith, 1997). In terms of 
implementing the Toyota Way, more attention should be given to the areas described 
as firms’ weaknesses and constraints. This is followed by developing specific 
strategies and considerations which can then: 
(1) be used as a set of guidelines for implementing Toyota Way-styled practices, and  
(2) assist top management in developing long-term Toyota Way implementation 
plans.  
  
11.3.1 Toyota Way Philosophy model  
11.3.1.1 SWOT discussions  
The results of the SWOT analysis of LCCFs implementing the Toyota Way 
philosophy model are summarized in Table 11.1. 
 
                                                     
9
 Datamonitor is a leading business information company specializing in industry analysis. 
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Table 11.1 SWOT analysis of LCCFs in terms of Toyota Way Philosophy model 
Toyota Way Philosophy 
model 
Strengths (S) Weaknesses (W) Opportunities (O) Threats (T) 
Long-term philosophy 
 Established long-term 
relationship with 
partners (S1) 
 Lack of long-term thinking 
in employee 
development, partners 
relationship, as well as 
problem solving (W1)  
 The role of government 
(O1)  
 Fierce competition (T1) 
 Pursuit of short-term 
benefits (T2) 
Constant purpose  
 Articulated firm’s value, 
missions, etc. (S2) 
 Lack of commitment on 
improvement initiatives 
(W2)  
 N.A.  N.A. 
Customer focus 
 Always set client 
requirements as priority 
(S3)  
 Poor focus on internal 
customer (W3) 
 N.A. 
 Clients can exert their 
power intentionally (T3)  
Be self-reliance and 
responsible 
 Strong specialization in 
what they have been 
doing (S4)  
 N.A.  






Statistically, the LCCFs performed quite well in terms of most of the attributes 
identified in the first principle of the Toyota Way model (see Chapter 8), and hence 
were placed in the top right quadrant (high-high) of the “implementation-importance 
matrix” (see Figure 8.1). The strengths include: 
 Long-term relationships appeared to have been established with different types of 
partner (e.g. suppliers and subcontractors) (S1). This enables their companies’ 
technical departments to quickly select a group of appropriate candidates from the 
portal where partners have already registered. For projects in very remote 
locations, a number of partners was also found to be available.  
 All the firms interviewed were established firms, whose mission and values had 
already been articulated (S2). 
 Firms showed the ability to rapidly respond to clients’ needs, which is always a 
priority for LCCFs (S3). In order to satisfy clients, LCCFs would typically identify 
various methods for reducing costs, improving quality, enhancing the safety of the 
working environment, and others. For instance, to cut costs from the client’s 
perspective, value engineering would be used, i.e. using alternative materials or 
components to replace the higher-priced materials of similar quality.  
 With respect to self-reliance, most firms interviewed have developed into industry 
leaders, and have demonstrated their specialization in what they have been doing 
for many years (S4).  
 
Weaknesses 
 Nonetheless, judging from the attributes rated in other Toyota Way layers – 
Process, People/Partners, and Problem solving, for example – it becomes clear 
that some attributes which should embrace “long-term” philosophy were not 
appropriately implemented. This suggests that although some LCCFs claimed to 
practice “long-term” thinking, this approach may just be present in their written 
statements (such as mission statements), and have not yet been translated into 
strategies or actions. For example, employee training and development does not 
embrace long-term thinking (W1): in most cases, limited or no training was 
provided.  
 Although a long-term relationship was claimed to be established with existing 
working partners, short-sighted behaviour was still found, including multi-
subcontracting, distrust, etc. (W1). 
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 Problem-solving practices did not feature in the commitment to long-term thinking: 
the attitude of employees towards problems has nothing to do with continuous 
improvement, i.e. there is no documentation of the progress made or of problems 
solved (W1).  
 Efforts for improvement initiatives, such as cost deduction, TQM, inventory 
management, etc, have been claimed to have been introduced into the firms, but 
in fact they only existed for a short period, as a result of the lack of long-term 
commitment (W2). 
 Poor focus on internal customers was identified as another weakness in 
customer-focus (W3).  
 
Opportunities  
As noted, a significant number of large construction firms are state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), which are closely associated with the central government. Such firms’ 
strategies and plans are overseen by the central government. If Toyota Way 
principles are appreciated by top management, the chances are high that the 
implementation will benefit from government support (O1), i.e. that specified 
allocations of funds can be received from government sources. Moreover, the 
government has put forward an agenda for improving the management skills of firms, 
and has highlighted that the business and project management of Chinese 
construction firms must be standardized, normalized, and fine-tuned at all stages of 
the management process. It is implied that the government may need a holistic 
system to act as a reference point for policy-making.  
 
Threats  
Firstly, the major threats that would affect the LCCFs in developing a long-term 
philosophy lie in the fierce competition (T1) among Chinese construction firms. 
Secondly, some players (such as subcontractors and suppliers) blindly pursued short-
term benefits (T2), and were not at all good at laying the groundwork for long-term 
gain. In order to survive in such a competitive industry, reaping a short-term 
advantage naturally have become primary goals. For example, one potential threat is 
the use of substandard material instead of first-rate materials, in order to cut costs. In 
order to reap even very marginal profits, some partners from multilayered 
subcontracting would use substandard supplies simply for the short-term benefits. 
This may eventually lead to low quality projects. Moreover, highly demanding clients 
(T3) are another serious threat. The real threat is that the binding force of contracts in 
 317 
 
China is so weak that clients can exert their power intentionally. It is not uncommon to 
see clients changing the contract terms, even when everything has already been 
“agreed on” earlier. Thus, because of unreasonable requests from clients, companies 
may subscribe to short-term solutions even at the risk of compromising their long-
term goals.  
 
11.3.1.2 Strategies 
In Liker’s (2004) view, the first principle of the Toyota Way model is the most difficult 
one to apply, as it will generally involve an enormous change in culture and mindset. 
Although some of the attributes derived from this principle were rated highly by most 
LCCFs, it does not follow that they possess a long-term philosophy. It is important to 
reflect on what strategies should be taken to overcome the weaknesses diagnosed, 
especially regarding (1) the lack of internal customer-focus, and (2) the options for 
cultivating a long-term philosophy.  
 
Improving customer focus 
Customer-focus is one of the central pillars of lean thinking (Womack et al., 1990). 
Currently, customer-focus is perceived and used simply as a unilateral term, for which 
the LCCFs only emphasized the external aspects. The LCCFs should however be 
aware that customer-focus involves not only meeting the requirements of external 
clients and customers, but also those of internal customers and client – that is, 
colleagues within the firm or project should also be considered as customers, and 
that employees rely upon the internal services of others to complete their tasks 
effectively. It is therefore required that all employees pay equal attention to their 
internal customers. Similarly, employees should also be aware of who their next 
“internal customer” is, and what their expectations will be. Good communication in 
this context would result in a better process with less conflicts, and that will eventually 
add value to the final customers.  
 
Long-term philosophy  
Secondly, it should be noted that the cultivation of long-term thinking does not occur 
overnight. A starting point for developing long-term thinking should be based on the 
current situation, followed by the future vision (Liker, 200). In other words, time should 
be given for LCCFs to move towards long-term thinking by taking the steps needed to 
reach each of the smaller short-term goals. To achieve both short-term and long-term 




Table 11.2 Strategies for achieving both short-term and long-term objectives 
 Short-term objectives Long-term objectives 
Business/projects 
 The bottom line is to not act 
irresponsibly in the pursuit of 
short-term profits 
 Aim for generating value for the 




 Adopt the relevant Toyota Way 
process-oriented initiatives to 
compete for projects within the 
client requirements 
 Continuously improve the 
project process by employing 





 Be aware of employees as 
internal clients (people) 
 Work with capable partners 
and remove incapable ones 
(partners) 
 Acknowledge people are the 
most important asset of a firm; 
respect them, develop, and 
grow with them (people) 
 Maintain long-term relationships 
with partners (partners) 
Problem solving 
 Solve the problems on-site and 
learn lessons from them 
 Become a learning organization 
 
11.3.2 Toyota Way Process model  
11.3.2.1 SWOT discussions  
In general, the attributes identified in the Toyota Way process model were viewed as 
being less holistically adopted by LCCFs (see Chapter 8). Apart from built-in quality 
(P5), according to the matrix of implementation importance (see Figure 8.1), the 
largest number of the process-oriented principles was in the “low implementation, low 
importance” quadrant. In addition, the interview results also suggested that there is a 
huge gap between the Toyota Way-styled practices and what the LCCFs actually 
implemented. However, these are not necessarily categorized as weaknesses 
because within some process-oriented principles – and even though they were rated 
poorly in terms of implementation as a broader theme (e.g. P7, P6, and P3) – a few 
individual attributes turned out to be different. Taking this into consideration, Table 
11.3 summarizes the SWOT components of the LCCFs in their adoption of the 
Toyota Way process model.  
 
Strengths  
The strengths of LCCFs in this aspect rest in the attributes that were relatively highly 
rated in the survey, as well as being supported by interviews findings. As shown in 
Table 11.3, several factors can be viewed as strengths in terms of the implementation 
of the Toyota Way Process model. A closer examination reveals that the identified 
strengths pertain mainly to Chinese building professionals’ technical knowledge and 
strong ability in managing projects. Thanks to the booming construction industry in 
China, where the building professionals have ample opportunities to participate in 
different types of projects, they have not only developed their technical competence, 
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but their site management skills have also been enhanced. These in turn added to 
their strengths, which include:  
 Good knowledge and understanding of construction-site layout design (S1). 
Although they may never have heard of the Japanese term “muda”, the way they 
work is actually in line with the principle of eliminating “muda”; they did 
understand the way that non-value-adding activities can adversely affect projects. 
In projects, much effort was made to optimize the site layout, for example, a 
number of factors have been considered in order to meet the needs of site 
logistics (i.e. minimizing on-site traffic congestion), material flow and storage (i.e. 
avoiding double handling of materials), labour movement (i.e. minimizing walking 
distance), and others. Such valuable knowledge has developed out of their study 
of contract documents, diligent site investigation, and timely communication with 
the local authorities. This seems to suggest that Chinese building professionals 
are capable of planning site layout with the aim of achieving the maximum 
efficiency. They acknowledged that removing non-value adding activities was 
essential duty in their jobs, as these activities were not to be tolerated.  
 Good cost control of materials (S2). Since materials make up a substantial part of 
the cost, project leaders keep a close tab on the market prices of materials. 
Experiences have taught them to be price-sensitive for building materials, and 
have also equipped them with the ability to negotiate with their suppliers. Although 
large amounts of bulk materials are visible on-site, they explained that when the 
project completes, the actual wastage of building materials will be under control. 
They also have good knowledge of quality, price, storage, and transportation of 
materials.  
 Good planning skills (S3). The four hierarchical plans were generally adopted at 
the project level. In contrast to the LPS principles, the schedules in the Chinese 
context are commonly developed by the project manager or engineers, rather 
than by empowering the last planner (i.e. the foreman) with planning 
responsibilities. This is because the foremen’s experience and understanding of 
the project has trained them to be confident in their planning skills. They believe 
that delays will rarely occur as long as the subcontracted teams are willing to 
follow instructions and are capable of facing the challenges in the schedules they 
produce. Apart from their good planning skills, the workforce in China is typically 
hard-working, and willing to obey their supervisors in order to remedy a slipped 
schedule back on the right track as quickly as possible (S4).  
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 Commitment to quality (S5). Managers have high quality expectations from 
employees, subcontractors, and others. It has been mentioned that the quality 
requirement stated in the contract is the minimum standard, and that leaders 
actually look for a higher standard. As far as motivation is concerned, the 
manager’s commitment to quality largely arises from the desire to win the “Luban” 
award, which is the highest quality award in China. This “Luban” award could 
benefit them in various ways in terms of enhanced career development.  
 Strong execution ability. This is reflected in a number of activities that were well-
executed, including standardization and visual management. For example, 
project-management guidelines were established for project use (S6), and main 
construction method statements were also available and are reviewed with the 
foremen, supervisors, and site engineers prior to the commencement of specific 
processes (S7). Project managers had played a key role in implementing such 
procedures in the project. With respect to visual control, mandatory signages, 
notice boards, etc were displaced prominently (S8).  
 
In terms of technology, some of the firms interviewed have participated in very 
complex projects, both in the domestic market and overseas. They are capable of 




Table 11.3 SWOT analysis of the LCCFs under Process model  
Toyota Way 
Process Model 
Strengths (S) Weaknesses (W) Opportunities (O) Threats (T) 
P2: One-piece 
flow  
 Project managers (PM) 
possess strong technical know-
how in creating uninterrupted 
workflow (S1)  
 Workers lack 
understanding of muda 
(non-value-adding 
activities) (W1)  
 N.A. 
 Shortage of skilled workers 
(employees) 
P3: Pull kanban 
system  
 Good cost control of building 
materials (S2)  
 Project team has no idea of 
“pull” strategy (W2)  
 N.A. 
 Uncertainty in material prices 
(industry) 
 Just-in-case timidity (firm culture) 
 Client’s request to prepare piles 
of inventory on-site (client) 
P4: Heijunka (level 
out the workload) 
 PMs possess good planning 
skills (S3)  
 Workers are able to work hard 
under stressful condition (i.e. 
overtime) (S4)  
 Foremen possess poor 
planning ability (W3)  
 Workers have no sense of 
ownership of scheduling 
(W4)  
 N.A. 
 Clients are sometimes 
demanding in terms of project 
delivery (client) 
 High labour turnover (employee) 
P5: Built-in quality  
 Management has high priority 
for quality (S5) 
 Workers lack “do it right” 
attitude (W5)  
 Frequent government’s quality 
audits country-wide  
 Role of Jianli  
 Collaboration with foreign firms 
 Firm culture allows “re-do” or 
“rework” (firm culture) 
 Multi-subcontracting (industry) 
P6: Standardized 
work  
 PM guidelines are available to 
provide basis for 
standardization (S6)  
 Detailed documentation for 
main construction process (S7) 
 Poor emphasis on 
standardization (W6) 
 Prefabrication is promoted by the 
government  
 Clients are not supportive about 
using prefabrication (client) 
P7: Visual 
management  
 Mandatory visual signs are put 
up (S8)  
 Workers’ high tolerance of 
an untidy site (W7) 
 Government’s efforts in “beautify 
construction project” initiative 
 Collaboration with foreign firms 
 Messy construction site is firm 
culture (firm culture) 
P8: Use of reliable 
technology  
 Possess advanced and 
innovative technology in certain 
areas (S9)  
 N.A. 
 Government’s call to adopt 
technologically advanced 
construction methods.  
 A labour-intensive industry 
(industry)  
 Construction methods are still 





It is clear that the most reported weaknesses in this aspect were those posed by 
people, especially by frontline workers. The consensus among the interviews pointed 
to two major weaknesses:  
(1) Lack of awareness of lean and Toyota Way terminology among employees. 
(2) Lack of skills or capacity to practise lean or Toyota Way process-oriented 
initiatives. 
 
(1) Lack of awareness  
It is widely acknowledged that ultimately lean or Toyota Way process-oriented 
initiatives should be implemented by the frontline workers (Liker, 2004). However, in 
the context of the Chinese construction industry, the problem is with the rather low 
awareness or prior knowledge of lean terminology (i.e. muda, 5-S, visual tools, and 
pull/kanban, to name a few) (see Table 11.3) among employees and frontline workers 
at the site. Without a basic understanding of the underlying mechanisms of the lean 
terminology, it is not possible for the workforce to take the initiative to improve the 
processes by employing the lean tools derived from the Toyota Way process 
initiatives. This seems to be a common problem that can be found elsewhere (see 
Picchi and Granja, 2004; Salem et al., 2005). Hence, the introduction of 
an awareness program on-site is strongly recommended for a start. Workshops and 
training should be given to deliver the key principles, to explain applications, and to 
provide guidance on learning.  
 
(2) Lack of skills or capability to practise lean initiatives  
Apart from the low levels of awareness, another major weakness is the lack of skills 
or the capability to perform these process improvement initiatives at the project level.  
 Lack of skills in the elimination of muda (W1): Although the Chinese workers 
enjoy a reputation for being hard-working, they are nonetheless not capable of 
identifying non-value-adding activities for higher efficiency. To identify muda 
requires a basic understanding of processes, familiarity with lean terms, and a 
commitment to continuous improvement. One interviewee stressed that workers 
were perceived as either not hard-working or lazy. Hence, it is the project leaders 
who need to work hard on the layout planning, work planning, and others, in order 
to minimize the chances for workers to engage in non-value-adding activities. For 
example, a greater workload could be given, or the time-frame to complete the job 
could be frozen. This approach of assigning work would result in less idle time, as 
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workers are then aware that they need to speed up their work or face punishment 
for not delivering the job on time.  
 Lack of knowledge of “pull” strategy (W2): The project team has zero knowledge 
of the “pull” strategy in terms of material procurement. Instead, the push approach 
is widely adopted on site.  
 Lack of planning skills (W3): The workforce performed by simply completing the 
given tasks along with a (locked) time constraint. Several project managers 
thought of engaging their foremen in the planning process, but this ended up with 
poor efforts, because most foremen or supervisors are not qualified to analyse 
where they presently are to identify the constraints. In addition, the foremen are 
not ready to engage in the planning process, as they are not comfortable yet with 
taking on responsibilities instead of merely taking orders (W4).  
 The lack of a “do-it-right attitude” (W5): this weakness comes mainly from the 
frontline workers. The problem is that, due to the financial constraints and cost 
considerations, the workers supplied to the construction project are a mix of 
skilled, semi-skilled, and poorly skilled labourers. Their attitudes towards quality 
also vary, and this depends on their experience, the training they have received, 
the level of commitment of their supervisor, and other factors. These workers are 
not part of the firm’s internal team. Hence the chances are high that they may be 
working in a different work culture, which may not put a priority on quality. 
Because of this, site engineers are required most of the time on-site to correct 
their attitudes and, such operations lack the “do-it-right” attitudes.  
 Poor emphasis on standardization (W6): site management supervises the site at 
the micro level – focusing on the end results, without caring for the details of the 
procedures adopted in their operations. In this context, the workforce’s 
understanding of and skills in standardization develop slowly. On the one hand, 
the workers work purely based on their experience and with limited consultation 
with the written standardized procedures due to their poor literacy standard. In 
their views, practice makes perfect, thinking that their skills will develop through 
doing the work repeatedly.  
 High tolerance of site untidiness (W7). A high level of tolerance for untidy 
construction sites is one of the weaknesses for implementing the P7 – 5-S 
program in particular. The workforce is not motivated to improve its working 
environment, as it takes away their spare time in order to tidy, clean, sort, and so 
on. When the workers are exhausted after their work, they are not willing to 




Although weaknesses and threats hindered the successful implementation of the 
Toyota Way process model, various opportunities exist to support and improve 
implementation. Opportunities lie in three aspects, namely (1) government support in 
various areas, (2) role of jianli in “built-in quality”, and (3) collaboration with foreign 
firms.  
 
Firstly, government support is reflected in four ways: 
 The government bureau has initiated quality audits, and most visits occurred with 
prior notification. The audit is not to opportunistically issue punishments or fines 
on the quality infringement but to enhance their awareness and quality skills.  
 The construction bureau has made basic visual displays of health and safety, risk 
identification, and basic cleaning tasks mandatory on-site. This could be an 
opportunity for them to extend the existing norms and policy into a higher level in 
a restrictive way, and to include other 5-S principles if possible. 
 Prefabrication is actively promoted by the government: it represents an 
opportunity for the principle of standardization to be implemented. This is inline 
with Arif and Egbu’s (2010) observation that manufactured construction would 
appear to be an attractive and strategic direction China should adopt. For 
example, a video clip from YouTube in June, 2010, showcased how a high-rise 
hotel was built by a Chinese construction firm in six days (Broad Group, 2012). 
Moreover, it is comforting to see that several responding firms have also 
strategically invested heavily in prefabrication; one respondent from a private firm 
stated that its focus on prefabrication is reflected in the firm’s mission which is set 
out as “from construction to manufacturing”. 
 The government pushes for use of technology. The availability of the so-called top 
10 emerging new technologies is a good opportunity and a good starting point for 
the adoption of technology in construction. Again, P8 (adoption of reliable 
technology) of the Toyota Way provides a series of guidelines for better 
technology adoption.  
 
Secondly, the role of jianli – known as the supervision firm – was very unique in 
China, which became compulsory in the 1990s to monitor if contractor’s quality 
programmes are put in place. Jianli has since then gained much experience in 
assisting construction firms to fulfil quality management in practice. This has laid a 
much needed foundation for the adoption of lean construction because it shares 
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some similarities with TQM (i.e. customer focus and continuous improvement). 
Moreover, it opens an opportunity for jianli to upgrade their skills and to offer a role as 
a lean champion or a change agent in assisting the construction firms in promoting 
the lean construction concept in the industry.  
 
Thirdly, the increased involvement of international construction firms in China 
represents an opportunity for several principles to be implemented. As the interview 
results revealed, three responding firms have had experiences in working with their 
Japanese counterparts, and they were deeply impressed by the authentic Japanese 
management style which pays much attention to details and commitment to quality, 
schedule and tidiness of construction sites. These international construction firms 
have brought about not only competition but also management know-how from the 
developed countries.  
 
Threats 
Threats can come from a number of sources, both internal and external, that hinder 
the implementation of the Toyota Way process model. As shown in Table 11.3, these 
threats can be categorized into (1) employees, (2) firm culture, (3) clients, and (4) 
industry practices.  
 
Firstly, there are two threats from the employees: namely, the shortage of skilled 
workers and the high level of labour turnover. The former may prevent uninterrupted 
workflow from being achieved, because skilled workers tend to work in an effective 
manner and with an in-depth understanding of their work. Almost all the firms 
interviewed expressed their desire to recruit a greater number of skilled workers, but 
it has become a lot more difficult to find skilled workers than it was in the past. 
Without a qualified workforce – regarded as key assets in embarking on and 
implementing lean – the implementation process will be slowed down. This has the 
potential to become a major threat to affect the workload from leveraged effectively. 
When the labour turnover appears to be high, it is more likely to affect the way 
workloads are designed and allocated. In such circumstances, Chinese building 
professionals have no better solution than to request their workers to work overtime, 
with one or two days off per month, in order to ensure that the work can be completed 
on schedule. This also resulted in reluctance of management to train their worker, as 




Secondly, the threats pertaining to the firm culture are as follows: 
 Just-in-case mindset. This might be the reason why the pull/kanban system has 
yet to be adopted in material procurement. Uncertainties about material prices 
caused project teams to be cautious, thinking, “what if the inventory runs out on-
site when the price is still at a high level”. Therefore, the Chinese way is to adopt 
a just-in-case approach: it involves preparing on-site a safety stock – which 
usually contains a week or two’s worth of materials. Meanwhile, the purchase of 
material is based on the planner’s forecasting skills and adjustments: whenever 
they feel that the price is reasonably low, they will procure the price-sensitive 
materials in bulk.  
 Firm culture allows the attitude of “re-do” or “rework”. This potential threat is the 
opposite of “built-in quality” (P6). This explains the fact that a team of site 
engineers would be tasked to patrol the site and spot as many quality, health, and 
safety problems as they could.  
 Firm culture regards having numerous construction sites as a good business sign. 
The firm culture of most LCCFs encourages bulk materials to be stored on-site, 
and tolerates tools, materials, and other items being strewn all over the place, 
once everyone is busy at their work. The firm culture considers that these are also 
good signs that the project is progressing.  
 Firm culture views construction methods as conventional. This could be the 
reason for slow technology development in China’s construction industry. In the 
respondents’ views, the conventional methods are the most appropriate means to 
undertake the current projects. Such views prevented the construction firms from 
adopting new technologies such as prefabrication.  
 
Thirdly, clients play a critical role and pose another major threat that hinders the 
implementation of several process-oriented principles, including:  
 Clients wish to see stockpiles of inventories on-site (P3). This performance can 
hinder the contractors from pursuing the pull system on-site.  
 Clients are sometimes demanding in terms of project delivery. For example, 
clients who drastically reduce the project delivery time is a common phenomenon 
in the Chinese construction industry. Even large construction firms are helpless 
but to accept it, because they are afraid of jeopardizing their relationships with the 
clients. In order to deliver the project on time under such time pressures, the 
“locked milestone” strategy is widely adopted for specific portions of projects. This 
gives subcontractors and specialized trades locked deliverable dates in which to 
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complete the work. If the work is not completed, large penalties are imposed. In 
cases like this, some interviewees pointed out that it is not possible to “pull” the 
work from the workers; the majority agreed that their commitments at this point 
are unreliable. Hence, a top-down approach is preferable, where the plan is 
generated by the project team in the absent of any concerns from frontline 
workers and foremen. 
 Private clients are not supportive in using standardized components (i.e. 
prefabrication). The contractors complained about the client’s lack of interest in 
prefabrication technology. One interviewee highlighted that, “in terms of 
standardized components, we have no say in it unless it is supported by clients. 
They might not be a fan of prefabricated materials/components, although we 
understand it can boost productivity here. But we are not likely to change, as the 
client will not take the risk for us to use this so-called unconventional approach to 
constructing the project.” 
 
Lastly, there are external threats stemming from industry practices: 
 Uncertainties. Most of the uncertainties are related to price changes in materials. 
This is the major factor that prevents LCCFs from implementing the pull system, 
opting instead for buying the materials in bulk at a price they feel to sufficiently be 
low.  
 Multi-subcontracting. Alarmingly, many contractors in China seek profits by 
illegally leasing their licenses or subcontracting their jobs to unqualified firms (Lan 
and Jackson, 2002). This illegal practice compromises quality, as each 
subcontractor within the different layers of a multi-subcontracting system will 
always reap benefits; obviously the consequence is low quality performance.  
 A labour-intensive industry: This nature of the Chinese construction industry is still 
seen as a major threat for the development of technology that requires heavy 
financial investments. However, from a short-term perspective, the abundant 
labour resources and cheap labour have undermined technology adoption.  
 
11.3.2.2 Strategies 
In the Chinese construction context, many LCCFs seemed to adopt the Toyota Way-
styled process initiatives in a piecemeal fashion. That is, they adopted some of its 
aspects and methods while ignoring or rejecting others. Changing this status quo 
takes time, and therefore training is inevitable for both labour-only subcontractors and 
the main contractors. As pointed out earlier, for a start, programmes should be 
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introduced to increase the awareness of lean or Toyota Way principles on the site, at 
least to improve their understanding of what these lean tools are, and how these tools 
can be used in the daily work. In response to the weaknesses and threats discussed 
earlier, strategies are formulated below for each principle of the Toyota Way Process 
model.  
  
One-piece flow (P2) 
2.1 Enhance project leaders’ understanding of site issues; more genchi genbutsu 
practice is encouraged to identify the constraints for better improvement of 
workflow. 
2.2 An awareness programme on the theme of “eliminating muda” should be 
introduced on-site. 
2.3 Involve subcontractors/suppliers in the planning process, so as to improve the 
availability of manpower and material resources. 
 
Pull kanban system (P3)  
Resistance will always be encountered when implementing pull kanban systems 
when major material prices fluctuate. The common reaction to such fluctuations is the 
adoption of the purchase-to-stock strategy. The approaches to eliminating external 
factors (such as changing prices) include: 
3.1 For those material that are subject to fluctuations in market prices, purchasing 
partnerships with trusted working partners should be established for material 
purchase to reap mutual benefits.  
3.2 However, for those materials that cannot be stored on-site, and which are 
vulnerable to burglary, or which have to meet with customs requirements, a pull 
system can be adopted.  
3.3 Concurrently, it is important to track material usage as well as the needs from the 
foremen. For the necessary inventory to be on-site, good material management is 
required.  
 
Heijunka (level out the workload) (P4)  
The large gaps in the planning ability of project managers and foremen prevented 
collaborative planning, such as LPS, to be implemented in the Chinese context. 
Rather, there is a one-way flow from project manager’s office to conveying schedule 
information to the frontline workers. Nevertheless, in order to better achieve the aim 
of levelling out the workload, as well as gaining more reliable working plans, the 
strategies below are proposed.  
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4.1 Following the existing structures of project planning, which are widely adopted 
within LCCFs, attention can be paid to the following aspects: (1) updating weekly 
plans and look-ahead (monthly) plans in a timely manner if unexpected events 
occur; (2) communicate these updates and changes with the frontline workers in 
a timely manner through their supervisors, in order for them to understand where 
they are and what the follow-up actions are.  
4.2 From a long-term perspective, trust should be established between foremen, 
supervisors, and contractor’s employees. The foremen and supervisors need to 
be trained to understand where they are and where the project is heading. They 
should also be encouraged to participate in the planning process, at least to 
provide key information and commitments in the weekly plans. This should be 
carried out in an open, understanding, and trusting atmosphere.  
4.3 Given that PPC is not very much practised by Chinese building professionals, 
alternatively, tracking the reliability of the weekly performance is of importance; 
root causes should be revealed and lessons should be learnt – which can be used 
as the basis for the next week of planning and for better implementation.  
4.4 Adopt appropriate motivational strategies to maintaining the core workforce at least 
until the project is accomplished. This is because a high turnover in the workforce 
can severely affect the workload to be levelled. To understand the capacity of the 
workforce, efforts should be made to alleviate the burden of the workers, i.e. 
overtime, which can fuel discontent.  
  
Built-in quality (P5)  
Overall, the difficult part of quality control has been relatively well executed (i.e. 
rejection of defects, stopping work when problems are found, and etc.). In response 
to the weaknesses and threats diagnosed earlier, a few areas remained to be 
improved, including:  
5.1 Improve the firm’s culture relating to quality, i.e. promote “zero tolerance” for 
substandard quality. To achieve that, employees should be empowered to stop 
the process when an abnormality occurs or when problems are detected.  
5.2 Apart from the difficult part of quality control, employees should also be 
encouraged to give feedback on quality issues, engage in quality improvement 
dialogues, provide teamwork in problem solving, etc.  
5.3 QC should be done more frequently. The management must not ignore the 




Standardized work (P6)  
It is encouraging to see various forms of standardization being practised in projects. 
However, in order to better implement standardized works, adequate groundwork 
should be completed in advance, including:  
6.1 Standardized operating procedure (SOP). In particular, the construction work 
statement should not remain in the project filing room. The essence of the 
construction methods should be made easily accessible for convenience, and 
frequently shared with workers in order for them to truly understand the 
procedures.  
6.2 It should be acknowledged that standardization cannot be maintained forever, as 
Imai (1997) puts it: it goes hand in hand with continuous improvement. Hence, 
any improvement in the current processes (i.e. in the construction work 
statement) should be encouraged. Recognition for innovative ideas should be 
made to replace the conventional approach, even for small improvement.  
6.3 In the event that the construction industry plays an important role in realizing 
sustainable development and the transition to a green industry, LCCFs are 
advised to keep track on the development of prefabrication components and 
materials and the potential these represent to the construction industry in China. 
For appropriate projects in which standardized prefabrication components can be 
applied, the use of prefabrication should be promoted.  
 
Visual management (P7)  
Visual management is one of the most poorly implemented principles of the Toyota 
Way process model among LCCFs. The opportunity is that some of the basic ideas 
for visual management (i.e. putting up visual labels, signage, etc.) parallel the 
government’s campaign of “beautifying the construction site”. To better improve the 
implementation of visual management, three strategies are proposed:  
7.1 Highlighting the visual management components in the government’s “beautifying 
the construction site” campaign to all the employees. These should be set as 
priorities to be implemented.  
7.2 Prior to the implementation of “5-S”, this concept should be introduced through 
training to all employees. Given that 5-S contains 5 core elements, the process 
can start by implementing 5-S using the basic principle, i.e. site cleaning, sort 
redundant materials out, etc.  
7.3 Efforts should be made to change the clients’ – as well as the contractors’ – 
mindset of the site environment. The goal of working towards a tidy, organized, 
clean construction site should be set.   
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Use of reliable technology (P8)  
Chinese construction firms lacked the initiative to use new materials, new technology, 
and new construction methods, as they continued to operate in the conventional way. 
With the government’s encouragement to adopt emerging technologies, the firms’ 
experience and profile in applying new technologies will soon be linked to the 
evaluation of performance, which will encourage more Chinese construction firms to 
adopt new technologies. In this context, it seems more meaningful to introduce 
Toyota Way principle 8 to guide LCCFs in adopting the new technology. The 
strategies could include: 
8.1 The adoption of emerging technologies, as promoted by the Ministry of 
Construction, should be based on the characteristics of the project, the actual 
situation of project location, and other considerations.  
8.2 The handbook of “Ten Emerging Construction Technologies in China’s 
construction industry” can be used as a reference, but the actual adoption may 
not necessarily be limited to the handbook; other forms of innovation are also 
encouraged, as long as this leads to the improvement of construction tools, 
machinery, etc.  
8.3 If resistance to adoption is encountered, long-term interests should be taken into 
consideration, as it may be helpful to the employees, their work, and the firm at 
large.  
 
11.3.3 Toyota Way People and Partner model 
11.3.3.1 SWOT discussions  
The literature highlights that the people-oriented principles of lean are surprisingly 
absent, or insufficient to support the take-off of lean initiatives among so-called lean 
organizations (Liker, 2004). In a similar vein, the implication of lean in relation to HRM 
in the construction context has been the subject of further scrutiny by Green (2002) 
and Green and May (2005). Table 11.4 outlines all the factors affecting LCCFs in the 
SWOT analysis for implementing the Toyota Way People and Partner model.  
 
Strengths  
Toyota Way-styled leadership (P9) was regarded by most survey respondents and 
interviewees as an essential factor for a firm’s performance; these were thus 
relatively highly implemented. Strengths include the fact that (project) leaders from 
LCCFs possess in-depth technical skills (S1), they know about things and physical 
processes, and they also possess problem-solving skills (S2). These results, however, 
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seem to be inconsistent with the assertion of Lu et al. (2008), who identified the lack 
of general management skills as a common weakness of Chinese construction firms. 
In contrast, China’s booming construction market has benefited a large number of 
project managers, by developing and enhancing their management skills, especially 
in the technical aspects (Gao et al., 2012b). Because of their experiences gained 
through various types of projects, they have now become valuable assets for 
companies and projects. Among those who have been interviewed, some have 
worked for their firms for a very long time, and they thoroughly understand the 
company culture, values, and mission. This appears to be very similar to what Liker 
(2004) described about the experience of Toyota’s leaders. Moreover, the Chinese 
building professionals also showed their great willingness and commitment to support 
their employees to perform better (S3). This echoes Han et al.’s (2010) finding that 
putting people first is the most important leadership characteristic shown in China: 
assisting subordinates in problem-solving with their assigned duties. Overall, their 
down-to-earth personality and family-styled leadership (Chen and Partington, 2004) 
as well as in-depth understanding of construction projects (from the interview findings) 
have allowed many project managers to become successful and able leaders. In 
terms of the strengths of people management, it was revealed earlier that individuals 
(such as site engineers, QS, and others) within project teams are also technically 
competent and dedicated to their work. They usually work as a project team, and 
meet regularly (S4) on-site to discuss urgent or unresolved project issues in order to 
satisfy the client’s requirements. It should be noted that other than this nature of 
teamwork – the weekly meeting (Bryde and Schulmeister, 2012) –  teamwork such as 
QC teams or kaizen teams was generally limited at the project level.  
 
Another strength of the LCCFs’ relationship with their working partners is that all the 
firms interviewed have a database of qualified suppliers, subcontractors, and vendors 
across China, and the number of their working partners is increasing. The strength 
lies in that, for the same item or material, the LCCFs have multiple suppliers to keep 
price competitive, and this ensures alternative channels of supply in case one fails 
(S5). This reflects the Chinese way of maintaining relationships with working partners, 
which is to take risk allocation into consideration, and in “not putting all your eggs in 
one basket”. Additionally, with respect to the frontline workforce supply, several firms 
interviewed took the initiatives to establish relationships with some Chinese counties 
that are well known for labour outsourcing. Endeavours were made to set up training 
centres in such places to provide basic skills training before the workers are sent to 
work in the projects (Gao et al., 2012b).  
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Table 11.4 SWOT analysis of the LCCFs under the People and Partner Model  
Toyota Way People and 
Partner Model 
Strengths (S) Weaknesses (W) Opportunities (O) Threats(T) 
P9: Leaders and leadership 
 In-depth technical skills 
(S1) 
 Good problem solver (S2) 
 Strong willingness to 
support the employees 
doing their work (S3) 
 Lack of motivational 
skills (W1) 
 Lack of teaching skills 
(W2)  
 Collaboration with the 
foreign firms (O1) 





 Good teamwork among 
project team members (S4) 
 Lack of trainings at the 
workforce level (W3) 
 Government support 
(O3) 
 High level of turnover 
(T1) 
 Resistance to change 
(T2) 
P11: Partners relationships 
 Good relationship with 
various working partners 
(S5) 
 Lack of collaboration 
with partners (W4) 
 Lack of sharing in terms 
of information, best 
practice, etc. (W5) 
 Large base of suppliers 
(O4) 
 Competitive bidding still 
prevails (T3) 





In terms of the weaknesses of Toyota Way-styled leadership in the Chinese context, 
apart from technical skills, it seems that the importance of some soft skills was 
undervalued – for example, there is a lack of motivational skills (W1) and of teaching 
ability (W2).  
 Lack of motivational skills (W1): project leaders seemed to struggle to formulate 
effective motivational strategies for their workforce. On the one hand, being afraid 
of losing their workforce, leaders were reluctant to issue “fines” or “penalties,” but 
only gave verbal warnings. The bottom line was to maintain a sufficient workforce 
as a priority whenever possible.  
 Lack of teaching ability (W2): Although the so-called mentor system is available in 
most LCCFs, it is generally designed for new recruits and only lasts a short time 
period. This contrasts with Toyota’s requirement of its leaders: not only should 
they be constantly on the shop floor to provide necessary guidance for employees 
(Liker, 2004), but the leaders also need to teach the employees to perform their 
work better under the “learning by doing” thinking. It seems that the Chinese 
building professional are the “fire-fighters” on-site, who always turned up to help 
resolve certain problems. Rather, the (project) leaders should take their time to 
genchi genbutsu on the site and provide hands-on teaching to their employees for 
them to develop their own problem-solving skills.  
 
In people management (P12), although the training system was said to be available, 
it was only paid lip service most of the time (W3). The problem is that there is far less 
training provided at the project level. For some reasons, the firms seem to expect 
people, especially frontline workers, to know how to perform and behave on the job. 
They tend to assume that everyone knows and understand the importance of being 
on time, taking the initiative, being friendly, producing high quality work, and being 
readily competent for the work. In contrast to Toyota’s intense efforts to develop its 
human resources, the LCCFs have much room to improve in the following areas: 
 Enhance on-the-job training.  
 Upgrade frontline workers’ skills based on evaluations. 
 Training should be cultivated as part of the firm’s culture, rather than exists only 
as long as when the top management conducts an audit. 
 
The last major weakness comes from the low level of collaboration between the 
contractors, the suppliers and the subcontractors (W4). It was revealed that project 
effectiveness (P11.4) and technical capacity (P11.5) are the two areas least 
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considered for possible improvement. There are several reasons for this weakness. 
Firstly, the multi-tiered subcontracting system in China confuses the contractors; they 
do not know who they should be collaborating with. Moreover, their definition of long-
term relationships narrowly focuses on whether their names are included in their 
working partners’ portal. Even if they are one of the listed partners, it only means the 
relationship has been established. It also means that they are more likely to receive 
some portions of the work in future projects. This, however, does not mean that the 
contractor would help the working partners grow, and that they are now part of a big 
family or the “extended” enterprise of the general contractor. This shallow 
interpretation of a “long-term” relationship prevents the collaboration between the two 
parties from developing into possible improvements of their projects. Furthermore, 
low awareness among suppliers and subcontractors of lean practices and principles 
is yet another problem. More effort is thus needed to promote lean principles in the 
same language, and to ensure that all practitioners understand – especially those 
regarded as belonging to the extended firms of the general contractor. 
 
Opportunities  
Multiple opportunities present themselves as areas for improving the implementation 
of the principles of the Toyota Way People and Partners model. For leadership 
development, the increased involvement of international construction firms in China 
represents an excellent opportunity (O1) for Toyota Way-styled leadership practice to 
be implemented. As the interview results revealed, three responding firms have had 
experiences working with their Japanese counterparts, and they were deeply 
impressed by the authentic Japanese management style that pays so much attention 
to details and has such great commitment to quality, schedules, and other project 
features. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the numerous on-going projects (O2) also 
provided valuable opportunities for leaders to pick up skills, broaden their knowledge, 
and enhance their understanding of construction projects.  
 
For human resource development, the opportunities once again lie in the hands of the 
government (O3). Efforts relating to protecting and improving the situation of 
construction workers have been made by the government in the past decades 
through various means. These include establishing migrant schools for training the 
workforce, pay increases, and other benefits. With all these encouraging efforts, the 
implementation processes should become smoother. Furthermore, for the partners’ 
relationship, there is the opportunity for a large base of suppliers and subcontractors 
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available in the market. Because of the booming construction industry in China, 
subcontractors and suppliers are mushrooming and their numbers are growing (O4).  
 
Threats  
Several major threats need to be considered. Firstly, a threat may come from 
resistance for employees (T1) especially from the introduction of multi-skilled 
programmes. It is understandable that multi-skilled training would result in both more 
workload and greater levels of stress. Moreover, a high level of workforce turnover 
(T2) is regarded as a major threat: it contributes to firms being reluctant to invest in 
training workers that can readily leave the company. On the one hand, the LCCFs, 
especially the SOEs, are a perfect workplace for fresh graduates to begin their career, 
yet such employees typically use them as stepping-stones to seek greener pastures. 
On the other hand, the turnover at the site level is also high, as employees are 
tempted away by higher wages – even by small salary increases. There are also 
threats to building relationships with partners, including (1) the competitive bidding 
practice that still prevails in China (T3), and which affects the trust between the two 
parties. If LCCFs desire to enter into a true partnership with their suppliers and 
subcontractors, then they must try to be as nurturing as possible, and focus less on 
the cost; (2) “guanxi” or relationship (T4). This threat can result in unqualified 
subcontractors being brought into a project. The potential problem is that if their 
company culture or philosophy of conducting business is not aligned with that of their 
main contractor’s, things may quickly go wrong. 
  
11.3.3.2 Strategies  
Some relevant strategies are proposed in this section for both LCCFs and their 
external partner firms, to better implement the Toyota Way people and partner model.  
 
Leaders and leadership (P9)  
Firstly, there is a soft skill gap among Chinese building professionals. It should be 
acknowledged that soft skills are what accompany hard skills, and these help the firm 
to use its technical expertise to full advantage. This was identified as the biggest 
weakness, and the corresponding strategies for dealing with it include:  
9.1 Begin by building the company’s culture in a way that its leaders are encouraged 
to genchi genbutsu on the projects, to understand the projects and their 
employees’ work, as well as their own capacity. In this way, the relationships 
between them will be established with the use of soft skills.  
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9.2 The management should develop a long-term plan for leadership development, 
with a focus on developing their teaching skills. This solves the weakness of 
Chinese building leaders’ tendency to become problem-solving “fire-fighters”, 
while overlooking the importance of cultivating their employees’ own problem-
solving skills.  
 
People management (P10) 
The principles relating to people management (P10) were only moderately practiced 
within LCCFs. These principles include basic HRM activities, such as people 
selection, training, teamwork, and motivation. Some forms of these are present in a 
majority of the firms surveyed. However, the interviews revealed a huge gap between 
the status quo of LCCFs in this aspect and the genuine Toyota Way-styled practice. 
In order for these activities to be better practised, some strategies and considerations 
for improving people management within LCCFs are given below:  
10.1 Select the right people: In the Chinese construction industry, selecting the 
frontline workforce is more challenging than selecting “blue-collar” employees, 
given that the former is notorious for its high mobility. It is more urgent for 
LCCFs to build up their labour sources. It is worth taking a good suggestion, 
currently practised by a few leading contractors: to sort the workforce into three 
layers based on their abilities and skill sets – that is, to maintain the appropriate 
levels of skilled and semiskilled workers. Such a flexible labour resource 
structure can easily accommodate the varying needs of different projects. 
10.2 Training: the LCCFs should make sure that adequate resources are available to 
carry out a variety of on-site programmes for executive and workforce training. 
Addressing the identified weaknesses in Table 11.4, the breadth, types, and 
variety of training should be considered and enhanced. Apart from quality, 
health and safety, and construction skills, other themes such as “identifying the 
non-value-adding activities in work”, “possible improvement in current working 
procedures”, and so on, are worth incorporating into current training 
programmes. For workforce training, training facilities should be utilized (e.g. by 
moving the training school to on-site), and the training plan should be further 
developed and linked to the performance of the workforce. The workers may 
actually be excluded from the firms, but strategically the best-performing teams 
should be maintained within the above-mentioned flexible labour resource 
structure.  
10.3 Teamwork: although teamwork is practised, it is nonetheless advised that within 
LCCFs, the working environment should allow various forms of teamwork to 
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emerge in the daily work. Possible forms of teamwork may include QC teams, 
kaizen teams, 5-S teams, and multidisciplinary teams to tackle a particular 
problem. In addition, such forms of teams provide their members with multi-
skilled development.  
10.4   Motivation: for improving the presently used motivation strategies.  
 
Partner relationships (P11) 
Toyota treats its suppliers as partners and as integral elements of the Toyota Way 
(Liker, 2004). The interviews with LCCFs suggest that this principle would seem to be 
considered unnecessary to their operations, given that low levels of implementation of 
this principle were described by a majority of the interviewees. Taking the SWOT 
factors into consideration, the strategies for the LCCFs to develop meaningful 
relationships with their partners are presented below.  
11.1 Limiting the selection of partners: carefully review the existing portal that 
integrates the information of suppliers and subcontractors. Efforts should be 
made to remove working partners with unsatisfactory records and performance. 
It may be unnecessary, and not to mention impossible, to transform the multi-
sourcing partners into single-sourcing partners overnight. Yet from a long-term 
perspective, it should be reasonable to reduce the number of working partners, 
and in this way, trust and collocation would be enhanced.  
11.2 Eliminating the illegal multi-subcontracting practice: given that the multi-
subcontracting system prevails in the Chinese construction industry, contractors 
must establish ground rules to eliminate such unlawful practices. The partners’ 
portal should be used as a reference for choosing reliable firms for material 
delivery and subcontracting work.  
11.3 Encourage collaboration: with respect to the issues relating to the lack of 
collaboration raised in the SWOT discussion, LCCFs are advised to create 
more opportunities for team-working with their partners to improve potential 
areas and work problems of the project. They should capture the lessons learnt 
and share best practices with other partners.  
11.4 It is also important to establish training to raise awareness of the Toyota Way 
practice (or lean practice) for partners, and to periodically evaluate their 
compliance with the Toyota way principles, so as to maintain an on-going 




11.3.4 Toyota Way Problem-Solving model  
11.3.4.1 SWOT discussions  
This section outlines the SWOT analysis of problem-solving practices used by LCCFs 
(see Table 11.5).  
 
Strengths  
The LCCFs have many strengths in their implementation of the Toyota Way problem-
solving model. First of all, the project leaders are committed to problem-solving, and 
this is reflected in their high professional responsibility (S1). This is consistent with 
the study of Han et al. (2010), which stated that Chinese leaders are dutiful, diligent, 
reliable, and take the initiative at work. It is true that without these qualities, leaders 
will react slowly to the problem. Another strength lies in the accessibility of the project 
engineers (S2), given that they were requested to spend most of their time on-site, to 
walk around the site, to spot as many defects and problems as possible, and to 
monitor workers’ performance. Overall, it is encouraging to see that the interviewees’ 
attitudes towards genchi genbutsu were positive (see Chapter 9).  
 
With respect to the practice of kaizen or continuous improvement, it was found that 
management had higher awareness and understanding of kaizen activities (S3) than 
their subordinates. The reason for this might be that the preparation for pursuing ISO 
9000 certification as a part of the TQM efforts of LCCFs has contributed to continuous 
improvement – a key component of ISO 9001/2 – familiar vocabulary (Gao, et al., 
2012b).  
 
Table 11.5 SWOT analysis of the LCCFs under Problem-Solving Model  
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One weakness of the genchi genbutsu implementation included the interviewees’ 
statement that experience was what they have heavily relied on during decision-
making processes (W1). There is a chance that narrowly relying on experience 
without consulting the data collected around these problems may prevent the root 
causes from surfacing. The weaknesses in decision-making include the following:  
 Limited adoption of decision-making tools and techniques (W2), such as the “5 
whys” for finding the root cause. Employees are easily satisfied with superficial 
solutions, and do not attempt to find out the root causes.  
 Limited participation of employees in decision-making (W3): this arises because 
of the more centralized system that is adopted within the firms, whereby major 
decisions relating to all aspects of the project (cost, scheduling, and problem 
solving) need to be finalized by senior leadership. 
 Employees’ poor capability and negative attitudes (W4): it is generally believed 
that the employees’ untapped potential in problem-solving and their “don’t care” 
attitude lead leaders to distrust the employees, and therefore prevent them from 
joining the decision-making process. 
 
With respect to the kaizen implementation, the identified weaknesses included (1) 
only serious problems drew the attentions of management (W5), and (2) poor 
documentation of kaizen resulting from mistakes (W6). The former is a result of the 
common culture that not all the problems are treated equally. Also, due to the busy 
schedule of the project management team, other day-to-day matters need its 
pressing attention rather kaizen problems. The evidence for the latter is that even 
when a problem has been solved, the Chinese building professional does not value 
the documentation for the process, unless the problem is particularly severe. Not 
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many of the interviewees appreciated the importance of documentation. This too was 
reflected in the results of the questionnaire survey. Without thorough documentation 
of the resolutions to problems, new knowledge and new standards were prevented 
from being shared and learned. 
 
Opportunities  
The client plays a key role and provides an external opportunity (O1) in response to 
better genchi genbutsu. A client’s request is usually taken seriously and treated as a 
priority. Hence, if there is a request from the client asking the project leaders to be 
present on the gemba (site) in order to investigate a problem, the project leaders 
would not usually reject such a request and would in fact show up. However, caution 
should be taken here: a client’s request for genchi genbutsu is an enabler or facilitator, 
but is not in itself a truly Toyota Way-styled genchi genbutsu practice. Therefore, it 
requires LCCFs to cultivate a company culture that always sees problems as 
opportunities for potential improvement. In the case of kaizen or continuous 
improvement, the growing recognition of QC in construction projects in China (O2) 
represents another opportunity. The interviews confirmed that QC was conducted in 
the projects that were being undertaken. The successful introduction of QC enables 
the workers to understand that there is an opportunity to improve quality, for example, 
in a teamwork fashion. The opportunity could lead to a QC improvement motivating 
the firm or employees to engage in further, similar improvement initiatives.  
 
Threats  
At first glance, the threat to leadership in being genchi genbutsu might come from the 
project leaders’ busy schedule (T1). A common excuse repeatedly heard during the 
interview was that: “I wish I had more time to spend on-site. However I am always too 
busy handling other issues.” A closer examination reveals that the major threat to the 
implementation of Toyota Way genchi genbutsu within LCCFs is that the traditional 
firm culture within large Chinese construction firms undervalues the importance of 
“going to see the source of problems”, unless it is related to major issues. In contrast 
to Toyota’s culture – which sees every problem as an opportunity – LCCFs were 
operating in the opposite way, treating the problems as troublesome responsibilities. 
“Minimize the big problem into a smaller one, and then into no problem” (“大事化小，




The threat concerning consensus decision-making comes from the use of data. In the 
Toyota Way, data measurement, collection, analysis, summary and interpretation 
provides the basis for joint decision-making (Liker, 2004). However, a majority of the 
construction projects in China do not require advanced information technology or 
data-mining techniques, and hence far less statistical control was employed in the 
decision-making process (T2). 
 
Finally, unlike large-scale manufacturers with in-house kaizen teams continuously 
striving for gradual improvement, the LCCFs did not present convincing examples of 
how kaizen was actually implemented in their projects – with the exception of the 
recently introduced QC teams, and of learning by visiting other projects undertaken 
by the same company. The large differences lie in the fact that Chinese construction 
firms would not engage in the operations or processes needed to seek out potential 
improvement opportunities. In fact, this may be the very last thing they are willing to 
consider, as substantial portions of construction work are subcontracted, and there is 
tight delivery pressure. What stays at the top of their agenda is the rush for the 
project to be completed by managing and controlling perceptibly more important 
matters. In addition, other possible threats were also raised by interviewees, including:  
 Limited time windows (T3): as indicated earlier, the pressure to deliver means that 
there is no time left for improvements to be considered. Moreover, once the 
project completes, the next project may be a totally different one, in which 
implementing kaizen becomes very challenging, as there is now a new set of 
standardizations to be developed; in such cases, it is not possible to simply build 
upon the previous standards.  
 Lack of supporting culture of carrying out kaizen: unlike Japanese workers who 
treat problems as opportunities and who are encouraged to expose problems 
rather than simply bury them, clients in the Chinese construction industry do not 
appear to be happy to see annoying problems recurring. The same attitude was 
found among leaders on the contractor’s side. Under this organizational culture, 
workers thus become numb to problems, and start to hold attitudes like “avoid 
trouble whenever possible”, “don’t care”, and so on.  
 Cutting corners: it was generally agreed by most of the interviewees that financial 
incentives are at present the most effective means for motivating Chinese 
construction workers to work “faster” and “more efficiently”. This does not mean, 
however, that a continuous improvement effort can be expected in this way. Quite 
the opposite: some workers might think themselves as being “smart” enough to 
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cut corners or skip a few essential procedures in order to “fabricate” an artificial 
improvement.  
 
11.3.4.2 Strategies  
The Toyota Way PSM was developed by and works well for Toyota’s employees 
(Liker, 2004). The top hierarchical level of the Toyota Way is its problem-solving 
model, which is based on three principles, namely genchi genbutsu (P12), decision-
making through consensus (P13), and continuous improvement (P14). It is not simply 
a “how to” concept, but is clearly related to key management issues: the development 
of genchi genbutsu leadership, empowerment, participative decision-making, 
continuous improvement, and other features. This section presents strategies for 
improving the implementation of the Toyota Way PSM within LCCFs. The strategies 
are outlined here in response to the SWOT factors discussed earlier.  
 
Genchi Genbutsu (P12) 
Genchi genbutsu is one of the guiding principles of the Toyota Way (Liker, 2004). 
Given that Chinese building professionals have shown their commitments and 
professional ethics in problem solving, and as there is an increasing demand from 
clients to request project or company leaders to be present on-site, it is suggested 
that: 
12.1 A genchi genbutsu firm culture is established: the attitude of genchi genbutsu 
should be strengthened, even going so far as to write this into the core values 
or guiding principles of the companies.  
12.2 Details are relied on: Decision-making should not only be based on experience, 
but also needs to incorporate an understanding of the condition.  
12.3 Genchi genbutsu is set as a priority: time management is very important for 
leadership, as leaders are always busy with unexpected activities and events. 
Genchi genbutsu should therefore be set as a priority to show the determination 
of the leadership, and to boost the morale of employees. Excuses such as “I’m 
too busy at work and hence have no time” should not be tolerated or allowed to 
compromise the practice of genchi genbutsu.  
 
Consensus decision making (P13) 
It was revealed earlier that consensus decision-making received the least amount of 
effort and attention (see the survey results) from Chinese building professionals. 
However, it is understandable that each individual has his own way of making 
decisions, and that the process also exhibits certain cultural features. Understanding 
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the Toyota Way-styled decision-making process requires good knowledge of its 
relationship to Japanese culture (Low and Gao, 2011). Earlier research reported that 
Chinese culture, being embedded in its tradition of Confucianism, is focused on group 
harmony, stability, and cooperation, and is also collectivist in nature. The survey 
findings, however, reported that Chinese employees from construction firms are still 
far from practising consensus decision-making. In order to narrow the gap, the 
strategies proposed include: 
13.1 Establish a “no blame and no complaints” work environment: in a work place 
without blaming, all employees should be encouraged to voice their opinions 
and their suggestions for decisions. In addition, ideas from the lower hierarchy 
should also be respected and appreciated. This is the first step to introducing a 
consensus.  
13.2 Encourage the use of decision-making tools in a systematic way: decision-
making tools, such as the 5 whys, cause and effects, and pareto – all of which 
are widely used in industrial engineering – are seldom practised within the 
Chinese construction industry. These decision-making tools should be 
encouraged and introduced in the form of workshops or classroom training.  
 
Kaizen (P14)  
Kaizen is not simply a set of tools for implementation, but is a long-term mindset in 
which employees commit to make things better (Imai, 1997). Taking into 
consideration the SWOT factors pertaining to kaizen, the strategies proposed are as 
follows:  
14.1 Leaders’ initiative: kaizen activities are more widely known and recognized 
among management, who should play the role of champions in taking the 
initiative to facilitate continuous improvement in the lower levels of the firm. 
Unlike Toyota employees who may form kaizen teams in the spirit of 
volunteering (Imai, 1997), the initial strategy for LCCFs should be to introduce 
recognition rewards for any kaizen improvement achieved in the project.  
14.2 Moreover, it is very important to understand the importance of the role of culture, 
which should be shifted to allow seeing problems as opportunities. The 
common practice within the Chinese construction industry is to treat serious 
problems with greater emphasis, while for all other problems one of the 
strategies is “to turn big problems into little ones and little ones into none at all”. 
This attitude requires tweaking. Learning from the Toyota Way, the opportunity 
can be taken to solving problems in order to make improvement. These are the 
first few steps to cultivating a kaizen culture.  
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14.3 Efforts are also required to document the improvements made, especially the 
valid solutions that are generated. In response to this identified weakness, it is 
suggested that the project team emphasizes the importance of documentation, 
which can be used for future learning and sharing purposes. Several good 
practices were already discussed during the case studies which relate to kaizen 
activities. 
  
11.4 Toyota Way model: guidelines for implementation 
11.4.1 Introduction 
The conceptual framework of the Toyota Way in the context of construction was 
developed in Chapter 4. Acknowledging its comprehensiveness, the pyramid 
structure of the Toyota Way model has been retained, and lean construction concepts 
and practices have been linked to various relevant principles to make these more 
applicable in the context of construction. This section discusses improvements to the 
Toyota Way framework in the Chinese construction industry, based on the fieldwork 
results, the SWOT discussion, and the validation exercise.  
 
11.4.2 A review of the Toyota Way model 
The conceptual model has proven to be robust for this research, as it was tested in 
the Chinese construction industry and shown to be valid and applicable to the large 
construction firms in China. However, this is not to say that no further development or 
adjustment of the model is needed, given that the findings have highlighted a great 
number of constraints that could become potential threats to the implementation of 
Toyota Way-styled practices (see the discussion of SWOT). This would seem to 
suggest that some Toyota Way-styled attributes or practices may need to be tweaked 
before these can truly be accepted and better implemented by Chinese building 
professionals. Taking this into consideration, the implementation of the Toyota Way 
model would undergo certain minor changes. These changes will be reflected in the 
implementation guidelines.    
 
11.4.3 Framework implementation guidelines 
The framework implementation guidelines are provided in a series of tables below, 
with the aim of narrowing the gap between the Chinese practices that currently 
prevail and the Toyota Way-styled practice. In doing so, it is expected to facilitate 
LCCFs to manage their organizations and construction projects more efficiently and 
effectively from the beginning to the end. The framework implementation guidelines 
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not only list the Toyota Way-styled practices and depict how these should be 
implemented in a holistic way, but these also offer strategies for implementing them 
effectively. These strategies are valid in the Chinese construction context. Moreover, 
the implementation framework can be used by project managers and project directors 
in particular, given that it is they who plan and manage the delivery of the whole 
project from the very beginning to the end. This framework can also be used by the 
top management of the firm, especially as this is essential for effecting organizational 
culture changes, mindset changes, etc. All such changes require the commitment of 
top management who need to take the initiative to become champions for facilitating 
implementation. Overall, this framework can be used as a practical guideline covering 
a number of areas, including organizational philosophy, process, people and partners, 
and problem solving. The purpose of the Toyota Way implementation framework with 
the toolkit is to assist the construction firms in a few ways: 
(1) To enable the construction firms to assess themselves, using a series of 
questions and scales to evaluate where their firms stand relative to Toyota Way 
implementation. 
(2) To provide guidelines for operationalizing the activities of the Toyota Way 
implementation.  
(3) To monitor and audit best practices for the application of Toyota Way principles.   
 
For actionable attributes that received sufficient support, the strategy is that no 
adjustment is needed. In contrast, for those attributes that were discovered to be 
subject to implementation challenges and difficulties, attention was paid, with the 
caution that the mechanism of the Toyota Way principle must not be changed; 
actions, however, may be altered. The bottom line is that these attributes cannot be 
treated negatively or abandoned. The previous sections provided strategies and 
considerations for these specific attributes for enhancing the reliability of the modified 
Toyota Way model for the Chinese construction industry. Eventually, the strategies 
and considerations for these specific attributes, as well as for those that have been 




Philosophy model  
The Toyota Way Philosophy model implementation guidelines are shown in Table 
11.6. The table summarizes the key attributes towards the Toyota Way-styled long-
term philosophy. For those that the LCCFs did not perform well, the corresponding 
strategies are already highlighted in the earlier section.  
 
Table 11.6 Toyota Way Philosophy model: implementation guidelines 
 Long term philosophy (P1) 
Objectives 




 Sustain a constant purpose (company vision, mission, and values). 
 Have a high purpose or mission to generate value towards employees, 
society, and customers. 
 Formulate a plan towards the realization of a company’s long-term 
vision. 
 Short-term losses affect decision making, but are less important than 
pursing long-term goals. 
 Have a clear view of core competencies and endeavour to become an 
expert in this area. 
 Be responsible for products, employees, and society. 
 Understanding customer’s requirement is priority work. 
 Be able to rapidly respond to meet the changing requirement of 
customers (e.g. design change). 
 Treat employees and suppliers as internal customers. 
Expected 
outcomes 
 Improved understanding of customers and customers values 
 Improved customer satisfaction 
 Increased competitiveness 
 Contributing more value to employees, firms, and society at large 
 
Process model  
Liker and Meier (2006) described working on a couple of process-oriented initiatives 
as an ideal starting point for lean implementation. The tangible benefits reaped in the 
short term will make this approach undeniably attractive to most practitioners. 
However, the implementation of process-oriented initiatives should embed the first 
principle highlighted in the previous section, which is to recall what customers or 
clients really want, and what the value to be maximized within the process is. Table 
11.7 presents the guidelines of the Toyota Way Process model. The objective is to 
highlight what actions need to be taken to improve the process within each different 
principle. There are three elements associated with the actions for each principle: the 
role of employees and workers (manpower), the role of materials and machines, and 
the role of workplace design. A better implementation of the above-mentioned 
process-oriented initiatives requires, collectively (1) in terms of manpower, that those 
working in the lower levels of the hierarchy in projects need to be aware of what they 
can do to contribute to a better process; (2) in terms of materials and machines, that 
an understanding is gained of how materials and machines should be treated in order 
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to assist people to achieve better processes; and (3) in terms of workplace design, 
that those aspects which affect the design of workplace design need to be considered, 
and improvements incorporated at the project site level (i.e. of layout) to result in 
better processes (Liker, 2004). The proposed strategies were presented earlier. 
These are more relevant to Chinese construction firms, given that they are formulated 
to improve their weaknesses in implementation.  
 
People and Partner model 
It has become clear that actionable attributes and strategies within this theme are 
generic, and thus are applicable to construction with no adjustments needed. 
However, there is a difference between the people elements within construction and 
manufacturing (see section 3.4.2): the quality of frontline workers in the Chinese 
construction industry is not comparable to that of Japanese blue-collar workers. To 
narrow this gap, and to achieve a maturity level similar to Toyota in this category, 
Table 11.8 provides a checklist for LCCFs wishing to implement the Toyota Way 
People and Partner model in the Chinese construction context. 
 
Problem solving model  
The guidelines for the Toyota Way Problem-solving model are shown in Table 11.9, 
highlighting the key attributes and strategies for better implementation.  
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Table 11.7 Toyota Way Process model: implementation guidelines  
 Requirement and actions Expected outcomes 
P2: One-piece Flow 
P2.1 Employees are concerned with waste elimination. 
P2.2 Material flow is adhered to consistently throughout the daily work activities. 
P2.3 Materials, equipment, and other resources are provided in a “just-in-time” manner 
when needed. 
P2.4 Site layout is organized to enhance material flow, employee movement, and so on, 
in order to minimize waste due to movement. 
P2.5 Strive to cut to zero the amount of time any work is sitting idle or waiting for 
someone to work on it. 
P2.6 Make flow evident through organizational culture. 
 Waste is eliminated as much as 
possible. 
 Achieving uninterrupted workflow. 
 Sufficient numbers of workers can be 
maintained on site. 
 Materials arrive in JIT manner.  
P3: Pull “kanban” 
system 
P3.1 Materials are ordered as close as possible to exact needs. 
P3.2 Strive for as low as possible levels of material inventory (even stockless) on the 
construction site. 
P3.3 Use simple signals – cards, empty bins, and so on, to monitor the level of inventory 
and to order the needed materials or components. 
P3.4 Monitor the quantities of materials, components, and equipment that the teams 
actually take away. 
P3.5 Clear job contents, work time, material requirements, and other information should 
be prepared before releasing a work task to a crew. 
 Low level of inventory at project level.  
 Good practice of material management. 
 Increased reliability of work plans. 
 Enhanced ability in shielding the 
downstream work. 
P4: Level out the 
workload 
P4.1 The project manager plans the work with inputs from other parties, including 
subcontractors, clients, and suppliers. 
P4.2 Daily work activities are planned to balance material availability, manpower, 
machine availability, and workload between operations. 
P4.3 Foremen (the last planners) make commitments as to what their crews will do each 
week based on what is ready to be done. 
P4.4 Weekly and daily work assignments are completed in accordance with the weekly 
and daily schedules. 
P4.5 Levelling the daily work activities without overburdening workers and machinery 
 Improved collaboration between project 
teams and other stakeholders in project 
planning. 
 More empowerment can be seen on 
site. 
 Enhancement of foremen’s skills in job 
planning. 




 Requirement and actions Expected outcomes 
P5: Built-in Quality 
P5.1 Employees are dedicated to providing quality “built-in” to every aspect of 
operations. 
P5.2 Preventing defective or “no inspection” assignments from entering the next process. 
P5.3 Rejecting defective materials, components, and equipment. 
P5.4 Employees are encouraged to seek support from their supervisors when something 
goes wrong at work. 
P5.5 Employees are empowered to be responsible for quality. 
P5.6 Employees who work in the same team meet on a regular basis to discuss quality 
problems and lessons learned. 
P5.7 Feedback about quality is routinely given by employees. 
 Improved quality: reduction in rework 
and less reoccurring quality problem. 
 Improved skills in detecting problems. 
 More empowerment in letting workers 
stop the operation if a problem occurs. 
 More teamwork and communication 
relating to quality improvement. 
P6: Standardization 
P6.1 Established standard operating procedures (SOPs) (e.g. for work processes) are 
practised by employees for each major operation and process. 
P6.2 Employees play a key role in creating the SOPs. 
P6.3 Employees are encouraged to improve the existing SOPs based on their own 
practical experience. 
P6.4 Incorporate employees’ creative improvements of the standard into new SOPs. 
P6.5 Use standardized prefabricated components from offsite yards. 
 Improved understanding of 
standardization. 
 Improved productivity resulting from the 
implementation of standardization. 
 Improved ownership of worker 
operations. 
 More standardized components or 
materials can be introduced and used. 
P7: Visual 
Management 
P7.1 Adopt visual aids to make wastes, problems, and abnormal conditions readily 
apparent to employees. 
P7.2 The information posted on job status, schedule, quality, safety, and others appears 
in a place that most workers can see on a daily basis and is kept up-to-date. 
P7.3 Appropriate signage is used to identify layouts, traffic flow, safety concerns, and so 
on. 
P7.4 The construction site is kept clean at all times. 
P7.5 Employees take pride in keeping the construction site organized and clean. 
P7.6 The workplace follows the principles of 5-S. 
 Increased use of visual tools. 
 Higher awareness of the 5-S 
programme and fuller participation.  
 More organized and tidier site. 
 Employees are more disciplined to keep 
the site clean. 
P8: Use of Reliable 
Technology 
P8.1 New technology must support the company’s values. 
P8.2 New technology must demonstrate its potential to enhance processes. 
P8.3 New technology must be specific-solution-oriented. 
P8.4 New technology must be thoroughly tested and proven to provide long-term 
benefits. 




Table 11.8 Toyota Way People and Partner model: implementation guidelines 
 Leaders and leadership (P9) People management (P10) Partner relationships (P11) 
Objectives  
Toyota Way-styled leadership (servant 
leadership)  
Treats people as the most important asset 
in the firm 
Challenge and grow with partners  
Requirements and 
actions 
P9.1 Leaders are motivated to inspire 
people to achieve goals. 
P9.2 Leaders must have in-depth job 
knowledge. 
P9.3 Leaders possess teaching ability and 
are able to pass their knowledge on 
to others. 
P9.4 Leaders must support the employees 
doing their work. 
P9.5 Leaders will take time to understand 
problems and root causes before 
acting. 
P9.6 Leaders strongly encourage 
employees to develop “continuous 
improvement” in thinking and action. 
P9.7 Leaders must understand company 
policy and procedures, and 
communicate these effectively to 
their team. 
P10.1 Select the best person for a given 
job. 
P10.2 Training is provided to equip 
employees with the required skills 
before they are assigned to work. 
P10.3 On-the-job training is provided to 
further develop employees’ 
exceptional skills. 
P10.4 Employees are cross-trained to 
perform additional functions. 
P10.5 Training materials are standardized. 
P10.6 Employees are encouraged to 
cooperate with others to complete 
the whole task. 
P10.7 Daily work activities are organized 
into team functions. 
P10.8 Internal motivation methods. 
P10.9 External motivation methods. 
P11.1 Respect partners’ capabilities. 
P11.2 Challenge partners by setting 
collaborative targets. 
P11.3 Take part in partners’ production 
process. 
P11.4 Work with partners to improve 
project effectiveness. 
P11.5 Work with partners in various areas 
to develop their technical 
capabilities. 
P11.6 Share information with partners in a 
structured manner. 
P11.7 Conduct joint improvement activities 
with partners to solve problems. 
P11.8 Strive to establish a long-term 
relationship with reliable partners. 
P11.9 Limit the number of suppliers. 
 
Expected outcomes 
 Higher commitment to genchi 
genbutsu. 
 A greater willingness to teach their 
followers. 
 Working with employees in more 
continuous improvement programmes. 
 Being more respected by employees. 
 Employees understand their work 
contents clearly and are skilful in their 
work. 
 Multi-tasking. 
 Good team working spirit and 
willingness to work in a team. 
 Highly motivated. 
 Small base of partners (suppliers, 
subcontractors). 
 Improved project effectiveness 
resulting in more collaboration. 
 Enhanced capabilities of partners. 
 Collaborative problem solving. 
 Mutual benefits in the long-term. 
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Table 11.9 Toyota Way Problem-solving model: implementation guidelines 
 Genchi genbutsu (P12) Consensus decision making (P13) Continuous improvement (P14) 
Objectives  Establish genchi genbutsu culture  
Value the decision making process and 
achieving consensus  
Practise continuous improvement and 
become a learning organization  
Requirements and 
actions 
P12.1 Solve problems by going to the 
place (e.g. on the construction site) 
where the problems were 
discovered. 
P12.2 Analyse and thoroughly understand 
the situation before making 
decisions. 
P12.3 Making decisions based on the 
verified data. 
P12.4 Making decisions based on 
management team’s past 
experiences. 
P12.5 Allow genchi genbutsu to become 
part of the company culture. 
P13.1Use appropriate problem-solving 
methodologies (e.g. the 5 Whys) 
to determine the root causes of 
problems. 
P13.2 Conduct experiments to test the 
potential cause of a problem. 
P13.3 Broadly consider alternative 
solutions. 
P13.4 Value the process through which 
the decision was reached. 
P13.5 Build consensus within the team, 
including employees and outside 
partners. 
P13.6 Address the root causes of 
problems via effective 
communication vehicle. 
P14.1 Reflect on mistakes (defects, rework, 
safety issues, etc.) on a regular basis. 
P14.2 Management should treat problems 
as development opportunities for 
employees. 
P14.3 Kaizen activities are conducted in the 
workplace. 
P14.4 Management supports kaizen 
activities. 
P14.5 Improvements will be codified into 
documents and/or policies used by 
organization. 
P14.6 Each hierarchy of the organization 
develops measurable objectives and 
actions to support executive-level 
goals. 
P14.7 Managers are keen on measuring the 
objectives and give feedback. 




 Increasing commitment to genchi 
genbutsu. 
 Improved appreciation of the gemba. 
 Rely on reliable data, rather than the 
past experiences. 
 Increased use of decision-making 
tools, even if these are not widely 
adopted yet. 
 A more consensus decision-making 
process respecting different voices. 
 Improved persistence and skills in 
finding out the root cause.  
 A change of culture to appreciate the 
importance of revealing problems, rather 
than hiding them. 
 More proactive continuous improvement 
programmes. 
 An improved system for documenting 
and sharing lessons learnt. 
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11.5 Validation  
11.5.1 Overview 
Validation is a process closely related to triangulation, and consists of member 
validation or member checks. In other words, validation participants determine 
whether the research’s interpretation of the findings and its recommendations accord 
with their own (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Lyons and Doueck, 2010). Peer or expert 
validation is widely used, where findings are shared with others who have expertise in 
the research phenomenon or the population (Lyons and Doueck, 2010). In this study, 
validation aims to seek opinions on the Toyota Way model within Chinese 
construction firms, as well as to identify the validity of the strategies proposed for 
implementing the Toyota Way model better. 
 
Due to time constraints, the validation exercise was conducted with Chinese building 
professionals currently working in Singapore. Since Chinese construction firms are 
currently well represented in Singapore, this mode of carrying out the validation 
exercise greatly assisted the researcher in finding sufficient numbers of validation 
participants. The key requirement for the validation participants was that they must 
have had some working experience in the Chinese construction industry. This is 
because eventually the Toyota Way model, along with the strategies recommended, 
is intended for implementation in the context of the Chinese construction industry. In 
addition, the validation participants must have piror understanding and experience 
pertains to lean, so that they are competent to comment on the Toyota Way model 
and the strategies. According to O’Keefe et al. (1986) as well as Bryman and Bell 
(2003), the number of validation participants does not matter quite as much as the 
expertise that the research participants have, and usually their number is no more 
than ten. Hence, in this study, the group of six participants invited for validation is 




Table 11.10 Particulars of research validation participants  



































*Contractor E (Poh Lian) 5 11 
Note: “*” indicates a Singaporean firm, while unmarked firms are subsidiaries of 
Chinese construction firms in Singapore. The average work experience in China is 
approximately 8 years, less than the average 10 years in Singapore.   
  
The validation exercise was conducted between August 2012 and September 2012. 
Prior to validation, briefings of about an hour were given to these six research 
participants. The validation process was carried out in the following stages:  
(1) Fieldwork findings on the state of the level of implementation of Toyota Way-
styled practices, as well as on the SWOT factors that might affect the 
implementation of Toyota Way-styled practices, were presented to the validation 
participants.  
(2) The validation participants were then asked to confirm whether they agreed with 
the strategies proposed in (1): the set involved 45 strategies, falling within the 14 
Toyota Way principles. Each strategy requires the research participates to rate 
their level of agreement on a scale of 1 to 5, from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree”. The ratings of the six participants are presented in Appendix 5.   
(3) The respondents were then presented with a framework for improvement. The 
participants reviewed and commented on the framework developed in the study, 
and assessed: 
a. the completeness of the strategies in dealing with all the issues that 
prevent effective implementation of Toyota Way-styled practices, and 




11.5.2 Discussion of validation results  
The outcome of the validation is discussed in this section.  
 
Strategies  
The results, presented in Appendix 5, indicate that the validation participants agreed 
with the various strategies proposed on the basis of the SWOT analysis. The ratings 
given to these strategies ranged from “agree” to “strongly agree”, or from 3.83 to 5. In 
the opinions of the respondents, some strategies were already in place, despite their 
experiences with projects in China (a number of years ago), or in Singapore 
(currently).    
 Philosophy: in the views of the participants, the strategies outlined in this category 
were useful and generally valid. However, they also mentioned that the long-term 
philosophy is not an easy task to implement in a short time. Once it is decided 
upon, it also becomes hard to change in the short-term. The current practices in 
China are such that they still place too much focus on profit, and try to maximize it 
by all means, given the fierce competition.   
 Process: the ratings for the strategies listed in the process model showed a strong 
consensus. For example, one strategy under principle of heijunka, which states 
“tracking the reliability of weekly plans and revealing the root causes where 
possible” was rated “5”. While the strategy concerning the adoption of 
prefabrication was rated “3.5”, indicating some hesitation. This is because they 
understood the pre-condition for the adoption of prefabrication given that they all 
have similar experience in Singapore, where prefabrication is widely used. They 
argued that prefabrication may not be an entirely valid strategy for the Chinese 
construction industry since the possibility of earthquake would prevent them from 
adopting such a technology. 
 People and partners: the strategies highlighted in this category, in the views of the 
participants, were all considered to be timely, appropriate, and effective. They 
agreed that managing people and people’s performance is the most difficult area 
at the project level. There is a great need to learn from best practices in effectively 
managing people. Although the strategies related to people and partners sound 
effective in theory, in real-life projects, it is reasonable to doubt the extent to which 
these would be implemented. For example, “adequate resources to carry out on-
site training programmes” and “removing working partners with unsatisfactory 
records and limiting the base of parties” all translate to cost increases, and their 
implementation could face obstacles.    
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 Problem solving: all of the validation participants mentioned that whenever they 
are working for Chinese or Singaporean projects, the problem-solving procedure 
that they followed has much common with the Toyota Way style. That is, it is 
simply a cycle involving (1) the timely discovery of problems, (2) the discussion of 
possible solutions, (3) the resolution of the problems, and (4) the lessons to be 
learnt. In their views, it does sound like a valid strategy to focus on better problem 
solving, especially with keeping the continuous-improvement thinking in mind, 
along with the culture shift towards greater openness and tolerance to exposing 
problems.   
 
All that needed to be done with these already-in-place strategies was to ensure that 
these are properly communicated for their effective implementation.  
 
Validating the framework  
When the Toyota Way model and the attributes identified were presented to the 
respondents, they generally found the implementation framework to be acceptable. 
Again, they acknowledged that some of the so-called Toyota Way-styled practices 
have already been implemented. This is where they found the framework useful, as it 
does not introduce a new technique, but rather identifies familiar practices – but using 
terms that are more widely known in the manufacturing setting. There are challenges 
concerned with full implementation and, in their opinions, with the SWOT analysis. In 
fact, for those weaknesses associated with frontline workers, they also commented 
that similar generalizations can be applied in the Singapore construction context, as 
most of the workers are from overseas, and they sometimes have even greater 
problems than would be the case with the Chinese workers alone in China.  
 
11.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the SWOT analysis of LCCFs in terms of their 
implementation of Toyota Way practices. It has also presented strategies for better 
implementation in response to the weaknesses and threats identified. It is necessary 
that proper strategies be derived when strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
threats are understood, and where improvements are required. This chapter has 
outlined the generic strategies under each of the four themes of the Toyota Way 
model: long-term philosophy, process, people and partners, and problem-solving. The 
strategies for Toyota Way implementation were validated with a group of Chinese 
building professionals in Singapore. The lessons learnt from the Toyota way model 
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were also shared with them, and their opinions were sought on the resulting model. 
An attempt was made to overcome the problems and bottlenecks identified during 
Toyota way implementation within the construction industry. While these guidelines 
may appear generic, they do point out the areas which Chinese construction firms 
need to improve. Unlike other studies which may provide more specific strategies for 
firms at different stages of implementing other management initiatives, this research, 
anchored on the Toyota Way kaizen thinking, strives for perfection. The checklist 
requires firms’ commitment, determination, resources, etc. to accomplish what they 









12 CONCLUSIONS   
12.1 Introduction  
This final chapter presents an overall summary of the study. It starts with describing 
how the aims and objectives of the research have been met, along with the major 
conclusions and potential contributions to both theoretical and managerial practices 
that arise from the research. The limitations of the study, along with 
recommendations for construction firms and the Chinese construction industry and 
future work are described at the end of the chapter.  
 
12.2 Realization of the aim and objectives of the research  
This study aimed to investigate the Toyota Way-styled practices within the 
construction industry, with a particular focus on establishing an implementation 
framework that would embrace the Toyota Way-styled practices for LCCFs. Figure 
12.1 illustrates how the aim and objectives of the research are realized.  
 
12.2.1 Key attributes arising from the Toyota Way in the context of construction  
The first objective of this research is to break the Toyota Way principles down into 
measurable or quantifiable parameters. This contains two sub-objectives, namely: 
(1) Reviewing the state of the art in lean and Toyota Way, and  
(2) Identifying the actionable attributes of the Toyota Way-styled practices.  
 
For a start, a survey of the relevant literature was performed to gain a theoretical and 
critical understanding of lean production and lean construction (Chapter 3), and 
Toyota Way related literature (Chapter 4). Lean production was investigated in terms 
of its development (Liker, 2004; Shah and Ward, 2007; Sugimori et al., 1977; 
Womack et al., 1990), its principles (see Womack and Jones, 1996; Koskela, 1992), 
and the models and frameworks it employs (Forze, 1996; Karlsson and Åhlström, 
1996; Paez et al., 2006; Sanchez and Perez, 2001; Shah and Ward, 2007), along 




























Figure 12.1 Flow chart showing the realization of how the aim and objectives  
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Although lean production has received growing recognition and application within 
manufacturing and other industries, it has been criticized as suffering from 
shortcomings, including:  
(1) It has a vague definition (Hine et al., 2004; Jørgensen and Emmitt, 2008; Shah 
and Ward, 2007). 
(2) It exclusively focuses on process-oriented initiatives for short-term benefit (Liker, 
2004; Emiliani and Stec, 2005; Hine et al., 2004; Paez et al., 2004). 
(3) The implication of lean construction for people in relation to HRM, in construction, 
is a subject that needs further scrutiny (Green, 2002; Green and May, 2005; Low 
and Gao, 2011). 
(4) It has insufficient details for its implementation guidelines: it was still lacking a 
generally accepted toolkit that would address all the key Toyota Way principles.  
 
In this regards, neither lean production frameworks nor lean construction models 
were chosen as the basis of this study, but these can be used instead as references. 
To contribute to the resolution of the shortcomings highlighted above, and to provide 
a better understanding of lean in the context of construction, this research 
acknowledges the comprehensiveness of the Toyota Way model (Liker, 2004), and 
has selected it as the conceptual framework. The Toyota Way model contains four 
key elements: long-term philosophy, process, people and partners, and problem 
solving.  
(1) The foundational layer is the long-term philosophy, which requires construction 
firms to be prepared to see the long-term benefits of their actions, rather than 
being short-sighted.  
(2) The underlying constructs that have arisen from the two middle layers of the 
Toyota Way are process (technical) improvement and human resource (social) 
development. The process improvement represents those attributes (from P2 to 
P8) that cater for continuous improvement on a project level, while the human 
resource development construct refers to the aspects of leadership (P9), people 
management (P10), and the cultivation of a long-term relationship with working 
partners (P11). Generally, these two middle layers of the Toyota Way model are 
supported by its foundational layer, the long-term philosophy. 
(3) The top layer is the problem-solving philosophy, which uses various improvement 
tools such as genchi genbutsu and kaizen to achieve continuous improvement. 
The problem-solving mindset supports what has been discussed in the “process” 




Given the vast differences that exist between the manufacturing and construction 
industries, each Toyota Way principle within these four broad categories has been 
translated with care to address its applicability in the construction context (see 
Chapter 4). Since lean construction practices have been receiving increasing 
recognition, tools such as the Last Planner System were adopted for linking the 
Toyota Way process model (see section 4.7.2.1). As a result, Objective 1 was 
realized with a basket of attributes (91 in total) that were identified in the construction 
context. The derived attributes later formed the basis of the questionnaire survey.    
 
12.2.2 Assessing Toyota Way-styled practices in the Chinese construction 
industry  
Objective 2 could only be fulfilled after Objective 1 has been accomplished. Given the 
problems of poor quality, inefficiency, low profitability, and others, that were haunting 
the Chinese construction industry, it became apparent that there was a need for a 
framework that could help the industry achieve improvement. However, the literature 
relating to lean or the Toyota Way was hardly known in the Chinese construction 
industry, apart from a few applications in China’s manufacturing industry. To fill this 
knowledge gap, and prior to introducing Toyota Way-styled guidelines to the Chinese 
construction industry, it was necessary to explore the current state of Toyota Way-
styled practices within the Chinese construction firms, as well as the attitudes of 
Chinese construction professionals towards these Toyota Way attributes. This was 
what Objective 2 set out to investigate and to achieve. Furthermore, the 
corresponding last sub-objective was to investigate the relationship between the 
implementation level of Toyota Way practices and project performance in the Chinese 
construction industry. All of these needed to be evaluated as far as was possible in a 
quantitative manner; thus questionnaire surveys were used. Objective 2 was 
achieved with the following findings: 
 
In terms of the implementation level:  
(1) Overall, the vast majority of Toyota Way-styled attributes were adopted in some 
way, but the degree varied. Statistically, of the 91 attributes, 15 attributes were 
found to be not significantly implemented (p > 0.05 or p > 0.01), or else 
insignificant efforts were put into implementing them. 
(2) Practices under Principle 1 were rated most highly over other principles in terms 
of the degree of their implementation. Most of these practices were rated over 4, 
as “moderately implemented”. 
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(3) Five of the ten most implemented attributes in the Toyota Way process model 
were actually from “built-in quality” (Principle 5), which rendered it the most 
implemented principle among the process-focused principles. 
(4) The least amount of attention was paid to visual management practices, followed 
by standardization practices, in the process model. 
(5) People management related practices (P10) were notably poorly practised n the 
Toyota Way people and partner model.  
(6) There was a much higher level of genchi genbutsu practices than of the remaining 
principles in the problem-solving model. 
 
In terms of perceived importance: 
(1) The respondents from the LCCFs rated the practices as at least “moderately 
important”, with many considering this to be “highly important”. 
(2) In general, the perceived importance of the Toyota Way-styled attributes was 
rated higher than the extent to which they were implemented. 
 
Gap between the implementation and perceived importance: 
(1) Statistically significant differences were found between the actual implementation 
level and the corresponding perceived importance.  
(2) This implies that the responding firms were aware of the importance of lean or 
Toyota Way practices, but were not yet fully ready to implement them. 
 
Relationship between implementation and performance:  
(1) All correlation coefficients of the relationships between implementation level and 
the various performance indicators were positive.  
(2) 6 out of a possible 70 correlation coefficients between the Toyota Way principles 
and the performance measures were above 0.5. 
(3) The Pull kanban system (P3) was found to be insignificantly correlated with client 
satisfaction (r = .189, p = 0.68), while genchi genbutsu (P12) exhibited an 
insignificant association with profitability (r = .15, p = 0.152). 
(4) It can be concluded that the introduction of the Toyota Way model to the Chinese 
construction industry has the potential to contribute to client satisfaction, to reduce 






A number of researchers, including Liker (2004), Hine et al. (2004), Paez et al. (2004), 
among others, have argued that when lean or Toyota Way approaches were adopted 
as a “popular” recipe by most manufacturers, it was viewed as sort of an “operations 
improvement” technique – as tools whose focus was exclusively on quick 
performance improvement. However, in the Chinese context, the philosophy element 
was most important, while the process-oriented initiatives were among the least 
important and most poorly implemented attributes for most responding firms.  
 
12.2.3 Understanding the challenges in the implementation of the Toyota Way 
Following Objective 2, some unresolved issues still remain. For example, the causes 
for the low level of implementation of some of the Toyota Way-styled attributes in the 
Chinese construction industry remained unanswered. This became the Objective 3 of 
this study: to identify the potential factors that could hinder the implementation of the 
Toyota Way within Chinese construction firms. This was motivated by the fact that 
understanding the challenges and using appropriate strategies to overcome them 
should increase the chances of the Toyota Way being successfully implemented in 
these firms. Objective 3 was met using the mixed method research approaches 
(questionnaire survey and interviews) with Chinese building professionals. For a start, 
some twenty hindrances, having been identified in the literature, were assessed using 
a Likert scale (see section 8.7). It was discovered that in Chinese construction firms, 
the most significant barriers that can be ascertained from the ranking results were 
“lack of a long-term philosophy”, “absence of a ‘lean’ culture in the organization”, and 
“multilayer subcontracting”. This phase was followed by semi-structured interviews 
with the LCCFs (see Chapter 9) to further investigate two sub-objectives, namely: 
(1) To understand the current practices of LCCFs in relation to the Toyota Way-styled 
practices, i.e. how would this lead to opportunities for the Toyota Way principles 
to be introduced? 
(2) To investigate the constraints present in real-life projects that hinder the 
successful implementation of Toyota Way principles.  
 
The results from the interviews highlighted that, compared to Toyota Way-styled 
practices, the gap was enormous, and the interviewees faced considerable 




12.2.4 Toyota Way implementation framework and guidelines  
The final objective was to establish guidelines for the implementation of the Toyota 
Way for the LCCFs. This final objective contains three sub-objectives (see section 
1.3). Based on a literature review of the state of the art of lean production and lean 
construction, the conceptual framework of the Toyota Way was developed, assessed, 
and validated through mixed quantitative and qualitative inquiries in the Chinese 
construction industry. To fulfil the three sub-objectives, the following steps were taken: 
(1) Firstly, SWOT analysis was used to summarize the strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats to the LCCFs in terms of the implementation of the 
Toyota Way (see section 11.3). Management would then be in a better position to 
develop plans for Toyota Way implementation by focusing on weak areas, and 
thus increasing the likelihood of success in the implementation of the Toyota Way. 
(2) Secondly, in order to narrow the gaps with Toyota Way-styled practices and to 
reduce the threats, a set of strategies was proposed and validated by a group of 
participants. These strategies were aimed at helping the LCCFs obtain the 
potential to move towards better, more effective, and more efficient 
implementations of the Toyota Way. 
(3) Subsequently, all of these contributed to the formulation of guidelines for the 
Toyota Way implementation framework (see Tables 11.6 to 11.9). Similarly, for 
some of the principles which were less implemented because of constraints, 
necessary modifications are recommended to better suit the Chinese construction 
context. Such a framework would highlight the various aspects affecting the 
Toyota way implementation. It would also assist firms in identifying their needs 
and the current status of the various key factors that affect the Toyota Way 
implementation. This provides management with effective guidance that 
contributes to meeting their business objectives. 
 
12.3 Summary of hypotheses 
The research hypotheses set out in section 1.5 are reviewed and summarized in this 
section. The first two hypotheses relate to the implementation level and perceived 
importance of Toyota Way principles and attributes among Chinese building 
professionals. Of the 91 attributes identified (derived from 14 Toyota Way principles), 
only 15 attributes were found to be not significantly implemented, or implemented 
with insignificant effort (p > .05 or p > .01) (see Table 8.8). In other words, the results 
of these 15 attributes did not support the first hypothesis. Overall, the first hypothesis 
(H1) was partially accepted (see Appendix 6). With respect to the importance level, 
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the t-test results show that, in all instances, the significance level (p-value) is < 0.05, 
suggesting that the second hypothesis (H2) is supported.  
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts the differences between the extent to which respondents 
perceived Toyota Way attributes to be important and the extent to which they have 
implemented Toyota Way attributes (see Tables 8.4 to 8.7). In all instances (except 
P12.4), the mean scores were higher for the importance scale than for 
implementation scale. In addition, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank two-tailed significance 
levels showed that all (except P12.4 and P1.8) are < 0.05, suggesting that there is a 
statistically significant difference between perceived importance and  implementation 
level for all ranges of the Toyota Way attributes (expect P12.4 and P1.8). 
 
For the two hypotheses concerning the barriers associated with the Toyota Way 
implementation, as shown in Table 8.11, all the hindrances have a p-value < 0.05, 
meaning that H4.1 was fully supported, and that there are hindrance when Chinese 
construction firms implement Toyota Way principles. This refers to a list of 22 
hindrances, ranging from lack of a long-term philosophy, through the absence of a 
lean culture in the organization, to a lack of support from the government. In addition, 
for hypothesis H4.2 to predict whether there are insignificant differences in the mean 
score on the perceived importance scale for hindrance to Toyota Way implementation 
between “premier” and “first-grade” Chinese construction firms, the results revealed 
that this hypothesis was partially supported, given that the perceptions of H5, H14, 
and H18 were statistically found to be significantly different between the two groups.  
 
For the final hypothesis, the results showed that the level of Toyota Way 
implementation has a direct correlation with various performance measurements. In 
other words, the more comprehensive the implementation undertaken, the greater the 
advantage gained by large Chinese construction firms. There are two exceptions, 
namely the pull kanban system (P3) and client satisfaction, and genchi genbutsu 
(P12) and profitability. Both exhibited insignificant correlation coefficients (p > 0.05). 
This suggests that a company can still improve its performance by focusing on 
implementing different Toyota Way principles. 
 
12.4 Contributions to knowledge and practice 
This study makes a number of contributions to knowledge and practice, and 
particularly to an improved understanding of Toyota Way-styled practices in the 
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context of construction. The contributions listed in the following subsections constitute 
an original contribution to existing knowledge and to practice.  
 
12.4.1 Contributions to knowledge 
Firstly, this study contributes to the knowledge of lean construction by developing and 
successfully testing a conceptual framework of the Toyota Way model that embraces 
various dimensions. This conceptual framework was developed through a synthesis 
of different literature sources with lean production principles, lean construction 
practices, tools, and others. Conceptually, the Toyota Way model has its roots in 
socio-technical systems, given that the model is supported by two pillars – respect for 
people and continuous improvement. This explains why organizations struggled in 
their efforts to implement lean or Toyota Way because they failed to understand and 
appreciate both the social and technical aspects of Toyota Way deployment. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to a better understanding of the Toyota Way 
model by linking appropriate theories from the domains of production and 
management to each sub-model of the Toyota Way (see Chapters 2 and 5). This 
includes the following: 
(1) Drucker’s (1994) “theory” of the business was linked to the first principle of the 
Toyota Way model. The “theory” of the business was built upon an assumptive 
framework (Drucker, 1994), including the assumptions about the environment of 
the organization, specific mission of the organization, and core competencies of 
the organization. This, combined with the long term philosophy of the Toyota Way 
(Liker, 2004) is able to better guide and nurture the organization’s activities. 
Consequently, this goes beyond making profits or gaining market share, but aims 
to create value for customers, employees, suppliers and the society (see section 
5.2).  
(2) Koskela’s (1992, 2000) flow model relating to the TFV production paradigm was 
linked with the tactical and operational aspects of the Toyota Way - the process 
sub-model. Arguably, Koskela’s (1992, 2000) flow model and its heuristic 
principles was mainly focused on the reduction of non-value adding activities by 
following a set of actions or steps, along with using lean tools and techniques. 
This study contributes to a better understanding of the flow model by highlighting 
the significant role of people in process improvement as people are the 
implementers who identify wastes in the work processes. Consequently, people 
need to be trained and empowered for this purpose.  
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(3) For the Toyota Way’s People and Partners model, the servant leadership theory 
and a portfolio of motivation theories under the Human Relations paradigm were 
linked. These were also tested in the Chinese construction industry where it was 
found that the Chinese building professionals who are in leadership positions do 
exhibit some of the good qualities and abilities that are in line with the Toyota Way 
servant leadership features. The functional features of servant leadership such as 
service to others, appreciation of others and empowerment is essential for the 
successful implementation of the Toyota Way. Moreover, this study showed that 
the perception of frontline workers in China’s construction industry predominately 
reflects Theory X of McGregor’s (1960) XY theory, as against Theory Y being a 
precondition in the design of learning organizations such as Toyota. This 
suggests that the application of Theory Y, along with other motivation theories 
(e.g. Skinner, 1948; Locke, 1968) should be considered at this point to develop 
people and teams when the Chinese construction firms consider Toyota Way 
implementation.  
(4) Toyota Way’s Problem-solving model: in this submodel, Deming’s (1986) PDCA 
was linked as this is the heart of the problem-solving approach in Toyota (see 
section 5.5.1). This study contributes to knowledge of the problem-solving 
approach with kaizen thinking in a project environment.   
 
Thereafter, the Toyota Way model was operationalized in the context of construction, 
and was found to have common grounds with Koskela’s (2000) TFV perspective on 
the construction process (see section 5.3), as well as with the Last Planner System 
(see section 4.7.2). This framework forms a foundation for research into lean 
construction and has proven to be helpful in enabling researchers to understand lean 
in construction through a different perspective. Implementing lean thinking (Egan, 
1998) in construction is one way, while the Toyota Way model can be seen as an 
alternative way, for the reasons below:   
(1) A comparison of several existing lean construction frameworks (Gao and Low, 
2012a) has highlighted that the current lean construction frameworks focus 
specifically, though not exclusively, on lean practices (tools and techniques) on 
the shop floor.  
(2) This study returns to the origin from which the concept of lean and later of lean 
construction, were derived – the Toyota Way. Using the mother platform of lean 
eliminates many possibilities of missing out on certain relevant points. For 
example, the social implications of lean have been ignored in real life applications 
(see Green, 2002). The choice of the Toyota Way model for construction firms 
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takes full recognition of both the technical and social views, which are currently 
lacking from lean implementation. It also alerts construction practitioners to the 
importance of complementing the operational factors with the human factors of 
the Toyota Way (or of lean approaches) in the construction workplace. 
(3) The operational measure of the Toyota Way model appears to be more 
comprehensive than other measures observed in the literature, particularly for the 
construction industry. Credit should be given to Liker’s (2004) Toyota Way model, 
which broadly considered both technical and social dimensions.  
 
Secondly, this study echoes concerns (Green, 2002; Green and May, 2005) that a 
majority of the lean construction frameworks do not consider the implications of lean 
construction for HRM. As Green (2002, p.151) put it, “a considerable body of 
research that equates the implementation of lean production to regressive policies of 
human resource management is strangely ignored by lean construction researchers”. 
This study does consider how such policies would affect the development of human 
resources (see Berggren, 1993; Garrahan and Stewart, 1992; Williams and Haslam, 
1992), and then follows Toyota’s guiding principle – to “respect people” – to develop 
best practices and strategies for leaders, employees, and partners. This contribution 
is in agreement with Shah and Ward (2007), Liker (2004), and others when they 
stated that lean or Toyota Way is not a singular concept, and it cannot be equated 
solely to waste elimination or continuous improvement.    
 
12.4.2 Contributions to practice 
This research is expected to yield practical significance as detailed below.  
 
The development of the Toyota Way model in construction 
Koskela (1993) called for research that would take the initiative in overcoming 
barriers and interpreting lean in the construction industry. The primary practical 
contribution made here is that the interpretation of the Toyota Way in the construction 
context has been completed. The Toyota Way model was chosen, and has been 
reviewed and evaluated, along with the lean construction tools and techniques, 
resulting in a checklist of Toyota Way-styled attributes that can easily be used to 
evaluate the state of a construction company’s Toyota Way implementation. This 
approach provides construction firms with a framework for their philosophy, for 
redesigning their process operations, and for focus on human resource issues, as 
well as on Toyota Way problem-solving practices. Companies in the construction 
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industry that are interested in working with lean construction or Toyota Way-styled 
practices in a systematic way, but do not know where o how to start, can follow these 
guidelines based on the discussions and implications of this study. 
 
Reporting on lean in the Chinese construction context  
The lean philosophy has begun to emerge in construction, although it is still in its 
infancy. However, the discussion of lean construction practices in developing 
countries, such as China, is hardly seen in the English-language literature. In filling 
this gap, the present study may be the first in the lean construction domain to 
establish the Toyota Way – a model from the manufacturing context – for construction 
firms in China. To the best knowledge of the researcher, this study is also the first to 
assess the level of Toyota Way implementation in the Chinese construction industry. 
For instance, the scale developed here may be used by managers to self-evaluate 
their progress in implementing Toyota Way-styled practices. The Toyota Way 
implementation framework developed in this study provides specific, actionable items 
that can be used in practice to further restructure LCCFs and to provide useful 
guidelines for solving the current quality, productivity, and health and safety issues of 
the Chinese construction industry. They can also serve to meet the threat of foreign 
competition, now that China is a member of the WTO, and can guide China’s 
aggressive entry into the international market.  
 
Moreover, this study has also shed light on the challenges and barriers faced by the 
LCCFs in their day-to-day operations. It has also identified strategies and proposed 
guidelines that can be used to facilitate the implementation of the Toyota Way-styled 
practices for these firms. The findings here will contribute to a better understanding of 
the applicability of the Toyota Way model in the construction industry, and will provide 
guidelines for its implementation. Finally, during the fieldwork – and especially in the 
interview stages and case studies – this study created certain level of awareness 
among the LCCFs about the practices of the Toyota Way and its application within 
their organizations.  
  
12.5 Limitations   
Limitations are inevitable in research. The present study has taken on a challenging 
task in considering the breadth of the Toyota Way as its subject area. Other 
challenges included the time constraints on the research and the difficulties that 
occurred during data collection in China. The following limitations can be identified: 
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(1) Research participants: The research was primarily focused on the LCCFs, on the 
assumption that (i) they may possess sufficient resources to better carry out 
Toyota Way implementation; and (ii) the leadership of these LCCFs may be more 
open-minded to this new management philosophy. The limitation here is that 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China’s construction industry were 
excluded from this research. These SMEs should be taken seriously. Although 
they are small in terms of their business turnover, they are actively involved with 
undertaking substantial works that are subcontracted from the LCCFs’ projects. In 
other words, they play a critical role in the construction process, the improvement 
of which is closely relevant to the Toyota Way process model and its various 
process-oriented initiatives.  
(2) More stakeholders should be engaged: The second limitation emerged when the 
research progressed further into the fieldwork stage. Apart from the construction 
firms, it would also be meaningful to consult the opinions of other project 
stakeholders, including clients, Design Institutes (DI), supervision firms (jianli), 
suppliers, and other stakeholders in the Chinese construction industry. This would 
make the data more reliable, given that it would originate from different 
stakeholders with different interests in the projects. For example, the client has 
been identified as a critical factor from the perspective of a general contractor 
(see SWOT analysis), and that would affect the implementation of the Toyota 
Way. However, there is nowhere to validate alternative perspectives if others are 
also not included in the research. In addition, this points to a promising direction 
for future research: to involve more stakeholders in the research process.   
(3) No one-size-fits-all guidelines: a third limitation lies in the assumption that there 
are “one-size-fits-all” guidelines for individual LCCFs. Given that LCCFs in China 
vary in terms of the operational strategies, aims, and environments that govern 
their application of the Toyota Way implementation guidelines, informed judgment 
must be exercised in determining the suitability of any specific guidelines 
proposed. This is supported by the contingency approach, which argues that 
there is no one best way to manage an organization. As shown in the case 
studies and questionnaire surveys conducted in this research, different 
companies are in different stages of implementing the Toyota Way. In addition, 
their motivations and their perceived barriers to implementation also appear to be 
distinct. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this research will help LCCFs to tailor their 
initiatives to meet their implementation needs and requirements.  
(4) Nature of the measurement: mean values were computed in the survey stage to 
assess the state of implementation of the Toyota Way attributes. This 
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measurement, using the Likert scale, is ordinal in nature. Several researchers in 
the domain of construction management have suggested that ordinal data are 
more appropriately analysed using procedures that require rank-order information, 
such as non-parametric methods (see Fellow and Liu, 2008; Naoum, 2007). It is 
worth mentioning that the use of a questionnaire survey was intended to partly 
achieve this aim. It should be borne in mind that mean values are nevertheless 
adopted throughout to give an overall picture of the status quo of the LCCFs in 
implementing the Toyota Way-styled practices. To overcome this limitation, a 
mixed research method was employed, including using face-to-face interviews for 
further justification. 
 
12.6 Recommendations  
The recommendations represented in this section are divided into three areas: (1) 
LCCFs, (2) the Chinese construction industry, and (3) future research.  
 
12.6.1 Recommendations for large Chinese construction firms 
Systematic implementation 
The LCCFs need to implement Toyota Way-styled practices, and in a holistic manner. 
Systematic implementation has two meanings here. Firstly, the Toyota Way is not 
simply about copying a set of tools (Liker, 2004; Liker and Meier, 2006) and using 
them in the same way as Toyota does (Lander and Liker, 2008), i.e. to remove waste 
from processes. What should be remembered is that the Toyota Way developed the 
process-oriented initiatives within the context of a wider socio-technical system, and 
without that, the process-oriented initiatives will fail or at least underperform. In other 
words, apart from implementing improvement initiatives derived from the Toyota Way 
Process model, it is also important to establish a better people system, by developing 
leadership, truly valuing their employees and cultivating long-term relationships with 
partners. The pertinent principles and strategies formulated to achieve better people 
systems have been discussed earlier (see section 11.3). Secondly, within an 
individual layer, the principles are considered by the researcher to be intrinsically 
connected - especially in the case of the process model, which embraces a number 
of principles. For example, the visual management principle is closely associated with 
principles of pull (kanban), built-in quality (andon system), etc. These indicate the 
interrelationships between different process-related principles. Again, for the LCCFs, 
the point is not to reach for the most applicable or handy tool, but to understand the 
principles behind the tools and the linkages between the improvement initiatives, and 
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to apply these in a holistic manner. In the event that the Chinese construction firms 
may not be fully aware of these principles coming together as a whole-system 
strategy, it is more important to raise the awareness of lean or Toyota Way principles 
by emphasising an understanding of the true purpose of each of these principles.  
 
Mindset change 
A change in mindset is needed before or when LCCFs embark on the implementation 
of the Toyota Way practices. This is because a fundamental part of any lean strategy, 
including the Toyota Way implementation, must stem from a change of mindset and 
of organizational culture (Liker and Meier, 2006). Accordingly, this study found that 
the current attitudes of Chinese building professionals to inventory management, 
workers, empowerment, relationships with partners, quality problems, decision 
making, etc. (see Chapter 9) would potentially cause problems when attempting to 
implement the Toyota Way, and have therefore been identified as potential barriers 
(see section 8.7). The mindset change has been elaborated in among the strategies 
proposed for LCCFs in various areas (see section 11.3). Compared to the 
implementation of Toyota Way tools and technique or other improvement initiatives, 
which are fairly quickly and easily understood, the mindset of people or the related 
cultural issues are less tangible and require change for implementing the Toyota Way. 
As Pun (2001, p.330) observed, “the alternation of beliefs, assumptions and values 
that define the behavioral norms and expectations that determine corporate culture is 
both a difficult and long-term undertaking.” Therefore, those at the very top of the 
organization have a key role to play here. They must intervene and require people to 
behave differently, starting with changing their conventional mindset, and allowing 
them to experience a better set of results as the Toyota Way promises. As this 
process is repeated, a different set of beliefs and value - a new organizational culture 
– will eventually evolve. This however requires a long-term endeavor and 
commitment.  
 
Understanding their SWOT 
Every LCCF is different, and will need to apply a different approach to develop the 
Toyota Way-styled practices to suit its needs and fill the gaps in the desired Toyota 
Way implementation. A key to success for any firms starting on the pathway to 
Toyota Way implementation is planning, and successful planning requires that the 
people involved have a understanding of their current status and external conditions. 
SWOT is useful in addressing these needs. However, prior to that, the checklist 
containing the Toyota Way attributes in the context of construction is a good starting 
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point for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of a firm, as well as the 
opportunities and threats it faces. This can be determined readily by referring to a 
series of Tables containing the Toyota Way attributes (see section 11.4), as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 11. Information discovered during the assessment can 
provide the foundation for a SWOT analysis. For example, if the assessment, using 
the checklist of Toyota Way attributes, highlights that attributes such as P5.1 
“employees are dedicated to providing built-in quality to every aspect of operations” is 
given a relatively low score for implementation (i.e. below average), this may suggest 
that lack of dedication in built-in quality is likely to be identified as a weakness in the 
SWOT analysis. Hence, corresponding strategies should be formulated to tackle the 
weaknesses identified, while at the same time maintaining its strengths as these are 
rated highly. Moreover, it is also important to keep in mind that Toyota Way 
implementation is not a one-time, one-off event. Therefore, organizations are 
recommended to perform the self-assessment and followed-up SWOT analysis on a 
regular basis to see the improvements they have achieved.    
 
12.6.2 Recommendations for the Chinese construction industry 
Although this study did not involve stakeholders such as clients, suppliers, or 
subcontractors as research participants, there are recommendations here for them, 
as well as for the government.  
 
Clients 
Clients play a key role in the implementation process. Unlike the government, the 
SWOT analysis indicates that clients can play a role opposite to that of a facilitator, 
and can constitute a substantial threat to the general contractors, for example by 
setting unreasonable deadlines, having traditional mindsets, and others. For these 
particular threats, the recommendation can include ensuring that clients also 
understand the Toyota Way principles and the possible benefits that can be derived 
from them. In addition, it is necessary to change their perceptions on site 
management, and not to let their traditional perceptions hinder the proper 
management of projects. It worth mentioning that changing clients’ behaviour and 
their perceptions is not an easy task, given that clients are the ones who finance the 
project. Moreover, satisfying the client’s needs is a common project culture in China’s 
construction industry (Zuo et al., 2009), rather than challenging and educating them. 
A good strategy is to highlight the benefits claimed from a part of the project, in which 




Suppliers and subcontractors 
These partners play crucial roles in assisting the implementation of the Toyota Way 
by the general contractors. This is because the general contractor, as a team, is 
present on site mainly in the form of a project manager, while a large portion of the 
work is subcontracted – and these subcontractors’ workers are not part of the general 
contractor’s internal workforce. In this regards, there is a requirement that partners 
must proactively cooperate and collaborate with the general contractor in 
implementing the Toyota Way, especially for those who are also directly involved with 
(such as JIT delivery, collaborative planning, and so on). The ultimate goal is to 
achieve what Liker (2004) has described as the real extension of the enterprise.  
Government  
The recommendation to the Chinese construction industry, and for that matter to the 
government, is to be more committed to supporting and promoting the concept of 
lean and Toyota Way-styled practices, and to learning from the best practices outside 
of construction. In addition, as far as the earlier SWOT analysis is concerned, many 
opportunities are linked to the role of the government (e.g. quality auditing, visual 
management, and adoption of reliable technology). Since most LCCFs are SOEs and 
thus have close relationships with the government in terms of their policies and 
strategies, the government needs to also work correspondingly on these aspects – for 
example, to facilitate and mobilize the physical environment in which Toyota Way-
styled practices can be better implemented. This includes prefabrication for 
standardization, design as well as build for lean delivery, migration schools for more 
skilled workers, and other initiatives.  
 
12.6.3 Future work  
Although this study is a meaningful starting point to garner a better understanding of 
the Toyota Way model in the Chinese construction industry, several issues remain to 
be resolved for this research. In view of the research findings and the conclusions, of 
the following areas are recommended for future research. 
(1) It would be beneficial to perform a longitudinal analysis of the impact of Toyota 
Way principles on company and project performance. In particular, the causal 
relationships of the elements within the Toyota Way model, presented in this 
study, are to some extent undetermined (although correlations have been 
considered). As a result, all the correlation coefficients are positive and therefore 
all the elements within the Toyota Way are presented and recommended. This 
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may look comprehensive, but can result in a lack of focus or priority, given the 
long checklist provided. Future work should focus on the elements which have 
priority, and which are closely related to a specific type of performance.  
(2) As the entire Toyota Way model is constructed from a socio-technical point of 
view (apart from the performance indicators like quality, productivity, and 
profitability), future research should also include measurements of performance 
pertaining to people and organizational aspects (see Respect for People Working 
Group, 2000), such as personnel morale, employee satisfaction, staff turnover, 
and others.  
(3) Future work on improving the Toyota Way implementation guidelines in the 
context of construction should include an evaluation of the effectiveness of the set 
of guidelines itself on a periodic basis in order to modify these guidelines 
according to time-related changes within the construction industry.  
(4) Research should be carried out on the framework relative to the current tools 
available for the application of project management. This is to provide more 
“practical” applications, and also to improve the ease of deployment of the 
framework.  
(5) Further research should also be conducted in other categories of the construction 
industry, such as large infrastructure work, “routine” building projects (Winch, 
2010), or refurbishment projects (Bryde and Schulmeister, 2012)  –  not least for 
validation and further generalization. It is expected that the model’s characteristics 
will need to be updated to adapt to different subsectors as the operational 
environment changes. The comparisons these provide would give greater 
confidence to the analyses presented and guidelines proposed.   
 
12.7 Closing remarks  
Initially applied to the automotive industry, this study confirms the applicability of the 
Toyota Way to construction firms in China. This research has made significant 
contributions to lean construction by identifying key components of the Toyota Way 
model in the context of construction. In the field to which the research belongs, 
interests in this subject have lead to numerous models, and the application within 
construction has been documented. This study has addressed several related issues 
with the aim to enable better implementation of the Toyota Way in the construction 
industry, such as in the integration of socio-technical views, addressing implications 
for human resource management, and so on. The study takes the Chinese 
construction industry as an example, and shows the state of, and constraints deriving 
from, the implementation of Toyota Way practices within large Chinese construction 
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firms. Implementing the Toyota Way requires a change in both thinking and culture, 
as well as changes in processes. Management must be committed to the change and 
be willing to train everyone to match the new culture, to ensure that the organization’s 
culture fosters employee participation, and to monitor the results over time. Most 
importantly, endeavours have been made to understand the SWOT factors relevant 
to construction firms prior to their implementation of the Toyota Way. This results in 
the formulation of strategies for better implementation within the Chinese construction 
industry. The future of the Toyota Way is bright, but there remains a long road ahead 
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY (ENGLISH VERSION) 
ABOUT THE SURVEY 
Learning from Toyota and its underlying principles is a novel undertaking in the 
construction industry. Establishing an implementation framework of the Toyota Way 
model for the Chinese construction firms is important as this management philosophy has 
the potential to help solve the problems which plague the Chinese construction industry. 
The aim of this survey is to investigate the extent/importance which the large Chinese 
construction firms have attributed to the Toyota Way principles which can be summarized 
into four categories namely Philosophy, Process, People and Partner, and Problem 
solving. Please be assured that the information you give will be kept strictly confidential 
and will be used for academic purpose only. Thank you for your participation! 
 
















PART 2: GENERAL INFORMATION 
Respondent’s name:      (optional)                                    
Company name:       
Company size:      number of 
employees 
Registered capital:                                        
Position held:                                                                   
Area of expertise:                                     
Highest professional qualification:                                    
Years of industrial experience:                                   
Contact:                              (Email) 
                                           (Telephone) 
Company’s headquarter:       
Service provided:  
General Contractor Professional Contractor  
Labour Subcontractor           
Company type:  
State-owned   Collective-owned  Private           
Qualification grade of company:  
Premier    First   Second   Third and below   
Engaged in overseas projects:     Yes       No              
ISO 9001/9002 certified:             Yes       No 
 
1. Base your management decisions on long-term philosophy, even at the expense of short-
term financial goals. 
2. Create continuous process flow to bring problems to the surface. 
3. Use “pull” systems to avoid overproduction. 
4. Level out the workload (Heijunka). 
5. Build a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right the first time all the time. 
6. Standardized tasks are the foundation for continuous improvement and employee 
empowerment. 
7. Use visual control so no problems are hidden. 
8. Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people and processes. 
9. Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy, and teach it to 
others. 
10. Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company’s philosophy. 
11. Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging them and helping 
them improve. 
12. Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situation (Genchi Genbutsu). 
13. Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options; implement 
decisions rapidly. 
14. Become a learning organization through relentless reflection and continuous .improvement. 
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PART 3: THE TOYOTA WAY PRINCIPLES IN CHINA’S CONSTRUCTION FIRMS 
(1) Please rate to what extent (using a scale of 1- 5) the following management 
philosophy/activities are adopted in your company (1 = not at all; 2 = very little; 3 = 
somewhat; 4 = moderately; 5 = to a large extent). 
(2) Please rate how important do you consider the following management 
philosophy/practices to be in contributing towards organization’s performance (1 = not 
important; 2 = less important; 3 = neutral; 4 = important; 5 = very important). 
3.1 Philosophy (Toyota Way Principle 1) 
P1: Long term philosophy 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Sustain a constant purpose (company vision, 
mission and values) 
          
(2) Have a high purpose or mission which is to 
generate value towards employees, society 
and customers 
          
(3) Formulate a plan towards the realization of 
company’s long-term vision  
          
(4) Short-term losses affect decision making, but 
are less important than pursuing long-term 
goals 
          
(5) Have a clear view of its core competency and 
endeavour to become an expert in this area  
          
(6) Be responsible for products, employees and 
society 
          
(7) Understanding customer’s requirement is 
priority work 
          
(8) Be able to rapid response to meet the 
changing requirement of the customers (e.g. 
design change) 
          
(9) Treat employees/suppliers as internal 
customers 
          
 
3.2 Process (Toyota Way Principles 2-8) 
P2:  One-piece flow 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Employee is concerned with waste1 
elimination in their daily work  
          
(2) Material flow is adhered to consistently 
throughout the daily work activities 
          
(3) Material, equipment, and other resources are 
provided in a “just-in-time” manner when 
needed 
          
(4) Site layout is organized to enhance material 
flow, employee movement, etc to minimize 
wastes due to movement, motion, travel, etc. 
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(5) Strive to cut back to zero the amount of time 
any work is sitting idle or waiting for someone 
to work on it 
          
(6) Make flow evident through organizational 
culture  
          
1
Waste can mean rework, poor quality, defects, waiting, etc. 
 
P3: Use “pull” system 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Materials are ordered as close as possible to 
exact needs  
          
(2) Strive for possible low level of (even stockless) 
material inventory in construction site 
          
(3) Use simple signals – cards, empty bins, etc to 
monitor the level of inventory and to order the 
needed material/component 
          
(4) Monitor the quantity of 
material/component/equipment that the teams 
actually take away 
          
(5) Clear job contents, work time, material 
requirements, among other information are 
prepared before releasing a work task to a 
crew  
          
 
P4: Level out the workload (Heijunka) 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Foremen (Last Planners) make commitments 
on what the crews will do each week based on 
what is ready to be done 
          
(2) Project manager plans the work with input 
from other parties including subcontractors, 
clients, suppliers, etc.  
          
(3) Daily work activities are planned to balance 
material availability, manpower, machine 
availability,  and workload between operations 
          
(4) Weekly/Daily work assignments are completed 
in accordance with the weekly/daily schedule 
          
(5) Levelling the daily work activities without 
overburdening workers and machinery 
          
 
P5: Build a culture of stopping to fix problems 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Employees are dedicated to provide “built-in” 
quality into every aspect of operations 
          
(2) Preventing defective or “no inspection” 
assignments from entering the next process 
          
(3) Rejecting defective materials, components and 
equipment  
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(4) Employees are encouraged to seek support 
from their supervisors when something goes 
wrong at work 
          
(5) Employees are empowered to be responsible 
for quality 
          
(6) Employees who work in the same team meet 
on a regular basis to discuss quality problems 
and lessons learned 
          
(7) Feedback about quality is routinely given by 
the employees 
          
 
P6: Standardized tasks 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Established standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) (e.g. work processes) are practised by 
employees for each major operation/process 
          
(2) Employees play a key role in creating the 
SOPs  
          
(3) Employees are encouraged to improve the 
existing SOPs based on their own practical 
experience 
          
(4) Incorporate employee’s creative improvement 
of the standard into new SOPs 
          
(5) Using standardized prefabricated components 
from offsite shops 
          
 
P7: Visual control 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Visual aids are adopted to make wastes, 
problems, and abnormal conditions readily 
apparent to employees. 
          
(2) The posted information in terms of job status, 
schedule, quality, safety, etc is in place that 
most workers can see it on a daily basis, and it 
is up-to-date 
          
(3) Appropriate signages are used to identify 
layouts, traffic, safety concerns, etc. 
          
(4) The construction site is kept clean at all times           
(5) Employees take pride in keeping the 
construction site organized and clean. 
          
(6) The workplace follows the principles of 5-S
2
 
including “sort”, “straighten”, “shine”, 
“standardize” and “sustain” 
          
Note: 5-S
2
 comprises a series of activities namely “sort”, “straighten”, “shine”, “standardize” 




P8: New technology procurement strategy 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) New technology must support the company’s  
values 
          
(2) New technology must demonstrate its potential 
to enhance processes 
          
(3) New technology must be specific solution 
oriented 
          
(4) New technology must be thoroughly tested  
and proven to provide long-term benefits 
          
 
3.3 People and Partners (Toyota Way Principles 9-11) 
P9: Grow leaders and leadership 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Leaders are motivated to inspire people to 
achieve goals 
          
(2) Leaders must have in-depth job knowledge           
(3) Leaders possess teaching ability and are able 
to pass their knowledge on to others 
          
(4) Leaders must support the employees doing 
their work 
          
(5) Leaders will take time to understand problems 
and root causes before acting 
          
(6) Leaders strongly encourage employees to 
develop “continuous improvement” in thinking 
and action 
          
(7) Leaders must understand the company policy 
and procedures, and communicate these to 
their team members 
          
 
P10: Develop people and promote teamwork 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Select the best person for a given job             
(2) Training is provided to equip the employees 
with the required skills before they are 
assigned to work 
          
(3) On-the-job-training is provided to further 
develop employee’s exceptional skills 
          
(4) Employees are cross-trained to perform 
additional functions 
          
(5) Training materials are standardized           
(6) Employees are encouraged to cooperate with 
others to complete the whole task 
          
(7) Daily work activities are organized into team 
function 
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(8) Internal motivation methods (e.g.  safe working 
conditions, good pay, job rotation, etc) are 
used to motivate employees 
          
(9) External motivation methods (e.g. rewards, 
commendation, and measurement towards 
goals) are used to motivate employees 
          
 
P11: Respect the extended network of partners 
and suppliers 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Respect partners’ capabilities           
(2) Challenge the partners by setting collaborative 
targets 
          
(3) Take part in partners’ production process           
(4) Work with the partners to improve project 
effectiveness 
          
(5) Work with the partners in various areas to 
develop their technical capabilities 
          
(6) Share information with partners in a structured 
manner 
          
(7) Conduct joint improvement activities with 
partners to solve problems  
          
(8) Strive to establish a long-term relationship with 
reliable partners 
          
(9) Limit the number of suppliers            
 
3.4 Problem Solving (Toyota Way Principles 12-14) 
P12: Practice of Genchi Genbutsu
3
 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Solve problem by going to the places (e.g. 
construction site) where problems are 
discovered 
          
(2) Analyzing and thoroughly understand the 
situation before making decisions 
          
(3) Making decisions based on the verified data           
(4) Making decisions based on management 
team’s past experiences  
          
(5) Genchi Genbutsu  has become part of the 
company culture  
          
Note
3
: Genchi Genbutsu is a Japanese term, which refers to going to the source where value 




P13: Decision making strategy 
Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Using appropriate problem-solving 
methodologies (e.g. 5 Whys) to determine the 
root causes of problems 
          
(2) Possible experiments are conducted to test 
the potential cause of a problem 
          
(3) Broadly consider alternative solutions           
(4) Valuing the process through which the 
decision was reached 
          
(5) Building consensus within the team, including 
employees and outside partners 
          
(6) Addressing the root causes of problems via 
effective communication vehicle 
          
 





Extent of practice Level of importance 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Reflection on mistakes (e.g. defects, rework, 
safety issues, etc) on a regular basis 
          
(2) Management treats problems as development 
opportunities for employees 
          
(3) Kaizen activities are conducted in your 
workplace 
          
(4) Management supports the kaizen activities           
(5) The improvement will be codified into 
documents and/or policies used by 
organization  
          
(6) Each hierarchy of the organization develops 
measurable objectives as well as actions to 
support the executive-level goals  
          
(7) Managers are keen on measuring the 
objectives and give feedback 
          
(8) PDCA
6
 methodology is used to solve problems           
Note: Hansei means reflection in Japanese. Kaizen is known as continuous improvement in 
the West. 




PART 4: PERSPECTIVES ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TOYOTA WAY 
PRINCIPLES AND ORGANIZATION’S PERFORMANCE 
(1) Please indicate the level of your company’s operational performance (using a scale of 
1-5), as compared with your competitors, described by the following items (1 = very 
poor; 2 = poor; 3 = average; 4 = good; 5 = excellent). 
(2) Please rate the extent to which you expect your organization’s performance to 
improve when the Toyota Way principles are fully implemented (1 = no improvement; 
2 = little improvement; 3 = some improvement; 4 = good improvement; 5 = very good 
improvement). 
Items 
Level of performance Level of improvement 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Financial performance (profitability)           
(2) Productivity           
(3) Quality           
(4) Eliminate waste on site           
(5) Deliver the project on time            
(6) Health and safety records           
(7) Client satisfaction           
 
(3) If the Toyota Way philosophy proves to be a feasible system for improving the 
performance of construction firms in the above-mentioned areas, would your 
organization be willing to implement the Toyota Way philosophy as an investment for 
a better future? 
  Yes, we will                        we will consider                                No, we will not 
 
PART 5: HINDRANCES OF THE TOYOTA WAY PRINCIPLES WHEN 
IMPLEMENTED IN CHINA’S CONSTRUCTION FIRMS 
Please rate to what extent do you consider the following items to be the hindrances that 
may hamper the implementation of the Toyota Way principles in large China’s 
construction firms (1 = no influence; 2 = little influence; 3 = some influence; 4 = strong 





Level of hindrance 
1 2 3 4 5 
(1) Lack of a long term philosophy      
(2) Absence of a “lean” culture in the organization       
(3) Limited use of design and build procurement mode      
(4) Construction firm’s limited involvement in the design stage      
(5) Foremen’s (last planner) limited involvement in the planning 
stage 
     
(6) Multi-layers subcontracting      
(7) Limited use of off-site construction techniques (e.g. 
prefabrication) 
     
(8) Lack of project management skills (e.g. leadership skills, 
problem solving skills, etc.) 
     
(9) Lack of support from the top management      
(10) High workforce turnover      
(11) Insufficient training       
(12) Employee’s resistance to change      
(13) Management’s resistance to change      
(14) Employee’s tolerance for an untidy or disorganized 
workplace 
     
(15) Absence of a “lean” culture in the extended network of 
partners  
     
(16) Unhealthy competition among suppliers      
(17) Inadequate delivery performance       
(18) Hierarchies in the organizational structure      
(19) Financial constraints      
(20) Less personal empowerment      
(21) Avoid making decisions and take responsibility      
(22) Using “guan xi” or relationships to conceal mistakes/errors      
(23) Stringent requirements and approvals      
(24) Lack of support from the government       
(25) Others       (Please specify)      
(26) Others       (Please specify)      
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire 
If you have any questions about the survey, please feel free to contact Mr. Gao 
Shang, National University of Singapore, Department of Building. Tel: +65 91033614 
(SINGAPORE)  
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(2) 本次问卷采用 5分制打分的形式 
实行程度： ① “实行程度非常低” ② “实行程度比较低” ③ “实行程度一般水平” 
 ④ “实行程度比较高” ⑤ “实行程度非常高”  
重要程度： ① “非常不重要” ② “比较不重要” ③ “一般水平” 
 ④ “比较重要” ⑤ “非常重要”  
 
丰田模式原则 1: 管理决策以长期理念为基础 
原则 1： 长期理念 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 拥有一个坚定的目标（企业愿景、理念和价值）           
(2) 把为员工、业主以及整个社会创造价值作为企业
的出发点 
          
(3) 从企业发展的全局制定出一个长远目标并制定周
密实施计划 
          
(4) 始终认为短期财务损失可能会影响决策，但远不
如长远目标重要 
          
(5) 明确企业的核心竞争力并努力保持在该领域的领
先地位 
          
(6) 对企业产品、员工和社会有强烈的使命感和责任
感 
          
(7) 优先考虑业主的需求和要求           
(8) 能对业主提出的要求（比如设计变更等）进行快
速的反应，满足业主的要求 
          
(9) 把员工和合作伙伴视为内部顾客           
 
丰田模式原则 2-8：正确的的生产流程  
原则 2: 无间断的生产流程 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 员工在工作中会尽量避免浪费【注】           
(2) 根据工作量明确每天所应消耗材料的需求计划           
(3) 材料，设备和其他资源在需要时能及时到位           
(4) 合理布置施工现场，从而增强物流，人流，工序
流等从而减少不必要的运输，移动，和搬运 




          




原则 3: “拉动式”生产制度 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 材料的采购量尽可能接近实际的需求量           
(2) 在施工现场建立最小的材料存货，甚至“零”库
存 
          
(3) 设立卡片、空箱等简单工具对库存情况进行监
测，以便对材料和构件进行即时补充供应 
          
(4) 对施工队实际领取材料/构件/设备的数量进行严
格考核,控制损耗 




          
 
原则 4: 工作负荷水准稳定 (生产均衡化) 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 制定施工进度计划时会尽可能的考虑到包括业
主，分包商，供应商等利益相关者提供的信息 
          
(2) 制定施工进度计划时会尽量考虑到材料，设备资
源和人员的均衡化 
          
(3) 各个施工队(班组)的督工根据实际中可执行的工
作承诺他们每周的工作计划 
          
(4) 各个施工队能完成周计划/日计划规定的施工任务           
(5) 均衡每日的施工任务，不使员工和机械设备的负
荷过重 
          
 
原则 5: 追求质量的企业文化 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 员工注重质量，将质量“内置”于每一项施工环
节 
          
(2) 确保施工过程中上一道工序质量未经检验或者检
验不合格，不得进入下一道工序 
          
(3) 确保不合格的施工材料，设备不会被用于施工           
(4) 员工在工作中遇到问题时及时反映给项目经理/工
程师，并寻求解决问题的方法 
          
(5) 员工被授权并肩负确保工程质量的责任           
(6) 员工会在施工队的小组会议中定期讨论工程质量
问题，总结质量通病的经验教训  
          
(7) 员工会向项目经理或工程师对质量问题提出反馈
意见 









原则 6: 工作标准化 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 员工按照标准化的施工程序和操作方法来施工           
(2) 员工是企业制定标准化施工程序和操作方法的主
要贡献者 
          
(3) 鼓励员工根据自身的实践经验提出施工程序和操
作方法中需要改进的地方 
          
(4) 把员工提出的有创意的改进意见纳入新的施工程
序和操作方法手册中 
          
(5) 企业定制并采用标准化的预置构件           
 
原则 7: 可视化管理 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 可视化工具在施工中被采用，让浪费、异常等情
况曝光，方便员工改进 
          
(2) 员工在施工现场能阅读及时更新的关于施工进
度，质量，安全等信息 
          
(3) 施工现场有足够的图示标明施工现场布置，交通
指示，安全标语等 
          
(4) 施工现场一直保持清洁有序           
(5) 员工会自觉维持清洁有序的施工现场           




原则 8: 新技术引进策略 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 引进的新技术必须支持企业价值           
(2) 引进的新技术能表现出改进施工流程的潜力           
(3) 以解决具体问题为导向引进新技术，不盲目追求
高科技 
          
(4) 引进新技术之前经过全面的评估，并证实其具有
长期效益 




原则 9: 培养领导者和领导力 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 项目经理懂得如何自我激励和激励员工           
(2) 项目经理具备扎实的专业技术知识           
(3) 项目经理有能力把他们具备的专业知识教授给其
他员工 
          
(4) 项目经理经常到实际工作现场支持员工的工作执
行 
          
(5) 项目经理会在行动前会花时间去了解问题和其发
生的根源 
          
(6) 项目经理会鼓励员工去培养精益求精的工作态度
和“持续改进”的执行能力 
          
(7) 项目经理熟知公司政策和工作程序，并能和员工
及时沟通该方面的信息 
          
 
原则 10: 培养与发展杰出人才和团队 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 企业总是会挑选最胜任的员工             
(2) 企业会提供必要的上岗前的技能培训           
(3) 企业会提供员工在职培训的机会，发展其出色的
专业技能 
          
(4) 企业为员工提供跨部门培训使其成为多面手           
(5) 企业有标准化的员工培训手册           
(6) 企业鼓励员工之间进行合作           
















① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 尊重合作伙伴各方面的能力           
(2) 通过给合作伙伴设置目标，来对他们提出新的挑
战 
          
(3) 与合作伙伴密切合作，提高项目效益           
(4) 参与合作伙伴的生产管理过程中去           
(5) 与合作伙伴在不同的领域展开合作，提升其技术
能力 
          
(6) 与合作伙伴资源信息共享           
(7) 与合作伙伴共同实施持续改善计划，共同解决工
作中出现的问题 
          
(8) 拥有一支稳定可靠和长期合作的供应商队伍           






① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 项目经理到实际作业现场（比如施工现场）去查
看问题并解决问题 
          
(2) 在做决定前务必确认事实并做非常全面的分析           
(3) 根据亲临现场得到的资料来做决策           
(4) 做决策时主要要依赖领导的经验           
(5) 亲临现场查看以彻底了解情况（现地现物）已成
为一种企业文化 
          
【注】现地现物是在日文里译为亲临现场查看以彻底了解情况. 
 
原则 13: 决策策略 
实行程度 重要程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 采用适当的解决问题的方法（比如问上 5 次“为
什么”直到找出问题的根本原因） 
          
(2) 通过实验来测试一个问题的可能原因           
(3) 广泛考虑到各种可能的解决方案           
(4) 重视实现决策的过程           
(5) 决策时能和员工以及其他部门达成共识           








① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 定期对诸如质量问题，返工，安全问题等工作中
存在的不足进行自我反省 
          
(2) 把问题或者错误当做学习的机会           
(3) 员工在工作中执行“持续改进”方案           
(4) 领导大力支持“持续改进”方案           
(5) 任何取得的改进结果都会被记录并得到相关部门
的使用 
          
(6) 企业对诸如质量，进度等各项目标进行逐级分
解，明确各级人员的责任 
          
(7) 定期考核目标的进展情况并提出反馈意见           
(8) 运用 PDCA (规划-执行-检查-行动)的学习循环来
解决问题并取得持续改进 





表现程度: ① “表现非常差” ② “表现比较差” ③ “表现一般水平” 
④ “表现比较好” ⑤ “表现非常好”  
2． 请评价在何种程度上，丰田模式的推行能帮助您所在的公司在下列几个方面获得改善（请
将您的回答用打“√”的方法，填在空格“□”内） 
改善程度: ① “没有改善” ② “较少改善” ③ “一些改善” 
④ “较大改善” ⑤ “显著改善”  
 
表现程度 改善程度 
① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 财务表现           
(2) 生产效率           
(3) 质量           
(4) 杜绝浪费           
(5) 项目进度            
(6) 健康与安全问题           
(7) 业主满意度           
3. 如果丰田模式理念被证明其对提高施工企业在上述领域的表现是可行的，您所在企业是否
考虑将实施丰田模式作为一项投资来改善企业的绩效？ 





影响程度: ① “几乎没有影响” ② “有较小影响” ③ “有一定影响” 






① ② ③ ④ ⑤ 
(1) 缺乏长期理念      
(2) 缺乏一个“精益”的组织文化       
(3) 设计施工一体化的承包模式非常有限      
(4) 建筑企业在设计阶段的参与非常有限      
(5) 各个施工队负责人没有充分参与项目的进度计划安排      
(6) 多层分包/转包      
(7) 很少采用诸如预置等非现场施工技术      
(8) 缺乏项目管理技能（如领导能力，解决问题的能力等）      
(9) 缺乏领导的支持      
(10) 员工离职率高，流动性大      
(11) 没有充分的培训      
(12) 员工对变革的抵制      
(13) 管理层对变革的抵制      
(14) 员工习惯于“脏”﹑“乱”﹑“差”的工地      
(15) 诸如供应商，分包商等事业伙伴缺乏对“精益”的了解       
(16) 供应商之间的恶性竞争      
(17) 供应商的交付能力差      
(18) 多层级的组织结构      
(19) 没有充分的财政支持      
(20) 个人授权太少      
(21) 避免单独决策，不想承担责任      
(22) 找“关系”      
(23) 过于严格繁冗的政府规章      
(24) 缺乏政府部门对的支持       
(25) 其他                  （请注明）      
 
2. 若您对本研究有其他建议，请在下面方框内提出： 




如果您对调查问卷有任何疑问，请随时联系高尚先生, 新加坡国立大学(房屋建筑系)  




APPENDIX 3: CORRELATIONS RESULTS 
Toyota Way Philosophy Model   Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time 
Client 
satisfaction 
P1 Long-term philosophy .320**  .434**  .496**  .322**  .485**  











P1.2 Have a high purpose or mission which is to generate value towards employees, 


































P1.5 Have a clear view of its core competency and endeavour to become an expert in 




























































Toyota Way Process Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time Client 
satisfaction 












































P2.4 Site layout is organized to enhance material flow, employee movement, etc to 











P2.5 Strive to cut back to zero the amount of time any work is sitting idle or waiting for 





























*  .189  
(.068) 
























P3.3 Use simple signals – cards, empty bins, etc to monitor the level of inventory and to 





























P3.5 Clear job contents, work time, material requirements, among other information are 

























P4.1 Project manager plans the work with input from other parties including 
















P4.2 Daily work activities are planned to balance material availability, manpower, 

















Toyota Way Process Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time Client 
satisfaction 
P4.3 Foremen (Last Planners) make commitments on what the crews will do each week 





































































































P5.4 Employees are encouraged to seek support from their supervisors when something 






























P5.6 Employees who work in the same team meet on a regular basis to discuss quality 





































P6.1 Established standard operating procedures (SOPs) (e.g. work processes) are 



































































Toyota Way Process Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time Client 
satisfaction 


























P7.1 Visual aids are adopted to make wastes, problems, and abnormal conditions readily 
















P7.2 The posted information in terms of job status, schedule, quality, safety, etc is in 
































































































































































Toyota Way People and Partner Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time 
Client 
satisfaction 




















































































P9.6 Leaders strongly encourage employees to develop “continuous improvement” in 
















P9.7 Leaders must understand the company policy and procedures, and communicate 









































P10.2 Training is provided to equip the employees with the required skills before they 

























































































Toyota Way People and Partner Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time 
Client 
satisfaction 




























































































































































































Toyota Way Problem-solving Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time 
Client 
satisfaction 



























































































P13.1 Using appropriate problem-solving methodologies (e.g. 5 Whys) to determine the 
























































































































































Toyota Way Problem-solving Model Profitability Productivity Quality Delivery time 
Client 
satisfaction 

































P14.6 Each hierarchy of the organization develops measurable objectives as well as 




















































APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL    
Institution: National University of Singapore (Department of Building) 
Programme: PhD in Project Management 
Research Topic: The Toyota Way Model: An Implementation Framework for Large 
Chinese Construction firms  
 
To attain a deeper understanding of how the principles of the Toyota Way can be 
implemented by the Chinese construction firms in their work, semi-structured 
interviews will be conducted, in addition to observation, with a representative sample 
of interviewees from site engineers, to project managers, and managers in large 
Chinese construction firms. Interviews comprise a core set of questions which  are 
listed below.  
 








B – Awareness of Lean or Toyota Way in the construction context  
 
1. What is your knowledge about lean principles in construction or lean construction? 
 
2. Do you currently practise any form of the Toyota Way or lean in your daily work? 
 
 
C – Toyota Way Philosophy model  
[P1: Base your management decisions on a long-term philosophy, even at the 
expense of short-term financial goals] 
 
1. How the long-term philosophy has been adhered to, and implemented within your 
firm? 
 
2. Are you and your colleagues aware of the constant purpose of your firm? 
 
3. Has the management attempted to maximize the value to the clients? 
 





D – Toyota Way Process model  
[P2: Create a continuous process flow to bring problems to the surface] 
1. Are the efforts made to achieving a one-piece or uninterrupted workflow in your 
project? 
 
2. Do you see any construction trades conflicts in the flow? 
 
3. What is your strategy to eliminate the non-value adding activities? 
 
[P3: Use “pull” systems to avoid overproduction] 
1. What material planning systems are you currently adopting? 
 
2. What is the inventory level of the commonly used materials? 
 
3. If it is high, what are the challenges you normally encounter in pursuing the low 
level of inventory at site? 
 
[P4: Level out the workload (heijunka)] 
1. What are the levels of project planning adopted at the project level? 
 
2. Who is the last planner in the project (e.g. general foreman, engineer, or project 
manager)? 
 
3. How is the reliability of the project planning (e.g. weekly plan)? 
 
[P5: Build a culture of stopping to fix problems, to get quality right the first time] 
1. How are the non-conforming parts identified in operations? 
 
2. What are the challenges you normally encounter in implementing built-in quality in 
the daily operations? 
 
3. How are the quality circles (QCs) conducted (e.g. at project level)? 
 
[P6: Standardized tasks and processes are the foundation for continuous 
improvement and employee empowerment] 
1. Generally, have you practised standardization in terms of work processes, or 
perhaps in other areas pertaining to your daily operations? 
 
2. Are standard operations procedures (SOPs) available on the site? 
 
3. Please state the role of workers in improving the current process or SOPs? 
 
4. Any awards for such improvement? 
 
[P7: Use visual control so no problems are hidden] 
1. Generally, how do you implement the visual control tools in your daily work? (e.g. 




2. Are you aware of the 5-S practice in the field of construction? If so, do you and 
your colleagues practise any form of the 5-S in your project? 
 
[P8: Use only reliable, thoroughly tested technology that serves your people 
and processes]  
1. In addition to the “Ten new emerging construction technologies in China’s 
construction industry” promoted by the Chinese Construction Bureau, did your 
firm pursue any new technology and apply it in your project? 
 
2. What are the guiding principles set by your firm in terms of the new technology 
adoption? (provide an example if any) 
 
D – Toyota Way People and Partner model  
[P9: Grow leaders who thoroughly understand the work, live the philosophy, 
and teach it to others] 
1. Did your firm frequently identify the leaders from outside or grow leaders within 
the firm? 
 
2. What is the level of technical knowledge of your leaders or supervisors? 
 
3. Did management attempt to support the employees doing the work? 
 
[P10: Develop exceptional people and teams who follow your company’s 
philosophy] 
1. How would you rate the employees and the sub-contracted workforces? 
 
2. What what kind of trainings are available for different levels of employees? (e.g. 
frontline workers, site personnel, and management) 
 
3. How would you rate your workforce at the project level in terms of teamwork 
ability? 
 
4. Please state the motivation method adopted for your firm. 
 
[P11: Respect your extended network of partners and suppliers by challenging 
them and helping them improve] 
1. How are the suppliers/subcontractors selected? 
 
2. Did your firm use single- or multi-sourcing? 
 
3. What is the size of your main suppliers/sub-contractor base? 
 
4. What kind of delivery systems are adopted in your firm? 
 
5. How is collaboration conducted between your firm and the partners (e.g. suppliers, 
subcontractors, client and so on) 
 
6. How is your relationship with your clients?  
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E – Toyota Way Problem-solving model  
[P12: Go and see for yourself to thoroughly understand the situation (genchi 
genbutsu)]  
1. Did management attempt to go and see what actually happens on site?  
 
2. Generally, what are the steps for problem solving at the project level? 
 
[P13: Make decisions slowly by consensus, thoroughly considering all options; 
implement decisions rapidly (nemawashi)] 
1. How are the decision(s) for problem-solving made at the project level? 
 
2. Did your project team practise “consensus” to reach final agreement? 
 
3. What is the role of the employees in decision-making? 
 
[P14: Become a learning organization through relentless reflection (hansei) and 
continuous improvement (kaizen)] 
1. What is the general attitude of management towards problems? 
 
2. Have you heard of continuous improvement activities or kaizen being conducted 
in your firm or project? 
 
3. If so, what types of kaizen activities are implemented? 
 
4. Do you and your colleagues practise reflection or hansei of the progress, quality, 




APPENDIX 5: VALIDATION RESULTS  
Strategies for better implementation of the Toyota Way-styled practices in China’s 
construction industry 
Average 
1.1 Aiming for generating value for clients, employees, and society at large. While, the 
bottom line is not act irresponsibly in the pursuit of short-term profits.  
4.17 
1.2 Educate all the employees to understand and accept  the company vision, mission, 
and values.   
4.00 
1.3 Acknowledge people are the most important asset of a firm; respect them, develop, 
and grow with them 
4.33 
1.4 Establish the firm’s culture of “clients are the priority”, and help the employees to 
understand who their internal clients are.  
4.67 
1.5 Improve the project process by employing Toyota Way process-oriented initiatives to 
create more value for clients.  
4.33 
2.1 Enhance project leaders’ understanding of site issues; more genchi genbutsu practice 
is encouraged to identify the constraints for better improvement of workflow, material 
flow, and manpower flow. 
4.00 
2.2 An awareness programme on the theme of “eliminating muda” should be introduced 
on-site. 
4.17 
2.3 Involve subcontractors/suppliers in the planning process, so as to improve the 
availability of manpower and material resources. 
4.33 
3.1 For those material that are subject to fluctuations in market prices, purchasing 
partnerships with trusted working partners should be established for material 
purchase to reap mutual benefits. 
4.50 
3.2 For those materials that cannot be stored on-site, and which are vulnerable to 
burglary, or which have to meet with customs requirements, a pull system should be 
encouraged. 
4.17 
3.3 Develop foremen’s ability in effective preparing work for the coming weekly plan, e.g. 
tracking material usage, understand the constraints, and others. 
4.50 
4.1 Update weekly plans and look-ahead (monthly) plans in a timely manner if 
unexpected events occur, and communicate these updates and changes with the 
frontline workers in order for them to understand where they are and what the follow-
up actions are. 
4.50 
4.2 From a long-term perspective, trust should be established between foremen, 
supervisors, and contractor’s employees for them to be included in the planning 
process. 
4.17 
4.3 Track the reliability of the weekly performance is of importance; root causes should 
be revealed and lessons should be learnt. 
5.00 
4.4 Adopt appropriate motivational strategies to maintaining the core workforce at least 
until the project is accomplished. 
4.17 
5.1 Improve the firm’s culture relating to quality, i.e. promote “zero tolerance” for 
substandard quality. 
3.83 
5.2 Apart from the difficult part of quality control, employees should also be encouraged 
to give feedback on quality issues, engage in quality improvement dialogues, provide 
teamwork in problem solving, etc. 
4.00 
5.3 QCs should be done more frequently. The management must not ignore the 
importance of recognizing and rewarding QC achievements.  
4.33 
6.1 The essence of the construction methods should be made easily accessible for 
convenience, and frequently shared with workers in order for them to truly understand 
the procedures. 
4.00 
6.2 Recognition for innovative ideas should be encouraged to improve the conventional 
approach, even for small improvement. 
4.00 
6.3 For appropriate projects in which standardized prefabrication components can be 
applied, the use of prefabrication should be promoted. 
3.50 
7.1 Highlighting the visual management components in the government’s “beautifying the 
construction site” campaign to all the employees. 
4.50 
7.2 Prior to the implementation of “5-S”, this concept should be introduced through 
training to all employees. 
4.50 
7.3 Efforts should be made to change the clients’ – as well as the contractors’ – mindset 
of the site environment. The goal of working towards a tidy, organized, clean site 




Strategies for better implementation of the Toyota Way-styled practices in China’s 
construction industry 
Average 
8.1 The adoption of emerging technologies, as promoted by the government, should be 
based on the characteristics of the project, the actual situation of project location, and 
other factor considerations. 
4.50 
8.2 If resistance to adoption is encountered, long-term interests should be taken into 
consideration, as it may be helpful to the employees, their work, and the firm at large.  
4.50 
9.1 Building the company’s culture in a way that its leaders are encouraged to genchi 
genbutsu on the projects, to understand the projects and their employees’ work, as 
well as their own capacity. 
4.50 
9.2 The management should develop a long-term plan for leadership development, with a 
focus on developing their teaching skills. 
4.67 
10.1 Build up the workforce into different layers based on their abilities and skill sets – 
that is, to maintain the appropriate levels of skilled and semiskilled workers.  
4.67 
10.2 Make sure that adequate resources are available to carry out a variety of on-site 
programmes for executive and workforce training. The breadth, types, and variety of 
training should be considered and enhanced. Training topics such as “identifying the 
non-value-adding activities in work”, “possible improvement in current working 
procedures” and so on are worth incorporating into current training programmes.  
4.67 
10.3 Possible forms of teamwork should be encouraged include QC teams, kaizen 
teams, 5-S teams, and multidisciplinary teams to tackle a particular problem. 
4.17 
10.4 Improve the presently used motivation strategies. 4.00 
11.1 Carefully review the existing portal that integrates the information of suppliers and 
subcontractors. Efforts should be made to remove working partners with 
unsatisfactory records and performances.  
4.83 
11.2 Eliminating the illegal multi-subcontracting practice. The partners’ portal should be 
used as a reference for choosing reliable firms for material delivery and 
subcontracting work. 
4.33 
11.3 Create more opportunities for team-working with their partners to improve potential 
areas and work problems of the project. They should capture the lessons learnt and 
share best practices with other partners. 
4.17 
11.4 Establish training to raise awareness of the Toyota Way practice (or lean practice) 
for partners, and to periodically evaluate their compliance with the Toyota Way 
principles, so as to maintain an on-going dialogue with the contractor to foster 
continuous improvement.  
4.67 
12.1 A genchi genbutsu firm culture should be established. The attitude of genchi 
genbutsu should be strengthened, even going so far as to write this into the core 
value or guiding principles of the companies.  
4.00 
12.2 Decision-making should not only be based on experience, but also needs to 
incorporate an understanding of the condition. 
4.83 
12.3 Genchi genbutsu should be set as a priority to show the determination of the 
leadership, and to boost the morale of employees.  
4.33 
13.1 Establish a “no blame and no complaints” work environment. All employees should 
be encouraged to voice their opinions and their suggestions for decisions.  
4.17 
13.2 Encourage the use of decision-making tools in a systematic way. Decision-making 
tools, such as 5 whys, cause and effects, and others should be encouraged and 
introduced in the form of workshops or classroom training.  
4.33 
14.1 Establish the “continuous improvement” firm culture. Employees are motivated to 
engaged in continuous improvement activities on a regular basis.  
4.33 
14.2 The firm’s culture should be shifted to allow seeing problems as opportunities. 
Employees are encouraged to expose problems.  
4.17 
14.3 Management should play the role of champions in taking the initiative to facilitate 
continuous improvement in the lower level of the firm. Management should also 
introduce recognition rewards for any kaizen improvement achieved on the project. 
4.50 
14.4 Efforts are also required to document the improvements made, especially the valid 
solutions that are generated. 
4.83 
Note: A five-point Likert scale is used from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) for measuring their 




APPENDIX 6: SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESE TESTING  
Hypotheses Results Remarks 
H1: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented  
implementation of Toyota Way principles 
Partially 
supported 
15 attributes (from principles ) were found to be not significantly 
implemented (p > 0.05 or p > 0.01) 
H1.1: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 1 (long-term philosophy) 
Supported 
The significance level (p-value) of all attributes in Toyota Way 
principle 1 is < 0.05 
H1.2: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 2 (one-piece flow) 
Supported 
The significance level (p-value) of all attributes in Toyota Way 
principle 2 is < 0.05 
H1.3: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 3 (pull kanban system) 
Partially 
supported 
P3.2 (p > 0.01) and P3.3 (p > 0.05) were found to be not significantly 
implemented 
H1.4: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 4 (level out workload) 
Partially 
supported 
P4.5  (p > 0.01) was found to be not significantly implemented 
H1.5: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 5 (built-in quality) 
Supported 
The significance level (p-value) of all attributes in Toyota Way 
principle 5 is < 0.05 
H1.6: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 6 (standardized work) 
Partially 
supported 
P6.4 (p > 0.01) and P6.5 (p > 0.05) were found to be not significantly 
implemented 
H1.7: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 7 (visual management)  
Partially 
supported 
P7.1 (p > 0.05), P7.2 (p > 0.01), P7.5 (p > 0.05) and P7.6 (p > 0.05) were 
found to be not significantly implemented 
H1.8: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 8 (adoption of reliable technology)  
Supported 
The significance level (p-value) of all attributes in Toyota Way 
principle 8 is < 0.05 
H1.9: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 9 (leaders and leadership) 
Supported 
The significance level (p-value) of all attributes in Toyota Way 
principle 9 is < 0.05 
H1.10: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 10 (partners relationship) 
Partially 
supported 
P10.4 (p > 0.05) was found to be not significantly implemented 
H1.11: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 11 (long-term partnership)  
Partially 
supported 
P11.4 (p > 0.05), P11.5 (p > 0.05) and P11.6 (p > 0.05) were found to 
be not significantly implemented 
H1.12: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 12 (genchi genbutsu) 
Supported 
The significance level (p-value) of all attributes in Toyota Way 
principle 12 is < 0.05 
H1.13: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 13 (consensus decision making) 
Partially 
supported 
P13.2 (p > 0.05) was found to be not significantly implemented 
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Hypotheses Results Remarks 
H1.14: Large Chinese construction firms have implemented 
Toyota Way principle 14 (continuous improvement)  
Partially 
supported 
P14.5 (p > .05) was found to be not significantly implemented 
H2: Large Chinese construction firms perceive the 14 Toyota 
Way principles as important factors in firm performance  
Supported The significance level (p-value) of all attributes is < 0.01.  
H3: There is a difference between the extent to which 
respondents perceived Toyota Way attributes as important 




There was a statistically significant difference between perceived 
importance and  implementation level for all ranges of Toyota Way 
attributes, expect P12.4 (p = .928 > 0.05) and P1.8 (p = .299 > 0.05) 
H4.1: There are hindrances when Chinese construction firms 
implement Toyota Way principles  
Supported 
All hindrance are statistically significant barriers at the significance level of 
< 0.05 
H4.2: There are no significant differences in the mean scores 
on the perceived importance scale for hindrances to Toyota 
Way implementation between “premier” and “first graded” 
Chinese construction firms.  
Partially 
supported 
There were statistically insignificant differences between the two groups 
in terms of the perceptions of hindrance to the Toyota Way 
implementation, except for the perception of H5 “foremen’s insufficient 
knowledge on project planning”, H14 “employee’s tolerance for an untidy 
or disorganized workplace”, and H18 “hierarchies in the organizational 
structure”, which were statistically significant. 
H5: The level of Toyota Way implementation has a direct 
correlation with the performance measurement 
- - 
H5.1: The level of Toyota Way implementation has a direct 
correlation with profitability  
Partially 
supported 
The correlation matrix (see Table 8.10) shows that of the 14 principles, 
the implementation level of genchi genbutsu (P3) is insignificantly 
correlated with profitability (r = .150, p = 0.152) 
H5.2: The level of Toyota Way implementation has a direct 
correlation with Productivity 
Supported 
The correlation matrix (see Table 8.10) shows that all the Toyota Way 
principles are significantly correlated with productivity measures (p > 
0.05) 
H5.3: The level of Toyota Way implementation has a direct 
correlation with quality  
Supported 
The correlation matrix (see Table 8.10) shows that all the Toyota Way 
principles are significantly correlated with quality measures (p > 0.05) 
H5.4: The level of Toyota Way implementation has a direct 
correlation with project delivery time 
Supported 
The correlation matrix (see Table 8.10) shows that all the Toyota Way 
principles are significantly correlated with delivery time (p > 0.05) 
H5.5: The level of Toyota Way implementation has a direct 
correlation with client satisfaction 
Partially 
supported 
The correlation matrix (see Table 8.10) shows that of the 14 principles, 
the implementation level of pull kanban system (P3) is insignificantly 
correlated with client satisfaction (r = .189, p = 0.068) 
 
